De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Two opinions concerning the first state of man.— From these things there is an easy step to understanding that happy state in which the first man was created. Concerning it, first of all, the judgment of the ancient Fathers and of the later theologians is agreed: that he was created in original justice. But whether he was created in grace and the friendship of God is not so agreed among all. Whence it follows that not all agree about the very nature and definition of original justice. For there are among the theologians those who deny that the angels were created in grace, and by an equal conjecture deny it of the first man. This judgment pleased William of Auxerre and Hugh of Saint Victor, book 1 On the Sacraments, part 6. Alexander of Hales followed it, 2, question 96, as did Bonaventure and Scotus, distinction 29 of book 2, and Marsilius in the same book, question 16, and others. There are, on the contrary, those to whom the affirmative part is more approved. Among them was the ancient Praepositivus, and Saint Thomas, 1, question 95, Durandus, book 2, distinction 20, and not a few others. And I plainly think it was the opinion of Augustine. Scotus therefore and the rest of his class say that Adam was created in original justice alone, without sanctifying grace. But Saint Thomas and the rest are of the judgment that he was established in grace and justice. Nay, they hold that that justice so depends on grace that they were either inseparable, or perhaps (as we shall explain later) one and the same thing. But first,¹ whoever wishes clearly to know the nature of original justice must look to those two defects which we set out in the preceding chapter in naked human nature. For the first was that in order to the end which is commensurate with our nature—namely, to work according to reason—man would suffer very great difficulty, both because of concupiscence inclined to evil and because of the weak and feeble body. The second defect was that by no natural work, however great and whatever its kind, could he merit the friendship of God. The authors of the former opinion, therefore, separating justice from grace, hold that original justice is only the health of nature against the former defect, and say that grace would have had to be received in that state as in ours, through the help of God with man cooperating. But Saint Thomas says that man received both benefits in his creation: both to work according to reason and to merit eternal life. Therefore by the name of original justice, according to either opinion, there does not come a special virtue which is numbered among the cardinal virtues, rendering to each its due; nor is it such justice as that by which we are now justified, which is the grace of the remission of sins. But original justice is a certain rectitude of the whole man—namely, of the body toward the soul, and of the sensitive appetite toward reason. This is designated by that word in Ecclesiastes 7, where it is written: “God made man upright.”² Namely, that sensuality should bring no trouble to reason, nor should the bodily members be wearied when man wished to use them; and therefore reason, never disturbed, would be continually intent on God. And because by origin that justice was both received by Adam and was to be transmitted to posterity, it is called original.³ In the same way the contrary fault is also called original. Yet there is a difference between the aforesaid opinions: according to Scotus and⁴ his followers, that justice would not make reason so intent on God as if man were raised by it to the friendship of God—for that is the proper gift of grace—but intent only insofar as our nature is naturally borne toward God. Hence Scotus⁵ says that that gift of justice did not have to be the principle of merit, but was in comparison with grace exceeding and lofty. Exceeding indeed, because through it the will was more firmly joined to God than through grace, since it suffered no trouble from sensuality nor heaviness from the body. But grace is simply more excellent, because it joins one to the end as to a supernatural good, and as to be attained supernaturally through merit; not so the gift of justice, which joined one only to that good as fitting and delightful. Thus Scotus. But Saint Thomas,⁶ in that word of Ecclesiastes 7, “God made man upright,” acknowledges integral rectitude—namely, that by which man would be subject to God through grace, and therefore the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. These things must for the present be weighed somewhat more fully, both by the testimonies of the sacred writers and by the probability of reasons. And first that which is common to all the Fathers and theologians: namely, concerning original justice. For no place seems to be open in the divine utterances, not only where that original justice can be established, but where any mention of it is made. Since therefore the things that are above nature are to be established from sacred Scripture alone, it seems that that justice is invented without any foundation.⁷ For concerning the creation of man we read this especially: that God made him in his image and likeness,⁸ and that he placed him in a paradise of delight. But image and likeness, from the force of the literal sense, brings to the understanding only this: that he was distinguished by reason and free will. But the paradise of delight pertained altogether to the bodily life. Since therefore it is the nature of brute sensuality, beyond reason and beyond any measure, to be borne by impulse into its objects, and it is the nature of the will to take delight in sensible pleasures, whence it is gathered that sensuality was so restrained, or the will so free from its assault, that in that state man enjoyed that highest tranquillity. And in almost the same way someone will hesitate about the peculiar opinion of Saint Thomas and others who assert that he was also created in grace. To these things it is answered nonetheless⁹ that although in sacred Scripture there is not so express a faith concerning Adam’s original justice as concerning our original fault (for Paul openly states the latter, as will appear later), it is nevertheless not without foundation in divine Scripture according to the exposition of the holy Fathers. And the same testimonies by which original justice is established at the same time support that opinion: that justice either was grace itself or was its inseparable companion. Wherefore we confirm both together. First of all, that place just cited from Genesis,¹⁰ although perhaps not by the rigor of the words, yet by a good understanding, signifies not only that man was created with reason and will, but also with those same powers inclined to good and to God himself. For since God implanted in all things which he formed an affection and inclination toward himself, and therefore made all things for himself, friendly to himself according to each one’s degree and manner, it is most likely that man, whom he formed to his image and likeness and made capable of his fellowship, he brought forth not only with every propensity toward himself and without any inclination to evil (in which, according to the authors of the first opinion, the nature of original justice is completed), but also made him friendly to himself as regards grace, which Saint Thomas and others join to the nature of that justice. Hence Ecclesiasticus 17:¹¹ “God,” it says, “created man from the earth, and made him according to his image, and clothed him according to himself with virtue”—that is, with grace and love of himself. And Paul to the Colossians 3:¹² “Putting off the old man with his acts, and putting on the new, which is renewed in knowledge according to the image of him who created him.” There he calls renovation through grace the renewal of the image in which man was created. But from the other place, the paradise of delight, an argument is also taken.¹³ For since the place is an indication of the one placed there, the paradise of delight shows that man was placed in the highest felicity that can exist under heaven outside the sight of God. But such felicity could not exist where the flesh rebelled against reason, since from that conflict there could not but arise for man both danger and even grave trouble. The third place, and indeed the one most used in this cause, is that of Ecclesiastes 7, “God made man upright,”¹⁴ and he himself entangled himself in infinite questions. There by the word “questions” are designated all the perplexities and windings of this life which come to us from the sickness of the body. From this it is gathered that he was created in that rectitude of reason where there was no disturbance from sensuality. This the doctors understand by the name of original justice. But in the exposition of this place¹⁵ the aforesaid opinions begin to disagree. For some say that he was created only with rectitude referred to a natural end, which is to work according to reason, and toward God (as Scotus says) as toward a fitting and delightful good. But Saint Thomas and the rest interpret it of perfect rectitude, which embraces the friendship of God. It will therefore be worthwhile to subjoin the words of Saint Thomas¹⁶ in 1, question 95, which are these: “Some say that the first man was not created in grace, but that grace was afterward conferred on him before he sinned. But very many authorities of the saints testify that man in the state of innocence had grace. But that he was established in grace, as others say, seems to be required by that very rectitude of the first state in which God made man, according to that word of Ecclesiastes 7¹⁷: ‘God made man upright.’ For rectitude was according to this: that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But the first subjection was the cause of the second and third. For as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower things were subject to it, as Augustine says. But it is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was not natural. Otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names. Hence it is manifest that that first subjection also, by which reason was subject to God, was not only according to nature, but according to the supernatural gift of grace. For it cannot be that the effect be stronger than the cause. Hence Augustine says in 13 of The City of God that after the transgression of the commandment was committed, at once, with divine grace withdrawing, they were confounded at the nakedness of their bodies. For they felt the motion of their disobedient flesh as a reciprocal punishment of their disobedience. From which it is given to be understood that if, with grace withdrawing, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, then through grace existing in the soul the lower things were subject to it.” Thus Saint Thomas. There, in that word “God made man upright,” he acknowledges the grace and friendship by which man was joined to God, from which the other rectitudes were derived. Moreover, this first must be noted here: that although some interpreters say that it is not Saint Thomas’s teaching that original justice was the same as sanctifying grace, but that grace was the root of justice,¹⁸ perhaps Saint Thomas’s mind is otherwise—namely, that original justice was nothing other than grace, of greater dignity in this respect than our grace, since it not only made man pleasing to God but restrained sensuality and strengthened the body for obedience to reason, so that the tranquil will was subject to God. And this seems plainly to be Augustine’s judgment. From these words Saint Thomas concludes thus: “From which it is given to be understood that if, with grace withdrawing, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, then through grace existing in the soul the lower things were subject to it.” “Through grace,” he says—namely, through that by which reason was subject to God. Wherefore what he thought about grace in the first part, question 110, he also asserted about original justice in question 83: namely, that it is a habit inhering in the essence of the soul. And in 1, question 95, he says that the rectitude of the will in order to God is as it were formal in original justice, but the rectitude of the other powers is as it were material. There he seems to think that those three rectitudes constitute one and the same habit. And finally, since in the remission of sins original justice is not now restored to us, but grace, he says in 2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 1, that original justice is restored to us in baptism as to the formal element; which in meaning is as if he had said: grace is restored, having that power by which it makes us pleasing to God, but not that power by which it then subjected the lower powers to the higher. We shall note a place in the following chapter where he seems to think that justice is distinguished from grace. Therefore I do not delay over whether they were the same habit, provided they were inseparable,¹⁹ so that because man was created in grace he was also in justice, and because he lost grace he was also stripped of justice. Next it must be observed that according to neither opinion is it to be denied that Adam before sin had grace, as Saint Thomas notes here on account of the very many authorities of the saints testifying to it. But finally it must be noted that the opinion of Saint Thomas was Augustine’s.²⁰ For he confirms his judgment by his testimonies in 13 of The City of God, and since all confess that the condition of the angels and of the first man was the same, he expressly cites him also in book 12, where he says that God was at once in the angels, establishing nature and bestowing grace. Add that in On Correction and Grace, chapter 50, where he treats of the rectitude in which Adam was created, he makes man equal to the angels, saying that as they were blessed—that is, in the grace of God—before they fell, in which, unless they had fallen by free will, they would have been confirmed through glory, so Adam was created in beatitude, so that he could refrain from sinning, in which, if he had persevered, he would have been confirmed when transferred to heaven. For he would never have called him blessed without the grace of God. And in chapter 11, expounding how, according to the word of Ecclesiastes, “God made man upright,” he says that he had given him a good will; “for in that will,” he says, “he made him, who made him upright.” But Augustine never calls a good will “good” outside charity. Nay, the very name of rectitude,²¹ and therefore the name of original justice, manifestly carries before it the grace and friendship of God. For who can be called upright unless he has his intention fixed on him who is our highest end? But what justice, except in order to God, who is the first rule of our life, is in the sacred books truly reckoned by the name of justice at all, except that by which we are just before God, as is gathered from Paul, Romans 4? Nor does original justice detract or diminish anything from the nature of justice, but rather increases it; wherefore it also includes grace in itself. To these things Augustine²² in the Enchiridion, chapter 104: “God would have wished,” he says, “to keep the first man in that salvation in which he was created, and at the fitting time, without the intervention of death, to lead him to better things, if he had foreknown that he would have the perpetual will in which he was made.” Certainly by the name of salvation he understands without any doubt the grace and friendship of God. But the last place²³ from which the faith of original justice is established is that very one where Paul instructed us about original fault. And the argument is of this kind. By the first sin of Adam we all sinned, as is had in Romans 5, which is affirmed of no other sin, either of the same Adam or of other parents. Therefore our nature then lost some divine gift and benefit which Adam had received for all of us; otherwise why would the whole nature have sinned more in that offense than in other sins? But that benefit could have been nothing other than the rectitude of nature and the possibility of not sinning. Since therefore the chief cause of sinning for us is the struggle of the flesh with reason, it follows that man was created without that strife, lest, when he sinned, he might thereby make an excuse for himself. And that benefit, by the reason said above, is called original justice. And the argument is confirmed²⁴ from what Paul says: that death passed into all men because of Adam’s sin, in whom all sinned. For by the word death all corruption of the flesh is included; but the appetite of sense against reason is a certain corruption of the flesh; therefore there was no such thing before sin. Since therefore it is natural to man (as we explained in chapter 3), it is gathered that man was created with some supernatural gift of justice to repress sensuality and keep it within the bounds of reason. Paul suggests the same to us in Romans 7,²⁵ where, complaining of the conflict of the flesh against the spirit, he adds: “Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Alluding, namely, to this: that unless the body had been made mortal through sin, that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit would never have arisen. Of this there is also that testimony, that from the very moment of sin man began to blush at the shameful motion of the flesh. Excellently therefore Augustine compares mortality²⁶ and immortality with the possibility of sinning and the possibility of not sinning, and therefore proves that Adam was created in original justice, which was the possibility of not sinning, from the fact that he then had the possibility of not dying. For he treats this question expressly in On Correction and Grace, chapter 10,²⁷ and the two following, namely, what sort of man he was created. And he answers that as there is a twofold immortality—one by which man was able not to die, the other by which he cannot die, of which the first-formed man had the former in the state of innocence, and we shall all have the latter in glory—so there is a twofold impeccability. The first, by which man is able not to sin, and in that man was created when he was created upright; the other, by which he cannot sin, and that will be common to us with the angels in the fatherland. But by sin, as he lost immortality, so he lost impeccability—that is, the possibility of not sinning. And since the struggle of the flesh against the spirit is the cause of sinning, he concludes that man in that state would never have suffered such strife, but we incur it through Adam’s sin. He establishes the same truth against Pelagius in the Hypognosticon, book 3, saying that now man does not suffice by free will to fulfill what he wishes. But the first-formed man could do this, when the will was sound before fault; through which fault man lost that possibility. And a little below: “God,” he says, “made man from the beginning,²⁸ and left him in the hand of his counsel.” And he adds: “But what is ‘in the hand of his counsel’ but in the possibility of his free will? For in the hand is understood the possibility. That is the first grace by which the first man could have stood, if he had wished to keep the commandments.” And a little below: “But having fallen by his own fault, he could not rise again by his own will, unless he had been rescued by the hand of the Lord.” Augustine therefore teaches that before the commandment was given not to eat of the tree of life, Adam was endowed with help by which he could avoid sinning forever if he wished; otherwise God, most merciful, would have unjustly imposed a commandment which had no possibility of being fulfilled. There he plainly seems to think that sanctifying grace was infused; for he speaks of the possibility of fulfilling meritoriously and of doing whatever he wished, which he says he had in that state and lost through fault, and now cannot recover except through Christ. But most rightly anyone will hesitate here²⁹ about that possibility of not sinning. For if it is understood that man before sin could by himself avoid sinning without the help of God, it is false, as Augustine himself warns in the cited place, On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where he says of the first man: “Nor did God wish him to be without his grace, whom he left in his free will; since free will is sufficient for evil, but is little for good unless helped by the omnipotent good.” And a little below: “If this help had been lacking to the angel or to man as soon as they were made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine help if it wished, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault.” Thus far he. But if that possibility of not sinning is understood through the help of God, man has the same even while he is in sin; for God is most ready to bring help to anyone willing to be converted. And therefore although no one can be converted by himself, nevertheless because of this kind of possibility from the help of God, it is a sin for him who is not converted. But the answer is³⁰ that help was given to the first man by way of habit; and so, from the law and condition of that state in which God had created him, provision was made for him so that he could suffice without waiting for new aid for every good that he wished. These are words in the form of Augustine, book 3 of the Hypognosticon. And because for fulfilling every moral good the health from the disease of sensuality was necessary, but for fulfilling meritoriously grace was necessary, Adam received both before the commandment was given, by obedience to which he would advance in grace. Wherefore Augustine most aptly made man and the angel equal in the authority cited just above, according to the nature of each. For the angel, because he was neither in a body nor composed of parts fighting against one another, did not need original justice,³¹ that is, justice healing nature, but grace elevating him to the merit of glory; but man needed both benefits. And therefore as the angel was created in grace, so also man in grace and justice. By sin therefore to have lost all possibility is to have lost those gifts. Wherefore he who is in original sin cannot be reconciled without new help from God. But as Adam in his creation received grace and gifts by which he could fulfill the law he was about to receive, so also he who is converted to God receives from him grace through Christ for fulfilling the law he receives, as is clear in baptism. Yet not such as was in Adam, because he does not receive the health of nature which is expressed by the name of original justice, but the infestation of sensuality remains. Of this more fully in what follows. I have decided to turn over this place somewhat more closely, both on account of Catholic theologians who treat original justice so jejunely that it appears to some not to be so certain a matter, and because when the Protestants in that imperial war³² at the Diet of Ratisbon, proposed by them, had begun from this—that Adam was created in justice and grace and in a higher knowledge of God than we have—Eckius rejected that³³ concerning grace as if it were against the common opinion and against Augustine. For he, otherwise not poorly learned, could have remitted much of that rigor of censuring. For Augustine speaks most openly for the judgment concerning Adam’s grace, as we have made plain. And if anywhere he says something that seems to make against it, Saint Thomas legitimately expounds and dissolves it all in the cited place. Wisely therefore our Synod of Trent, session 5, canon³⁴ 2, pronounced that Adam received holiness (that is, grace) and justice. But the authors of the contrary opinion³⁵ bring forward this one argument for themselves: namely, that it is congruous for each thing to attain its end through its own operation. And therefore both the angel and the first man ought to have disposed themselves for grace through the proper works of free will, as now happens in men of adult age. But this argumentation is very slight;³⁶ nay, natural reason taken from the mercy of God persuades the contrary. For the end of man and the angel (as we said above) is not grace, but heavenly beatitude, of which grace is the seed. Wherefore since God, most benign and most provident, when he created the earth, the trees, and all things together, implanted virtues in them so that each thing might make a seed in its own kind, by which each thing might attain its end, it is gathered by the best reasoning that both the angels and the first man were created in grace, by which they would be led to eternal felicity through the addition of merits. Namely, so that not only would he have no excuse for sin, but would owe immense praises to God, because he who had created him for an end so excellent for his nature had also cast its seed into that same nature. It is answered therefore that God did not confer the first grace on the first man through the motion and preparation of free will, as he does to us who use free choice, but at once (as Augustine says) he was establishing nature and bestowing grace, as it were by the manner of nature. For this is what the phrase “to be created in grace” designates. As must be said of the most sacred Virgin by those who hold that she was conceived in grace. Finally, to add the last word, this judgment is especially approved by me and confirmed from that place of Paul: “Judgment from one unto condemnation,” where we are taught that men are to be condemned by reason of original sin, even if they accumulated no actual sin. Since therefore condemnation at least carries with it expulsion from the kingdom (whatever may be said of the punishment of sense), it is most manifestly gathered that our whole nature received in Adam a right to the kingdom; otherwise there would be no expulsion. But a right is not acquired except through sanctifying grace. Therefore Adam received it for the whole of nature; whence it follows that he received it together with justice in the first instant, to be transmitted by origin. For if he had received it afterward through a disposition, it would have been a personal benefit, which posterity would also have acquired not by generation but by a similar disposition.³⁷

First doubt.— Yet from these things certain other little doubts arise concerning original justice. First: was that tranquillity of reason brought about by the flesh coveting nothing against the spirit, or rather by the will containing itself within the bounds of reason without any sadness and difficulty, whatever the flesh might covet? Scotus and the rest leave this under dispute. But it is much more consonant with reason; nay, Augustine says according to Paul in the place already cited, On Correction and Grace, that the flesh coveted nothing against the spirit, but continually followed the leadership of reason, since Paul implies that this came to us because of sin. Wherefore either grace itself repressed concupiscence, or by reason of infused grace and justice there were virtues both in the appetite and in the will, so that each power might quietly serve reason. Not that original justice was in the will, but it (as Saint Thomas says), because it was a gift of the whole nature, to be transmitted by generation, had its seat in the essence of the soul, whose infusion is the first term of generation; yet the virtues accompanied it in the powers, as now happens in the infusion of grace.³⁸

Second doubt.— There is another doubt: whether all the good things conferred on Adam would have been transmitted with nature by generation to posterity. The answer to this is easy: according to those who think Adam was created in justice only without grace, only that justice would have been transmitted by generation. For that alone would have been the gift of the whole of nature universally; but grace would have been a personal benefit, which Adam received through his own disposition, and so afterward whoever else. But according to Saint Thomas, grace itself was also a gift of the whole nature, and it together with the virtues (as is said of the blessed Virgin) would have been infused together with the soul in the conception of offspring.³⁹ And there is a most valid argument for this judgment. For since that state was far more excellent than the state of fault, no one ought to doubt that before the use of reason little children would have received grace; and since no sacrament was then needed, because with no fault preceding there would have been no future redeemer (as Augustine says expressly in On Correction and Grace), there would be no reason why men would not then have been conceived in grace, since there was no original sin. And by an equal, indeed a greater, reason it comes about that the first parent himself was created in grace. Nor does it follow from this that grace would be a natural form and not a gratuitous gift, since although it would be infused in generation, yet not by the force of generation, but by the gratuitous will of God, as long as no one transgressed his commandments. This the others of the contrary opinion must also say of original justice. And the example is clear in the grace of the most holy Virgin, which was not natural to her even if it was created with her. But besides that gift of grace and justice, the first parent was also enriched with other proper endowments which were not to be transmitted with nature to offspring. For since he was created as the principle of the human race in both man and woman, and further so that our race might propagate animal life and establish morals, it was fitting to divine providence that as he formed him strong with fitting age and bodily strength, so he also imbued his soul with knowledge and virtues, as much as was necessary for governing the world. Wherefore he gave names to all things according to each one’s nature and quality. But afterward children were little, as now, and were procreated without the use of reason, and they would advance along with age in knowledge of things and culture of morals.⁴⁰ Yet all would have had a faith and knowledge of God more lively and more excellent than ours. But of these things enough.

Last doubt.— Finally there is the last doubt.⁴¹ Since concupiscence was bound in the first parents, how could Eve covet to eat of the tree of knowledge? But to answer this at greater length would be to leap beyond the line of the present undertaking. It is enough that the first sin was not committed because of her own distorted concupiscence, but the sin of pride preceded, by which Eve, seduced, wished to know good and evil as God.