De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

By these things a way has been opened to us for investigating what that man could do naturally, and what he could not, if he were destitute of the help of grace. For this is our purpose, to speak of each state of man. And this will easily be established by three conclusions here, hanging from the three considerations already mentioned. First.¹ That man, then, supported only by the general help of God, could both know one first cause of things by strict cognition, and know those things which natural law teaches concerning offices and human virtues, and also at some time perform them by use and custom. Nor is it our intention to demonstrate this conclusion here from all its causes. For since nothing concerning this man whom we imagine has been written either in sacred page or in the holy Fathers, it will be more conveniently elucidated in chapter 20, where the same question must be taken up more deeply concerning man in original fault. In the meantime it will be enough to submit the natural argument. As far as cognition is concerned, it is as follows. It is the nature of effected things that each represents its own causes, and it is innate to man (as we said a little before) to search out causes from present effects, in the way in which they are causes. Since therefore God is the first cause of all things which we perceive, and the supreme end, man could be advanced to the knowledge of him through these visible things. Yet it must be considered that since God does nothing in things as triune, but as one² (for as the theologians have said, the works of the Trinity are undivided outside), he is not known from things as triune, but as one supreme cause and end, from which all things flow and to which all things, each in its own way and order, tend by appetite. And this is what the Apostle says when rebuking the philosophers.³ Because that which is known of God, that is, which is knowable concerning God by natural acumen, is manifest to them. For God has manifested it to them. And that he speaks of manifestation through the light of nature is plainly clear from what follows. For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity. For these are the things which the ray of nature discloses concerning God through creatures: namely, that he is one, of eternal power, wise, good, and the other things which this machine of the world by its mass, order and beauty confesses and proclaims concerning him.⁴ For the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands. In which accordingly the natural philosophers contemplated God the best and greatest.⁵ Nor did they recognize this only concerning God, but that all things are and are moved for the sake of man: and man for the sake of the first cause, which is the supreme end of all. And therefore that obedience is due from man to that supernal cause, and worship for things well done. And by that same natural light man could discern between good and evil, the honourable and the base, and perceive those first elements of human life as most known: Do to others what you wish to be done to you; and do not do to others what you do not wish done to you. And finally he could know that man is a political animal, and that offices are thence due from some to others, by which peace and a tranquil commonwealth might consist among them. From this former member of the conclusion concerning cognition, the other also follows.⁶ Namely, that that man in pure nature, with any original justice or fault removed, by the sole general impulse of God, could sometimes accomplish some honourable work, and one that would be (as they say) morally good. For indeed the knowledge of things to be done is not, by its nature, for anything except the work, as Aristotle maintains in 2 Ethics.⁷ Therefore if man was able by the power of the intellect to judge an honourable good, he could also sometimes pursue it by love through the will, and perform it by custom: at least insofar as it is ordered to the end prescribed by nature. Likewise man (as we said a little before)⁸ is by his nature a rational animal, that is, born apt to live according to reason: therefore he can sometimes attain this by the force and powers of his nature. For it is impossible to be persuaded that there are powers in sensuality to fight against reason, yet that no power is available to man from nature by which he may in turn overcome sensuality by reason, since this is especially (as we said) natural to man, while that is against his nature. We lay this preliminary consideration beneath [our argument] against those (whose leader was Gregory of Rimini)⁹ who deny that man can, without the special help of God, either sufficiently know or accomplish a morally good work: because it is necessary that it be referred to God, which cannot be done naturally. For this is [the error] of men who do not discerningly distinguish between the natural end and the supernatural end of man. For it presents the same thing to the ears, a morally good work,¹⁰ as a good work commensurate with the natural end, that is, one that is done only for the sake of the honourable. For the honourable itself, unless clothed with an evil circumstance, is by its own nature and power referred to God. Especially because it can naturally also be referred in act to him, insofar as from creatures it can naturally be known that he is the last natural end: which is enough for a morally good work. For it would be a miracle that a natural faculty should be present in other things, both inanimate and animate, for obtaining their own ends, and yet that to man, the most worthy of animals, there should not be supplied from his nature powers by which he might at some time attain the end prescribed in morals. Indeed Paul makes the philosophers inexcusable for this, that when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God: therefore they were inexcusable for that reason: whereas if they had done morally good works (as the law of nature showed, and the faculty of the same was present), God would then have succoured them with more special favour and help, by which he might reconcile them to himself. But these things must be deferred by us more at large to chapter 20, and therefore we must pass over them here, where we only lay natural foundations. We suppose, however, this second conclusion.¹¹ That man could not, from pure nature, perform the whole good of nature, that is, act well morally wherever a work was required. And the reason for this presents itself at once. For since man (as has been said), even in pure nature, was in a continual duel of sensuality against reason, reason would necessarily, not indeed always, but often, succumb to the enemy, unless he had help divinely supplied. Nor only on account of the struggle of sensuality, but also on account of the weakness of the body, which although it obeys with despotic obedience, is nevertheless fatigued, and when weary cannot obey reason at a nod. Wherefore man could keep one or another precept of nature, not indeed so as to merit the friendship of God (of which matter we are about to speak), but as regards the substance of the work, so that by a good moral work he might avoid sin. But neither could he do this frequently, as we shall express more at large in chapter 22. And the experiment of this lies most widely open in those who are outside the grace of God, and especially in unbelievers, who, deserted by the deity, rush down through all the precipices of vices.

Finally, the third conclusion and assertion concerning this man of ours is this.¹² By no means could he, even if no fault had preceded, either apprehend by the natural acumen of the intellect, or attain by his own powers, that supreme and most happy end for which he was created. This assertion is easy, and would be demonstrated by natural reason. For that end is beyond and above every line and order of created nature: because God is infinite, while every creature is limited, and infinitely distant from that abyss of perfection. Hence (as far as cognition is concerned), just as sense does not extend to the knowledge of universals and spiritual things, because it is a material power and therefore of a lower order, so no created intellect, as being finite, can by itself know that immense substance as it is in itself. And (to omit the angel for the present) the argument concerning man is clearer. For since he cannot ascend to divine knowledge except through sensible things: and these sensible things show us God himself only as he is one, man cannot naturally perceive by the intuition of the mind the Trinity and the things proper to the persons (in the knowledge of which that supreme happiness is placed). Nay, neither the soul stripped of the body, nor an incorporeal intelligence, could do so: because they are of limited power. There is a firm testimony of this truth in Isaiah:¹³ From the age they have not heard, nor perceived with the ears: the eye has not seen, O God, besides thee, the things which thou hast prepared for those who wait for thee. For since all human knowledge of things, or learning, is acquired and compared either by hearing or by invention through sight, the prophet has most significantly explained how it is not within human faculty to behold that divine substance. But lest anyone should imagine that man can contemplate it even in his mind, the divine Apostle added:¹⁴ Nor have they ascended into the heart of man, the things which the Lord has prepared for those who love him. What he had said, for those who wait for thee, this one expressed by, for those who love him. For love is the nearest and just merit of eternal happiness, provided only that the grace of God precedes it. But he adds: But God has revealed it to us through the Holy Spirit. Holyly, so as to warn us that what we cannot be carried up to by nature comes to us by the deity. Moreover, this was a cause to the philosophers¹⁵ that although they had refined the highest summits of intellects by the longest use and art, and had so shamelessly searched into the supreme happiness of man: yet they attained only this, that practical beatitude was placed in the use of virtues, and speculative beatitude in the contemplation of separated substances. But what that future contemplation would be like, they never even suspected. Whence the Apostle says of CHRIST:¹⁶ He is, he says, King of kings and Lord of lords: who alone has immortality, and inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see: namely, naturally. For he calls that light inaccessible because it is accessible only to the immortal God, and to those whom he has endowed with immortality. But if the knowledge of that inaccessible [light], where our end and the goal of our actions lies hidden, is by no means naturally possible for us, and man, unless he knows the goal, can intend no office thither nor refer it: it is gathered by natural reason that it is not placed in man's faculty to merit that ineffable reward by any offices or deeds. However many good works, therefore, man might naturally perform, there would nevertheless be in no way any merit either of the friendship or of the glory of God.

Whether that happiness is natural to us?.— But here perhaps something may come in our way, namely that that supreme happiness should rather be called our natural and supernatural end. For the natural end of each thing is that to which its natural appetite inclines: but our natural appetite is inclined and carried towards that inestimable happiness, because¹⁷ it cannot rest until that point: therefore it is our natural end. There are also in the school of St. Thomas those who, on q. 12 of the first part, distinguish in what way man naturally desires that end. For if man, they say, is considered in his natural state before the light of faith, it is false: since it can neither be naturally known, nor can appetite be carried into the unknown. If however he is considered as persuaded by the light of faith, which points out that goal, then it is true that human appetite continually tends thither naturally. Yet these men incline almost to this, that that end is supernatural. For if it cannot be desired by man from his natural powers, unless supernatural knowledge has first been had, it is rather judged a supernatural end than a natural one. And yet they do not weaken the force of the argument. For although (to use the schoolmen's terms) man cannot desire that end by an elicited act, unless preceded by the knowledge of faith revealing it, yet if appetition is taken for the inclination itself and the natural weight (as a heavy body, while at rest, desires the centre of the world), then surely the natural appetite of all men, even of those to whom the light of faith has not yet shone, is by its own nature carried thither. Of which there is a firm testimony, that however much a man may obtain the good he wished for in created things, he is nevertheless nowhere quiet, nor can be, until he enjoys that eternal vision. Whence that confession came to Augustine's mind:¹⁸ Thou hast made us, Lord, for thee, and our heart is restless until it comes to thee. Indeed I so judge¹⁹ that that end is simply natural to us. Nor would I define the natural end as that which we can naturally attain, but that which we naturally desire. And although we cannot naturally know that it is the supreme good by which we are to be blessed and satisfied, yet the very restlessness of the human mind, which nowhere rests short of that state, abundantly gives faith that it is our natural end. Otherwise there would be no last end of human appetite: which would be an absurd saying. There is therefore in us by nature an appetite in general for the good, as there is in matter an appetite for form. Yet it differs, in that matter rests under no form without desiring another: but our mind is content with no good short of that supreme one, in which at last it rests. Scotus seems to be of this opinion²⁰ in 4 Sentences, d. 49, q. 10, where he says that natural appetite always and perpetually and supremely is carried into supreme beatitude in particular: although by an elicited act it cannot do so without supernatural knowledge. And the same (unless I am mistaken) is the opinion of St. Thomas in the same q. 12 cited, article 1, where he says that²¹ there is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he beholds the effect: and from this admiration arises in men. For by these words he teaches that, when effects are seen, our natural desire is stirred to behold the cause in itself. For the discourse there was of that knowledge through essence. And in book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 50, he confirms by many arguments that natural desire would be vain unless man could see God. Nay, I would add that that desire of our nature which Aristotle acknowledged in the prologue of the Metaphysics,²² where he says, All men naturally desire to know, will there be altogether fulfilled (as it is in the Prophet)²³ when the glory of God shall appear. Therefore, to conclude, it must not be denied that that end is natural to us in respect of appetite, but it is nevertheless, if you look to its attainment, above the powers of our nature. But there is an argument against this opinion by no means weak. Nature has never implanted in anyone an appetite for some end²⁴ to which it did not at the same time supply organs and the faculty of obtaining it, as is clear to the eye in animals, where there are members destined for each end and work. Whence Aristotle in 2 On the Heavens says: If the celestial orbs had a power of progression, nature would have given them suitable organs.²⁵ Since therefore man does not have from nature the power and faculty of meriting and acquiring that beatitude, it follows that he does not have a natural appetite for it either. Otherwise nature would have made man maimed and mutilated in comparison with lower creatures, and would have dealt worse with him than with the rest. To this, however, it is easily answered²⁶ that from this very fact the loftiness of human nature shines forth more: that since there can be no created nature which is in any proportion for attaining that happiness which surpasses all sense, nevertheless the angelic and human natures, created to the image of God, have it as their last end: and where our nature failed, there God would be present to us, most ready to help, unless we ourselves refused. Moreover, if the saying of Aristotle in 3 Ethics is true²⁷ that the things which we can do through friends, we can in a certain way do through ourselves, there is no reason why we should not say that we can also enter into friendship with God and enjoy the vision of him: since God is so ready to come to our help through CHRIST our Saviour. Nor does that saying of Aristotle in the book On the Heavens make against us: both because he does not say that if the celestial orbs had an inclination to walk, they would have organs, but if they had the power: whereas in us there is not abundantly the power for that beatitude, but the inclination: and also because he himself knew nothing of the supernatural mysteries of faith. Therefore, to make an epilogue of what has been said,²⁸ whoever wishes to inspect the cause of original justice, the bereavement and impotence of fallen man, and finally the necessity of grace as it hangs from its root, let him place before his eyes these three assertions concerning man in pure nature. Namely, that it is in the power of man's bare nature, with any fault and grace removed, through general help, to perform some good in the genus of natural morals: because he is a rational animal: but that he cannot long persevere in such good without often falling, on account of the struggle of sensuality and the weakness of the body. Yet he can do, or will, or think absolutely nothing which is a merit of the friendship or glory of God, on account of his infinite excellence. Nay, this third foundation,²⁹ although we have relied on this natural reason to support it, is nevertheless of less certainty than any natural reason. And for that reason, of whatever weight the argument may be, this is nevertheless fixed and firm for Christians, as the catholic faith. Namely, that no one is admitted into the divine fellowship except by his free goodness: according to that saying, No one can come to me unless my Father draws him. And, By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God. And very many of this kind, which we have more copiously gathered and elucidated in the last chapter of book 2.