De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Therefore, although there never was, nor can there be by any established law, a man created and left in his mere nature outside fault and grace, nevertheless nothing prevents us from conceiving and fashioning him in our mind, and from discussing grace more clearly. Let us therefore imagine that a man has been created by God in this manner of nature: namely, a rational animal, without fault and grace, and without any supernatural gift. Concerning a man of this kind, such as the philosophers altogether knew, we can meditate on three things. First,¹ that by his own nature he is midway between the angels and the lower creatures, and therefore, consisting of a rational soul and a body, he excels in two parts and powers, namely sense and reason. By the name of sense, according to the custom of the philosophers, we call the whole sensitive part, that is, the cognitive and the appetitive; just as by the name of reason [we call] the rational part, namely the intellect with the will. For thus Aristotle, Ethics 2,² divides the parts in man into two, namely that which is partaker of reason, and the other sensitive, brute indeed and devoid of reason, which (as he taught in Politics 1) obeys reason: not indeed by despotic servitude, as a slave [obeys] a master, who since he is not his own master has no faculty of retaining [anything] (for in this way only the bodily members serve the soul), but by political and regal obedience: as a citizen obeys a prince, as being in whose power it is not to obey him. From these things it becomes plainly evident that that struggle³ of which the Apostle makes mention in Galatians, that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, is innate to man from nature: indeed it is born from these contrary parts. Therefore what the name concupiscence signifies (which will frequently recur in what follows) must be hunted out from the natural power (or, if I may speak more correctly, the impotence) of man. Let the wise reader begin to note here what natural philosophy is as an aid to understanding the sacred letters and the things of faith. For since the sensitive part⁴ comprises both powers, the cognitive and the appetitive, nevertheless it is the appetite alone that among theologians has the name sensuality. For this name is taken from sensible motion, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 12, because the sensual [power] both entices and stirs man beyond the bounds of reason toward sensible things which pertain to the body. Just as a power is denominated from its act, as sight from seeing. But to move belongs not so properly to the cognitive power as to the appetitive: the reason for which St Thomas learnedly adds in 1 p. q. 8. Therefore⁵ because the apprehensive operation is perfected in the reception of the object, but the appetitive in that it is inclined and borne toward the object, the former is likened to rest, the latter to motion. And indeed,⁶ although this kind of appetite has been divided by the philosophers into two parts: the first indeed concupiscence, by which we incline toward things that suit us and reject things that oppose us; the other the irascible, by which we resist things that stand in the way and deter us from pursuing things suitable; nevertheless the whole animal appetite has the name of concupiscence. From this, as I conjecture, [it is so called] because the concupiscible part is the foundation and end of the irascible. For we never undertake sad and arduous things except on account of those things which delight us as friends. As no one attacks an enemy in anger except because he harms him in that which he desires to possess in peace. Concupiscence therefore, even setting aside Adam and justice and fault, is a disease natural to us, and a genuine evil, as we have more fully discussed in chapter 13 below. But whether it was increased by sin, we define nothing at present.

Second consideration.— The second point according to which we may consider that man is that, since he was a rational animal, he certainly possessed reason and free will: according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 15:⁷ God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. For man by his own nature was made from reason to the image of God, because he possesses intellect, memory, and will. For the holy Fathers contemplate a threefold divine image in man:⁸ namely of creation through nature, of re-creation through grace, and of glorification through that beatific vision of the fatherland. Whence Damascene⁹ says: That which is according to the image signifies the intellectual, and that which is free in judgment, which is self-empowered. So he. For that is expressed to the image of another which exhibits and represents not only the other members but his face: but the face and countenance of God is his mind and the liberty of the will. And for this reason, since the rest of the crowd of creatures, which have only being, or life without mind, are altogether a vestige of God (as the impression of dust, which reproduces the foot and not the face), man after the angel is the one who by his own nature represents the face of God in some way: according to that saying of the Psalm, The light of your countenance, Lord, is stamped upon us.¹⁰ This is expressly signified in Genesis 1, where God says: Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air. As if he had said: Let us make man, who like us may excel in judgment and may prevail in the use of free choice: and so, since he has dominion over himself and his actions, may rule over the beasts and other things lacking reason. Whence St Thomas, 1 p. q. 96,¹¹ says: All animals are naturally subject to man. First, because lower things are for the sake of higher. Second, because higher things are those by which lower things ought to be governed. Third, because of the universal providence of all things which flourishes in man. So he. Nevertheless let no thought steal upon anyone that God's reason for making man from soul and body was that he should be a colonist of the world and be set over the other living things and inanimate things:¹² since man is not for the sake of the world, but the world, as far as its fabric extends, is for the sake of man. This Aristotle and the leading philosophers, with nature as their teacher, learned beforehand: and we, in expounding that passage of Paul, that the invisible things of God are seen through the things that are made, will elucidate it more fully. For since, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names, the good is by its own nature diffusive of itself, God determined to fashion two substances capable of himself, with which he would communicate his divine felicity: namely, to beatify them with the love and vision of himself, with which he himself is blessed. But on account of the incorporeal angel there was no need of a corporeal world, but only on account of man, for whose service therefore is whatever mass there is of the heavens, stars, and elements, and the most numerous furniture of things mixed from them.

Third consideration.— The third consideration, then, will be concerning this physical man of ours. Namely, that there are two ends of man:¹³ one which is commensurate with his natural power and faculty, whether as regards the intellect or as pertains to the will; the other which exceeds his power. The natural object of the intellect¹⁴ in this life is being, either as it is an object of the senses, or as it is seen through abstraction from sensible things. The reason which nature herself suggests ready at hand is that, since our soul is the act of the body, our knowledge must begin from sense and be perfected by the intellect. Whence that axiom of Aristotle:¹⁵ Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense. Wherefore, since the intellect is an immaterial power, it is able from effects presented to it to raise the eyes of the mind to contemplating heavenly and spiritual causes. But this pertains very little to the present matter and will perhaps be unpleasant to readers eager for other things. But as far as pertains to the human will and free choice (of which we will frequently make mention), it must be noted that, since man is a rational animal, his most natural end is always to act according to reason,¹⁶ that is, to do all things for the sake of what is honorable, when and where it is fitting, according to the rules of prudence prescribed by reason. But the end of his duties in this life is peace and the tranquil state of the commonwealth. For man is a political animal,¹⁷ born to live in society, and for that reason by his own nature inclined to this, that he conduct himself by that reason, first in respect of himself, then in respect of the family, and finally in respect of his fellow citizens, by which reason peace in the commonwealth, charity, and benevolence may perpetually stand. The natural philosophers thoroughly contemplated this end. To this end the civil laws are established, and the orders and magistrates are constituted in the commonwealth. Nor do we assert only that to act according to natural reason is [natural] to man, as flying is to birds, swimming to fish, and walking to land animals. For these are not ends, but the works and means by which they obtain their end, namely food, that they may live. But we say that it is the end and scope to which nature has brought us forth. Just as the nature of a heavy body is to be moved to the center, of a light body to be borne upward, of the sun to illuminate, of fire to burn. Nor is this a proposition which needs to be persuaded, but a position, as the dialecticians call it, which is immediately clear from the very definition of man. For this very thing prevails, a rational animal, because the animal is born for this, to live by reason. Nevertheless this is less innate to us from nature, because sensuality is an impediment to us, so that we cannot always perform that for which we were born. For, as we said in the first consideration, the appetite which by its own native impulse is borne beyond the just [bounds] of reason toward its objects either plunges reason headlong after itself or causes trouble and annoyance to it by resisting.

But here someone may rightly ask:¹⁸ If it is the nature of sensuality to act against reason, and sensuality itself is thoroughly present in man's nature, why do we not say that it is equally natural for man to act against reason as to act according to reason? The reason is clear and manifest. For since to act according to reason belongs to man by reason of his form, from its highest degree, whence he receives his species; but to act against reason he obtains by reason of matter, namely from the lowest degree, common to him with brute animals (which is the sensitive); that is rightly judged to be simply natural to him, but this natural only in a certain respect, that is, according to sensuality, but simply against nature. Although to be corporeal, mortal, sensitive, and the like, although they are predicated by reason of matter, nevertheless because they imply nothing contrary to reason, they are simply enunciated of man. And indeed this kind of speaking is also found in Paul:¹⁹ where he says, But if I do that which I do not will, it is no longer I that do it, but the sin that dwells in me. For that evil which we willingly do when reason succumbs, we are said simply to do; but that enticement which is in concupiscence when the will refuses, is not properly ours, but belongs to sensuality itself. Wherefore we did not call it above a good of nature, but its evil, and a vice, and a disease: as will become clearer below in chapter 3. For which reason also²⁰ all virtues, even according to the philosophers, as Augustine is the authority in City of God 14, and St Thomas 1.2 q. 71, are according to man's nature: but all vices are against nature. Whence Dionysius, in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names, says: The good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is against reason. And these things [we have said] concerning that end of man which is commensurate with the powers of our nature. But there is another end for us, far exceeding the virtue and powers of our nature, which, as it can be attained by us, [is so] by knowledge, not to say in reality itself. It consists in the comprehension of God supremely loved through face-to-face vision. For this (says Truth itself) is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. That is, that in this life knowing by faith, they may desire by hope, and cultivate by charity, so that at last they may comprehend you loved face to face by seeing. For vision is the reward of faith:²¹ according to that saying, We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face: and at the same time it is the comprehension which terminates hope. For thus, he says, do they run, that you may comprehend. Wherefore as the just man here lives by faith,²² namely while by hope of the things he will see he does just works, so the blessed one lives there by vision, while he is satisfied with the sight of the God he has hoped for and loved. And thus, as eternal life here takes its beginning from the knowledge of God, so there too knowledge is not perfected—but this is no place to contend whether beatitude consists in an act. Nevertheless both [powers], namely intellect and will, are necessary: which is enough for us at present.