De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

But that I may descend to my cause, I would have preferred that it had been permitted me through you never to have contended with anyone (which I have always hitherto held most firmly resolved) rather than to engage with you, most excellent father; whose person, on account of your religion and episcopal dignity, I would always rather revere than ever read or hear your opinions. But, as I said a little before, you think yourself so assailed by everyone that you have been able to move me even from my purpose. And yet I have long consulted with myself whether I should answer you or rather keep silence. For indeed scarcely can any contest be entered upon where the very style of contradicting does not produce something of bitterness, or at least of harshness; which, as it ought to be far from a Christian mind, so is it certainly most unpleasant to mine, especially against a bishop. For I am not unaware how great honor is to be given to your order, from the greatest to the least. And I could, besides, have pardoned all your reproaches against me by your own disposition, since you think it religion to write with such ink against all whom you consider to have erred. And yet in your judgment all err who in any way disagree with you. Especially since, as I said a little before, this contest of ours among Catholics, which you have set on foot, does not altogether bring about the harmony of minds that it ought. Nevertheless, since in this judgment of mine (however much inferior it is to yours) you still cling to the same false opinion about the certainty of grace,¹ which the holy Synod condemned, I could not, and I do not believe I ought to, ignore your censure without an answer. Especially since, when you have so defamed me as one who falsely imputed to certain Catholics things that none of them ever said, I thought that this scandal given by you would be done away with by me—among those, namely, who were not present at the Synod (for with the synodal fathers the matter against you is most clear-sighted)—unless I washed away these stains: namely, by making plain that I invented nothing, but narrated a public and manifest history, to which even you yourself openly testify still. Finally, this our apology, if you receive it with that Christian heart from which it comes on my part, could bring it about with you (which I most desire) that you would either lay aside that contemptuous disposition of yours, or at least moderate your style. Permit me for a little while, while I show what I have said: that you persist in a sense condemned by the Synod. For I do not count you among the Lutherans, an old man whom I have always revered as a Catholic; but you retain another sense: milder indeed, yet false. But to begin the matter from the first line:² our book On Nature and Grace, brought to your tribunal, wholly displeased you. But in the last four chapters of the third book I had treated of the certainty of grace, which was the longest of all discussions and the most troublesome in the holy council. And because the controversy was not simple but twofold, I distinguished two senses, as clearly as I could according to my ability. The first was that of the Lutherans, who therefore assert that each one is certain of his grace by the certainty of faith because they teach that the same grace depends on none of our works, nor as on dispositions, but is apprehended by faith alone—by catholic faith, by which we believe that the promises of Christ are true and certain. And therefore, with as great certainty as we are bound to believe that God is truthful, they say that individual just men are also bound to believe that they are in grace. No one in the council ever doubted that this sense was false; nor was it discussed except that it might be condemned more explicitly. The other was the sense of those who, as Catholics, confessed that grace depends in the said manner on our works, and that nevertheless a man could by the common law be made certain, with a certainty excluding all doubt whatsoever, that he was disposed and consequently established in grace. And that indeed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, of which Paul speaks to the Romans, chapter 8, where he says that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit that we are sons of God.³ Of these Catholics, since you so greatly usurp this title for yourself, by way of honor, we gladly grant that you were the leader. But I not only marked out the Catholics with a different and milder note than the Protestants, but I also used different arguments against them. You, however, have published two little treatises, both indeed directed against me, but the first, you say, you completed before you saw our book; the second is that in which you properly plead the cause against me. In both your complaint and indignation is that I have defamed Catholics with the greatest scandal and injury.⁴ For not only in the first member do we agree against the Lutherans—namely, whose sense we refute with the greatest consent—but in the second also, you say, there was no disagreement among Catholics. Except that I, speaking confusedly and inconstantly, wished to differ in words from others. And therefore in the first treatise you immediately propose that you easily divined that most would take the words of the decree otherwise than was the mind of the holy Synod. And in the second you say against me properly that I impute to Catholics what was always alien from their mind and thought. And you add that you grieve that it was not permitted you through us to see our book before it was published. For you would have understood that in nothing do you and we think differently. And beginning from there, you prepare a most bitter fight against us.⁵ But I, most reverend father, before I answer the individual points in order, shall try to explain how much difference there has been between us, and, as I see, still exists. And then I shall most briefly show (confirming those things which I have gathered most copiously in our book) that the sense in which you persist is false, and, as I believe, different from the mind of the Synod. Finally, in the third place, I shall pursue either the individual or the chief heads of your argument by dissolving them.

Therefore, to dismiss the sense of the Lutherans, in refuting which our agreement is greatest, the disagreement which you think is none between your mind and mine except in words is in the greatest matter.⁶ For you think that a man can be made certain of his grace with a certainty which, although it is not equal to catholic faith, is nevertheless true faith, that is, excluding all doubt whatsoever; and that indeed by the common law—namely, by that testimony which, according to Paul, the Holy Spirit gives to our spirit that we are sons of God. But I, with your leave and authority, believe this to be altogether false. I cannot otherwise enunciate the holy truth as I think it. But if you continue, as you do, to affirm this of all the just universally, you openly fight against the common sense of Christians. Nay, again and again I say: apart from those most holy men to whom God has specially granted this privilege, no one is certain of his grace by an assent that deserves the name of faith, that is, that altogether removes every doubt and extinguishes every fear, down to the least particle. If I explain these things, it will become clear how gratuitously you have reproached me with so many perplexities, falsehoods, and ignorances, wondering so often about me; and how much more advisable it would have been for you to withdraw from your own opinion, as all others have done, and simply to listen, as it stands, to the decree of the Synod.

In this explanation, however, I shall not repeat many of the things I brought forward in my treatise—for it would be tedious to hear—but only those which will be especially worthwhile for your sake. Not, I say, so intent on asserting the truth, since it is sufficiently confirmed there, as on repelling your reproach. You therefore, reverend father, because you cannot by any reasoning tear from your mind the opinion you have once conceived, persist especially in that passage of Paul⁷ where he says that the Holy Spirit gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons and heirs. For from there you immediately construct this paralogism in the first treatise.⁸ “We receive this testimony of the Holy Spirit by faith; and since it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is valid; and since it is valid, it makes the believer certain, who knows it; and so certain that to waver is a matter of unbelief. For falsehood cannot be subject to the testimony of the Holy Spirit.” Wherefore it is concluded, you say, that a man can be certain of his grace, and that by the certainty of faith, and of that faith to which falsehood cannot be subject. Your words are to the letter; and although you place them among the arguments for proposing the question, you nevertheless most firmly believe that the syllogism concludes, so much so that in both treatises you repeat it with most frequent inculcation. And therefore you distinguish two assents of faith in this way:⁹ namely, that one is the assent of faith whose certainty is taken from the object—namely, which is about those things that are proposed by the Church to be believed, such as are all things written in sacred Scripture. And this faith we all acknowledge to be catholic, that is, universal, necessary for all. But the other is the assent of faith whose certainty is taken from the internal light of the Holy Spirit testifying that we are sons of God. And this, you say, although it is not as great as catholic faith, is nevertheless true faith, altogether excluding all doubt, because it is from the Holy Spirit. And since in this little word “as great”¹⁰ there lies, best father, either your fallacy or mine, see how you deny that this faith is as great as the catholic faith. For by this sole reason you deny it, because it is not so universal that its obligation embraces all. Likewise it is not as great because its certainty is not taken by the same way—namely, from the object proposed by the Church. But it is as great in effect: namely, because it removes every doubt and wipes it from the mind, just like catholic faith. Since your reasoning is that it is from the same divine cause as catholic faith—namely, from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if you weigh the matter well with yourself, you only deny that it is as great extensively (to use the words of the philosophers); you nevertheless concede that it is as great intensively—or, if you prefer, effectively. For the intention even of catholic faith can be more abundant in one than in another, according to that saying, “Increase our faith.”¹¹ But if these words do not please you, you at least retain equality in this effect, that it leaves not the least scruple of doubt, just like catholic faith. For so you expressly say in your declaration, in these words: “And therefore we do not call this faith catholic, that is, universal, as blessed Athanasius takes it, but it is the faith of particular propositions.” And you add: “And it is most false that a man from the light of faith cannot know anything else than what has been determined by the Church.” Thus you. Therefore in your view this faith differs only as particular from universal, but in certainty they are equated. And so, to equate the faith of one’s own grace by the common law with that which is from privilege, I, however—and, as I think, as many as have examined the matter most clear-sightedly—think very differently. For beyond catholic faith and that special revelation which was made by privilege to the most sacred Virgin and to certain other most holy persons, no assent, even if it is inborn by the common testimony of the Holy Spirit, reaches that degree so as to take away all doubt whatsoever. And therefore I say that it does not deserve the name of faith except in the human way—namely, as men speak civilly of faith and of security. I shall explain myself still further, for I would rather seem prolix to you than entangled. I acknowledge with all Christians (otherwise I should be a heretic) that to anyone coming into the grace of God the Holy Spirit gives some testimony of his regeneration in Christ: now less, now greater, according as each one advances in the way of God. But the assent instilled by the Holy Spirit¹² is sometimes, for example in men lukewarmly converted, so remiss that the opinion is not great but slight. But it grows as the indications grow—for example, inward sweetness of divine things and firmness of purpose in good, etc. Yet never (apart from a special privilege) is it so confirmed as to erase wholly every scruple, unless we are certain in the human way of speaking, or (as the moral philosophers would say) morally. For men in civil conversation are said to believe firmly and most certainly when there is no probable reason for doubting. For example, I most certainly believe and am secure that Rome exists; nevertheless I would not affirm it by oath, because it can happen that it now no longer exists. I am also secure and most safe, speaking in the human way, that a friend whom I saw healthy an hour ago is alive now; yet I would not have sworn it, though I would do so concerning articles of faith. Nor, if someone told me the contrary, would I affirm it without any doubt, because that credulity does not wash away every suspicion. And therefore Aristotle did not distinguish this faith from opinion. So I say precisely of the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law, that we are sons of God. Nay, would that I might one day attain to as great certainty as I have that Rome exists—which nevertheless is only a most intense opinion.

The Privilege of Revelation.— But before you call me a heretic¹³ for denying that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is efficacious for engendering faith that deletes all doubt, consider, I pray, my explanation, which I wrote most clearly in my treatise. For the assent of faith that removes all hesitation to be generated in us, it is not enough that it be from the Holy Spirit, but it is required that we have certainty that it is from the Holy Spirit. And therefore, as I there reported from Saint Thomas and the theologians, two things concur to the assent of faith: namely, the internal light inclining us, and besides, the divine authority of someone proposing that this has been revealed by God—such as is the authority in the Church proposing the sacred Scriptures. But when the Holy Spirit inwardly reveals to each one by indications and what you call circumstances the state of grace, there is indeed the first cause of certainty—namely, the internal light, from which the assent that flows cannot be false. Yet because we cannot have certainty that this inward revelation is made by the Holy Spirit (since there is no authority of the Church proposing it, nor of God certainly affirming that he himself is the one who reveals), that assent does not remove all doubt. Not that the Holy Spirit could not do so if he wished—far be so great a blasphemy—but because he speaks to us in such a way that it is not established for us that he is the one speaking. Since the angel of Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. Nor does he reveal more certainly that we are in grace than through conjectures, which heretical men sometimes have so apparent to themselves from levity and ignorance. Take another example: if Christ our Savior should now appear to me, most unworthy, in human form, and before he revealed to me that he was Christ, should affirm some truth, certainly he would make nothing in me but opinion, although whatever he said would be most true. But after he had certainly disclosed that he was Christ, I would believe all things he said to me just as the articles of faith themselves. Hence the falsehood of what you say in the second treatise appears: that nothing prevents someone from having knowledge of a matter with the certainty of faith, and yet the same person not knowing whether it comes from the light of faith. Nay, I say that in those things which consist solely in God’s revelation, no one can know more certainly that this is true than he knows that it has been revealed by God. And hence the difference plainly appears between those who have the privilege and those who by the common law receive the testimony of the Holy Spirit that they are in grace. For the former perceive the revelation in such a way that it is most certain to them that it has been revealed by God, God then doing through himself what he now does through the Church—whether the revelation be of inherent grace or of another thing, such as a future victory. But for us, to whom the revelation is made by the common law, it is not established with a certainty of faith greater than that had through conjectures that the spirit who speaks to us is the Holy Spirit. And this is the point of difference between us,¹⁴ that you make the common revelation equal to that which is from privilege. I do not care about the intensity; for even that was greater in the Virgin than in Paul. But at least in this, that it drives out every doubt. To which I say: nay, the Synod utterly denies it.

Wherefore, that I may come closer to the cause, wherever I affirm that no one can be made certain of his grace with as great certainty¹⁵ as is catholic faith, but only in the human way, I not only deny concerning that extensive quantity on the part of the object—namely, that certainty about this cannot be as universal as about those things which are proposed by the Church (for about this there was no dispute)—but I say that in effect it cannot be as great, that is, such as to remove altogether every doubt, which is the effect of catholic faith. And this was the sense at issue entirely between the theologians and the Fathers, and in which we now disagree, with you denying it. Therefore you posit two faiths by the common law: namely, the catholic faith and this special faith; and since in your view it removes every doubt, it is faith in the most proper sense. But I posit only one—namely, that which is catholic—and whatever other faith is from privilege, where God certainly reveals that the testimony is his; and this indeed does not differ from catholic faith in certainty, but in this, that it is not universal, unless perhaps it has been proposed by the Church, as is that “Hail, full of grace.” But the particular faith you posit concerning each one’s grace by the common law is not faith but opinion, more or less intense; and in advanced saints it removes doubt, so that in the human way we are called certain by it. Whence it comes about that when I, with all the theologians, said that only that faith is properly faith to which falsehood cannot be subject,¹⁶ I did not understand (as you imagine) that it must be about a necessary object, but that in the composite sense, even if it is about a contingent matter, it does not stand that anyone assenting in this way is deceived. Which means that such an assent altogether removes doubt, making a man most certain. And that opposites placed side by side may shine more clearly:¹⁷ the ancient Greek philosophers dispute whether the accident of quantity is a thing distinct from substance, as color is. Now that proposition is necessary if it is true, and impossible if it is false. But because that assent—“quantity is a thing other than substance”—does not remove all doubt, we say that one assenting thus, or in a contradictory way, can be deceived. Wherefore either side is opinion. In the same way we speak of this contingent proposition, “I am in grace.” For if God should reveal this to me by a special privilege, as to Paul, it would be most certain faith, to which falsehood could not be subject. But when the Holy Spirit reveals it to me by the common law through the sweetness of mind which he instills in me, or through other conjectures by which I conjecture that the same Spirit dwells in me, although—speaking conditionally—it is necessary that if the assent is from the Holy Spirit, it is true, nevertheless because we do not certainly know that it is from him, we say that falsehood can be subject to this assent. For I could be deceived by similar conjectures. And that this was the sense of the holy Synod we shall make manifest below. Let the last particle of our exposition be¹⁸ that when I call the assent of the Holy Spirit human faith, I do not mean human on the part of the cause (which is most manifest to everyone but you; for I see that the cause is the Holy Spirit). In which respect, if anyone says that it is divine and comes about in a divine manner, I refuse nothing; but I call it human because it has certainty and removes doubt in the human and civil way of speaking—or, as the Scholastics would say, faith morally, except that the word is not quite so Latin in this signification. For in order that it be called simply divine in the manner of removing doubt, it is required, besides that it be from God, that it be established that the revelation is made by God.

But with this explanation prefaced, I proceed to confirm what I have said before: not indeed with many arguments, since in my own treatise I have heaped up very many. But with you, most learned father, I shall deal by this one question alone.¹ When Paul teaches that the Holy Spirit bears witness to our spirit that we are sons and heirs, does he think this of all who are in the grace of God? I believe you will not deny it, since he seems to speak generally. Indeed, in your exposition of a certain passage of Saint Bernard, and further on in reciting another testimony of Saint Ambrose, and often in this matter you observe against me, you openly assert that this is understood of all who exist in grace. This objection, therefore, which you hurl at me, I most willingly accept, so that I may either most openly vanquish you or betray my own ignorance. I ask therefore at once: do you contend that as many as are in grace have such great faith that they are in grace that they have no doubt at all, but are altogether certain and even secure that at that very instant they are acceptable to God? If you, most circumspect father, grant me this, I no longer dispute with you, but confess that I have lost the case. But besides the fact that such an error is now expressly condemned by the holy Synod, as I shall openly prove below from the decree, I shall send you to the whole of Christendom, to see whether it would tolerate you preaching thus. For very many are in doubt; indeed there are scarcely any who do not have some little doubt and fear about the state in which they stand before God. There are, I say, very many of outstanding holiness, yet scrupulous, who are never without fear, being rather too attached to Gregory’s saying that it belongs to a timid mind to recognize fault where there is no fault. I pass over other lukewarm men struggling with the flesh, now falling, now rising again, who are sometimes in grace and yet most rightly doubt their state until they make further progress. Go, then, and preach thus among them: “As many as are in grace are certain without any doubt that they are in such a state; and therefore as many as doubt are outside grace.” For the consequence is most evident, from the contrary of the consequent to the contrary of the antecedent. I believe, most prudent father, that you will never preach thus; for I think the people would drive out such a preacher with clubs. Certainly, if all who in any way hesitate about their grace are deprived of it, human condition would be most miserable in this respect. You will never grant this, I believe. But what I can assume with the best right, you also grant: namely, that very many are in grace concerning which they nevertheless doubt in some way. Let us therefore gather the argument from these two assumptions: As many as² are in grace receive some testimony of the Holy Spirit, greater or lesser; but not all have certainty of their grace that removes all doubt; therefore the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not universally valid for generating properly faith, that is, faith that expels every doubt. Do you wish to hear the matter openly from Augustine?³ What Paul said, that the Holy Spirit testifies to the sons of God, Augustine himself says means that charity casts out fear; but he does not say “all charity,” but “perfect charity casts out fear.” Nothing therefore prevents charity from being with some fear, and therefore with some doubt. This argument of yours is therefore broken, so that you may no longer conclude from this sole means that some assent is properly faith removing all doubt because it has been produced by the Holy Spirit. Nor will you divert us any longer from that passage of Paul. Before I descend to your other proofs, therefore, I shall repeat your Achilles, which I mentioned above.⁴ For at the very beginning of your former treatise, citing Paul’s passage, “The Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit,” you add: “But this testimony we receive beyond doubt by faith.” If you understand that we receive Paul’s word by faith—namely, that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit—it is most true, for we receive all the sacred Scriptures by faith; but this is nothing to the purpose. If, however, you say that the assent which the Spirit suggests by the common law is properly faith, it is false, and you will never prove it. For you add: “And since it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is valid.” Here now your reasoning collapses; for if you understand it universally, as you do, that every testimony of the Holy Spirit is valid for generating faith that eliminates every doubt, we have already proved that this is false. And you certainly suspected it was false. For you add: “And since it is valid, it makes the believer certain, who knows it, and so certain that to waver is a matter of unbelief.” There you do not simply infer that it is of itself valid to make every just man certain, but the one who knows it. This I frankly concede; but yet in the way in which one knows the testimony to be of the Holy Spirit, he recognizes that he is in grace. I add nevertheless against you that, since no one is altogether certain that that internal testimony is from the Holy Spirit, neither is he altogether certain that it is true. Wherefore there is no unbelief in wavering for one who has grace. For although the testimony of the Holy Spirit cannot be false, it is not established that it is of the Holy Spirit.

But you say that not every divine testimony is so far valid, nor does it make⁵ such faith, but only when a man examines his conscience and weighs all the circumstances and conjectures of grace present in him. For then, according to Augustine, perfect charity casts out fear. First, this is not consistent for you: since on one hand (as we cited before) you repeatedly say that the Holy Spirit testifies to all who exist in grace, and on the other you now take refuge in certain circumstances. Moreover, not even this refuge is safe enough. For there are very many, like those whom theologians call fools, who do not perceive in themselves conjectures so full that every reason for wavering is removed from them.

But let us proceed to the point where you think to pierce me through. At least in the more advanced, who have vehement conjectures and indications of the Holy Spirit, the divine testimony is efficacious to remove every cause of wavering, and therefore to produce most certain faith. For here lies the point of controversy. To this I answer that, although a man may by the grace of God advance so far in holiness and in things done in a Christian manner that he has a peaceful mind, believing himself to be in the grace of God, that is nevertheless never anything but moral certainty—which I called human, that is, which so calms the mind, like that most intense opinion which we men call faith, examples of which I gave before. For we who live at Trent are now said to believe with certainty that Rome exists. And in this way perfect charity casts out fear, by the common law. Indeed, who among men, even of the rarest holiness, would grant that he has attained so high a degree of certainty concerning the grace he has obtained? Nor is any other argument needed besides experience. For we have learned by experience that some heretics, on account of their levity and ignorance and the holiness they display, are of such serenity of mind and certainty that they are in grace (this I called certainty on the part of the subject) as many Catholics are. For in what way can greater charity be signified than that a man lay down his life for Christ? And yet there are many who, persevering in their heresy, fell by the sword. Furthermore, we have hitherto heard of no prudent Catholic who would assert with such certainty that he is in grace as you say. Indeed, you yourself, when asked (as I have heard) whether you were so certain about yourself, did not dare to affirm it. But you will answer that you kept silent out of modesty. Certainly, if anyone could attain by that certainty that he is now just, which would remove every doubt, it would be no pride to affirm it of oneself—especially since (as you say) this certainty can be had short of the greatest holiness. Yet, on the contrary, as I said in my treatise (to which argument I wish you had responded), I am of the mind that not even among the Lutherans, apart from the stupid, is there anyone who judges himself to be in grace with as great certainty as they preach that all the just have.

Nay, come, let us weigh what you say in the second treatise: namely, that those who have this certainty of theirs concerning their own grace are not required to expose themselves to martyrdom for it,⁶ or to assert it by oath. If anyone is certain without any doubt that he is in grace, why will it not be lawful for him to swear? Certainly, if someone threatened me with death unless I asserted by oath that I was in grace, and your opinion were true, it would be lawful for me to swear it in order to save myself, just as it would be lawful for him to whom it was established by a special privilege that he had grace. Yet no just and prudent man in the world would swear thus. Indeed, all would say that they believe it, but not so certainly that they could swear it. Again, if a tyrant threatened me with death unless I denied that I was in grace, should I not rather die than lie? If your opinion were true, however, denying it would be a lie. Therefore I should then have to be a martyr. The remaining arguments lie very broadly open in my own treatise.

BUT so that these things may be firmer and clearer, I descend to your arguments, best father. In the former treatise, after by that syllogism which I weakened a little before you gather your conclusion—namely, that a man can by the common law be certain of his grace with a certainty removing all doubt—you immediately attach the exposition of the ninth chapter of the decree on justification. Although it makes entirely and most openly against you, you nevertheless take up the last little part to be expounded according to your judgment.¹ Let us first look at this; then I shall note the words you have omitted. At the end of the chapter the decree says: “As no pious man ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, so each one, while he regards himself and his own infirmity and indisposition, can fear and be afraid about his grace.” Thus far (you say) there is no controversy among Catholics. But I shall show that your opinion is opposed to this part. But there is added (you say): “since no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God.” And because you began from this last member, let us follow your own order. First, then, for the sake of exposition you argue by asking: since many by privilege had such certainty, as the blessed Virgin and other most holy persons, why were they not excepted? All without doubt except you alone will answer that no exception was needed, because it was most known of itself that such power exists in God. Indeed, in sacred Scripture privileges of this kind of revelation are expressly had, as “Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee,” and of the Magdalene, “Many sins are forgiven her,” and other things of that sort. But the Synod defined only those things about which some doubt can exist; about privilege no one can doubt. But you, to consult your own case, having rejected by I know not what reasons the answer that was the mind of all the Fathers, have devised a new and unheard-of interpretation.² Namely, that the Synod did not remember those privileges, nor was there need, because faith of this kind arising from privilege is not faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, since it is about a contingent matter. Wherefore although the saint to whom such revelation is made is not deceived, he could nevertheless be deceived. Since therefore the Synod holds that no one can be certain of his grace by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, the decree (you say) does not touch them. And this answer you have prepared for yourself, so that you might similarly answer concerning your peculiar faith, which you assert every justified man can have by the common law: namely, that it is not excluded by the words of the Synod. But you will never make anyone believe this fabricated answer of yours.

For who would doubt that the holy Synod openly denies every faith that drives away all contrary opinion?³ For by saying “to which falsehood cannot be subject,” it does not designate (as we explained above) the necessity of the proposition, but such faith by which the one assenting is certain that it is not possible for him to be deceived while he assents by it; which is to say, faith removing every doubt. In this way divine faith, when it is established that the revelation is God’s, is most certain. And therefore there is not suggested or permitted there, as you think, another faith to which, although falsehood can be subject, nevertheless makes the present believer most certain. Nay, that particle is definitive and expressive of the nature of true faith. As if it had said: No one can be certain by the common law (for the question was about this) that he is in grace with the certainty of catholic faith, or of faith equal in effect. For that alone is faith to which falsehood cannot be subject. Otherwise, if it wished only to deny the certainty of catholic faith, why did it not express it so? For it was easier to say “of catholic faith”; but because not only that faith was excluded, but every faith that would have the true and legitimate nature of faith, the Fathers used that circumlocution “to which falsehood cannot be subject” to explain the true and proper nature of faith. Your opinion does not cohere with this most true sense. But why do I labor over the exposition of the words of the decree? Are they not most clear of themselves? For when it adds the reason why any just man can fear and be afraid—that no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God—it most manifestly excludes every assent of faith that is opposed to fear and dread. But you assert an assent so certain that it drives out all doubt and fear and love of the present; therefore that assent is expressly condemned. And therefore wherever in your treatises you complain about me that I never said anyone is certain of his grace by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, consider the answer now given to you. For what you say—by faith removing all doubt—is in force the same as by faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, that is, by which he is certain who so assents that he cannot be deceived by such faith.

But let us go back to the preceding member of the text, about which, Reverend father, you acknowledge no controversy among Catholics.⁴ For in the first place you read that passage stealthily, as if fighting against yourself: namely, that the holy Synod most cautiously pronounced that each one, while he regards himself, etc., can fear and be afraid about his grace. For you do not say “it said he ought to fear,” but “he can.” And yet if the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law does not wipe away every doubt, it should have been said (you say) that he ought to fear, so that men would be obliged always to be in fear. But before I answer your “ought,” answer, I pray, our “can.” For “he can” is as much as “he can by right and lawfully.” I therefore resume the argument made above from your concession—nay, from the truth itself. The testimony of the Holy Spirit by the common law is present to all the just. But if, as you think, such testimony is everywhere valid to tear out all fear, no just man is permitted to doubt that he is in grace. Yet the holy Synod says: “A pious man can fear and be afraid” (and without doubt it understands every pious man by the common law). Wherefore neither is this particle without controversy, if you persist in your opinion; certainly it conflicts with your opinion, and the judgment of the Synod is beyond controversy true; therefore your opinion is beyond controversy false. Yet the Synod did not add “he ought to fear and be afraid,” because a man can attain to such grace that, in the ordinary human way of speaking, he has either no doubt or certainly a very slight doubt of his salvation, but is of a calm and peaceful mind, as happens to men who have advanced in heroic virtue. And this is what John says:⁵ “Perfect charity casts out fear.” But let us repeat, if you please, the words of the decree from the beginning, which are these: “Although it is necessary to believe that sins are not remitted, nor ever have been remitted, except freely by divine mercy for the sake of Christ, nevertheless it must be said to no one who boasts of confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins and rests in that alone that his sins are forgiven or have been forgiven. Since among heretics and schismatics there can be, indeed in our time there is, and it is preached with great contention against the catholic Church, this vain confidence, remote from all piety.” Consider, most clear-sighted father, the reasoning of the decree. There not only your opinion but the reasoning itself is struck down. For you say that by the common law a man who examines his conscience and weighs all the circumstances of inborn charity can have most certain faith, without any doubt, that he is in grace. But the Synod denies this. “Since among heretics,” it says, “and schismatics” (deceived, moreover, by similar conjectures) “there can be” this confidence. Not, I say, similar on the side of the cause (for true conjectures are from the Holy Spirit, but false ones from Satan), but similar, because the angel of Satan transforms himself into an angel of light. No one therefore can be certain by the common law with your certainty, best father. And it follows in the decree:⁶ “But neither must it be asserted that those who are truly justified ought to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified unless he believes with certain and most firm faith that he is absolved and justified.” What could be brought more clearly against you? You say that as soon as anyone is justified, by the testimony of the Holy Spirit he is made certain of his grace (if he carefully weighs the circumstances) with a certainty removing all doubt. Let us not care whether it is catholic or not, or whether falsehood can be subject to it or not; you nevertheless say that without any doubt at all the just man is at once certain of the present. The Synod formally contradicts these words: namely, that it must not be asserted that those who are truly justified ought to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified. I confess that it pronounced this against the Protestants, but nevertheless the dogma of certainty is generally condemned, whether such certainty is said to depend only on faith, as they say, or also on our disposition, of which a certain faith is had, as you say. For this reason I proposed at the beginning that you are stuck in the same difficulty⁷ that the holy Synod condemned. God is my witness that I have not deliberately brought any calumny against you; whether it was my ignorance, let others judge. I omit answering individually the examples and reasons that you heap together for this cause of yours; for I thought that those who read this our apology will most easily judge how far outside the choir, as they say, you dance.

The Sense of the Synod.— A Second Refutation.— Yet I cannot silently pass over that which near the end you make into an argument from other words of the council. There is the twenty-sixth canon: “If anyone says that the just man ought not⁸ to expect and hope for an eternal reward from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ for the good works that have been done in God, if he has persevered in doing well and keeping the divine commandments to the end: let him be anathema.” From this you introduce an argument. “The canon therefore manifestly wills,” you say, “that the just are specially bound to hope for good works; the just therefore are obliged to this.” And you add: “But if no one can know that he is just, consequently no one can know of his works whether they are good, that is, meritorious of eternal life. But if so, then no one will be bound to this precept of hope which peculiarly regards the just.” And indeed this consequence seems to me manifest. Thus far you, and you add many things in sequence to confirm that the holy Synod has established a peculiar precept of hope for the just. Wherefore it is not enough (you say) that a man recognize himself as just with probability, but he must hold it with most certain faith. I confess, most Reverend father, that when I came upon this passage in reading, the little book fell from my hands.⁹ For what am I saying? That with this Reverend father I should pour out words? For it has pleased him so much with this certainty of faith of his that for its sake he has meditated such things: namely, that the holy Synod by a peculiar law obliged the just to hope, besides the divine precept of hope which is set for all Christians universally. For I ask you, best prelate, do you wish the holy Synod to prescribe some human precept for the just concerning having hope, besides the divine one? To whom will you make anyone believe such a thing? For the Church, in precepts of this kind concerning the theological virtues, has never thought of anything else than to explain the divine law. But the precept of hope, like that of faith and charity, is it not prescribed to all Christians just as the Decalogue is? Is not the sinner bound to hope in God, just as he is bound to believe in God and love him, in the same way as the just man? Not indeed to hope that, persisting in evil, he can obtain eternal life. But I mean that by the same precept the sinner is bound to hope for the grace of God, and that through his works, with divine help going before, he will obtain eternal life, as also the just man is. Or do you suspect that the sinner is in better condition in this respect than the just man, so that because he is in sin he is exempted from this obligation? I confess indeed that confidence grows from works, but that there is a new precept of hope in some Christians that is not in all is new in the Church of God. But what the holy Synod wished to define—nay, openly defined—is that anyone is bound to hope that, if he has been just and has persevered, through good works, with grace going before, he will obtain eternal rewards. So that the obligation regards all without distinction; but the act of hope is borne toward the whole hypothesis, if he has done well perseveringly. As was said to Cain: “If you do well, you shall receive,” etc. Although perhaps the holy Synod there makes no mention of the precept; but because the Lutherans say that the works of the just are not meritorious of eternal life, it says: “If anyone says that the just ought not,” etc. But by another reason also, Reverend father, I join issue with you over these words. For you think that every just man is bound by a singular precept of hope, which nevertheless he cannot fulfill except by the certainty of faith excluding all doubt. Therefore according to you every just man is bound to have certainty of his grace. But whether this conclusion of yours most openly contradicts the words of the ninth chapter, where it is said “that those who are truly justified ought not to establish with themselves, without any doubt at all, that they are justified,” and again “that a pious man can fear and be afraid about his grace,” you may see. Acknowledge therefore that for having hope it is not only enough for the just and pious to have faith, in the manner we have expounded, that they are in grace, but it is enough for all to believe by catholic faith that it does not stand with God that he should fail to supply grace and strength to all for keeping his commandments, by the observance of which, in the same faith, we are bound to attain eternal happiness.

The second treatise is that in which you properly provoke me, tear me, accuse me, and refute me. You give it the title, A Defense of the Catholics who argued for the possible certainty of present grace. But you did not need to defend all. For very many now think otherwise than you. Nay, I do not know who else persists with you. But immediately in the dedicatory epistle to the Fathers you say that after the completion of the former interpretation of the decree, there was brought to you a book of a friend and most dear brother in the Lord, naming me, in which, you say, there are many things which you do not approve, and which you think deservedly should be greatly disapproved by the learned and those skilled in sacred letters. Either you would not have called me a most dear friend, or you would not have immediately cast me down so gratuitously. But so you are wont to treat friends.

There follows in your Epistle: “That, however, displeased me most, and most deservedly, that in the question of the possible certainty of grace he testifies that we defended (I, namely) those things which were not only always alien from our mind and thought, but even diametrically opposed to those things which we pronounced in clear words, and even recited in writing in your presence.” As I see, you are speaking of yourself alone: but whether you speak of yourself and your companions matters little. But how I imposed nothing on you, but rather the things which you were long defending, and which you, Reverend father, still hold with tooth and nail, I shall immediately make clear while discussing the title of my question, which you keep rubbing again by pressing it. But what you add, that I attack you yourself with your name suppressed in that disputation, believe nothing less. For I was disputing in general against those who had defended that opinion, in order to explain the reasons of the Synod. Nor did I remember you, if there is any faith in a Christian: nor indeed could I think that anyone of the Catholics would rise again against me after the holy decree of the council. Although I prayed that no one would any longer persist in that opinion. In the matter itself you again ask marvelously that we (you namely and I) agree concerning the question defined by the Synod. Wherefore you grieve that it was not permitted to you to see our book before it was printed, so that I might understand that you think nothing other than I think. To which I answer that we disagree so much that, as I conjecture from your recent writings, even if I had conferred the matter with you, it would have agreed no more. And these words are words altogether.

Let us come therefore to your apology, which you immediately begin with a protestation.¹ For, you say, “it would have been too laborious and very burdensome to censure all the things which offend me in that book,” and you do not approve the rest which you do not reprehend. Good God, how great was the danger if you had approved all things, since you thought it a holy thing to send such a protestation before. What if you had reprobated all things? Would the whole authority of my little book therefore be shattered? So you alone reckon with yourself: but to me you would have cast no care by protesting against it. Books were indeed sent to the Illustrious and Reverend Legates: who affirm that they found nothing in it² which does not savor of chaste, entire and Christian doctrine. The words are in the form of one of them. But I was not mindful of you, who would subscribe. Although I am not so stupid as not to understand how many things of mine can be reprehended. Especially because not even all the things of others could have been approved by me. Nor indeed of those whose shoelace I am not worthy to untie.

You add that I give no small scandal when I said that the contest with the Catholics is ours, and still remains. For I said, “The contest exists”: when³ it has now (you say) been defined by the Synod, I ought to have said, “It existed”: as if there were now no question. I could answer that I used the word of the present sincerely, and perhaps too securely, which is the word of disputants. And besides, that the question still exists with the Protestants, who do not yet obey the council. But that you may see how sometimes a spark leaps into the face of those who dig under fire with a sword, I say again that the contest now exists with you, who are a Catholic. Wherefore you, my lord bishop, are the one who has given scandal⁴ in the judgment of all. For to say that it was disputed in the council contrary to what has been defined, and indeed to say it for the sake of explaining the decree, was no scandal: but an excellent praise of the holy Synod, which freely permits all to bring forward their evidence, from which the truth might be elicited. But you, who come forth against the Catholics in order to retain your own opinions, are the one who casts scandal and stumbling block.

For let us see the title of the question, concerning which you assert that there is no difference between us.⁵ My words are these: “The question therefore is whether a man, without the special privilege of revelation, can by the common law have as great a certainty that he is in grace as is catholic faith.” And below: “The question therefore is established only concerning the certainty of catholic faith, and of that which is similar to it.” You contend that a question was never agitated among Catholics under such a title. But I was never present in the congregation of the Theologians, but I say that I myself, in your presence, in the congregation of the Synod, when I spoke on this matter, explained the question thus. And even if it had not been formally discussed under this title, nevertheless the very sense which you still persist in defending is plainly reduced to these words. I shall therefore repeat what I said a little before: these little words “so great”⁶ and “similar” are those which, being wrongly understood by you (if you pardon me, most worshipful father), deceive you. For according to the two senses of the question I placed two particles in the question: the first against the Lutherans, namely whether we can by catholic faith be certain of our grace; the other for the Catholics: namely whether we can be certain by as great or similar certainty as is catholic. Nor did I understand concerning quantity or similarity in extension, that is, which would extend to all things proposed by the Church with the universality of obliging all: which is what “catholic” means. For in this I well see there is no difference among Catholics, since all deny it. Nor was there need to mention this sense. But whether by a similar certainty, or as great in this effect which is most similar to the effect of catholic faith, and therefore so great that it altogether takes away and expunges every doubt, one can be certain of obtained grace. This I acknowledge only where there is a special privilege: but you hold it in all those things by common law through those circumstances of yours from an internal light. Why then do you beat me about this matter gratuitously, my father? Can you deny that there has been a very long controversy on this point, who strive to maintain the same? But it ought not, you say, to be called equal or similar to catholic. You would not call it so, who dissemble the true revelation of faith, if you do not ignore it. For properly there is no faith except that which in the manner explained⁷ is equal to catholic faith. But if in disciplines of this kind, the handmaids of theology, it had ever been your leisure to engage in scholastic matters, you would never have produced this business for us. Aristotle, 6 Ethic., for this reason did not place faith among the habits of virtue, because there is no human faith which transcends the line of opinion. And therefore the true account of faith, which he himself did not know, cannot be expressed — namely, that which takes away all doubt — except by this, that it is similar to catholic faith. And so between moral or human faith and catholic faith, or that which is similar to it, there is no middle ground among theologians who are worthy of the name. But I do not wish anything to be taken away from the authority of one Bacon, however much he hallucinated here.⁸ For he concludes (which is a most approved inference for you) from one proposition of faith and another which is not of faith, a conclusion as if of faith, by this syllogism: Whoever is baptized receives grace: I am baptized: therefore I receive grace. Not considering that the conclusion follows the weaker part. Which is an axiom most known of itself in the Analytics. For if that on account of which each thing is such is more so (as the philosopher says), where both premises are necessary for the inference, the conclusion cannot become more certain than the weaker premise. But that by the common law no one has faith that he is baptized stronger than moral faith is most evident. Whether we speak of those who were baptized as infants, or of adults, to whom the intention of the baptizer is not most certainly established: which is plainly necessary where there is not in the baptized sufficient contrition and disposition, which would suffice without the sacrament. But concerning that disposition no greater certainty can be had than conjectural. And these things concerning the title of the question.

You persist thereafter in contending, in corroboration of your conclusion, that man by the light of faith can not only believe those things which have been determined by the Church to be believed, but that its light extends even to those things which are in contingent matters of fact. With what ears that was received in the congregation of theologians, I dissembled in my treatise: because he who brought it forward is certainly a Catholic, learned in religion, and most dear to me, who said it with the best zeal: although some believed that it was your suggestion. But I think it has been sufficiently refuted by me. And because you answer nothing to me, I make no reply. Except that, besides the fact that your opinion strongly favors the Lutherans, the proper object of faith is altogether things to be hoped for, as Paul says, namely those things which the Church proposes as divinely revealed. Whence St. Thomas and the theologians place two things necessary for generating faith in us⁹ (for we say nothing of the manner in which revelation was made to the Prophets and Apostles). These two are the internal motion of light, and likewise the authority of the Church proposing that these things have been revealed. For otherwise, what certainty would Christians have that this or that has been revealed by God? I speak apart from special privilege. But wonderful is your eloquence. For you say that this assertion of yours needs no disputation or answer: since to deny it is against the most evident Scriptures. But after this hyperbole you bring forward no Scripture: surely because all would have cried out against you. But you add the testimony of Augustine and St. Thomas, saying¹⁰ that by the very light of faith a man can certainly know that he has infused faith. Which, namely, is not proposed by the Church. In the first place you cite the authors most falsely. For that word “infused” which you mention, you impose on them. For Augustine and Thomas only say that one can see that he believes, if he believes: and that he does not believe, if he does not believe. Where the discourse is not about the habit, but about the act. For Augustine never dreamed that anyone sees a habit, whether it be infused or acquired. Nay, Scotus rightly says that infused habits are not seen. But they only affirm this, that when one believes, he sees that he believes: as one who opines sees that he opines, and one who is angry sees that he is angry: and so of other acts or affections of the soul. But this evidence he by no means thinks is begotten by the light of faith, but from evident experience. For what we hope for (as Paul says), and by like reason what we believe, we do not see. For faith is the argument of things not apparent. See whither this ignorance of dialectic precipitates you, which by publicly despising it you confess was very little cared for by you. Answer, I pray, whether I see that God is three? Not certainly, but I believe by faith: unless with Paul you strictly say that we see through a glass and in an enigma. But do I see that I believe that God is three? I see it indeed, and that most evidently. Yet I do not see by what faith I believe, but I hold by faith that it is by infused faith. That is, by a divine motion. Therefore that evidence of which Augustine speaks, that I see that I believe if I believe, is not from the light of faith. For I have as much evidence that I opine under some doubt that the Pontiff is alive at Rome and the Caesar at Augsburg, as that I certainly believe that God is three. Note the words of Augustine: I see that I believe if I believe, and that I do not believe if I do not believe. Does a Turk, who sees that he does not believe in Christ, see this by the light of faith? Not certainly: but it is an evidence natural to him, as it is to me that I believe. How then can you apply this to your contingent proposition, that faith engenders in you an assent that you are in grace, so firm that it takes away all doubt: as if it had been proposed by the Church? Besides, I ask you to attend to another thing: namely, how you here suggest to us that catholic faith, whose object the Church proposes, and whose assent Augustine says is seen by us, is the same faith which makes that certain assent of yours to received grace. Why then do you so sharply reproach me for having imposed on you when I said “by as great or similar certainty of faith as is catholic”? But especially, who could keep silent at this? You cite St. Thomas, prima secundae, question 112, article 5, to the second, saying that a man can certainly know that he has faith: and yet you prudently suppress his explanation, lest it harm you. For he adds that because certainty pertains to the intellect, which has faith, one is certain that he has faith (namely, that he believes) by whatever habit that is done. But, he says, the reason is not similar concerning grace and charity and other such things which perfect the appetitive power. Where he expressly denies that anyone can by the common law have certainty of grace and charity. This he teaches far more clearly in his exposition of Paul, 2 Corinthians last, namely that we can certainly know that Christ dwells in us by unformed faith, but cannot certainly know that he dwells in us by formed faith; but this more broadly in our book. The other more minute things which you heap up here, with your remarkable slander, namely that I have defamed you with reproach and scandal, I refer to the fair reader who will judge between us, whether perhaps they are not rather returned to their author.

But let us come to those four things in which you say we agree.¹¹ I confess the first agreement, namely that no one can have certainty of his grace by catholic, that is, universal faith. If only you understand it, as you seem to, in the sense of the Lutherans, who say that by that faith which is commanded to all, namely by which we believe the promises of God to be true, when we are justified we are also made certain of our justice. For in another sense, even yours, we disagree very much. For you say (as I noted a little before) that the same faith extends itself not only to those things which are proposed by the Church (which is truly catholic), but to those things which are in contingent matters of fact, namely to begetting the assent of peculiar grace. Which I most holily reprobate. It will also have been agreed between us secondly that the certainty of one's own grace is not so great on the part of the object as catholic faith: because an object of this kind is not proposed by the Church as revealed. But this pertained in no way to the matter. But in that in which you say we agree thirdly,¹² namely that we both understand the decree in the same way — suppose that where it says that a man cannot be certain of obtained grace by the certainty of faith to which falsehood cannot be subject, it is understood only of catholic faith — in this, I say, we are diametrically distant. For the very thing which you say, I deny. Since if I granted it, I would seem to myself openly to deny the decree. For (as I noted a little above) when the holy Synod places as the cause of this affirmation — “Everyone, regarding his own infirmity, can fear and be afraid about his grace” — that contrary negation, “since no one can know with the certainty of faith, to which falsehood cannot be subject, that he has obtained the grace of God,” without any ambiguity it speaks not only of catholic faith, but most manifestly of every faith which is contrary to fear and dread. Wherefore since your faith takes away all doubt, it is most openly condemned there. But these things have already been explained most clearly by us above. Wherefore neither do we agree in the fourth, as you think, namely that a man can be certain of his grace. For you think this of a certainty taking away all doubt, as if it had been divinely and certainly proposed to us that this has been revealed by God: but I, and I believe all Catholics listening to the holy decree, deny it. But we concede only moral certainty in the manner most widely expounded by us above. Nor could you gather anything else from my writings, unless you were to spew out that black bile you are about to read. But this I frankly confess, and I thank you for having been admonished by my own words. For in our seventh argument, chapter 10, reporting these words of Bucer, “Faith makes a man certain that he is in grace, when it is had by the motion of the Holy Spirit,” I added this concession: “Who could ever have doubted this?” Where now you exultantly cry that I am conquered. Surely you who in clear words have granted me your opinion. I confess, I say, that to guard against such subtlety I should have said more cautiously: “Who could ever have doubted that whatever has been suggested to us by the Holy Spirit is most true” — for this was my mind — and not that the whole thing is certain to us with the certainty you think. Yet you could have perceived my mind from the words immediately following. For these words were subjoined by me: “But nevertheless when that motion is by the Holy Spirit, we say that certainty of catholic faith cannot be had concerning it.” Where I most clearly signified that although for the truth of assent it is enough to be instilled by the Holy Spirit, nevertheless for certainty it does not suffice: but it is further required that it be certainly established for us that the same has been revealed by the Holy Spirit. And so I meant to say: “Who could ever have doubted this?” namely that faith makes a man certain that he is in grace when faith is had by the motion of the Holy Spirit, and it is established for us that it is had from the Holy Spirit. For the name of faith embraces all this. Wherefore I immediately added that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is sometimes not so certain as catholic faith: namely, when it is not certain whether the testimony is of the Holy Spirit.

Far be it from me to pursue all the arguments you heap up against me, and the contradictions you continue to extract from my words, seasoned abundantly with your oil: lest I cause others the nausea which I suffered when I read your little book. For when I first perceived your hallucination, namely that you were unwilling to understand my mind when I denied that a man could know his grace with as great certainty as is in catholic faith, or similar, and when I said that human certainty could be had (that is, speaking civilly), all the rest which you derived in great number from this hallucination I swallowed like an unpleasant medicine. Wherefore since I have laid bare those roots, I think I have sufficiently cut down your branching tree. But all those holy Fathers — Bernard, Chrysostom, and the rest — with whose testimonies you think to press me,¹³ I understand to establish for the just that certainty of their obtained grace which men call certainty and security in a human and civil manner. Otherwise they would contradict themselves. Which far be it from us to think. For they say in other places, which we have reported in our treatise, that such certainty as you think cannot be had concerning this. Except where they speak of a special privilege. Besides that, they often in this sense extol the divine testimony, which cannot deceive, as human testimony can. For although it were most certainly established for me that a testimony concerning any matter whatsoever proceeded from a man, however truthful he might be, it would not be established for me with the same certainty that the same is true. But when the Holy Spirit reveals to me that I am a son of God, if it were established for me that the testimony is divine, I would by no means doubt that it is true. And this is what Chrysostom says where you cite him: “When the Spirit testifies, what ambiguity remains to us? But if some man, or an angel,” etc., “or any other created power should promise something, one might deservedly doubt: but concerning that supreme essence, who can doubt?” This is he. Nevertheless according to these words, where the matter cannot be known except by revelation, it will never be more certainly established to anyone that this is true than when it is established that the testimony is of the Holy Spirit. For I ask you, Reverend father, do you wish to bring forward the testimonies of the Fathers in this matter to persuade men that whoever is in grace, if he has diligently examined his conscience, will become certain of his friendship with God without any doubt at all? What men do you think can be found who could give you credence against what they themselves experience? For many will answer: I am conscious of nothing, but neither am I justified in this. But if you are unwilling to admit this sense of Paul, nevertheless even the best man will answer: I have no probable reason why sin remains in me: yet how will you persuade me that I am so altogether certain that I would now appear in the sight of God without any fear at all, when I experience the contrary? I omit others of lesser perfection: and also others recently converted. Do you wish to deny the experience of nearly all who depart this life: whom even the wisest men can scarcely make secure and peaceful without any fear? Why delay? For I have already sent you above on this matter as one preaching to the people.

But good God, how you press us with that passage, 1 John 3:¹⁴ Dearly beloved, if our heart does not reprehend us, we have confidence with God. As if confidence could not exist without faith, taking away, in your manner, all doubt. Do you wish, then, that men who are beginning, whatever they may be in charity, cannot nevertheless fail to waver — do you wish, I say, that they be without confidence? Therefore all sin against the precept of hope. But Christians do not think so. But where our heart does not reprehend us, that faith which, in the manner expounded by us, calms our consciences, is sufficient to generate and nourish confidence in us.

Besides these there are certain things¹⁵ to which I cannot fail to answer individually. In the first place, what you often urge against me, why that faith which by the common law is begotten by the Holy Spirit in the just, that they are in grace, is not divine: I have already answered repeatedly that if you wish to restrict the name, so that it is called divine on the part of the cause, it matters nothing to me: nevertheless it is not simply divine, but in its manner retains the name of human custom, from the fact that the revelation is not simply in this divine manner: namely, that it be altogether revealed that that testimony is divine. Which is required in order that every doubt be utterly taken away: but after the manner of human speech it makes us certain.

But what you vehemently wonder at,¹⁶ that I called catholic faith that which is given peculiarly to certain saints by privilege of obtained grace, is from your miracles, not from divine ones. For I wonder at nothing, since you have read me and all of me. For I never said that it was catholic, but that it was of as great certainty. For when I had asked whether we can be certain by catholic faith, or by as great a one, I granted as to the second part concerning that which is by privilege, whether it be of obtained grace, or of obtaining victory, or of any other matter whatsoever. But you do not distinguish between divine and catholic. For I regard these privileged ones as divine (which you elsewhere calumniate me for denying), and indeed divine not only on the part of the cause, as is that faith of yours from the common law, but simply, also as to the manner of taking away doubt. Because, namely, then it is certainly revealed that the testimony is divine. Yet I do not judge them simply catholic, that is, universal. Nay, in ch. 11 art. 3 I said most clearly that the account of the object of catholic faith extends only¹⁷ to those things which have been proposed by the Church to all to be believed. Such are not those peculiar ones. But when I say that the object of catholic faith altogether comprehends those things which have been proposed by the Church, I speak now according to the truth of the matter, since faith has been written. Why then do you deflect to those things which were revealed to the prophets before they were written? For I do not deny that once there was faith without Scripture, but now nevertheless it has been prescribed for us. You gather a little below (of which you do not doubt) that my fallacy¹⁸ depends on this, that when I hear from Paul that the Holy Spirit testifies to our spirit, I think that this testimony depends on our works. In this indeed I am not deceived, best father. But I say that the Holy Spirit testifies this to us, not with that certainty which takes away doubt: since he does not certainly reveal to us that that testimony is his, as he does to others by privilege, but he reveals this by suggesting to us a good purpose of acting rightly, and a sweetness of mind, and other things of that kind, from which we can conjecture that he dwells in us. Yet not so certainly as you think.

Then you come forth in consideration of me,¹⁹ who make the certainty of faith greater than the certainty of knowledge: not distinguishing, with St. Thomas, that faith is more certain in itself, but knowledge as to us. You should have read the next line of St. Thomas, where he teaches that nevertheless, simply and absolutely speaking, faith is more certain than knowledge. Add that the firmness of faith (which is sometimes designated by the name of certainty) is and ought to be greater even in us than that of knowledge. For I ought rather to deny that of which I seemed to have knowledge, than what faith teaches. For the philosophers would have reckoned this inference evident, without any distinction: This divine essence is the Father, and the same is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father. Which nevertheless we deny by faith.

In like manner you mock me for having assumed this proposition as a dignity: “No one is obliged to those things which are natural,”²⁰ opposing to me the precepts of the Decalogue, to which, although they are derived from the natural law, we are nevertheless obliged. Further, I wonder at nothing, that that distinction which is most ready to philosophers did not occur to you so easily. For in one way that is called natural to which we have a natural inclination: but in another way as it is distinguished against free, namely what is not in our power. And that the discourse there was of this second mode was clearer than light. But these things are of less moment.

But concerning that which at the end I finally complain of to all who will read us, honored father: how gratuitously you have twisted me into a sinister sense, namely that I compared the martyrdom of a heretic with the Scriptures and the holy Fathers; but with martyrdom as regards fullness of heart and affection of charity — as if I had been so alienated in mind as to attribute true charity, which is in the lawful martyr, to a false martyr. Was it not for this reason that I distinguished concerning the certainty of grace on the part of the object and on the part of the subject? Therefore what we did not say is altogether that which all know by most manifest and irrefragable experience, who have seen heretics burned with their eyes. For we have seen very many hasten to the pyre with far greater alacrity than perhaps some Christian in charity would go condemned by the Turks. Can you deny that that man is as certain in himself, and as secure (although not safe) that he dies in the grace of God, as perhaps some one of the Christians existing in charity? Otherwise how would he rejoice so exultantly to be burned alive and plunged into boiling oil? That I call certainty on the part of the subject. Why then do you say that I speak against the Scriptures and against the Fathers, who merely report the histories of things done? Or why do you suppose as known of itself that no one²¹ can be called certain of any matter which is false, except according to the scholastics, who devise many things unlearnedly? For you think it so advisable for you if you mock the scholastics. Is not he called certain both by the common people and by all wise men, who is secure and believes something without any doubt? Those heretics will affirm to you by oath that they are as certain of their errors as they are certain of catholic faith. And whatever may be the case with the name, that experience is enough for us to convince that there is no conjecture which suffices to wipe away every doubt that we are in grace, since that which is the greatest, namely that someone lays down his soul, is not an irrefragable testimony of charity. Further, that you accuse me of negligence, that the fifth decree was not printed in good faith at the end of our book, was no fault of mine. For the printer seized what copy he could, and it was corrected without my knowledge. Which when I perhaps saw here at Trent, I immediately took care to have it remade and reformed. Especially because in the first canon “created in grace” had been misprinted for “constituted in grace.” Furthermore you say that I profess that I hold the whole matter, and can at the same time teach heretics and Catholics. From what source indeed you have gathered this insolence of mine I do not know, unless because I wrote against heretics and sometimes turned aside from certain opinions of Catholics. Yet by this reasoning you could accuse any writers whatsoever of the same crime: and, observing the gospel order, cast the mote out of your brother's eye. But wherever you speak more bitterly against me, you excuse it by saying that I have thrown out bitterer things against Catholics: which indeed I can bear the less, the greater evil fault is than punishment. I can, I say, I ought at least to suffer injury from anyone: but what I have done to anyone in my book, I have not yet known to this day. Surely I have vomited no bitterness or harshness even against the Protestants. So far am I from having injured any Catholic by even the least word. Unless you think it harshness that when I could not descend into their opinions, I took care to confirm my own according to my ability: also by exposing the fault of theirs. Nor indeed have you now, by whatever words you have inveighed against me, provoked me more than to answer for the catholic faith and for the exposition of the decree and (as you say) the glory of the Synod. For the rest, you will always have me most obedient in Christ, and therefore more ready for your commands than eager to litigate with you: which may it be always free for me through you. Farewell.