De natura et gratia libri III, cum Apologia contra Catharinum

Would that, holy, ecumenical, and in every way legitimate Synod of Trent, this fire stirred up from the North had not invaded the Church of God more violently and dangerously than [a fire] which it is now easy to resist. For I would not then have rushed so rashly into public, until I had weighed my own poverty with myself, consulted my weakness, and found out what my shoulders could bear. But when we, astonished, see that the world of Christians is now ablaze from so many quarters,¹ and that so many sparks have leaped from it that scarcely any corner remains which does not already smoke, about to catch the flame, I have indeed thought nothing else worth the effort, if each man, according to his strength and the talent divinely given him, hastens without choice to meet it in some improvised way, and we all bring help, so that if in some part it has already eaten into men’s marrow and reduced their hearts to ashes, and we cannot extinguish it, at least it may not continue to flash and sparkle more widely—that is, in fine, our effort. We especially who have been brought here to write on this matter. For to this purpose Caesar also sent my smallness to you, most holy Fathers, if perhaps I could render you any service whatsoever. But if all were obedient to the word of this sacred order, as Christians are bound in the highest right, they would surely have enough to have heard your most holy counsels, and to obey them obediently. For what is there that can be objected to an ecumenical council, legitimately both summoned and assembled? Where, according to the Holy Spirit, three most reverend legates from the chief men of the sacred senate preside, worthy indeed to discharge the office of Vicar of Christ. With whom also two other Cardinals of the same order, both most distinguished and most wise, sit as assessors. Where the princes of Christians have sent their envoys along with holy bishops. Where finally from all lands the most just and most prudent number of every rank and ecclesiastical dignity has been gathered. But among the errors of that Patriarch Luther there is this one,² the cause and fuel of all, and by far the most pestilent of all: that he admits no public judge for defining and terminating controversies of faith, whose authority and judgment all Christians should obey. And this has so settled into the minds of those Lutherans that, after thirty years spent in truces, assemblies and conferences with them, they have now despaired of preparing their minds beforehand for the council, and have taken up unspeakable arms³ against the sacred Majesty, the parent of his country, against the Church of God, against the truth of the Gospel. See, alas, most excellent Fathers, whither the obstinate blindness of one man has finally come. And what is greater and a more grievous marvel, never have any errors, so slight and slender, whether you look to holiness of life or to doctrine, had progenitors and patrons.⁴ For they are not even covered with a sheep’s skin, nor much instructed in art. And yet never have any been more destructive to the Christian commonwealth, never have any spread so widely with less effort, and so seized the minds not only of the unlearned crowd but of the nobles and princes of the Germans—a race truly most celebrated throughout the whole world for its illustrious deeds, and also, had it not received this blow, most Christian in the sanctity of its religion. But is it not a miracle where the natural cause is so ready to hand?⁵ They teach that whatever pleases is lawful. But I have resolved to admonish my brothers, not to provoke them; for charity does not act perversely. All whom Christ has regenerated with me in the same blood I embrace with the same charity. I congratulate some on recognizing the evangelical truth; for others I desire that they may no longer ignore it, and I pray the immortal God for it. Especially since I wish that our own corrupted morals and the dissipation of laws had not been the occasion these men seized for so great a separation. For whatever it was that drove the ship of Peter into these rocks, it was the storm of our own evils. And unless we take care that this be first calmed, you strive in vain, most ample Fathers, to settle the disturbance of affairs which we suffer, and to check the waves of heresies by which we are tossed. Yet the adversaries could have censured the errors of persons without injury to the public faith. For whatever the morals of private men and the abuses of laws may be, the truth of faith is nevertheless beyond all doubt true. For it is divine, and so firm and holy that to oppose it out of any hatred or pretext is a nefarious crime of impiety. Wherefore, to return to the beginning from which I digressed: I have by no means received five talents, nor indeed two, which I might be able to double further at interest (according to the Gospel); but so great has the necessity of these times seemed to me that a little fear has begun to move me somewhat, lest perhaps even the one which I have received according to my slender strength I now bury in the earth, and that be reckoned to me as wickedness on the day of the Lord. For this reason, after so many and such illustrious men who in these thirty years have happily contended with them on our side, I have prepared this little work On Nature and Grace,⁶ meditating whether perhaps my labor might avail to contribute something to this public cause. Moreover, I have not given it altogether a similar argument to the same title which Augustine wrote against the Pelagians. For he in the book On Nature and Grace⁷ intended only to demonstrate the weakness and poverty of wounded and injured free will, for which therefore the grace of Christ was altogether necessary. But I, most Reverend bishops, so as to set forth as it were a kind of apology for your most prudent fifth and sixth sessions, which are on original sin and on justification, have decided to repeat the matter from a higher source and to set it forth more broadly. For thus I judged that the controversies which we have with the Lutherans would be explained more clearly if I treated in order not precisely those controversies, but all the matters which can in any way serve this business. Namely, if I inquired universally what our nature in human offices can accomplish with the general influence of God, and what then it is that it cannot do without the special favor and help of grace. Therefore I have thought our nature should be distinguished into four states and conditions: namely, that I should depict man as conceived in thought in pure natural state, as truly created in original justice, as fallen from there into fault, and finally as afterward restored to grace. But the distribution of the work is into three related little books.⁸ In the first of these, which is on the transgression of man, we have dispatched the first three states. In the second, which is on justification, we have elucidated all the causes and finally the modes of human reconciliation. In the third, finally, we have added the last disputations on the faculty of the justified man and the certainty of grace. So that the first may be as it were a commentary on the fifth session, and the rest on the sixth. For with these things deliberated, we can fully understand both whence man was cast down by his free will and whither he was afterward recalled by divine grace. Moreover, in style and in the manner of proceeding and disputing, I have not much rejected the scholastic form,⁹ although I am not unaware that the name of the Scholastics is hateful and infamous to the Lutherans.¹⁰ For what did these men not designate from the beginning, from the time they began to wage this war against the Church? Moreover, as they feared every order of men the most, so, in order to disparage their authority against themselves, they began to attack them with the greatest hatred, to tear them with insults, and to assail them most bitterly with curses—and therefore to drive them from their conferences and assemblies as suspected enemies. For this reason they hiss out the scholastic theologians as a public pestilence. Because, as in Demosthenes’ fable, the herdsmen’s dogs¹¹ cannot, since they are the defenders of the flock, be not hateful to wolves. But if it please the gods, as if they themselves were the ones who ought to lay down laws for the world, so there are many among Catholics who, listening to them, put the schoolmen last, cast aside philosophy, and wish the banquet to be furnished with the dishes of languages alone, since by their knowledge and assistance they think that without a Theseus they can of themselves approach both the volumes of the holy Fathers and also of sacred Scripture. To this evil, certainly (as I declaimed before your holiness in the public synod), unless you publicly resist, and the universities hasten to consult better for themselves and for the public good, we shall soon grieve that the whole Christian world boils over with errors. Why not? As each man most impudently strives to become trilingual and has washed his lips at that fabulous fountain, so he comes forth with the greatest authority among the priests of the sacred mysteries, a very Thrice-great. There is nothing indeed that I wish to pretend in excuse of my lack of eloquence. For I frankly confess that I have pursued studies for another reason—namely, that I might cultivate languages most accurately; and if the other were to be desired, I would rather at present have a spirit near to the Christian [matter] than that eloquence nearest to Cicero be given me. Nor do I deny that the knowledge and cultivation of languages, to which our age applies itself more diligently, is of great use for understanding the sacred books:¹² Augustine reminds us of this in On Christian Doctrine 2. But nevertheless I contend, on the other hand, that this should be persuaded: that as an eye suffering from ophthalmia is not immediately torn from the head, but is cured with eye-salves for the sake of its excellent use, so the scholastic matter should be cut away—namely, purged both of the trifles of sophisms and of the vain monstrosities of the metaphysicians, with which it has been unworthily defiled by the filth of some authors—yet the greatest effort should be given that it not utterly perish, but rather be restored, unless we wish to have very many who bear the name, but very few who in reality are theologians. Not so expressly does this method of disputing through questions exist in the holy Fathers; but since they were the greatest philosophers,¹³ it is plain that they knew this Peripatetic form. And although it was not necessary among the narratives of the sacred utterances, it nevertheless frequently shows itself in Augustine and others. And since after that age it was received into the schools of the theologians, what is its business, if it is instituted by the way, reason and method, except that faith through this most healthful art (as Augustine says in On the Trinity 14)¹⁴ may be begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened? For what method of interpreting can be more perspicacious and more suitable, both for the sayings of the saints and especially for the utterances of the sacred writers, than that, when one passage is brought into question, the underlying matter, explained from its causes, may yield the true sense? As it is to be seen in Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure and the rest. For man is a rational animal,¹⁵ and therefore by no power does he prevail more, or by any way, for drawing out truth from every source and deducing it from its causes, than by reasoning and discourse. And so, in order to investigate the causes and natures of things, to judge consequences, to reconcile contraries, and finally to bring forth anything unknown from its deepest hiding places into the light, he is aided by nothing more than by conferences, if they are conducted in order, and the other scholastic exercises. Add that faith does not oppose nature (as these men think), but certainly perfects it.¹⁶ Wherefore they mutually pour themselves into each other with a borrowed light. For as faith has taught us very many secrets of nature previously inaccessible to philosophers, so in turn the knowledge of natural things greatly serves as a handmaid for understanding and explaining the mysteries of faith. Especially since, besides those hidden things of divine matters, all other things—namely, those which pertain to laws, to virtues and vices, to human offices, contracts, and the relationships of men (all of which are most necessary to be known in a Christian commonwealth)—are discussed and treated by the Scholastics alone, whose reasons philosophy supplies in large part. But they say that the schools of the philosophers have always been the workshops of heresies.¹⁷ I do not deny that this was so while faith was in its infancy in the cradle. For then those who thought themselves wise judged the things that were above them against nature. Hence Arius, Sabellius, and monsters of that kind came forth. For this reason philosophy has a bad name among the early orthodox. Yet unless there had been among them those who would conquer the philosophers even from philosophy itself, they would scarcely have overcome those beasts by the sacred testimonies which those men twisted into a sinister sense. For there had to be philosophers to explain that it was not a demonstration which Arius was thought to have most invincibly—namely, that if the individual essence is the Father, and the same is the Son, then the Father is the person of the Son. Berengar was refuted by philosophy, who denied that the accidents of the sacrament exist without a subject, because he hallucinated that this was repugnant to their very nature; and in that error many Germans are now held. But true philosophy is that which teaches that this is in no way repugnant. If it could be brought about that there were no false philosophers to beget heresies, perhaps no philosophy would be necessary for this use, to blunt the audacity of heretics. But because (according to Paul) there must be heresies,¹⁸ I would have judged it equally necessary that philosophy be cherished among theologians, by which, according to Peter’s word, they may be more ready to give a reason to everyone who asks about the hope that is in us.¹⁹ For it is the office of natural philosophy²⁰ not indeed to demonstrate the supernatural mysteries of faith (since they are received from divine testimonies alone), but nevertheless to explain them and to assert them against the philosophers, while it weakens and breaks their arguments, showing that they prove nothing against us. Hence Paul also admonishes the bishop²¹ to hold to the faithful word, so that he may be able to exhort by sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict. And indeed, the more Augustine exhibited the business of the Church by his dialectic and philosophy while he was a Manichaean, the more useful he afterward was against heretics. Philosophy is a theriac, a heavenly remedy most carefully provided by the senate, which cures the bites of the very vipers from whose flesh it is made.²² And to make an end at once: who are they who have set languages in a more cultivated way than the Germans? Who have spent more time in reading Augustine and the Fathers of that kind? Who have turned over more copies of sacred Scripture? What cause, then, remains to them for so many errors, except that they have neglected scholastic theology? From ignorance of it that all have flowed, it will be easy for one who weighs the matter to perceive. Indeed, among the same men there began at once both the cultivation of languages and contempt for scholastic reasoning, and a crowd of heresies. I know not, Fathers, whither the heat of speaking has stolen me further than I had thought. But do you, in your clemency, provide for the good, since I could not say in fewer words what I fear for the theological matter if scholastic treatments are removed from the midst. Yet that I may not longer deafen you, holy men, with this inept prolixity of my speaking, receive this little gift, whatever it is, examine it, chastise it, and reform it according to your supreme authority. For to whom other than you, the lights of the Church, should I dedicate the apology of your decrees? Act as you have begun. Be obedient to the Holy Spirit. Consult the honor of the apostolic see, where the most holy head of the Church resides. Provide for your family—I mean the Christian world—kept by the blood of Christ, which holds its faces fixed upon you and its hands outstretched, that you may stir up this remaining spark of faith; hear the Christian princes, who earnestly beg this of you, who sit as judges in this cause: let not the zeal and office of the most invincible Caesar²³ be defrauded through you of its most holy purpose. He has exposed not only all his fortunes, armies and kingdoms to this same cause, but also, that he might discharge the faith he had bound himself to Christ, he has set his life before you in the camp, with prodigious arms and indeed with sulphurous missiles, so that his fame may be eternal to the glory of the divine name. For if you leave the Christian commonwealth at this point, when faith cannot long endure in so great a danger, and the world cannot survive once it is extinguished, you cast us into certain fear that this departure, spreading so widely, is that very one about which the Apostle took care to write to us, foretelling the approaching end of things.

Indeed, for those who undertake a disputation concerning nature and grace, it is first worth the effort to explain the matter of these names. For by the word nature we here designate the natural faculty of free will for acting well, and by the name grace the help and gifts divinely supplied to us for those offices which nature is not sufficient to undertake and accomplish. Here it must be noted that the influx¹ and general concurrence of God, although it is spontaneous and voluntary to the divine majesty, belonging to universal providence, nevertheless, because in the very first establishment of things it so agreed to concur with the nature of things that it allowed things (as Augustine says, 3 On the Trinity)² to act by their own natural motions, is numbered among natural causes: as if it were due to nature. For as it was of God's mercy to create the natures of things out of nothing, yet to each individually its powers and qualities are due: to the heavens, namely, light; to man, reason and sense; and to others other things. And by almost the same reasoning, that general concurrence is due to the universe as long as it has endured. Wherefore when both philosophers and theologians say that the sun illuminates by nature, the heavens are carried around naturally, fire burns by its own nature, and the like, they comprehend under the name of nature the general efficiency of God: who surely not only gives to each thing the form of being and the power of acting, but sustains all things so that they may be, and moves them so that they may act. But those things which man, helped in that way, cannot do, either are repugnant to his nature, or he obtains them by supernatural help. And this is called the help of grace: as if not due to nature, but conferred freely. This is surely the phrase the Apostle uses,³ where he says: To him who works, the reward is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt. As if works which are so placed in our free will that they can be accomplished by the sole general influx of God are our own, for which accordingly a reward is due to us as for our own merits. Therefore, if you consider the mercy of God, both fashioning this machine of things out of nothing and continually sustaining it, you will recognize that all natural things are works of grace. But indeed everywhere in sacred page, especially in Paul, we read grace, and under that name a gift comes, over and above its own debt to nature, bestowed from heaven for doing a supernatural work. For natural gifts, although they are not due to the person as though he himself merited them, are nevertheless in a certain way due to nature; but supernatural gifts are due neither to the person nor to nature: and therefore it is said simply of grace. Finally, take an indication of this distinction. The natural and the miraculous are opposed over against each other; but when God withdraws that universal influence from natural causes (as he once did both when he made the sun stand still and when the Babylonian fire did no harm to the boys)⁴ it is reckoned a miracle: therefore that influence is a natural cause. But concerning special help we speak otherwise. For that God has mercy on some and hardens others, we do not regard as a miracle, but as his incomprehensible judgment. Augustine⁵ recognized this very thing, as almost all the things which can be devised for the argument of this work. Hence it is no wonder if we repeatedly have recourse to him as almost the sole leader, before the other Fathers. Just as also among the scholastics we shall more frequently consult St. Thomas, who discusses these matters more copiously than the rest, even to the letter. He, on Psalm 144, says: There is a certain grace of God by which God made or created us. Another by which he remade or redeemed us. And a little after: Pelagius attributed to God indeed that which is: and in this he thinks rightly: but to himself that which is just: and in this his opinion deceives him. Thus Augustine. For Pelagius confessed, in a pre-eminent sense, that we are justified by the grace of God, because he said that natural powers were freely implanted in us: not however that beyond them we need a new help of grace. This the same Augustine⁶ more sharply censures in the letter of the five bishops to Innocent, which is the 95th, in these words. Although by a certain reasoning not to be disapproved, that is called the grace of God by which we were created, so that we should not be nothing, nor be something in such a way as a corpse which does not live, or a tree which does not feel, or a beast which does not understand, but men who both are, and live, and feel, and understand: and for this so great benefit we ought to give thanks to our Creator: whence deservedly even this can be called grace, because it was given not by the merits of any preceding works, but by the free goodness of God. There is nevertheless another grace by which the predestined are called, justified, glorified. And concerning this, he says, the question was with Pelagius, when he was compelled not to say that grace is given according to our works and merits. And in the second letter to Sixtus, which is the 105th in order,⁷ he says: When it is asked of these (namely the Pelagians)⁸ what grace Pelagius had in mind when he anathematized those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits: they answer that he had in mind human nature itself, in which we were created. For before we existed, we could merit nothing so as to exist. But let that fallacy (he says) be cast away from the hearts of Christians: for the Apostle by no means commends that grace by which we were created to be men, but that by which we were justified to be just men. For this is the grace through JESUS CHRIST our Lord. For CHRIST died not for those who were nothing, that men might be created, but for the ungodly, that they might be justified. Thus far Augustine. Let us conclude therefore that although natural benefits also have the name of grace, yet wherever there is speech simply about grace (unless the context more particularly diverts it to something else), the benefit of JESUS CHRIST our Saviour, bestowed on us for our salvation, is understood.⁹ Concerning which Paul says: By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God. Whence although some grace specifically receives its name from its effect, so as to be called grace making pleasing, or gratifying, yet every grace receives such a name from the privation of a preceding cause: namely, because it is given not from debt, but freely. To which Paul also alludes, when he set in opposition: It is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt. And again: If by grace, not of works: otherwise grace is now not grace. And such is the opposition of nature and grace, concerning which we begin this treatise. But what grace is, we have more conveniently examined in book 2, chapter 3.

The theme of the work.— But that we may insert ourselves into the dispute which the Lutherans intend against us, there have always existed two opposing dangers to the Church of God concerning our justification. One, indeed, has come from those who, injurious to the grace of God and the divine honour,¹⁰¹¹ conceded too much to free will and to our works. Whom the Apostle Paul often and more often convicts of a shameful error, and as men who are impudently contumelious against God, so he pronounces concerning them everywhere. This error, after four hundred years, that famous Pelagius¹² revived. But the other danger was brought upon the Church by those who deferred to the grace of God to such an extent that they took away almost free will: saying that God works justice in us without us. And therefore that we need only faith, by which we may lay hold of the mercy of God. But that other works are by no means necessary: since Paul says, We reckon that a man is justified by faith, and not by works, and very many of this kind. Against whom (as Augustine says in On Faith and Works)¹³ Peter and the rest of the apostles wrote, and therefore Peter calls them corrupters of Paul's letter, as we shall explain more fully in book 2, final chapter.¹⁴ But amid these rocks, our holy mother the Church, breathing the breeze of the Holy Spirit, so establishes free will that she nevertheless judges the grace of God necessary for it, lowly and needy as it is. But conversely she so extols grace that she does not wish free will to be taken away, but wills that our cooperation is needed in justification, and then in our works, by which, being just, we are still justified. Therefore Martin Luther, among the other errors¹⁵ which he disseminated of many kinds, not only inclined to this second part, different from Pelagius, but made a very great addition. For he wills our nature to have been so far profaned and exhausted of powers by the sin of our first parent that no liberty for good remained in us from that source. Whence he fabricates innumerable monstrosities concerning original sin, free will, justification, and our works. But that these things may be clearly weighed from their causes, we have determined to treat all the matters concerning nature and grace: so that wherever anyone encounters a place against the Lutherans, we may discuss it there more lucidly. But since by the knowledge of extremes the middle becomes very well known, both the supernatural and most happy state of grace and the most wretched condition of sin are best discerned from our natural condition, and therefore I thought I had found no other suitable beginning of speaking from that point than if I first set before the eyes of all four men, differing in states and qualities,¹⁶ whom I mentioned a little before. In which I shall have made clear throughout the whole work how far our nature by its own powers advances in the cultivation of morals, and where, unless supported more particularly by the help of grace, it fails. But the aim and theme of the work, at least of the two books, will be the elucidation of this word, which is the symbol and badge of a Christian: FAITH, WHICH WORKS THROUGH CHARITY. For although concerning this word we and our adversaries agree, namely that justification is made by faith which works through charity, nevertheless the reality differs very much.

A distinction must be made between the things that belong to faith and the things that belong to opinion.— But besides this, at the very entrance of our disputation we have thought it should be warned, namely that in all controversies those things must be distinguished concerning which, without injury to faith, each one is free to think variously and differently: as being things which the catholic Church allows to be held in opinions, from those things which are disputed whether they are dissonant from the canonical Scriptures or not. That indeed (to speak peaceably of both) is perhaps less guarded by our adversaries, but not sufficiently by our own either. For whatever doctrine of some one of our doctors the Lutherans happen to stumble upon, as if the whole school of theologians among us upheld it as faith, they so sharply attack and assail it, and strive to persuade their peoples that it is our faith: whereas very many of them are held among us by grave doctors as of no probability. On the other hand, some of ours defend some opinion of their own school so obstinately, as if, once it were convicted, danger threatened the orthodox faith. Therefore, when faith is at issue, let us not vex the people with opinions and tenets of this or another school. Concerning which it is enough to dispute within the school. But the things which pertain to the faith of CHRIST, let them be entirely such as we discuss with modesty and charity: so far as the mercy of God, there may be one confession of faith for us, and let us obey the same Church. Where that which cannot possibly come first, the end of discords, will come to be. But if it should more often happen to approve the opinion of some doctor (which is very often necessary), let us make our readers warned that it is a human persuasion, not a divine persuasion.

Therefore, although there never was, nor can there be by any established law, a man created and left in his mere nature outside fault and grace, nevertheless nothing prevents us from conceiving and fashioning him in our mind, and from discussing grace more clearly. Let us therefore imagine that a man has been created by God in this manner of nature: namely, a rational animal, without fault and grace, and without any supernatural gift. Concerning a man of this kind, such as the philosophers altogether knew, we can meditate on three things. First,¹ that by his own nature he is midway between the angels and the lower creatures, and therefore, consisting of a rational soul and a body, he excels in two parts and powers, namely sense and reason. By the name of sense, according to the custom of the philosophers, we call the whole sensitive part, that is, the cognitive and the appetitive; just as by the name of reason [we call] the rational part, namely the intellect with the will. For thus Aristotle, Ethics 2,² divides the parts in man into two, namely that which is partaker of reason, and the other sensitive, brute indeed and devoid of reason, which (as he taught in Politics 1) obeys reason: not indeed by despotic servitude, as a slave [obeys] a master, who since he is not his own master has no faculty of retaining [anything] (for in this way only the bodily members serve the soul), but by political and regal obedience: as a citizen obeys a prince, as being in whose power it is not to obey him. From these things it becomes plainly evident that that struggle³ of which the Apostle makes mention in Galatians, that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, is innate to man from nature: indeed it is born from these contrary parts. Therefore what the name concupiscence signifies (which will frequently recur in what follows) must be hunted out from the natural power (or, if I may speak more correctly, the impotence) of man. Let the wise reader begin to note here what natural philosophy is as an aid to understanding the sacred letters and the things of faith. For since the sensitive part⁴ comprises both powers, the cognitive and the appetitive, nevertheless it is the appetite alone that among theologians has the name sensuality. For this name is taken from sensible motion, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 12, because the sensual [power] both entices and stirs man beyond the bounds of reason toward sensible things which pertain to the body. Just as a power is denominated from its act, as sight from seeing. But to move belongs not so properly to the cognitive power as to the appetitive: the reason for which St Thomas learnedly adds in 1 p. q. 8. Therefore⁵ because the apprehensive operation is perfected in the reception of the object, but the appetitive in that it is inclined and borne toward the object, the former is likened to rest, the latter to motion. And indeed,⁶ although this kind of appetite has been divided by the philosophers into two parts: the first indeed concupiscence, by which we incline toward things that suit us and reject things that oppose us; the other the irascible, by which we resist things that stand in the way and deter us from pursuing things suitable; nevertheless the whole animal appetite has the name of concupiscence. From this, as I conjecture, [it is so called] because the concupiscible part is the foundation and end of the irascible. For we never undertake sad and arduous things except on account of those things which delight us as friends. As no one attacks an enemy in anger except because he harms him in that which he desires to possess in peace. Concupiscence therefore, even setting aside Adam and justice and fault, is a disease natural to us, and a genuine evil, as we have more fully discussed in chapter 13 below. But whether it was increased by sin, we define nothing at present.

Second consideration.— The second point according to which we may consider that man is that, since he was a rational animal, he certainly possessed reason and free will: according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 15:⁷ God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. For man by his own nature was made from reason to the image of God, because he possesses intellect, memory, and will. For the holy Fathers contemplate a threefold divine image in man:⁸ namely of creation through nature, of re-creation through grace, and of glorification through that beatific vision of the fatherland. Whence Damascene⁹ says: That which is according to the image signifies the intellectual, and that which is free in judgment, which is self-empowered. So he. For that is expressed to the image of another which exhibits and represents not only the other members but his face: but the face and countenance of God is his mind and the liberty of the will. And for this reason, since the rest of the crowd of creatures, which have only being, or life without mind, are altogether a vestige of God (as the impression of dust, which reproduces the foot and not the face), man after the angel is the one who by his own nature represents the face of God in some way: according to that saying of the Psalm, The light of your countenance, Lord, is stamped upon us.¹⁰ This is expressly signified in Genesis 1, where God says: Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air. As if he had said: Let us make man, who like us may excel in judgment and may prevail in the use of free choice: and so, since he has dominion over himself and his actions, may rule over the beasts and other things lacking reason. Whence St Thomas, 1 p. q. 96,¹¹ says: All animals are naturally subject to man. First, because lower things are for the sake of higher. Second, because higher things are those by which lower things ought to be governed. Third, because of the universal providence of all things which flourishes in man. So he. Nevertheless let no thought steal upon anyone that God's reason for making man from soul and body was that he should be a colonist of the world and be set over the other living things and inanimate things:¹² since man is not for the sake of the world, but the world, as far as its fabric extends, is for the sake of man. This Aristotle and the leading philosophers, with nature as their teacher, learned beforehand: and we, in expounding that passage of Paul, that the invisible things of God are seen through the things that are made, will elucidate it more fully. For since, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names, the good is by its own nature diffusive of itself, God determined to fashion two substances capable of himself, with which he would communicate his divine felicity: namely, to beatify them with the love and vision of himself, with which he himself is blessed. But on account of the incorporeal angel there was no need of a corporeal world, but only on account of man, for whose service therefore is whatever mass there is of the heavens, stars, and elements, and the most numerous furniture of things mixed from them.

Third consideration.— The third consideration, then, will be concerning this physical man of ours. Namely, that there are two ends of man:¹³ one which is commensurate with his natural power and faculty, whether as regards the intellect or as pertains to the will; the other which exceeds his power. The natural object of the intellect¹⁴ in this life is being, either as it is an object of the senses, or as it is seen through abstraction from sensible things. The reason which nature herself suggests ready at hand is that, since our soul is the act of the body, our knowledge must begin from sense and be perfected by the intellect. Whence that axiom of Aristotle:¹⁵ Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense. Wherefore, since the intellect is an immaterial power, it is able from effects presented to it to raise the eyes of the mind to contemplating heavenly and spiritual causes. But this pertains very little to the present matter and will perhaps be unpleasant to readers eager for other things. But as far as pertains to the human will and free choice (of which we will frequently make mention), it must be noted that, since man is a rational animal, his most natural end is always to act according to reason,¹⁶ that is, to do all things for the sake of what is honorable, when and where it is fitting, according to the rules of prudence prescribed by reason. But the end of his duties in this life is peace and the tranquil state of the commonwealth. For man is a political animal,¹⁷ born to live in society, and for that reason by his own nature inclined to this, that he conduct himself by that reason, first in respect of himself, then in respect of the family, and finally in respect of his fellow citizens, by which reason peace in the commonwealth, charity, and benevolence may perpetually stand. The natural philosophers thoroughly contemplated this end. To this end the civil laws are established, and the orders and magistrates are constituted in the commonwealth. Nor do we assert only that to act according to natural reason is [natural] to man, as flying is to birds, swimming to fish, and walking to land animals. For these are not ends, but the works and means by which they obtain their end, namely food, that they may live. But we say that it is the end and scope to which nature has brought us forth. Just as the nature of a heavy body is to be moved to the center, of a light body to be borne upward, of the sun to illuminate, of fire to burn. Nor is this a proposition which needs to be persuaded, but a position, as the dialecticians call it, which is immediately clear from the very definition of man. For this very thing prevails, a rational animal, because the animal is born for this, to live by reason. Nevertheless this is less innate to us from nature, because sensuality is an impediment to us, so that we cannot always perform that for which we were born. For, as we said in the first consideration, the appetite which by its own native impulse is borne beyond the just [bounds] of reason toward its objects either plunges reason headlong after itself or causes trouble and annoyance to it by resisting.

But here someone may rightly ask:¹⁸ If it is the nature of sensuality to act against reason, and sensuality itself is thoroughly present in man's nature, why do we not say that it is equally natural for man to act against reason as to act according to reason? The reason is clear and manifest. For since to act according to reason belongs to man by reason of his form, from its highest degree, whence he receives his species; but to act against reason he obtains by reason of matter, namely from the lowest degree, common to him with brute animals (which is the sensitive); that is rightly judged to be simply natural to him, but this natural only in a certain respect, that is, according to sensuality, but simply against nature. Although to be corporeal, mortal, sensitive, and the like, although they are predicated by reason of matter, nevertheless because they imply nothing contrary to reason, they are simply enunciated of man. And indeed this kind of speaking is also found in Paul:¹⁹ where he says, But if I do that which I do not will, it is no longer I that do it, but the sin that dwells in me. For that evil which we willingly do when reason succumbs, we are said simply to do; but that enticement which is in concupiscence when the will refuses, is not properly ours, but belongs to sensuality itself. Wherefore we did not call it above a good of nature, but its evil, and a vice, and a disease: as will become clearer below in chapter 3. For which reason also²⁰ all virtues, even according to the philosophers, as Augustine is the authority in City of God 14, and St Thomas 1.2 q. 71, are according to man's nature: but all vices are against nature. Whence Dionysius, in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names, says: The good of man is to be according to reason, but evil is against reason. And these things [we have said] concerning that end of man which is commensurate with the powers of our nature. But there is another end for us, far exceeding the virtue and powers of our nature, which, as it can be attained by us, [is so] by knowledge, not to say in reality itself. It consists in the comprehension of God supremely loved through face-to-face vision. For this (says Truth itself) is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. That is, that in this life knowing by faith, they may desire by hope, and cultivate by charity, so that at last they may comprehend you loved face to face by seeing. For vision is the reward of faith:²¹ according to that saying, We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face: and at the same time it is the comprehension which terminates hope. For thus, he says, do they run, that you may comprehend. Wherefore as the just man here lives by faith,²² namely while by hope of the things he will see he does just works, so the blessed one lives there by vision, while he is satisfied with the sight of the God he has hoped for and loved. And thus, as eternal life here takes its beginning from the knowledge of God, so there too knowledge is not perfected—but this is no place to contend whether beatitude consists in an act. Nevertheless both [powers], namely intellect and will, are necessary: which is enough for us at present.

By these things a way has been opened to us for investigating what that man could do naturally, and what he could not, if he were destitute of the help of grace. For this is our purpose, to speak of each state of man. And this will easily be established by three conclusions here, hanging from the three considerations already mentioned. First.¹ That man, then, supported only by the general help of God, could both know one first cause of things by strict cognition, and know those things which natural law teaches concerning offices and human virtues, and also at some time perform them by use and custom. Nor is it our intention to demonstrate this conclusion here from all its causes. For since nothing concerning this man whom we imagine has been written either in sacred page or in the holy Fathers, it will be more conveniently elucidated in chapter 20, where the same question must be taken up more deeply concerning man in original fault. In the meantime it will be enough to submit the natural argument. As far as cognition is concerned, it is as follows. It is the nature of effected things that each represents its own causes, and it is innate to man (as we said a little before) to search out causes from present effects, in the way in which they are causes. Since therefore God is the first cause of all things which we perceive, and the supreme end, man could be advanced to the knowledge of him through these visible things. Yet it must be considered that since God does nothing in things as triune, but as one² (for as the theologians have said, the works of the Trinity are undivided outside), he is not known from things as triune, but as one supreme cause and end, from which all things flow and to which all things, each in its own way and order, tend by appetite. And this is what the Apostle says when rebuking the philosophers.³ Because that which is known of God, that is, which is knowable concerning God by natural acumen, is manifest to them. For God has manifested it to them. And that he speaks of manifestation through the light of nature is plainly clear from what follows. For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity. For these are the things which the ray of nature discloses concerning God through creatures: namely, that he is one, of eternal power, wise, good, and the other things which this machine of the world by its mass, order and beauty confesses and proclaims concerning him.⁴ For the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of his hands. In which accordingly the natural philosophers contemplated God the best and greatest.⁵ Nor did they recognize this only concerning God, but that all things are and are moved for the sake of man: and man for the sake of the first cause, which is the supreme end of all. And therefore that obedience is due from man to that supernal cause, and worship for things well done. And by that same natural light man could discern between good and evil, the honourable and the base, and perceive those first elements of human life as most known: Do to others what you wish to be done to you; and do not do to others what you do not wish done to you. And finally he could know that man is a political animal, and that offices are thence due from some to others, by which peace and a tranquil commonwealth might consist among them. From this former member of the conclusion concerning cognition, the other also follows.⁶ Namely, that that man in pure nature, with any original justice or fault removed, by the sole general impulse of God, could sometimes accomplish some honourable work, and one that would be (as they say) morally good. For indeed the knowledge of things to be done is not, by its nature, for anything except the work, as Aristotle maintains in 2 Ethics.⁷ Therefore if man was able by the power of the intellect to judge an honourable good, he could also sometimes pursue it by love through the will, and perform it by custom: at least insofar as it is ordered to the end prescribed by nature. Likewise man (as we said a little before)⁸ is by his nature a rational animal, that is, born apt to live according to reason: therefore he can sometimes attain this by the force and powers of his nature. For it is impossible to be persuaded that there are powers in sensuality to fight against reason, yet that no power is available to man from nature by which he may in turn overcome sensuality by reason, since this is especially (as we said) natural to man, while that is against his nature. We lay this preliminary consideration beneath [our argument] against those (whose leader was Gregory of Rimini)⁹ who deny that man can, without the special help of God, either sufficiently know or accomplish a morally good work: because it is necessary that it be referred to God, which cannot be done naturally. For this is [the error] of men who do not discerningly distinguish between the natural end and the supernatural end of man. For it presents the same thing to the ears, a morally good work,¹⁰ as a good work commensurate with the natural end, that is, one that is done only for the sake of the honourable. For the honourable itself, unless clothed with an evil circumstance, is by its own nature and power referred to God. Especially because it can naturally also be referred in act to him, insofar as from creatures it can naturally be known that he is the last natural end: which is enough for a morally good work. For it would be a miracle that a natural faculty should be present in other things, both inanimate and animate, for obtaining their own ends, and yet that to man, the most worthy of animals, there should not be supplied from his nature powers by which he might at some time attain the end prescribed in morals. Indeed Paul makes the philosophers inexcusable for this, that when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God: therefore they were inexcusable for that reason: whereas if they had done morally good works (as the law of nature showed, and the faculty of the same was present), God would then have succoured them with more special favour and help, by which he might reconcile them to himself. But these things must be deferred by us more at large to chapter 20, and therefore we must pass over them here, where we only lay natural foundations. We suppose, however, this second conclusion.¹¹ That man could not, from pure nature, perform the whole good of nature, that is, act well morally wherever a work was required. And the reason for this presents itself at once. For since man (as has been said), even in pure nature, was in a continual duel of sensuality against reason, reason would necessarily, not indeed always, but often, succumb to the enemy, unless he had help divinely supplied. Nor only on account of the struggle of sensuality, but also on account of the weakness of the body, which although it obeys with despotic obedience, is nevertheless fatigued, and when weary cannot obey reason at a nod. Wherefore man could keep one or another precept of nature, not indeed so as to merit the friendship of God (of which matter we are about to speak), but as regards the substance of the work, so that by a good moral work he might avoid sin. But neither could he do this frequently, as we shall express more at large in chapter 22. And the experiment of this lies most widely open in those who are outside the grace of God, and especially in unbelievers, who, deserted by the deity, rush down through all the precipices of vices.

Finally, the third conclusion and assertion concerning this man of ours is this.¹² By no means could he, even if no fault had preceded, either apprehend by the natural acumen of the intellect, or attain by his own powers, that supreme and most happy end for which he was created. This assertion is easy, and would be demonstrated by natural reason. For that end is beyond and above every line and order of created nature: because God is infinite, while every creature is limited, and infinitely distant from that abyss of perfection. Hence (as far as cognition is concerned), just as sense does not extend to the knowledge of universals and spiritual things, because it is a material power and therefore of a lower order, so no created intellect, as being finite, can by itself know that immense substance as it is in itself. And (to omit the angel for the present) the argument concerning man is clearer. For since he cannot ascend to divine knowledge except through sensible things: and these sensible things show us God himself only as he is one, man cannot naturally perceive by the intuition of the mind the Trinity and the things proper to the persons (in the knowledge of which that supreme happiness is placed). Nay, neither the soul stripped of the body, nor an incorporeal intelligence, could do so: because they are of limited power. There is a firm testimony of this truth in Isaiah:¹³ From the age they have not heard, nor perceived with the ears: the eye has not seen, O God, besides thee, the things which thou hast prepared for those who wait for thee. For since all human knowledge of things, or learning, is acquired and compared either by hearing or by invention through sight, the prophet has most significantly explained how it is not within human faculty to behold that divine substance. But lest anyone should imagine that man can contemplate it even in his mind, the divine Apostle added:¹⁴ Nor have they ascended into the heart of man, the things which the Lord has prepared for those who love him. What he had said, for those who wait for thee, this one expressed by, for those who love him. For love is the nearest and just merit of eternal happiness, provided only that the grace of God precedes it. But he adds: But God has revealed it to us through the Holy Spirit. Holyly, so as to warn us that what we cannot be carried up to by nature comes to us by the deity. Moreover, this was a cause to the philosophers¹⁵ that although they had refined the highest summits of intellects by the longest use and art, and had so shamelessly searched into the supreme happiness of man: yet they attained only this, that practical beatitude was placed in the use of virtues, and speculative beatitude in the contemplation of separated substances. But what that future contemplation would be like, they never even suspected. Whence the Apostle says of CHRIST:¹⁶ He is, he says, King of kings and Lord of lords: who alone has immortality, and inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see: namely, naturally. For he calls that light inaccessible because it is accessible only to the immortal God, and to those whom he has endowed with immortality. But if the knowledge of that inaccessible [light], where our end and the goal of our actions lies hidden, is by no means naturally possible for us, and man, unless he knows the goal, can intend no office thither nor refer it: it is gathered by natural reason that it is not placed in man's faculty to merit that ineffable reward by any offices or deeds. However many good works, therefore, man might naturally perform, there would nevertheless be in no way any merit either of the friendship or of the glory of God.

Whether that happiness is natural to us?.— But here perhaps something may come in our way, namely that that supreme happiness should rather be called our natural and supernatural end. For the natural end of each thing is that to which its natural appetite inclines: but our natural appetite is inclined and carried towards that inestimable happiness, because¹⁷ it cannot rest until that point: therefore it is our natural end. There are also in the school of St. Thomas those who, on q. 12 of the first part, distinguish in what way man naturally desires that end. For if man, they say, is considered in his natural state before the light of faith, it is false: since it can neither be naturally known, nor can appetite be carried into the unknown. If however he is considered as persuaded by the light of faith, which points out that goal, then it is true that human appetite continually tends thither naturally. Yet these men incline almost to this, that that end is supernatural. For if it cannot be desired by man from his natural powers, unless supernatural knowledge has first been had, it is rather judged a supernatural end than a natural one. And yet they do not weaken the force of the argument. For although (to use the schoolmen's terms) man cannot desire that end by an elicited act, unless preceded by the knowledge of faith revealing it, yet if appetition is taken for the inclination itself and the natural weight (as a heavy body, while at rest, desires the centre of the world), then surely the natural appetite of all men, even of those to whom the light of faith has not yet shone, is by its own nature carried thither. Of which there is a firm testimony, that however much a man may obtain the good he wished for in created things, he is nevertheless nowhere quiet, nor can be, until he enjoys that eternal vision. Whence that confession came to Augustine's mind:¹⁸ Thou hast made us, Lord, for thee, and our heart is restless until it comes to thee. Indeed I so judge¹⁹ that that end is simply natural to us. Nor would I define the natural end as that which we can naturally attain, but that which we naturally desire. And although we cannot naturally know that it is the supreme good by which we are to be blessed and satisfied, yet the very restlessness of the human mind, which nowhere rests short of that state, abundantly gives faith that it is our natural end. Otherwise there would be no last end of human appetite: which would be an absurd saying. There is therefore in us by nature an appetite in general for the good, as there is in matter an appetite for form. Yet it differs, in that matter rests under no form without desiring another: but our mind is content with no good short of that supreme one, in which at last it rests. Scotus seems to be of this opinion²⁰ in 4 Sentences, d. 49, q. 10, where he says that natural appetite always and perpetually and supremely is carried into supreme beatitude in particular: although by an elicited act it cannot do so without supernatural knowledge. And the same (unless I am mistaken) is the opinion of St. Thomas in the same q. 12 cited, article 1, where he says that²¹ there is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he beholds the effect: and from this admiration arises in men. For by these words he teaches that, when effects are seen, our natural desire is stirred to behold the cause in itself. For the discourse there was of that knowledge through essence. And in book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 50, he confirms by many arguments that natural desire would be vain unless man could see God. Nay, I would add that that desire of our nature which Aristotle acknowledged in the prologue of the Metaphysics,²² where he says, All men naturally desire to know, will there be altogether fulfilled (as it is in the Prophet)²³ when the glory of God shall appear. Therefore, to conclude, it must not be denied that that end is natural to us in respect of appetite, but it is nevertheless, if you look to its attainment, above the powers of our nature. But there is an argument against this opinion by no means weak. Nature has never implanted in anyone an appetite for some end²⁴ to which it did not at the same time supply organs and the faculty of obtaining it, as is clear to the eye in animals, where there are members destined for each end and work. Whence Aristotle in 2 On the Heavens says: If the celestial orbs had a power of progression, nature would have given them suitable organs.²⁵ Since therefore man does not have from nature the power and faculty of meriting and acquiring that beatitude, it follows that he does not have a natural appetite for it either. Otherwise nature would have made man maimed and mutilated in comparison with lower creatures, and would have dealt worse with him than with the rest. To this, however, it is easily answered²⁶ that from this very fact the loftiness of human nature shines forth more: that since there can be no created nature which is in any proportion for attaining that happiness which surpasses all sense, nevertheless the angelic and human natures, created to the image of God, have it as their last end: and where our nature failed, there God would be present to us, most ready to help, unless we ourselves refused. Moreover, if the saying of Aristotle in 3 Ethics is true²⁷ that the things which we can do through friends, we can in a certain way do through ourselves, there is no reason why we should not say that we can also enter into friendship with God and enjoy the vision of him: since God is so ready to come to our help through CHRIST our Saviour. Nor does that saying of Aristotle in the book On the Heavens make against us: both because he does not say that if the celestial orbs had an inclination to walk, they would have organs, but if they had the power: whereas in us there is not abundantly the power for that beatitude, but the inclination: and also because he himself knew nothing of the supernatural mysteries of faith. Therefore, to make an epilogue of what has been said,²⁸ whoever wishes to inspect the cause of original justice, the bereavement and impotence of fallen man, and finally the necessity of grace as it hangs from its root, let him place before his eyes these three assertions concerning man in pure nature. Namely, that it is in the power of man's bare nature, with any fault and grace removed, through general help, to perform some good in the genus of natural morals: because he is a rational animal: but that he cannot long persevere in such good without often falling, on account of the struggle of sensuality and the weakness of the body. Yet he can do, or will, or think absolutely nothing which is a merit of the friendship or glory of God, on account of his infinite excellence. Nay, this third foundation,²⁹ although we have relied on this natural reason to support it, is nevertheless of less certainty than any natural reason. And for that reason, of whatever weight the argument may be, this is nevertheless fixed and firm for Christians, as the catholic faith. Namely, that no one is admitted into the divine fellowship except by his free goodness: according to that saying, No one can come to me unless my Father draws him. And, By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God. And very many of this kind, which we have more copiously gathered and elucidated in the last chapter of book 2.

Two opinions concerning the first state of man.— From these things there is an easy step to understanding that happy state in which the first man was created. Concerning it, first of all, the judgment of the ancient Fathers and of the later theologians is agreed: that he was created in original justice. But whether he was created in grace and the friendship of God is not so agreed among all. Whence it follows that not all agree about the very nature and definition of original justice. For there are among the theologians those who deny that the angels were created in grace, and by an equal conjecture deny it of the first man. This judgment pleased William of Auxerre and Hugh of Saint Victor, book 1 On the Sacraments, part 6. Alexander of Hales followed it, 2, question 96, as did Bonaventure and Scotus, distinction 29 of book 2, and Marsilius in the same book, question 16, and others. There are, on the contrary, those to whom the affirmative part is more approved. Among them was the ancient Praepositivus, and Saint Thomas, 1, question 95, Durandus, book 2, distinction 20, and not a few others. And I plainly think it was the opinion of Augustine. Scotus therefore and the rest of his class say that Adam was created in original justice alone, without sanctifying grace. But Saint Thomas and the rest are of the judgment that he was established in grace and justice. Nay, they hold that that justice so depends on grace that they were either inseparable, or perhaps (as we shall explain later) one and the same thing. But first,¹ whoever wishes clearly to know the nature of original justice must look to those two defects which we set out in the preceding chapter in naked human nature. For the first was that in order to the end which is commensurate with our nature—namely, to work according to reason—man would suffer very great difficulty, both because of concupiscence inclined to evil and because of the weak and feeble body. The second defect was that by no natural work, however great and whatever its kind, could he merit the friendship of God. The authors of the former opinion, therefore, separating justice from grace, hold that original justice is only the health of nature against the former defect, and say that grace would have had to be received in that state as in ours, through the help of God with man cooperating. But Saint Thomas says that man received both benefits in his creation: both to work according to reason and to merit eternal life. Therefore by the name of original justice, according to either opinion, there does not come a special virtue which is numbered among the cardinal virtues, rendering to each its due; nor is it such justice as that by which we are now justified, which is the grace of the remission of sins. But original justice is a certain rectitude of the whole man—namely, of the body toward the soul, and of the sensitive appetite toward reason. This is designated by that word in Ecclesiastes 7, where it is written: “God made man upright.”² Namely, that sensuality should bring no trouble to reason, nor should the bodily members be wearied when man wished to use them; and therefore reason, never disturbed, would be continually intent on God. And because by origin that justice was both received by Adam and was to be transmitted to posterity, it is called original.³ In the same way the contrary fault is also called original. Yet there is a difference between the aforesaid opinions: according to Scotus and⁴ his followers, that justice would not make reason so intent on God as if man were raised by it to the friendship of God—for that is the proper gift of grace—but intent only insofar as our nature is naturally borne toward God. Hence Scotus⁵ says that that gift of justice did not have to be the principle of merit, but was in comparison with grace exceeding and lofty. Exceeding indeed, because through it the will was more firmly joined to God than through grace, since it suffered no trouble from sensuality nor heaviness from the body. But grace is simply more excellent, because it joins one to the end as to a supernatural good, and as to be attained supernaturally through merit; not so the gift of justice, which joined one only to that good as fitting and delightful. Thus Scotus. But Saint Thomas,⁶ in that word of Ecclesiastes 7, “God made man upright,” acknowledges integral rectitude—namely, that by which man would be subject to God through grace, and therefore the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. These things must for the present be weighed somewhat more fully, both by the testimonies of the sacred writers and by the probability of reasons. And first that which is common to all the Fathers and theologians: namely, concerning original justice. For no place seems to be open in the divine utterances, not only where that original justice can be established, but where any mention of it is made. Since therefore the things that are above nature are to be established from sacred Scripture alone, it seems that that justice is invented without any foundation.⁷ For concerning the creation of man we read this especially: that God made him in his image and likeness,⁸ and that he placed him in a paradise of delight. But image and likeness, from the force of the literal sense, brings to the understanding only this: that he was distinguished by reason and free will. But the paradise of delight pertained altogether to the bodily life. Since therefore it is the nature of brute sensuality, beyond reason and beyond any measure, to be borne by impulse into its objects, and it is the nature of the will to take delight in sensible pleasures, whence it is gathered that sensuality was so restrained, or the will so free from its assault, that in that state man enjoyed that highest tranquillity. And in almost the same way someone will hesitate about the peculiar opinion of Saint Thomas and others who assert that he was also created in grace. To these things it is answered nonetheless⁹ that although in sacred Scripture there is not so express a faith concerning Adam’s original justice as concerning our original fault (for Paul openly states the latter, as will appear later), it is nevertheless not without foundation in divine Scripture according to the exposition of the holy Fathers. And the same testimonies by which original justice is established at the same time support that opinion: that justice either was grace itself or was its inseparable companion. Wherefore we confirm both together. First of all, that place just cited from Genesis,¹⁰ although perhaps not by the rigor of the words, yet by a good understanding, signifies not only that man was created with reason and will, but also with those same powers inclined to good and to God himself. For since God implanted in all things which he formed an affection and inclination toward himself, and therefore made all things for himself, friendly to himself according to each one’s degree and manner, it is most likely that man, whom he formed to his image and likeness and made capable of his fellowship, he brought forth not only with every propensity toward himself and without any inclination to evil (in which, according to the authors of the first opinion, the nature of original justice is completed), but also made him friendly to himself as regards grace, which Saint Thomas and others join to the nature of that justice. Hence Ecclesiasticus 17:¹¹ “God,” it says, “created man from the earth, and made him according to his image, and clothed him according to himself with virtue”—that is, with grace and love of himself. And Paul to the Colossians 3:¹² “Putting off the old man with his acts, and putting on the new, which is renewed in knowledge according to the image of him who created him.” There he calls renovation through grace the renewal of the image in which man was created. But from the other place, the paradise of delight, an argument is also taken.¹³ For since the place is an indication of the one placed there, the paradise of delight shows that man was placed in the highest felicity that can exist under heaven outside the sight of God. But such felicity could not exist where the flesh rebelled against reason, since from that conflict there could not but arise for man both danger and even grave trouble. The third place, and indeed the one most used in this cause, is that of Ecclesiastes 7, “God made man upright,”¹⁴ and he himself entangled himself in infinite questions. There by the word “questions” are designated all the perplexities and windings of this life which come to us from the sickness of the body. From this it is gathered that he was created in that rectitude of reason where there was no disturbance from sensuality. This the doctors understand by the name of original justice. But in the exposition of this place¹⁵ the aforesaid opinions begin to disagree. For some say that he was created only with rectitude referred to a natural end, which is to work according to reason, and toward God (as Scotus says) as toward a fitting and delightful good. But Saint Thomas and the rest interpret it of perfect rectitude, which embraces the friendship of God. It will therefore be worthwhile to subjoin the words of Saint Thomas¹⁶ in 1, question 95, which are these: “Some say that the first man was not created in grace, but that grace was afterward conferred on him before he sinned. But very many authorities of the saints testify that man in the state of innocence had grace. But that he was established in grace, as others say, seems to be required by that very rectitude of the first state in which God made man, according to that word of Ecclesiastes 7¹⁷: ‘God made man upright.’ For rectitude was according to this: that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. But the first subjection was the cause of the second and third. For as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower things were subject to it, as Augustine says. But it is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was not natural. Otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names. Hence it is manifest that that first subjection also, by which reason was subject to God, was not only according to nature, but according to the supernatural gift of grace. For it cannot be that the effect be stronger than the cause. Hence Augustine says in 13 of The City of God that after the transgression of the commandment was committed, at once, with divine grace withdrawing, they were confounded at the nakedness of their bodies. For they felt the motion of their disobedient flesh as a reciprocal punishment of their disobedience. From which it is given to be understood that if, with grace withdrawing, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, then through grace existing in the soul the lower things were subject to it.” Thus Saint Thomas. There, in that word “God made man upright,” he acknowledges the grace and friendship by which man was joined to God, from which the other rectitudes were derived. Moreover, this first must be noted here: that although some interpreters say that it is not Saint Thomas’s teaching that original justice was the same as sanctifying grace, but that grace was the root of justice,¹⁸ perhaps Saint Thomas’s mind is otherwise—namely, that original justice was nothing other than grace, of greater dignity in this respect than our grace, since it not only made man pleasing to God but restrained sensuality and strengthened the body for obedience to reason, so that the tranquil will was subject to God. And this seems plainly to be Augustine’s judgment. From these words Saint Thomas concludes thus: “From which it is given to be understood that if, with grace withdrawing, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, then through grace existing in the soul the lower things were subject to it.” “Through grace,” he says—namely, through that by which reason was subject to God. Wherefore what he thought about grace in the first part, question 110, he also asserted about original justice in question 83: namely, that it is a habit inhering in the essence of the soul. And in 1, question 95, he says that the rectitude of the will in order to God is as it were formal in original justice, but the rectitude of the other powers is as it were material. There he seems to think that those three rectitudes constitute one and the same habit. And finally, since in the remission of sins original justice is not now restored to us, but grace, he says in 2 Sentences, distinction 32, question 1, that original justice is restored to us in baptism as to the formal element; which in meaning is as if he had said: grace is restored, having that power by which it makes us pleasing to God, but not that power by which it then subjected the lower powers to the higher. We shall note a place in the following chapter where he seems to think that justice is distinguished from grace. Therefore I do not delay over whether they were the same habit, provided they were inseparable,¹⁹ so that because man was created in grace he was also in justice, and because he lost grace he was also stripped of justice. Next it must be observed that according to neither opinion is it to be denied that Adam before sin had grace, as Saint Thomas notes here on account of the very many authorities of the saints testifying to it. But finally it must be noted that the opinion of Saint Thomas was Augustine’s.²⁰ For he confirms his judgment by his testimonies in 13 of The City of God, and since all confess that the condition of the angels and of the first man was the same, he expressly cites him also in book 12, where he says that God was at once in the angels, establishing nature and bestowing grace. Add that in On Correction and Grace, chapter 50, where he treats of the rectitude in which Adam was created, he makes man equal to the angels, saying that as they were blessed—that is, in the grace of God—before they fell, in which, unless they had fallen by free will, they would have been confirmed through glory, so Adam was created in beatitude, so that he could refrain from sinning, in which, if he had persevered, he would have been confirmed when transferred to heaven. For he would never have called him blessed without the grace of God. And in chapter 11, expounding how, according to the word of Ecclesiastes, “God made man upright,” he says that he had given him a good will; “for in that will,” he says, “he made him, who made him upright.” But Augustine never calls a good will “good” outside charity. Nay, the very name of rectitude,²¹ and therefore the name of original justice, manifestly carries before it the grace and friendship of God. For who can be called upright unless he has his intention fixed on him who is our highest end? But what justice, except in order to God, who is the first rule of our life, is in the sacred books truly reckoned by the name of justice at all, except that by which we are just before God, as is gathered from Paul, Romans 4? Nor does original justice detract or diminish anything from the nature of justice, but rather increases it; wherefore it also includes grace in itself. To these things Augustine²² in the Enchiridion, chapter 104: “God would have wished,” he says, “to keep the first man in that salvation in which he was created, and at the fitting time, without the intervention of death, to lead him to better things, if he had foreknown that he would have the perpetual will in which he was made.” Certainly by the name of salvation he understands without any doubt the grace and friendship of God. But the last place²³ from which the faith of original justice is established is that very one where Paul instructed us about original fault. And the argument is of this kind. By the first sin of Adam we all sinned, as is had in Romans 5, which is affirmed of no other sin, either of the same Adam or of other parents. Therefore our nature then lost some divine gift and benefit which Adam had received for all of us; otherwise why would the whole nature have sinned more in that offense than in other sins? But that benefit could have been nothing other than the rectitude of nature and the possibility of not sinning. Since therefore the chief cause of sinning for us is the struggle of the flesh with reason, it follows that man was created without that strife, lest, when he sinned, he might thereby make an excuse for himself. And that benefit, by the reason said above, is called original justice. And the argument is confirmed²⁴ from what Paul says: that death passed into all men because of Adam’s sin, in whom all sinned. For by the word death all corruption of the flesh is included; but the appetite of sense against reason is a certain corruption of the flesh; therefore there was no such thing before sin. Since therefore it is natural to man (as we explained in chapter 3), it is gathered that man was created with some supernatural gift of justice to repress sensuality and keep it within the bounds of reason. Paul suggests the same to us in Romans 7,²⁵ where, complaining of the conflict of the flesh against the spirit, he adds: “Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Alluding, namely, to this: that unless the body had been made mortal through sin, that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit would never have arisen. Of this there is also that testimony, that from the very moment of sin man began to blush at the shameful motion of the flesh. Excellently therefore Augustine compares mortality²⁶ and immortality with the possibility of sinning and the possibility of not sinning, and therefore proves that Adam was created in original justice, which was the possibility of not sinning, from the fact that he then had the possibility of not dying. For he treats this question expressly in On Correction and Grace, chapter 10,²⁷ and the two following, namely, what sort of man he was created. And he answers that as there is a twofold immortality—one by which man was able not to die, the other by which he cannot die, of which the first-formed man had the former in the state of innocence, and we shall all have the latter in glory—so there is a twofold impeccability. The first, by which man is able not to sin, and in that man was created when he was created upright; the other, by which he cannot sin, and that will be common to us with the angels in the fatherland. But by sin, as he lost immortality, so he lost impeccability—that is, the possibility of not sinning. And since the struggle of the flesh against the spirit is the cause of sinning, he concludes that man in that state would never have suffered such strife, but we incur it through Adam’s sin. He establishes the same truth against Pelagius in the Hypognosticon, book 3, saying that now man does not suffice by free will to fulfill what he wishes. But the first-formed man could do this, when the will was sound before fault; through which fault man lost that possibility. And a little below: “God,” he says, “made man from the beginning,²⁸ and left him in the hand of his counsel.” And he adds: “But what is ‘in the hand of his counsel’ but in the possibility of his free will? For in the hand is understood the possibility. That is the first grace by which the first man could have stood, if he had wished to keep the commandments.” And a little below: “But having fallen by his own fault, he could not rise again by his own will, unless he had been rescued by the hand of the Lord.” Augustine therefore teaches that before the commandment was given not to eat of the tree of life, Adam was endowed with help by which he could avoid sinning forever if he wished; otherwise God, most merciful, would have unjustly imposed a commandment which had no possibility of being fulfilled. There he plainly seems to think that sanctifying grace was infused; for he speaks of the possibility of fulfilling meritoriously and of doing whatever he wished, which he says he had in that state and lost through fault, and now cannot recover except through Christ. But most rightly anyone will hesitate here²⁹ about that possibility of not sinning. For if it is understood that man before sin could by himself avoid sinning without the help of God, it is false, as Augustine himself warns in the cited place, On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, where he says of the first man: “Nor did God wish him to be without his grace, whom he left in his free will; since free will is sufficient for evil, but is little for good unless helped by the omnipotent good.” And a little below: “If this help had been lacking to the angel or to man as soon as they were made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine help if it wished, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault.” Thus far he. But if that possibility of not sinning is understood through the help of God, man has the same even while he is in sin; for God is most ready to bring help to anyone willing to be converted. And therefore although no one can be converted by himself, nevertheless because of this kind of possibility from the help of God, it is a sin for him who is not converted. But the answer is³⁰ that help was given to the first man by way of habit; and so, from the law and condition of that state in which God had created him, provision was made for him so that he could suffice without waiting for new aid for every good that he wished. These are words in the form of Augustine, book 3 of the Hypognosticon. And because for fulfilling every moral good the health from the disease of sensuality was necessary, but for fulfilling meritoriously grace was necessary, Adam received both before the commandment was given, by obedience to which he would advance in grace. Wherefore Augustine most aptly made man and the angel equal in the authority cited just above, according to the nature of each. For the angel, because he was neither in a body nor composed of parts fighting against one another, did not need original justice,³¹ that is, justice healing nature, but grace elevating him to the merit of glory; but man needed both benefits. And therefore as the angel was created in grace, so also man in grace and justice. By sin therefore to have lost all possibility is to have lost those gifts. Wherefore he who is in original sin cannot be reconciled without new help from God. But as Adam in his creation received grace and gifts by which he could fulfill the law he was about to receive, so also he who is converted to God receives from him grace through Christ for fulfilling the law he receives, as is clear in baptism. Yet not such as was in Adam, because he does not receive the health of nature which is expressed by the name of original justice, but the infestation of sensuality remains. Of this more fully in what follows. I have decided to turn over this place somewhat more closely, both on account of Catholic theologians who treat original justice so jejunely that it appears to some not to be so certain a matter, and because when the Protestants in that imperial war³² at the Diet of Ratisbon, proposed by them, had begun from this—that Adam was created in justice and grace and in a higher knowledge of God than we have—Eckius rejected that³³ concerning grace as if it were against the common opinion and against Augustine. For he, otherwise not poorly learned, could have remitted much of that rigor of censuring. For Augustine speaks most openly for the judgment concerning Adam’s grace, as we have made plain. And if anywhere he says something that seems to make against it, Saint Thomas legitimately expounds and dissolves it all in the cited place. Wisely therefore our Synod of Trent, session 5, canon³⁴ 2, pronounced that Adam received holiness (that is, grace) and justice. But the authors of the contrary opinion³⁵ bring forward this one argument for themselves: namely, that it is congruous for each thing to attain its end through its own operation. And therefore both the angel and the first man ought to have disposed themselves for grace through the proper works of free will, as now happens in men of adult age. But this argumentation is very slight;³⁶ nay, natural reason taken from the mercy of God persuades the contrary. For the end of man and the angel (as we said above) is not grace, but heavenly beatitude, of which grace is the seed. Wherefore since God, most benign and most provident, when he created the earth, the trees, and all things together, implanted virtues in them so that each thing might make a seed in its own kind, by which each thing might attain its end, it is gathered by the best reasoning that both the angels and the first man were created in grace, by which they would be led to eternal felicity through the addition of merits. Namely, so that not only would he have no excuse for sin, but would owe immense praises to God, because he who had created him for an end so excellent for his nature had also cast its seed into that same nature. It is answered therefore that God did not confer the first grace on the first man through the motion and preparation of free will, as he does to us who use free choice, but at once (as Augustine says) he was establishing nature and bestowing grace, as it were by the manner of nature. For this is what the phrase “to be created in grace” designates. As must be said of the most sacred Virgin by those who hold that she was conceived in grace. Finally, to add the last word, this judgment is especially approved by me and confirmed from that place of Paul: “Judgment from one unto condemnation,” where we are taught that men are to be condemned by reason of original sin, even if they accumulated no actual sin. Since therefore condemnation at least carries with it expulsion from the kingdom (whatever may be said of the punishment of sense), it is most manifestly gathered that our whole nature received in Adam a right to the kingdom; otherwise there would be no expulsion. But a right is not acquired except through sanctifying grace. Therefore Adam received it for the whole of nature; whence it follows that he received it together with justice in the first instant, to be transmitted by origin. For if he had received it afterward through a disposition, it would have been a personal benefit, which posterity would also have acquired not by generation but by a similar disposition.³⁷

First doubt.— Yet from these things certain other little doubts arise concerning original justice. First: was that tranquillity of reason brought about by the flesh coveting nothing against the spirit, or rather by the will containing itself within the bounds of reason without any sadness and difficulty, whatever the flesh might covet? Scotus and the rest leave this under dispute. But it is much more consonant with reason; nay, Augustine says according to Paul in the place already cited, On Correction and Grace, that the flesh coveted nothing against the spirit, but continually followed the leadership of reason, since Paul implies that this came to us because of sin. Wherefore either grace itself repressed concupiscence, or by reason of infused grace and justice there were virtues both in the appetite and in the will, so that each power might quietly serve reason. Not that original justice was in the will, but it (as Saint Thomas says), because it was a gift of the whole nature, to be transmitted by generation, had its seat in the essence of the soul, whose infusion is the first term of generation; yet the virtues accompanied it in the powers, as now happens in the infusion of grace.³⁸

Second doubt.— There is another doubt: whether all the good things conferred on Adam would have been transmitted with nature by generation to posterity. The answer to this is easy: according to those who think Adam was created in justice only without grace, only that justice would have been transmitted by generation. For that alone would have been the gift of the whole of nature universally; but grace would have been a personal benefit, which Adam received through his own disposition, and so afterward whoever else. But according to Saint Thomas, grace itself was also a gift of the whole nature, and it together with the virtues (as is said of the blessed Virgin) would have been infused together with the soul in the conception of offspring.³⁹ And there is a most valid argument for this judgment. For since that state was far more excellent than the state of fault, no one ought to doubt that before the use of reason little children would have received grace; and since no sacrament was then needed, because with no fault preceding there would have been no future redeemer (as Augustine says expressly in On Correction and Grace), there would be no reason why men would not then have been conceived in grace, since there was no original sin. And by an equal, indeed a greater, reason it comes about that the first parent himself was created in grace. Nor does it follow from this that grace would be a natural form and not a gratuitous gift, since although it would be infused in generation, yet not by the force of generation, but by the gratuitous will of God, as long as no one transgressed his commandments. This the others of the contrary opinion must also say of original justice. And the example is clear in the grace of the most holy Virgin, which was not natural to her even if it was created with her. But besides that gift of grace and justice, the first parent was also enriched with other proper endowments which were not to be transmitted with nature to offspring. For since he was created as the principle of the human race in both man and woman, and further so that our race might propagate animal life and establish morals, it was fitting to divine providence that as he formed him strong with fitting age and bodily strength, so he also imbued his soul with knowledge and virtues, as much as was necessary for governing the world. Wherefore he gave names to all things according to each one’s nature and quality. But afterward children were little, as now, and were procreated without the use of reason, and they would advance along with age in knowledge of things and culture of morals.⁴⁰ Yet all would have had a faith and knowledge of God more lively and more excellent than ours. But of these things enough.

Last doubt.— Finally there is the last doubt.⁴¹ Since concupiscence was bound in the first parents, how could Eve covet to eat of the tree of knowledge? But to answer this at greater length would be to leap beyond the line of the present undertaking. It is enough that the first sin was not committed because of her own distorted concupiscence, but the sin of pride preceded, by which Eve, seduced, wished to know good and evil as God.

It follows that according to our plan we examine what man in integral nature could naturally do in good morals—namely, with only the general help of God—and what therefore it was for which he needed special help. And yet that state is not to be judged altogether from the endowments and virtues with which Adam was adorned.¹ For he had (as we were just saying) very many peculiar goods which would not afterward be common to his posterity; but the reckoning of that state must be weighed from the common law which was to endure in the whole progeny, unless sin had intervened. And besides, there is one account of the state of original justice if under the same name is included sanctifying grace, and another if it is understood precisely as the justice healing nature in order to a natural end. Wherefore, that the disputation may be clearer, when we ask about the state of original justice we understand only man with the gift healing nature, setting aside in thought the grace elevating him to supernatural things. So also Saint Thomas himself distinguishes,² 1.2, q. 109, where he asks what that man could do from pure natural powers—that is, man both lacking grace and also free of fault, yet having received a strong nature. For that gift of justice was then numbered among natural things, although it was gratuitous, because it so confirmed nature in order to a natural end, as has often been explained. For if he had understood mere nature, of which we spoke in chapters 3 and 4, he would not have asserted that man could keep all the commandments and love God, as we are now about to say. But here Saint Thomas seems to allude to this, that grace and justice are distinguished as two things.³ Unless you say that it is enough for glossing him that they are distinct aspects of the same habit. With these things deliberated, it is most easy to establish how far human powers in that state reached in morals.

This will become clear in five propositions. Let the first therefore be:⁴ In no way could man then, by original justice, if you separate sanctifying grace, do any work worthy of the friendship of God and the heavenly inheritance; nay, neither could he prepare himself for grace except by special help. This assertion is plain. For original justice according to this account would be only the health of nature in order to the end prescribed to its natural faculty, so that man might work according to reason without the trouble of sensuality and the heaviness of the body. But the end which is placed in the friendship and glory of God infinitely transcends the summit of all natural powers, as was said above, and therefore it is properly the work of God. Yet here it must be noted in passing that grace would not then have been necessary for men through the merit of Christ.⁵ For Christ came only to save what had perished, as him whom God set forth as a propitiation for sins, who would redeem us from the slavery of sin; and therefore where there was no sin, there was no need of that redeemer, as Augustine says⁶ in On Correction and Grace, chapter 11. Nevertheless the grace of God and his help were necessary because of the impossibility of any created nature attaining that end.

The second proposition.⁷ Man in that state could by his natural powers both know and will and do all the good proportionate to his nature—for example, act according to reason in relation to God insofar as he is the end of natural good. This is the conclusion of Saint Thomas⁸ 1.2, q. 109, from which no theologian dissents. For there he distinguishes concerning man in integral nature, affirming that he could by his natural powers do all the good proportionate to himself, such as is the good of acquired virtue, but not the good exceeding it, such as is the good of infused virtue, unless supported by grace. Wherefore I wonder at those who twist Thomas’s meaning to say that he cannot do natural good works without special help, because he says that this could not be done without the help of God moving him. For when he says “by his natural powers,” he plainly explains that he is speaking of general help, which (as we set out in chapter 2) is reckoned among natural causes. But what man cannot do without special help he would never have pronounced possible for him by his natural powers. But besides, this assertion is proved from what was said in chapter 4.⁹ Since man is a rational animal, it is implanted in his nature to work according to reason for God’s sake, insofar as by natural light it is known that he is the end of all things. Yet if through the resistance of sensuality he is sometimes held back—and original justice was the medicine of this disease, preserving nature in its vigor—he was therefore able without any other peculiar help to perform all the good that was proportionate to his nature. And so the difference between man in pure natural state and the same man in the state of innocence was that between the weak and the strong: namely, that the former (as we said above) was able by his nature to do some morally good work, but not continuously every good work; whereas in the state of innocence he could do every good work and always.¹⁰ And by the same distinction man fallen differs from the same man in the state of innocence, as Saint Thomas teaches in the cited place, and as we shall dispute more fully in chapter 20.

The third proposition.¹¹ Man could then, even setting aside sanctifying grace, fulfill all the commandments of the natural law—nay, even keep from that prohibition of eating the tree of knowledge—as regards the substance of the works. But since we establish a similar conclusion in chapter 22 concerning fallen man, about which the Lutherans sharply reproach us,¹² namely that we Catholics, like Pelagians, teach that man can keep the commandments by natural powers, the solemn distinction of the theologians has been noted. To fulfill the commandments of God comes about in two ways.¹³ In one way, as regards the substance of the works—namely, insofar as man does just and honorable things which are good in their kind, without any evil end or circumstance. And this man can truly do by the faculty of his nature, namely with only the general concurrence of God, as Saint Thomas says in the cited question, article 4, and all the theologians affirm with one mind. And the reason is that all the works of the law, whether natural or divine, and even human law if it is just, are according to reason; nay, law can be the same as the rule of reason, to which our works must be measured and directed. Since therefore man is a rational animal, he can by his nature do all works of this kind. There is this difference, however: that man in the state of innocence could perform all of them because of the integrity of his nature, but in pure natural state and in the state of corrupted nature he cannot do likewise, except the lighter and fewer ones. But in another way this phrase “to keep the commandments” is used—namely, not only as regards the substance but also as regards the manner. This others call “as regards the intention of God commanding,” from which all laws are derived. And that intention is that, supported by his grace, through the merits of fulfilling the law we should obtain eternal rewards, according to the Gospel saying: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.”¹⁴ And in this way it is taken wherever it is said simply that the commandments of God are fulfilled; for the former manner of fulfilling is imperfect. And in this manner, neither in the state of integral nature, much less in this our state, can man fulfill even the least commandment without grace, which first freely reconciles us with God. The contrary was the error of Pelagius. This is the judgment from which no theologian departs. Since it must be confirmed by us more copiously and exactly concerning fallen man in chapter 22, it will be enough to have stated it here. I would say “the commandments of the natural law,” since man cannot have the knowledge of faith concerning supernatural things, nor indeed can an angel, without the special help of God.

The fourth assertion.¹⁵ Man also in the flower of original justice, with grace set aside, was sufficient to love God above all things with a natural love, but not in such a way that it would be meritorious and acceptable to God for eternal life. This is likewise the conclusion of Saint Thomas in the cited question, 1.2, article 3. I therefore bring forward his testimony alone because there is no theologian who does not subscribe to the same judgment. But it is demonstrated by its own reasoning. In that state, with grace set aside, man could by natural virtue accomplish all the good that is connatural to him; but such is the love of God above all things; therefore it was possible to him by nature. The second premise is thus expressed from the very midst of the nature of things. Any thing whatsoever is so born to desire and act as it is born to be (this is Aristotle’s judgment¹⁶ in Physics 2); but all creatures, each in its own order, exist for God; therefore all love themselves in their own way for God, as Dionysius teaches¹⁷ in his book On the Divine Names, where he says that God converts all things to the love of himself. Hence, since with nature then sound there was no allurement or other thing to hold it back from its inclination, it follows that man would love him and refer all his offices to God, which is to love him above all things. But if you wish to perceive this reasoning more clearly, note that God, who needs not our goods, created nothing for our sake or for the sake of other things outside himself, but chiefly for himself, that he might display his divinity and in some way propagate it in us.¹⁸ For this is the difference between God and created things: that a creature acts by love of concupiscence—namely, for the sake of obtaining or preserving its end; for this reason animals use food for their parts, that they may live, and beget like themselves, in which they perpetually preserve their species. But God does not act thus, but from his own love of benevolence he fashioned the world, that his name might be spread abroad to his own glory.¹⁹ Finally, a creature acts like a student who frequents schools for the sake of acquiring knowledge; but God acts like a teacher who, out of love of his wisdom, eagerly cares for it to be poured out upon others. Wherefore, as God made and loves all things for himself, he implanted in the things he formed from nothing the same propensity—namely, that they should love their author before themselves—and especially man, whom he established as lord of all things. The same truth is usually shown also by an example from the parts of a natural thing:²⁰ namely, of the arm, when it exposes itself at its own peril and loss for the head, when the safety of the whole is at stake. But some contend by two answers that this example is quibbled away. First, that the arm does not expose itself for the head but for itself, since what is endangered in the head is itself. But the falsity of this is clear from the fact that, when the arm perishes to protect the head, it is vain to say that it intends its own proper safety and not rather that of the whole person. The other answer is Scotus’s, 3, distinction 27: that the hand does not expose itself, but man himself exposes his hand to defend himself. Hence the argument is not taken that the hand loves the whole more than itself, but that the whole loves itself more than the hand. To this, however, it is answered that although the whole suppositum is what uses the parts, it is nevertheless a testimony that, just as it is its natural right to command the members, so there is a natural appetite of the members to obey. Just as when water rises to fill a vacuum, it is in no way moved against its nature; nay, that is its own proper nature. Since the whole was made not for the sake of the parts, but the parts for the sake of the whole. And in the same way all good things were created for God, who is the universal good. Nay, from these principles of nature the philosophers were taught that a citizen is bound even to undergo death for the commonwealth. It is gathered therefore that it is deeply implanted in man by nature to love God above himself. This, indeed, in integral nature he could fully do; but in corrupted nature, because of very many obstacles, he is by no means so able to do it as to refer all his works to him. Nevertheless, let not the prudent reader pass over this (which we must repeat in chapter 22): that the love of God above all things is twofold—one natural, the other derived from charity by divine gift;²¹ for so the theologians teach with one consent. Hence Saint Thomas, in the cited place, first forms against this conclusion the following argument: “To love God above all things is the proper office of infused charity, through the Holy Spirit who is given to us, as is had in Romans 5; therefore man in the state of innocence could not do this by his natural powers.” To this he answers that charity loves God above all things more excellently than nature does. For nature loves him above all things insofar as he is the principle and end of natural good; but charity, insofar as he is the object of beatitude and insofar as man has a certain spiritual fellowship with him. Thus he.

The fifth and last proposition is:²² Man in that state could persevere by the gift conferred on him, if he had willed. This is established by Augustine in On Correction and Grace, chapter 12,²³ where he says that to the first man, to whom it was given to be able not to sin, there was also given the help of perseverance: not by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but without which he could not persevere by free will. And a little later: “The first man did not receive this gift of God—that is, perseverance in good—but to persevere or not to persevere was left to his free choice, since nothing resisted his will, established without sin, by way of concupiscence.” Therefore the judgment of Augustine, and it is most true, is that the first-formed man did not receive the gift of persevering always. For he was not confirmed in grace, as the Apostles were, that they should not sin mortally, and the most sacred Virgin, that she should not offend even venially. Nor (what is less) did he have that grace so as truly to persevere. For if he had received it, he would never have fallen.²⁴ Yet the possibility of persevering was committed to his free will. And therefore Augustine says elegantly that, although Adam had received grace so that he could refrain from sinning if he wished, yet the distinguished evangelical saints, such as the martyrs, received a more abundant grace—namely, that they could not only do what they wished, but that they wished more firmly what they could. For Adam, with no one terrifying him, and besides against the command of God who terrified him, using his free will, did not stand in so great a felicity of not sinning. But those others, I do not say with the world terrifying them, but raging to prevent them from standing, stood in the faith. Since the former saw the present goods he was about to leave, while the latter did not see the future goods they were about to receive. Thus Augustine, commending the grace of Christ above that which was in Adam. Here perhaps someone might hesitate.²⁵

Could not other causes and occasions also then arise for sinning besides sensuality, which justice restrained? They could indeed arise for sinning mortally, as was the temptation of the serpent. For the first sin could not be anything but mortal, since by it that most happy state would be lost. For a venial sin was neither enough to cast man down from that state, nor could it occur while that state endured, because no evil at all could then befall him. Saint Thomas²⁶ 1.2, q. 89, says this opinion is the common teaching. And although there are some who think otherwise, it is nevertheless proved from the effect of venial sin above all, which cannot but deserve some punishment. But in that most happy state, as Augustine teaches²⁷ both in the cited places and also in The City of God 14, chapter 10, nothing evil could be present that would ever offend the mind of man living happily. Nay, he expressly adds that there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, and while that remained, no evil at all from elsewhere could rush in to sadden him. If therefore there was a tranquil avoidance of sin, there could be no venial sin. But this is further deduced from the causes of venial sin, which would then have no place:²⁸ for there would then be neither sudden motions of sensuality, nor sudden motions of reason without deliberation. Nor could there be any weariness in the body, since it was always vigorous and sound, and most apt to obey the soul. Nor indeed could any danger threaten at all from without, otherwise that state would not be most happy, as is signified by the name of paradise. And let these things concerning the second of those four states which we have proposed be enough. The rest will be treated more copiously in chapter 20 and the following.

After we have narrated man as established on the summit of happiness, such as he could have it on earth, it follows that we speak of sin, into which, having fallen thence by his own will, he also cast down his posterity. For this is the third state of man which we have undertaken to describe; and in it the remaining part of this book must be placed. Concerning original sin, therefore, there are roughly six things, partly worthy of consideration, partly of disputation, which were brought before us for disputation by the sacred synod. Namely, whether it exists, that is, whether it passed from Adam into all posterity; what its cause is; what it is, and how it is transmitted; what are its effects, and finally its punishment. For concerning remission, although in ch. 11 we shall say certain things against the Lutherans, nevertheless we must treat of it in book 2 as in its proper place. Further, the first member is not one that is now to be brought into discussion, since there is no one who calls it into doubt, unless one who strives to revive the heresy of the Pelagians. But the Lutherans, with whom we have to do at this time, flee so far from the Pelagians that they strike into the opposite extreme.¹ Let it therefore be settled for us, as the Catholic faith, that all, as many as descend from Adam by natural generation, contract original sin.² Since we have pronounced these and universal statements of this kind, I would not wish anyone to call me into suspicion concerning the conception of the most holy Virgin. For even if the present Council, defining nothing on this matter, but most wisely renewing the decree of Sixtus, has left it free for each to dispute on either side, nothing nevertheless is less dear to me. But although the Church permits either understanding, and the authors of this or that opinion have explained it by glossing, nevertheless the words of Scripture and of the sacred canons without addition are to be brought forward universally, as they stand, lest their purity be adulterated. Especially because, as is most manifest, the opinion concerning the conception is new; and therefore it is no wonder if among the holy Fathers no one was excepted from the general sentence of the sons of Adam, except Christ alone. Him they exempt for this reason only, that he was not sown from Adam through a man. In order, therefore, that we may return without disputation concerning the most holy Mother of God to our digression, of this Catholic truth concerning original sin there are most certain testimonies in the treasury of Scripture, both new and old. For behold (says David) I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother conceived me.³ And Ecclesiasticus: From a woman the beginning of sin was made, and through her all die.⁴ To which that man from the Gentiles, simple and upright, also alluded, when he called down so many evils on the day on which man was born. For Job opened his mouth, says Scripture, and cursed his day, and spoke: Let the day perish in which I was born, and the night in which it was said, A man is conceived.⁵ Surely recognizing that that vitiated conception is the cause of all the evils which mortals suffer. And ch. 14: Who can make clean from unclean seed one conceived? And ch. 25 according to the seventy interpreters: No one is clean without filth, not even an infant whose life is one day upon earth. But what was under the cloud in the prophecies of the Fathers has been openly brought forth in the evangelical noon. For to this nearly belongs Paul's argument to the Romans, that he might show that Jews⁶ all and Greeks, namely the whole human race, are under sin; and that there is no distinction, but all have sinned and need the glory of God. Explaining this much more clearly a little below, he says: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death: and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned.⁷ And he adds that death passed into those also who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression, that is, actually by their own will. Namely, that he might explain more clearly how all sinned by Adam's sin, since on account of it they die. And Gal. 3: Scripture (he says) concluded all things under sin, that the promise from faith of Jesus Christ might be given to believers.⁸ And Eph. 2: We were by nature children of wrath. Nevertheless, these and very many similar places of Scripture notwithstanding, there was Pelagius with his disciples Celestius and Julian, who strove⁹ to deny that Adam's sin harmed any others besides himself: twisting Paul's words in the other direction, [saying] that all sinned in Adam by imitation alone, but not that they contracted any fault thence by generation. The other holy Fathers, and most especially Augustine, made [them] guilty of this deadly heresy with most firm testimonies, and indeed in his very numerous little works. First, Hypog. art. 2,¹⁰ where from that form of Paul's speaking, "In whom all sinned," he presses that we sinned in him not only by imitation, but that when he sinned, the whole nature in him sinned. Whence alone, he says, the Lord Jesus Christ was made man without seed from a virgin, and was born God and man, free from transgression. And a little after, on that [text] "all sinned and need the glory of God," By saying, he says, "all," he excepts no one: nay rather he declared the whole human race. And in the book On the Merits of Sins and the Baptism of Little Ones, among many other things he especially proves it by that comparison of Paul: Judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification.¹¹ To which the imitation of sinning in no way fits; rather it is expressed that just as in Adam, before we were, we sinned, by which fault moreover we are infected by natural generation, so in the passion of Christ, before we were born, we were freed from all offenses, if that [passion] is applied to us through gratuitous regeneration. Whence book 2, ch. 10, having asked the question in form, whether there is anyone of those born of men, and whether he could ever have been or can be, who has altogether never had or will have any sin, he answers thus: That this one, beyond the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, no one either is, or was, or will be, is most certain.¹² And against Julian he pursues the same matter by the votes of all the holy Fathers. Among whom he cites Ambrose on Luke:¹³ where he says: He alone through all things born of a woman is the holy Lord Jesus, who did not experience earthly contagions of corruption by the newness of an immaculate birth. Where he places this precisely in the cause of vindicating Christ from original sin, that he was not conceived by virile seed. And in the book On Noah's Ark, concerning the same our Savior, He alone, he says, could be just, when every generation was erring, unless, being born of a virgin, he were held by no privilege of a generation subject to [sin]. And lest we recount the catalogue of all individually, thus book 2 near the end Augustine concludes against Julian: On account of which Catholic truth, the holy and blessed priests, and most renowned in the treatment of the divine utterances, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Reticius, Olympius, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Innocent, John, Basil, to whom I add, whether you will or not, the priest Jerome, not to mention those who have not yet fallen asleep, bring forward against you concerning the original sin of all men, by a succession subject [to it], a sentence from which they except no one except him whom a virgin conceived without the law of sin fighting against the law of the mind.¹⁴ This is Augustine. And book 6 he presses the same heretics more urgently by the weight of that passage which is 1 Cor. 5: If one died for all, therefore all are dead, for whom Christ died.¹⁵ Which collection of Paul he observes most keenly in these words: Paul therefore wished it to follow that all are understood to be dead, if Christ died for all. Since therefore not in the body (namely, it is necessary that all die) — it remains, he says, that all those for whom Christ died are dead in sin; let no one deny, let no one doubt, unless he denies or doubts that he is a Christian. Thus far Augustine himself. For Julian, conceding that Christ died even for little ones, denied that the same were conceived in sin. Augustine argues: If in truth they were not conceived in sin, they never were dead spiritually. But if they were not dead, neither did Christ die for them: Paul attesting that Christ died only for those who were truly dead. As in Rom. 5¹⁶ he says: In this God commends his charity in us, that when we were sinners, Christ died for us. Therefore he died only for those who were truly sinners. Whence the same Apostle in Rom. 8¹⁷ asserts that only Christ the redeemer came in the likeness of sinful flesh, so that all, as many as were redeemed, are understood to have come not in the likeness but truly into the flesh of sin. Which passage Augustine,¹⁸ book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence ch. 12, where he has a discourse on the marriage of Joseph and Mary, thus expounds: Alone there was no nuptial intercourse, because in the flesh of sin it could not take place without that concupiscence of the flesh which came from sin; without which he wished to be conceived, who was to be without sin: not in the flesh of sin, but in the likeness of the flesh of sin. That from this also he might teach that every flesh which is born from intercourse is flesh of sin: since only she who was not born from it was not flesh of sin. Thus far Augustine. From these universal statements therefore so often resumed, St. Thomas¹⁹ 1.2 q.81 art.3, where he asks whether Adam's sin passes into all men, answers without doubt in these words: I answer that according to the Catholic faith it must be firmly held that all men, except Christ alone, derived from Adam, contract original sin from Adam. For so Paul answers: Death passed into all, in whom all sinned. Finally Pelagius and Celestius were condemned for this heresy in the council of Milevis and Africa,²⁰ by the authority also of Innocent and Zosimus, supreme pontiffs. The words are of the Council of Milevis ch. 2: It likewise pleased that whoever denies that little children, newly come from the wombs of their mothers, are to be baptized, or says that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins, but that they draw nothing from Adam of original sin which is expiated by the laver of regeneration — whence it follows that in them the form of baptism for the remission of sins is understood as not true but false — let him be anathema. Which words are related among the decrees On Consecration dist. 4.²¹ Where also Augustine's sentence is transferred from On Faith to Peter. It reads thus: Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that every man who is conceived by the intercourse of a man and a woman is born with original sin, subjected to impiety and subject to death: and on this account is born a child of wrath by nature. Which was also renewed in our time by the holy synod of Trent, Sess. 5 can. 4. And these things concerning the first point, whether it exists.

The cause of original sin.— The other consideration of original fault is concerning its cause. The Fathers almost declare it in this way. Since in Adam the whole of human nature consisted in its power: as being the one planting for begetting and propagating our race, he received that original justice (of which we spoke in chapter 2) not only for himself but for his offspring forever. Which whole [justice] he would thence receive by hereditary right together with nature in begetting: if only man remained faithful in the grace and friendship of God. By equal reasoning that precept by which he was forbidden under threat of death to eat of the tree of knowledge was so set before him that the whole of nature was bound in him. Wherefore thus on account of his transgression he was deprived of that justice which he had received, and driven from that most happy state, so that he involved all mortals at once in the same guilt, and thence cast them into the same miseries. Moreover,¹ in order that this explanation of the cause may be made, two other things proposed by us in the preceding chapter are equally worth explaining: namely, what original sin is, and in what way it is transmitted through the series of generations. For this is most difficult to explain even for the most eloquent: concerning which, to confess my ignorance, I have read nothing thus far for which I do not desire more. But the cause of this perplexing ambiguity is that although the nature of fault in actual sin is manifest, yet from it we can scarcely investigate the nature of original [sin]. For sin (as Augustine says Against Faustus, book 22)² is a word or deed or desire against the law of God. Where it is shown that the nature of fault is that deflection of the work, and turning aside from the law of God and the rule of reason: as when Adam, having transgressed the line prescribed to him, ate of the tree of knowledge. Since therefore man, when he is conceived, is not yet possessed of judgment and liberty, nor can he act according to the law and norm, nor deviate from it, it is a very great labour to declare how in him there is the nature of a true fault, which from the sin of Adam was impressed on our nature.

Confession concerning original sin.— But these things concerning this sin are confessed by all catholics. First. That it is not ours as regards the cause, that is, that we committed it by our own will. There were indeed formerly, as Augustine reports in book 1 of the Retractations, those who fell into such madness as to say that little children are baptized for the remission of a sin which was their own in this way, and personal. But, he says, that holy father is not to be despaired of human senses to such a degree as to persuade this to anyone. So evident is it³ that the use of reason or will does not yet shine forth in them. Yet it is by no means to be denied that it is voluntary: as in chapter 14 of book 1 of the Retractations the same [Augustine] wished us to be warned: where, maintaining that there is no sin unless voluntary, he adds. That which is called original sin in little children, when they do not yet use the free decision of the will, is not absurdly called voluntary also, because contracted from the first evil will of man, it has in a certain way become hereditary. And below, chapter 15, against the Pelagians, who deny original sin in little children because they do not yet use the free decision of the will, he says. As if indeed the sin which we say they draw originally from Adam, that is, that they are involved in his guilt and on that account held liable to punishment, could ever have existed anywhere except in the will by which it was committed, when the transgression of the divine precept was made.

The second confession.— The second catholic confession is that it is ours as regards the subject, that is, that it is truly in us. To this sense, that we are truly and (as the natural philosophers say) by formal denomination sinners. For so Paul says, that when we were sinners (and he speaks of original sin) CHRIST died for us. Therefore if you look to the subject, it is properly ours: but if to the cause, it is neither proper to us, nor voluntary in us, but by necessity of nature: according to that saying of Paul, We were by nature children of wrath.

The third is that it is truly sin.— But thirdly, and above all, anyone who does not wish to be considered a Pelagian ought to hold as indubitable that it is truly and properly a sin. For there were not lacking (as the Master of the Sentences reports, book 2, dist. 30) those who believed that there is no true original fault in us, but only the guilt of punishments and calamities to which the human race is liable on account of Adam's sin: and that it is called sin in that sense because it is an effect of sin. Nor are there lacking now, not only from the stock of the Lutherans (for they are torn into different confessions) but also from the number of those who think themselves catholics, who, coming forth as Homers among theologians, continue to maintain either that there is no original sin, or that it is not truly and properly a fault, with whom we are soon to engage. For the present we warn that we are born not only guilty of punishment, but truly in fault, and therefore in guilt of punishment. This the passage just cited says Augustine:⁴ namely, that they are involved in the guilt of Adam's sin, and on that account liable to punishment. And on Psalm 50 more explicitly: Therefore, he says, David says he was conceived in iniquities, because in all iniquity is drawn from Adam, and the bond of death. For no one, he says, is born except drawing punishment and the merit of punishment. But the merit of punishment is sin. Everyone therefore who is born through the concupiscence of the flesh draws sin. Thus he. And in the Hypognosticon, article 2: The sin of Adam killed not only himself but the whole human race: since we have received together both his condemnation and his fault. But what need is there of Augustine as witness, where Paul is so clear and irrefragable a judge?⁵ For through one man, he says, sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all have sinned. Behold, not only death and punishments, but fault first passed into us, and therefore punishments. Likewise. Therefore Adam was a figure of CHRIST, because just as we are truly justified by the grace of CHRIST, so by the transgression of Adam we are all unjust, and truly sinners. Whoever therefore rejects this most clear light of truth, of whatever order he may be, let him be judged a heretic. And indeed (to use the words of Augustine cited above) let him not most firmly hold that every man who is conceived through the intercourse of man and woman is born with original sin, subject to ungodliness, subject to death: and on that account is born a child of wrath. Against which race of men the sentence of anathema was pronounced both formerly by the Council of Mileum, and also (as we said in chapter 7) just now by our holy synod, most advisedly on account of these contumacious men.

The fourth consideration.— Hence finally, in the fourth place, we must investigate where the nature of original fault lies hidden: further, that we may understand what it is that is common to us with Adam, which is truly sin in us: and that indeed not by way of act, but without use by way of habit. But in Adam, besides the transient act of sin which does not persist in us, there were two other things thence effected: namely, the privation of justice, and the dissolution of the concupiscence of the flesh, which, with the reins loosed, is borne unbridled into the objects of sense, outside the order of reason. Both of these are commonly congenital in us, his offspring. From this crossroads Augustine and Anselm⁶ seem to have gone in different directions. For the first, in places of his teaching by no means rare, appears to constitute that concupiscence of the flesh as original sin. But the latter, in the book On the Conception of the Virgin, openly says that it is the lack of justice which ought to have been in our nature. The Master of the Sentences, book 2, dist. 30, embraced the opinion of Augustine (as he himself judges). By whose opinion very many have been led. Others follow Anselm. St. Thomas,⁷ 1-2, q. 82, in order to reconcile both opinions, says that concupiscence is the material (as they say) in this sin: but the lack of justice is the formal. So that if one wished to define it, one would say that original sin is concupiscence lacking original justice.⁸ These things, although they prevail by their antiquity and the authority of the doctors, are nevertheless not things about which the Church has defined anything. Nay, the council recently, and most deservedly, defined nothing as to what original sin is, but left it under dispute among the doctors. And therefore it needs explanation.

Concupiscence, a morbid quality.— The Master of the Sentences (as it seems) and certain other followers of his comment that concupiscence is a certain morbid quality, adhering not in the flesh but in the soul. This they call the tinder, the law of the flesh, and the tyrant. They seem to elicit this from the authority of Augustine⁹ in On Marriage and Concupiscence, book 1, chapter 25, where he says that this concupiscence does not remain substantially, but is a certain affection of bad quality, like sickness. And that it is in the soul is clear, since in book 5 Against Julian he says that the soul is corrupted in the flesh as in a corrupted vessel. And in a certain sermon on the words of the Apostle: The vice of concupiscence is what the soul has contracted not from itself but from the flesh. And it is confirmed by reason, since original sin is a fault, but fault is not of the flesh, but is a stain of the soul. These men therefore conclude that the sin of Adam infected his flesh: but the infected flesh defiled that which it begot: and from that flesh, when the soul is infused, the soul is infected with that morbid quality. For it is Aristotle's doctrine in 1 On the Soul that from the motions of the soul the body is often affected, and conversely the mind from the qualities of the body.

The opinion of morbid quality is rejected.— But in truth these men, I know not to whom, can obtrude this opinion of theirs. For although the motions of the mind, as love, for example, or anger, stir up heat or bile in the body, and conversely the alteration of the body moves the mind, yet that the soul of Adam could imprint on the body a quality remaining by way of habit, which should perpetually remain in the flesh begotten from it, is persuasible by no philosophy: and much less that the flesh should impress such a quality on the soul coming to it: since a quality is of a material body, but the soul is spiritual. Then, that the sin peculiar to Adam could engender such a quality in the souls of men, the thing itself shows to be a fabrication, for that eating of the forbidden tree could not by its own nature have such efficacy: otherwise from all similar sins a similar effect would follow. Which is ridiculous. Unless you were so foolish as to imagine that by divine judgment such power was attributed to that sin because in it the whole of nature had sinned: the foundation of which can be no reason or authority on which it rests. But that that quality, even if it were possible, is admitted in vain, and believed to be present, is thus clear. For¹⁰ that we are guilty of the sin of Adam, in which the fault consists, can be explained perfectly without any quality, as will be seen a little later. And that the soul follows the desires of the flesh, it needs no morbid quality: since, being the act of the body, it follows sense by itself through appetite, unless it is contained by reason. Nor anywhere has Augustine insinuated that the concupiscence of the soul is original sin, but only the concupiscence of the flesh: as is most clearly established from all his works. Therefore wherever he said that the evil of concupiscence is not a substance, but an affection of bad quality, he does nothing other than repel the Manichaeans, who said that the evil in us is a substance begotten by the evil God: against whom he says that the evil of concupiscence is not in us from nature, which God made sound: but is accidentally adjacent to us from the fault of the first man. And everywhere, either he or the other saints say that the soul is infected from the flesh as from a vessel, they teach this thoroughly, that the soul does not draw this evil because the same soul migrates from body to body (as the Pythagoreans and Platonists imagined): nor indeed because souls are educed from the potentiality of matter, and so this evil descends from soul to soul, through the fact that the soul of the son comes from the father, as in brute animals: but that although the soul of anyone is created by God alone, it nevertheless does not contract original sin from God, but from the fact that it is infused into flesh sown by Adam. Which is in sum to say that man is conceived in sin because he is conceived as the son of Adam. But what these men add, that the fault is not in the body but in the soul, we willingly and gladly confess. Yet it does not follow from this that it is a quality produced by the flesh, but surely a guilt of nature concreated, as we are about to make plain.

Others, closer to the mind of Augustine¹¹ and to the truth, assert that the concupiscence of the flesh is original sin. They can gather this from Augustine. For he says in the book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, that when Adam sinned, disobedient to God, then his body lost the grace by which it obeyed his soul in every part. Then, he says, that bestial motion arose, shameful to men, at which he blushed in his nakedness. And below. From this disobedience of the flesh, therefore, from this law of sin and death, whoever is born carnally needs to be regenerated spiritually, so that he may not only be brought to the kingdom of God, but also be freed from the condemnation of sin. But I would set this as the basis of my disputation¹² from Augustine On Concupiscence, not only for catholic scholastics, but against the Lutherans: who contend that concupiscence is so much sin that it remains even in the baptized as sin. For Augustine here calls concupiscence sensuality, loosed from original justice. And he seems here to say that this is the sin on account of which we are to be regenerated by baptism. Concerning which, in book 2 of the same work, chapter 4: Concupiscence, he says, as the law of sin, remaining in the members of this body of death, is born with little children, in baptized little children is loosed from guilt, is left for the contest, before the contest it pursues the dead with no condemnation. It entangles unbaptized little children as guilty, and as children of wrath, even if they die as little children, drags them to condemnation. And in book 3 of the Retractations: The guilt of concupiscence is loosed in baptism, but the infirmity remains. Whence perhaps St. Thomas¹³ 1-2, q. 82, elicited that Augustine says that concupiscence is guilt. For I have read this word nowhere in Augustine unless St. Thomas perhaps had another codex. Hence therefore they conclude that that concupiscence of the flesh is original sin. Which in truth, unless it is interpreted in a sound way, I do not know how anyone can bring himself to believe, saving the most grave authority of Augustine. This others before us have prudently considered.

It is argued that concupiscence is not sin.— The first reason which offers itself to me against this opinion is as follows. That which was in Adam before it was in us, if it was not sin in him, surely will not be in us either: this concupiscence of the flesh was not sin in Adam, but an effect and punishment consequent upon sin: for on account of Adam's sin justice was taken away, and concupiscence was unbridled and loosed, not only in his person but in the whole of nature: therefore just as it was not sin in him, so neither is it in us, but an effect and punishment of sin.

The second reason.— Moreover, lest the ambiguity of the name make the disputation vain, original sin (as we have sufficiently established above) truly has the nature of fault, which accordingly, although it is distinguished from actual sin, is true iniquity: since on account of it the Psalmist confesses¹⁴ that we are conceived in iniquities: whence it follows that it is a depravity which is hateful to God: on account of which man, unless regenerated in CHRIST, is driven from the kingdom. But this nature can never agree with that concupiscence of the flesh. For that (as we said in chapter 3) is innate to man from natural principles, which that heavenly gift of justice restrained. And for that reason it is not that depravity, obliquity and iniquity in which the nature of sin consists, which God hates: but it is rather a punishment inflicted by God: who surely despoiled our nature of that justice on account of sin, and left it destitute in its natural state. Wherefore neither Adam nor we are blamed because we are thus concupiscible, but because we committed the fault in Adam, on account of which we lost the bond by which concupiscence was held subject to reason.

The third reason.— In addition. Sin properly is not that thing which remains the same in the justified as it was in the sinner, but concupiscence remains the same: therefore it is not sin, but plainly that guilt which is remitted when we are regenerated.

The fourth reason.— So then, to embrace all things. That force and power of concupiscence outside the order of reason, which is in a child, nay rather which is in an adult without act and consent, is not that on account of which we are disinherited from the heavenly inheritance: but rather by the same sin by which we were made exiles from the kingdom, the rein of concupiscence was also broken, and we fell into death and other calamities: therefore that concupiscence is no more sin than expulsion from the kingdom, or death, or diseases, or other wretched miseries of that kind, which are sins in no other way than that they are effects of Adam's sin. Except that concupiscence is besides the cause of our actual crimes. Those who now think that original sin is the love of earthly things suffer the same repulse.¹⁵ For if they declare this of the act of love, it is not indeed original but actual sin: but if they understand it of the love of the flesh, or of the inclination of the soul by which it is apt to follow sense, they fall into the same place from which we were just now driving the former.

Nor is it the privation of justice.— By almost the same reasons it is refuted that original sin is not the privation of original justice, in the sense which very many conceive, namely the privation of the rectitude of the whole man, which was in that state of integral nature. For that was not sin in Adam, but an effect and punishment of sin, prior by nature to the dissolution of concupiscence. Nor is that the depravity and obliquity of a perverse reason, nor on account of it did God make us exiles from the kingdom, but on account of the antecedent transgression he deprived us of the heavenly kingdom and punished us with the loss of original justice.

Justice due to be present.— And a second argument. For in that almost all doctors affirm that original sin is the privation of justice due to be present, if they understand the debt in such a way that Adam was bound by a singular precept to keep it, or his offspring, certainly it is false, and one whose faith can be established by no authority of the sacred writers, since no commandment is read to have been set for Adam, and no other law prescribed than that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge: from which if he ate, there would follow upon him the punishment both of justice taken away and of death consequently following: therefore in truth, not the loss of justice, but the eating of the tree itself was the fault. For indeed just as we are bound to preserve grace in no other way than by keeping the commandments, and the murderer has no other crime besides murder by which he either loses the grace of God or his life, if he pays the penalty of his head: so neither was Adam bound to have justice in any other way than by not transgressing the precept concerning the tree, or any other precept of natural law. Nor besides the eating of the apple was being stripped of justice a new crime for him: and therefore much less for us, to be born stripped of it. Nay, to speak more fully, even if he were bound by a peculiar precept to keep justice, to desert it would then indeed be a sin for Adam, but not that he afterwards, or we, were deprived of it.

In addition. If original sin were (as they say) the privation of justice due to be present, it would then follow that it is not remitted in baptism: since neither is justice restored there, nor is man released from any debt by which he was previously bound.

Original sin is not enmity with God.— Others, who strive to extricate themselves from these windings, could imagine original sin to be nothing other than enmity with God: but neither should these believe they have planted a fixed mark. For enmity is not sin, but plainly an effect of sin. For by the fact that someone offends God or another, he kindles his enmity. And besides, in infants there is a manifest argument. For either you wish original sin to be the hatred by which the infant hates God, or that by which God hates him. The first is none, since the infant has no use of will. The second is not sin, since it is in God, but is the work of sin: further, that God conceives that hatred when provoked by sin.

There are, therefore, men of this age who, although not all, yet opposing a part of these arguments against the old opinion, have fallen away from it: saying that there are not in individual men individual original sins, but that one [sin] which the first parent committed is the original transgression, of which we are all guilty, and from which we are named sinners. The leader of these is considered Albert Pighius,¹ a man indeed both pious and learned. Who nevertheless hears ill of this, as if he altogether denied that sins are original in us. But neither will he, if he is heard soundly and without prejudice, be condemned of such ignorance, nor, if he had more sharply weighed the sense of the old opinion, would he perhaps have rejected it. First, therefore, if it is fitting to hunt the subject from the name, you would call original sin nothing other than sin transmitted by origin from the first parent to the offspring.

Wherefore from that sin our contagion is to be judged.² So that what was in him as the formal nature of sin may be recognized as left in us by way of habit. And the effects which were in him may be the same effects in us. Let us suppose, for example, that the first sin of Adam was the eating of the tree (for whether pride preceded it or not is irrelevant). The formal nature of that crime then³ was the obliquity and deflection of the soul through the will from the law and order of God. And because Adam bore the person of the whole of nature, which had received in him that benefit of justice, to remain in it as long as he did not sin, the whole in him was made guilty of that transgression, and was made ungrateful and hateful to God. Wherefore the same deordination and deformity (to use the school's words) of that act remained fixed in nature by way of habit: which obliquity accordingly we contract as one with the same nature. Wherefore just as it must be conceded that original sin is in us,⁴ so it must not be denied that as to its formal [element] it is the lack of original justice: provided that justice itself is similarly taken as formal. For we have already reported above in chapter 8 from St. Thomas⁵ 1st part, q. 95, that the formal signification of original justice is the rectitude of the soul towards God, but the material [significations] are the other rectitudes, namely of the inferior powers of the soul towards reason, and of the body towards the soul. In Adam, if you consider the matter carefully, the privation of justice as to the first order was not an effect of sin, but its very formal nature: but the privation of the same justice as to the other two orders was not the nature of sin, but an effect. In the same way the privation in us of the former rectitude is original sin: but the privation of the others is the effect of the same sin. Which distinction, if Pighius and his followers had examined, they would never have denied that original sin is in us. Yet,⁶ to add this word in his favour in turn, if either Pighius or anyone else had so denied that original sin is in us as to say that we contract only the guilt of punishments which we owe for Adam's sin, but not the guilt of fault, he would openly fight not only against Augustine but against Paul: as we demonstrated in the third confession of the preceding chapter, and shall repeat in the next chapter as well. But he who should say that we are defiled, when we are conceived, by no other guilt of fault than that of Adam's transgression, would portend no error, except that he would lightly and without reason deny that that guilt is the lack of justice, in the manner explained. And therefore most truly and most advisedly the holy Synod of Trent⁷ decided, session 5, canon 3, that the sin which is one by origin, and is transmitted by propagation, is in all, and is proper to each. Therefore by the things explained here are dissolved the objections which we made in the preceding chapter against the opinion of Anselm. But as far as the matter concerns Augustine,⁸ who seems to teach that concupiscence is original sin, he must first be interpreted not of the formal but of the material signification: as his faithful interpreter St. Thomas explained. Since the same [Augustine] says,⁹ that the guilt of concupiscence is loosed in baptism, while concupiscence remains: but guilt, at least in original sin, is the same as the form of sin. But neither is concupiscence¹⁰ to be considered as the matter or substratum signified of sin in such a way as the act is in actual transgression. For in actual sin the action is placed beneath the obliquity as its subject: since through the action itself we turn aside from reason and the divine rule: so that the action itself is properly denominated oblique and sin: as snow is white by its colour. But in original sin it is far otherwise: since the form of sin is in no way in concupiscence as in a subject, but in the soul, where original justice was, as we said above in chapter 5, or (as others think) in the will. Wherefore concupiscence is not so properly denominated sin, as the soul itself is sinful, or man a sinner. Yet because in this kind of sin a material [element] cannot properly be devised as in actual sin, and the motion of concupiscence was the first and nearest effect of departing justice, it pleased Augustine to call it in a certain way material sin,¹¹ so as to show that the thing is evil and harmful. And this especially against Pelagius, who denied that the rebellion of the flesh was an effect of sin: nay, he said it was a natural good: as is seen against Julian. And that this was Augustine's doctrine will become more evident in chapter 12. Where we brought him in interpreting Paul, that he called concupiscence sin in the sense in which it is an effect of sin. For if after baptism sensuality is not reckoned sin except because it is an effect of sin, it is certainly established that neither before baptism is it otherwise sin. Although then, on account of the guilt conjoined in the soul, of which concupiscence itself is the nearest effect, it is called the material signification of sin. And this is what the disputation proves, which we constructed in the preceding chapter to explain his mind against the words of Augustine.

An answer to those who wish original sin to be in us.— But yet it remains for us besides to answer the arguments of those who think that no original fault is formally in us, but that all are called sinners from that fault which was in Adam. First.¹² Paul says that we all sinned in that sin of Adam alone. Whence Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 1, chapter 10, on that word, In whom all have sinned. If you understand, he says, in what sin, it is certain and most manifest that there are other sins proper to each one, in which they so sin only as they are whose sins they are, and this one other, in which all have sinned, when all were that one man. But if you understand in whom one man, what, he says, is more manifest than this manifestation? For we read that those who believe in CHRIST are justified in CHRIST, on account of the hidden communication and inspiration of spiritual grace, by which whoever cleaves to the Lord is one spirit. Thus far Augustine, leaving to the reader the conclusion of the allusion, that he may understand that all sinned in Adam through the communication of his fault, in whom we were one flesh, as we are justified in CHRIST, in whom we are made one spirit. And in the Hypognosticon, book 2: When man sinned, he says, nature sinned: and nature has now been made sinful, that is, having the vice of sin. To the same point belongs that: By the transgression of one many died. And by the disobedience of one many were made sinners. Whence Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15, says (as we have already cited above) that we are involved in the guilt of Adam alone, by whose will that sin was committed which we draw originally. Therefore we contract by origin that one sin in which all have sinned, and not many.

To these things, however, and the like, we answer by conceding that we all sinned in that sin of Adam alone, as has been clearly shown, since when we receive a soul we do not sin, but are conceived in sin. Nor is anyone to be said to sin originally,¹³ but to draw sin originally with nature. Nor is it to be denied that the sin of Adam is that which we contract. Yet this happens through the fact that that guilt of sin (as we have said) has been left in the nature which sinned in Adam. And therefore just as we all draw nature from Adam, each receiving his own, so also we all contract his sin, through the fact that in each one there is that deviation and obliquity of soul from God, whereby accordingly we are all so infected by the contagion of fault that we each contract individual stains. Although that guilt in us is not a positive quality, but a mere privation of justice (as we have said) as to the formal element. Wherefore since in the remission¹⁴ of original sin grace is restored to us in order to God, but not the inferior powers in order to reason, St. Thomas says very well, as we cited above in chapter 5, that original justice is restored in baptism only as to the formal element. But in what way through the will¹⁵ all we then sinned in Adam, the same holy doctor elucidates by a most apt example, 1-2, q. 81, where he says that just as all members are one man, and therefore the will of the whole is reckoned as that of all the members, so we all were in Adam in a certain way one man, wherefore the voluntary inordination of his sin remains in the whole nature which we receive by generation. It remains, namely, by way of habit: just as in a man who has passed through an act of sin, the obliquity of the soul remains, until it is restored to order by grace.

The theologians add here besides¹⁶ an example to explain how we all sinned in Adam, concerning a most munificent king who enrolled a servant adopted as son as heir of a very ample substance, of which benefit all his posterity would obtain possession: yet on this law, that if he persisted in his grace; but as soon as he committed the first crime against the king, he would fall from that inheritance. The example is ancient, and by no means unsuited to the matter. For God had not in a wholly dissimilar way bestowed on our nature in Adam original justice, but Paul is my [authority],¹⁷ who seems to explain the matter best: where he says that Adam bore the figure of CHRIST who was to come. For thence the antithesis of the fault of Adam and the grace of CHRIST shines forth, where, when the new Adam comes to the water of baptism, the heavenly Father says, This is my beloved Son,¹⁸ in whom I am well pleased. For it is just as if he had said: As Adam was [the one] in whom alone all his nation displeased me, which succeeds him by natural generation, so (as an antidote) this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased: that is, in whom alone, as many as have been reborn in him by baptism, reconciled to me in grace, shall please me. Which Paul also says: As by the disobedience¹⁹ of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many are made just. Therefore that all sinned in Adam²⁰ is nothing other than that our nature, on account of the participation of his fault, is ungrateful and hateful to God. And therefore all his offspring are born children of wrath. Just as to be justified in CHRIST is that, on account of his grace participated in us, we are all pleasing to God. In whom accordingly we are reborn children of mercy.

By these things finally²¹ let it be clear in what way the original stain is transmitted by the perpetual series of generations from Adam. But it is Augustine²² who, out of hatred of the Pelagians, throws some doubt into the eyes, who frequently says that that concupiscence of the rebellious flesh, on account of its disobedience, is the instrument of propagating this kind of fault. For he says (as cited in the preceding chapter) in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, that from this disobedience of the flesh straying from reason, and from the bestial and shameful motion of the members, whoever is generated carnally contracts sin, from which he is to be washed by baptism. And book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 24, where he investigates how, since marriage is a good of nature, children are procreated in sin from spouses reborn by baptism, and especially where no sin is mingled with the conjugal act, he answers that it is not from the good by which marriages are good, but from the evil of concupiscence, which the spouses use well, and of which they are nevertheless ashamed, that the devil holds the children born as guilty. And below. From this, he says, concupiscence of the flesh, which although in the regenerate it is now not reckoned as sin, yet has not come to nature except from sin, whatever offspring is born is bound by original sin, unless it is reborn in him whom the virgin conceived without that concupiscence. Therefore when he deigned to be born in the flesh, he alone was born without sin. Everywhere, finally, when Augustine speaks of this matter, he makes that concupiscence rebellious to reason, as it were for the reason that it does not obey reason, the channel of the original stain. But there is an argument which anyone could raise against this opinion.²³ If some men were now created out of nothing, male and female (of whom we spoke in the third chapter), namely in mere nature without fault and grace, these indeed, however much they burned with lust and the rebellion of concupiscence, and blazed with vices, would nevertheless never transmit original fault into the offspring they begot: as is the consensus of all theologians, because they would not then be the offspring of Adam. But if on the contrary two descending by natural seed from Adam were, in the first instant of the infusion of the soul, infused with grace preventing sin (as is said of the most blessed virgin), and concupiscence were cut off from them, or wholly extinguished, so that it could no more insult reason than in the state of innocence, they would nevertheless transmit original sin into the children they begot. I say [this] if the grace conferred on the parents were only personal, and not for the whole succession. Therefore the rebellion of concupiscence is not in the cause of original fault. I do not indeed doubt²⁴ that it is as these reasons persuade: namely that in whatever way nature is transmitted from Adam after his sin, sin is also transfused. And if nature were not transmitted from Adam, but from a man now created out of nothing, children would be begotten without sin. Nay, the holy Synod of Trent²⁵ determines this very thing in session 6, chapter 3: that as no one receives his grace unless reborn in CHRIST. Wherefore that concupiscence is the channel of sin means nothing else than that concupiscence and the shameful motion of the flesh are the natural instrument of generation, through which the nature of the prevaricator Adam is propagated. Nor did the wise Augustine mean anything else. But because the flesh²⁶ would never titillate against reason unless the fault of Adam were in the cause, he says that by the rebellion of concupiscence it is the channel of sin.

We have thought it worthwhile to place the pure form of truth first before the eyes of all, lest the cloudy darkness of errors obscure its light. There exist nevertheless two errors on this matter,¹ contrary by their extremes. One is that of certain recent Pelagians, who deny that original sin in us is anything other than a defect of nature—namely, the guilt of death and of the other penalties which we incur because of Adam’s fault. The other is that of the Lutherans, at the opposite extreme, who impress this kind of sin so deeply upon our nature that they refuse to allow it to be truly remitted in this life and altogether taken away. Lutherans, I say—not that the former were not also begotten with Luther as their father, but because, since they disagree with the rest on this matter in both respects entirely, we rightly call them Zwinglians after their leader. For that schism of theirs (which I mentioned in the prologue)—namely, of those who listen to no one in matters of faith who exercises divine authority—what can it produce but that Lernaean monster of fifty heads? The former, indeed, must be dealt with by us first, since the dispute with them is very brief; afterward the others, against whom we must argue at much greater length. Zwingli therefore is among the Germans,² who reopened the tomb of Pelagius, so that the pus might breathe from it. For he, in his little book On Baptism, and then more vigorously in his declamation to Urbanus Rhegius, persists in contending that original sin is not a sin but a disease. Nor are there lacking those who wish to be counted under the name of Catholics and nevertheless adhere to the Zwinglian view, if not in words, yet in reality. But the contrary conclusion—namely, that it is a true fault—we have established sufficiently and more than sufficiently by the testimonies of the sacred writers, both throughout the whole preceding discussion and especially in chapters 7 and 9. Wherefore we have determined to make clear here only this: with what slight reasons they persuade themselves away from original fault, so as altogether to reject it. For they gather the first argument³ from the clemency of God, of whom, since he is much more inclined to pardon sins than to avenge them (for he wills all men to be saved, and does not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted), it is not credible that he should impute the sin of one man as fault to all mortals. Especially since, speaking properly of offenses, he says through the Prophet: “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,”⁴ but the soul that sins, it shall die. The second argument⁵ they form from the nature of sin, since there is no sin unless it is voluntary. Since therefore none of mortals was present at Adam’s sin, nor consented to it—indeed all his successors disapprove of that sin, bearing with the greatest grief the miseries and hardships they experience from it—how can human sense grasp that those who did not yet exist were all bound by some law in one man, and that the will of one was so reckoned as the will of all that those not yet born were transgressors through it? Add that by the same reasoning the other sins not only of the first parent⁶ but also of other parents would be transmitted to their children; and by a stronger reason the good deeds of parents ought also to flow down to their descendants. For the same principle applies in Adam and in other, even nearer, parents. Indeed Zwingli adds⁷ that sin is joined with fault; but fault is born from the deed of him who committed the crime; therefore no sin belongs to anyone who did not himself commit it.

They add also a new kind of arguing. The sin of Adam is believed to have been remitted to him when he was reconciled with God; how then does it pass to us? Or if it is imputed to us, what is it that was remitted to Adam? For if we all sinned in that one man, truth far more effectively proves that the fault of us all was also pardoned in him. Nor indeed do they wholly approve that example⁸ by which we represented this matter above: of that servant who, held in the highest honor with his lord, ungrateful and treacherous, committed some most atrocious crime against his lord, and so fell from the friendship of the prince, and was deprived of all honor and favor, both he and his offspring. For if his offspring, cut off from honor and despoiled of the riches which he had received from the prince, were thus treated, they say, that would certainly not argue greater harshness in the prince than is right and fair. But if he afflicted all his posterity with punishments for their father's crime, and finally condemned them to death, that prince would truly be held guilty of the greatest cruelty and savagery. Since therefore God, because of the fault of the first parent, has not only deprived us of heavenly honor and inheritance, but has driven us into diseases and very many calamities, and even into death itself, this seems greatly to detract from the riches of his goodness and benignity.

Finally, others add to these⁹ that in all sacred Scripture there is no word of original justice or original fault, but that we invent this fault. By this reasoning, moreover, they are both unjust toward our nature and falsely charge the divine goodness.

Yet all these things¹⁰ and very many of this kind which they heap together into this argument, they would most easily dissolve themselves if they were willing to contemplate considerately human nature as we depicted it in chapter 3, so as to reason from it more perspicaciously about both grace and fault. For if God had created human nature in its purely natural state, no injury would have been done us because he had made us such that we could neither attain divine grace by ourselves nor possess divine glory, since natural powers are not equal to so great a gift. Nor would there be any injury in the fact that sensuality is hostile to reason, blinding it and hurling it headlong into vices; or that we are subject to diseases and other hardships and calamities of this life, and even to death. For all these things would be native to the proper principles of our nature. But it was due to his goodness and benignity, who formed us for himself, that he endowed our nature with grace and justice, by which he raised us above ourselves and restrained the lower powers, which obey the higher. Nor is it to be thought (as some imagine)¹¹ that a pact intervened between God and Adam, so that as soon as he sinned nature would be stripped of those heavenly gifts, and thus did not the consent of the whole human race present itself, and this cause make the whole race sin when he sinned. For that is a fable. For what need had God of Adam’s consent? Nor was he so bound for himself or for us to preserve the gift of original justice that a singular precept should be given about this matter. For Scripture is manifest that there was one commandment, not to eat of the tree of knowledge; and without his consent God could obligate the whole of nature, as its lord by right of creation. Just as the laws of a legitimate prince, which are proclaimed in the present manner to a city, are understood to be established for all its citizens forever. Nevertheless, in punishment of transgression¹² God threatened death, by which the privation of justice is signified. Since therefore Adam was then the whole of nature, there was no cruelty or harshness in God in that, when nature sinned, he stripped it of those gifts beyond nature with which he had adorned it from pure liberality. As if a prince should grant a city a most ample privilege, provided it did not commit a certain crime; but if it should violate this, then indeed the city would remain forever offensive and hateful to him. And therefore in a certain way that sin was voluntary for all men—namely, through the will of the whole of nature. For this reason¹³ other sins, whether of the first parent or of other parents, are not passed on to children, just as neither are virtues; because those are personal, and only personal punishments were decreed for them. But that first sin was the one for which a common punishment was established: namely, that our race should fall back into its bare nature. And for that reason the whole of nature became, in its own way, guilty of that sin alone. Wherefore it in no way detracts from the clemency¹⁴ of the most gentle God that we endure this kind of punishment—namely, diseases, miseries and death—because of that sin. For if he destroyed us by fire or sword, or by any other violent death, he could indeed perhaps be considered cruel. But that he has deprived us of the heavenly benefit of immortality, so that we incur natural death, in no way blackens either his justice or his mercy. But to another argument it is answered that that guilt was remitted to Adam¹⁵ in the respect in which it belonged to his person, yet it remained in the nature to be propagated. Just as one who is now baptized is freed from all fault, even original fault, insofar as it is this person’s; nevertheless nature is left infected, so that those whom a Christian begets are stained with the same corruption. But to that passage, “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,” another can be opposed from the opposite side, where it is said: “I am a jealous God,¹⁶ visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children.” Yet their harmony is this: that temporal punishments, such as infamy, deprivation of goods, and other things of that kind, children rightly pay for their fathers, because according to the body they are as it were part of the father. But spiritual punishments, and especially exclusion from the kingdom of heaven, only he who sins undergoes; for according to the soul the son is not part of the father, but “all souls are mine,” says God through Ezekiel. To the matter, then. Since¹⁷ all men share in Adam’s fault, they have been expelled from the heavenly inheritance—expelled, I say, in this way, that by our nature we have no right to it, but what God bestowed on our race in Adam, we lost in him. By these things the error of Zwingli is exposed, since he acknowledges no other kind of fault than what is contracted by one’s own consent. For if our nature did not sin by that will of the first-formed man, why because of that fault have we not only suffered so great a loss of temporal goods, but are even condemned, as Paul says? And indeed so condemned that we have been excluded even from the right to the kingdom. Certainly if it had been only his own, it would have harmed us nothing; but our right would have remained safe, at least in spiritual things. Because the son, as we were just now interpreting, shall not bear the iniquity of the father in goods of this kind. Therefore his example is most inept if he wishes to adapt it wholly to this matter. For he says that just as if someone in war or by some other fault of his is taken into slavery, he makes all his posterity slaves—yet to be a slave is no fault but a punishment—so it happens to us from Adam. But he does not see that God would never have deprived us of his friendship and the right to the kingdom unless we had in some way shared in the fault. Nor do we say that it is a sin that we are mortal and subject to miseries, but that since Adam’s sin was reckoned as the sin of the whole nature, that deflection and disordering of the soul from God, which was actual in him, remains in us restfully by way of habit. And from this we suffer these natural evils. As Paul says: “Death passed from Adam to all, in whom” (that is, because in him) “all sinned,” and therefore incurred wrath and indignation (as the Synod of Trent says, canon 1, according to Paul). Otherwise there would be no need of baptism for the remission of original fault, which was the Pelagian heresy. But Zwingli easily concedes this, saying that original sin is also called original by metonymy, that is, by an abusive signification of the name; and that infants are not to be adjudged to eternal damnation merely because they have not been dipped in water. For which reason another conflict with him remains for us in book two, chapter 10.

But what they add lastly, that these names¹⁸ of original justice and original sin are nowhere read in sacred Scripture, is the quibble of the Arians, who rejected the name Homoousion because it is not in the Gospel. But as they were then convicted, so we now refute these men. For where the matter is clear, the name itself is also virtually present. For since it is in the Gospel, “I and the Father are one,” it is as good as if it had been written “of the same substance,” which is Homoousion. In no dissimilar way must we speak of original justice and original sin. Moreover, since it is established in the Church of Christ that the first man was created in justice—namely, in the rectitude of the virtues and powers, as much as was sufficient to attain the end for which he had been created, as we demonstrated very fully in chapter 5—and that men would have possessed this felicity by perpetual generation to be propagated, as long as the human race persevered in its duty and in the grace of God, from this the name original justice has most aptly arisen. It can be called native, or natural, or congenital. And by a similar reasoning, since it is in Paul that all sinned in Adam, and not merely by imitation—and this was defined against Pelagius by the public consent of the Fathers of the Church—and since he also pronounces us by nature children of wrath, nothing more at all is wanting in Scripture to establish the belief in a sin that may be called natural, or connate, and hereditary, or contracted by origin, which is to say original.

We have come then¹ to the first place of the controversies which that Martin Luther, the contriver of new things, created for us, and which his offspring afterward persist in defending. For hence, driven by I know not what wind—never before raised in the Church—into the other extreme, different from the Pelagians, they thrust original fault upon our soul in such a way that it can by no grace be blotted out in this age. This place in Luther’s assertions addressed to Leo, article 2, reads thus: “To deny that sin remains in a child after baptism is to trample Paul and Christ underfoot at the same time.” And article 3: “The tinder of sin,” he says, “even if no actual sin is present, keeps the soul from entering heaven as long as it is in the body.” Nay, a little below he calls that same tinder actual sin. And his disciples in the Augsburg Confession, article 2, call the vice of origin truly sin, condemning and bringing eternal death. And in Melanchthon’s Commonplaces: “Scripture,” he says, “makes no distinction between actual and original sin. For even original sin is a certain actual depraved concupiscence.” And so it is their invention that concupiscence is not only materially sin, but formally, and in act, that the lust itself and the assault of the flesh, before the consent of the will, is sin, even in the baptized. And they say that this same concupiscence is prohibited by that commandment of the Decalogue, “You shall not covet.” And therefore Luther, in the same article 2, regards it as a disgrace that we do not truly call sin the lust of spouses who, however great in holiness, use their right with a legitimate and most just intention of begetting. But good God, in that most famous dogma of reformation which they themselves call a didagma,² with what explanation do they establish this place! For they say that although a man deliberately covets nothing iniquitous, that volatile concupiscence nevertheless, from which he restrains himself in all meekness, holiness and piety, is sin before God. And below: “Not only is homicide, adultery and theft sin, but also because of concupiscence, although the will does not consent to it, the man himself in the sight of God is a homicide and an adulterer.” But it is worthwhile to consider how they weave their web. For from the fact that concupiscence of the flesh is sin to them, they infer that all our works, however much done in grace, are defiled by concupiscence³ in the respect in which they are ours, and therefore that they are all sins. Nor do we by them fulfill the commandments of God, since concupiscence holds us back so that we do not work fully from love of him above all things. On this matter the place of speaking has been established for us in book 3. And therefore although in the conferences at Ratisbon, convicted by most manifest testimonies, they defend this error about original sin somewhat more remissly—so much so that in the second and most recent conference this article was omitted as if either confessed or sufficiently discussed—nevertheless because they persist in the errors about works which they derived especially from that source, and besides because Bucer, in his little book On the Reconciliation of the Churches, seems recently to have restored the same article with the rest, it will not be superfluous to add our vote to the things which have been said by our men, especially by the most learned man of Ross. Especially since, as long as their books survive, there is reason to fear from them.

The state of the controversy,⁴ which is the first of all between us and the Lutherans, is therefore constituted thus. We (as catholic truth has it) believe that after baptism legitimately received nothing of original contagion remains in the reborn that has the true nature of fault. But they, on the contrary, think that that concupiscence of the flesh, in the part in which it struggles against reason in holy men, in whatever kind of vices, is true fault and worthy of damnation and eternal death—even then when actual sin has not yet been perpetrated by the consent of the will—except that by the mercy of God that fault is not imputed to those who are in grace.

This ignorance⁵ would never have clouded their eyes with its mist had they not been such unjust enemies of philosophy, which nevertheless often and greatly serves faith as a handmaid. For concupiscence of the flesh⁶ (as we began to say in the third chapter) is natural to us, since—even if no fault or grace had preceded—it would exist in man from the principles of nature, insofar as he is endowed with senses; except that God created it subject to reason by the bridle of original justice. Therefore when on account of sin that justice was taken away, the word “concupiscence” signifies nothing other than nature deprived of that gift—besides that it is now an effect of sin, as removing that justice which prohibited the rebellion of the same concupiscence; and yet if man were created in pure natural state, it would be mere nature. There is Anselm’s example⁷ in On the Conception of the Virgin, concerning a ship: it is of its nature to be carried by the winds; and therefore if it is held by a fixed anchor, then he who breaks the anchor is said to set the ship in motion. Since therefore the things that are in us by nature are neither worthy of praise nor of blame, who, even if blind, would say that that concupiscence is sin? Unless perhaps materially before baptism, as was explained above. Truly, by whatever reason you say it, you will be consequently compelled to confess that sight, hearing and the other senses, which after Adam’s sin are instruments for us of sinning, are themselves sins. Nay, even gold, honors, a woman’s beauty, and whatever allures us, allures us to evil. Take the Gospel parable⁸ where the human race is likened to him who fell among robbers, by whom, despoiled and wounded, he was left half-dead. Was being despoiled and wounded a sin to him? Who would grant it? In like manner in us, besides the fact that we share in the fault from which we have been washed by the laver of regeneration, to have nature stripped and so wounded that concupiscence, like a certain sickness, struggles with reason, is certainly no fault as long as it does not overthrow reason, but is a punishment which we pay for a past fault—like bodily diseases, and finally death, and other calamities of that kind which have yielded to fault. To call these sins would be the part of a wholly stupid man.

The Lutherans’ diversion.— But when Luther imputed this kind of fault to the concupiscence of the flesh alone, his disciples afterward, when they could not defend that it has the nature of fault, invented that under the name of concupiscence is understood not only that of the flesh but also that which is in the soul. So they have it in the conference of Worms. Yet not even by this diversion can they elude the argument. For if they speak of the concupiscence of the soul which is the act of the will consenting to the flesh, that is certainly not original but truly actual fault, about which we dispute nothing. But if they understand the impotence and inclination of the soul (as they seem to), by which, as it is born to be the act of the body, it is drawn, enticed by the senses, the argument still has the same force. For all this (like the concupiscence of the flesh) means nature deprived of original justice, not fault.

The second argument from the testimonies of Scripture.— But besides, let them turn themselves in every direction, they will never extricate themselves from this: that they are most unjust toward the most efficacious sacrament of baptism, unless they profess that there all the nature and merit of fault is washed away. For (these are the express words of Jerome⁹ to Oceanus) all crimes are forgiven us in baptism. “Nor after the judge’s pardon,” he says, “is severity to be feared,” since the Apostle says:¹⁰ “And these things indeed” (namely, sinners) “you were, but you are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.” All sins therefore have been forgiven well and faithfully. Thus Jerome. Note in Paul: “sanctified and justified in the name of Jesus Christ.” Hence Jerome wisely gathers “well and faithfully.” Because in the name of Jesus Christ, who is truly the Savior, nothing of fiction lies hidden, but there is the highest truth both of faith in his promises and of fact in his deeds. This Jesus Christ himself, the truth, brings forth more clearly than Jerome, where he says: “Father, sanctify them in the truth;¹¹ your word is truth.” And: “If the Son has freed you,¹² you will be truly free.” And Paul: “Be renewed¹³ in justice and the sanctity of truth.” What therefore could be pronounced more clearly to show that when we enter the grace of God, every stain of sin is altogether wiped away in truth, than that the Father so truly sanctifies us, while his word is truth? Jerome there adduces to this same judgment from the ancients also Micah, where he says: “He will return¹⁴ and have mercy on us, he will cast down our iniquities and cast all our sins into the depth of the sea.” And Ezekiel:¹⁵ “I will take you from the nations, and I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your uncleannesses, and I will give you a new heart and a new spirit.” In the word “all,” says Jerome, nothing is left. But if there were no other evangelical testimony of the most full remission which is made in baptism than that “Unless a man is born again¹⁶ of water and the Holy Spirit,” the matter would be abundantly proved. For he who is reborn puts off entirely the old life and puts on the new. This the Apostle represents in the analogy of the death and resurrection of Christ, where he says: “We who are dead to sin,¹⁷ how shall we still live in it? Do you not know, brothers” (with these men he seems to me to speak with prophetic mouth) “that as many of us as were baptized in Christ Jesus were baptized in his death? For we were buried with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ rose from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life.” Behold, we truly die to sin in baptism, are buried, and rise in new life, as truly as Christ accomplished this in his body. Chrysostom,¹⁸ explaining this passage clearly to this judgment in Homily 24 on John, says: “When in the water of baptism they immerse the head as in a tomb, the old man is buried; when they come out, the new man rises.” And Origen, on Joshua, Homily 5, says that through the baptism of regeneration our souls are purged.

Where we have cast off all the reproaches of sins and in their place assumed the testimony of a good conscience toward God. And to Titus¹⁹ the same Apostle says: “According to his mercy he saved us, through the laver of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out on us abundantly”—that is, as much as suffices that we may truly be saved, and therefore sons and heirs, according to the hope of eternal life. Hence John:²⁰ “See what charity God has given us, that we should be called and be the sons of God.” “Called,” he says, “and be,” to express against these men that nothing of fault is in the baptized—otherwise, if there were truly fault, though not imputed, as they say, we would not truly be sons, but would be reckoned such by God. To the same thing belongs what the Apostle says: “There is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh.”²¹ But let us weigh Luther’s interpretation²² in the same article 2. For he says that Paul does not have “There is nothing of sin,” but “There is nothing of condemnation,” as if that concupiscence of the just were truly sin and of itself worthy of condemnation, but is not imputed to them because of faith, and because they do not walk according to the flesh. And his Bucer,²³ when he thinks to put the last hand to composing controversies, says the same and worse in the article of original sin. For he says that although in the regenerate there is nothing of condemnation in this sense, that they are not guilty, the guilt having already been dissolved in baptism, this nevertheless is on account of the merit of Christ not imputing sin—yet not that for this one evil of depraved nature alone, even if no iniquity of action or consent of ours were added, we do not deserve condemnation. And a little later: “The saints themselves also,” he says, “insofar as concupiscence resists the good will, are enemies of God.” Consider, pious reader, whether these words are worthy to be set under the title On the Composition of Controversies, and do not rather stir up what seemed already asleep and dead. Certainly the words of Paul²⁴ need no exposition. For by saying that there is no condemnation in those who do not walk according to the flesh, he most manifestly taught that there is nothing in the regenerate worthy of condemnation except to walk according to the flesh—as if he said: the troubles of the flesh are in no way damnable, but to walk, that is, to work freely according to the flesh. And so Augustine²⁵ expounds the same authority against the two letters of the Pelagians, book 1, chapter 10: “There is no condemnation,” he says, “to those who are in Christ Jesus, since no one is condemned except he who consents to the concupiscence of the flesh for evil.” Most distorted therefore is Luther’s exposition.

In sum: since baptism is for the remission of sins (as Peter says in the Acts of the Apostles²⁶), with what brazen face does a Christian say that any fault remains after baptism?²⁷ But let us hear Luther’s fabricated distinction, by which he thinks to answer all these so clear testimonies in the same second article. “It is one thing,” he says, “that all sins be remitted, and another that all be taken away. Baptism remits all, but takes away none utterly.” Consider, pious reader, whether this is not to wear away the sacraments of Christ and (what he himself hurls at us) to trample Christ himself underfoot—namely, that to remit sins is not to take them away utterly. For what else is that which the Evangelist says in his canonical letter: “You know that he appeared to take away sins”? And the Baptist: “Behold the Lamb²⁸ of God, who takes away²⁹ the sins of the world”? What of the fact that, with Jerome as interpreter in the place above, the Prophets sang beforehand of our justifier, and the Apostles agree? “He will cast down and cast away your iniquities. You shall be cleansed from all your iniquities.” And: “I have blotted out your iniquities as a cloud.”³⁰ And: “Washed, sanctified, justified.”³¹ And: “In whom there is nothing of condemnation.”³² And: “Reckon yourselves dead to sin, but alive to God”?³³ What, I say, do all these things, which are the effects of baptism, sound of, but that sin is utterly wiped away and fully taken away by baptism?³⁴ For sin is nothing other than an offense against God; whence it plainly follows that to remit it by him is nothing other than to pardon, abolish, and therefore altogether take it away. Unless you most absurdly abuse the name of remission here in the signification of the philosophers, to whom to remit a quality is to diminish it with some particle remaining—although in the present matter “to remit” has the same force as “to forgive,” that is, no longer to know the fault, as if it had never been. Wherefore God is said to forget and no longer remember the offenses which he remits. But if we are not ashamed to hear Augustine, whom they everywhere call the judge,³⁵ on this matter, let us listen to him in book 1 of the Retractions, chapter 7: “The laver of regeneration purges from the guilt of all sins which human birth has drawn and iniquity has contracted.” Thus he.³⁶ Therefore as nothing of fault remains of actual sin remitted in baptism, so neither of original sin. And in book 2 on the Merits of Sins, chapter 25: “But this law of sin,” he says (namely, the tinder of concupiscence), “does not so remain in the members of those who have been reborn of water and the Spirit as if its remission had not been made, where the remission of sins is altogether full and perfect, all enmities by which we were separated from God having been slain; but it remains in the oldness of the flesh as if overcome and slain, unless by illicit consents it in some way revives.” And at the end of the same chapter he says more clearly: “But if finally the departure from this life follows immediately after baptism, there will be nothing at all to hold man liable, all things that held him having been loosed.” Is it not sufficiently proved that original sin is taken away when it is remitted, if nothing remains but what is overcome and slain? But our Protestants owe more to sin than to faith.³⁷ For in order to defend their faith alone as justifying, they say that dead faith is in no way faith (although this too is perverse, as we shall show in book 2, chapter 7, from James’s words), and yet original sin, although they hear that we are dead to sin and buried, and that it is wiped away, deleted, cast out and slain, they nevertheless so always hold to it with their teeth that they are unwilling for it to be taken away. What if Augustine asserts that it is torn out by the roots?³⁸ For he introduces the Pelagians, in book 1 against their two letters to Boniface, chapter 13, slandering Christians because they denied that baptism tears out all sins by the roots, but granted only that it shaves off sins, the roots remaining, whence they might sprout again. He represses their slander with these words: “Who would affirm this but an unbeliever? For we say that baptism gives indulgence of all sins and takes away crimes, not shaves them off; nor are the roots of sins held in the evil flesh, like the hairs of those who shave their heads, whence the sins that have been cut back may grow again.” What could Augustine bring forward more effectively against these men than that not even the root of sin remains in the baptized? But yet, as if pointing them out with his finger, he adds: “But concerning that concupiscence of the flesh³⁹ I believe they are deceived, or deceive others, with which it is necessary that even the baptized—and this if he profits most diligently and is led by the Spirit of God—struggle with a pious mind. But this, even if it is called sin, is certainly not called so because it is sin, but because it was made by sin. As a writing is called someone’s hand because his hand made it. But sins are those things which are done, said and thought illicitly according to the concupiscence of the flesh or ignorance.” Thus Augustine, pronouncing most clearly against these men that after the guilt of original sin has been remitted in the sacrament, concupiscence neither is in any way nor is called sin, except by metonymy, of which more fully in the following chapter.

For now by this second argument we only try to demonstrate from the testimonies of sacred Scripture and of the saints how unjust these men are toward the sacrament of remission, asserting that the concupiscence left by it is properly sin.⁴⁰

But that we may add a third argument, let us suppose a baptized child before the use of reason, in whom, you say, true fault still exists, worthy of eternal damnation, but is not afterward imputed. This, I say, I ask of you: is it not imputed by the grace of baptism alone, or is some other application of mercy afterward needed so that it not be imputed afterward? If you grant the first, as the matter stands, then baptism so fully remitted it that nothing of fault remained which would need a new act of mercy afterward so as not to be imputed. But if you grant the second from your own head,⁴¹ then through baptism the price of Christ’s redemption was not fully applied for the redemption of sins, which is heretical. Likewise, against what they say, that for adults a new act of faith is continually needed after baptism, by which they may assiduously ask pardon for that original fault persisting in the baptized: first, if this is so, how was baptism efficacious? Since it was not sufficient to pardon that fault. Add that since children cannot have such an act of faith, they will then have no remedy against that fault. But if baptism suffices for them without another act of faith, why will it not also suffice for adults, as far as pertains to the same original fault?⁴²

Yet that argument which appeared to me the strongest I shall finally subjoin. For they say, as we reported a little before, that original sin indeed remains but is not imputed. And I shall add also other words of Luther in the same article 2.⁴³ “This is,” he says, “the grace of the new testament: that because we have been reborn by baptism, the favor of God receives and sustains us, not imputing to death what remains of sin in us, although it is truly sin and could be imputed.” They say the same of works done in grace, as we shall see in book 2, chapter 19. There is nevertheless (unless I am mistaken) a manifest contradiction: that true fault remains after baptism, and yet is not imputed by God as fault. For either God hates it or he does not. If not, what nature of fault can it have? Unless you implously say that any fault exists that is not hated by God—contrary to the divine utterance of David,⁴⁴ who repeatedly inculcates that God hates the wicked, the wicked way, and iniquity. But if he hates it, how does he not impute it as fault? Nay, how is it true that sin has been remitted in baptism? For no one at all remits fault unless he tears hatred from his heart utterly. For this reason God is said to forget the sins which he remits. Certainly I do not see by what shield they can guard against this dilemma. Unless, fleeing from it, they spit out that readiest spittle of theirs against us—namely, calling any reasoning whatsoever a sophism.⁴⁵ Meanwhile I omit that the authors of so great an error are driven to that impiety: that God in this life can in no way so remit all our sins as to take them away utterly. This they themselves concede, because that concupiscence of the flesh, which they judge to be truly sin, is so natural to mortals that it cannot be altogether extinguished in this age—nor, as they think, by privilege. Yet the theologians consentiently attribute this to the immaculate Virgin: namely, that she never felt the strife of the flesh. Therefore, to make an end to this chapter, the holy Synod of Trent most prudently judged in chapter 5 of session 5⁴⁶ that if anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism, or asserts that it is not wholly taken away, that which has the true and proper nature of sin, but says that it is only shaved off or not imputed: let him be anathema.