Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Divine invisibility is immediately followed by incomprehensibility, its inseparable companion and ally: for just as God is said to be invisible intuitively, inasmuch as He cannot be beheld by the created intellect by the powers of nature; so He is called incomprehensible, that is, invisible comprehensively, inasmuch as He cannot be seen adequately by any creature, however much it be elevated by the light of glory, or to the full extent to which He is visible. Hence comprehension is not taken here for the attainment of some thing, in which sense the Blessed are called comprehensors by the Apostle, prima ad Corinth. 9.: So run, he says, that you may attain; and ad Philippenses 3.: I follow after, if by any means I may attain: but it is taken for a wholly adequate knowledge of a thing, of which nothing at all lies hidden from the one knowing, as St. Augustine explains comprehension, lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 18., saying: Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the one knowing: and indeed, that a perfect knowledge of this divine incomprehensibility, as far as it is given to mortals to know, may be had, we propose the following single question to be resolved.

Note 1. In general God can be said to be incomprehensible in four ways, namely, in place, in time, in love, and in knowledge. In place, indeed, because He cannot be circumscribed by any created or creatable space: in time, however, because He exceeds all times, since He is altogether eternal: in love, moreover, because He transcends every created love whatsoever, so that no created mind can love Him as His dignity requires: whence St. Bernard, in the book De diligendo Deo: the way to love God is to love without measure: finally in knowledge, by which no created intellect can know Him and penetrate with its understanding as much as He is knowable and penetrable. The first incomprehensibility belongs to God by reason of Immensity. The second, by reason of Eternity. The third, by reason of Beauty and supreme goodness. The fourth, finally, by reason of infinite truth and intelligibility. Only the last is the subject here, not the three prior ones.

Note 2. For the true comprehension of a thing through an adequate knowledge of it, two things are especially required: first, indeed, that all be known which is knowable in some thing: second, that it be known totally and according to the commensuration of the intelligibility of the known object; so that the perfection in the knowledge of the one understanding be as great as the intelligibility in the object that is known, as the Subtle Doctor speaks in 3. distinct. 1. quaest. 2. n. 7., that is, that the representative power in the knowledge be as great as the representability of the object. The former comprehension is called extensive, because it extends to all the formalities and perfections of the object: the latter, however, is called intensive, because its perfection is intensified according to the perfection of the object; for the more perfect an entity is, the more perfect is its truth or knowability; and so it demands a more perfect knowledge in representing, namely that the thing be known and represented adequately and commensurately, that is, according to all its perfection and dignity.

Note 3. For extensive comprehensibility it is required not only that a thing be known according to all its intrinsic predicates, whether essential or attributive: but further it is required that all the terms which it regards, or which it terminates, be distinctly known, and so that it be known according to every termination and terminability: for a thing is not perfectly comprehended unless its entire intelligibility is attained and exhausted through knowledge and understanding; but it would not be attained nor exhausted unless all its terminabilities and terminations were perceived; since this notion of the terminable and terminative is knowable in the thing itself: whence not without reason St. Augustine, Epist. 112. cap. 9., defines comprehension thus: the whole is comprehended, he says, by seeing, so that nothing of it lies hidden from the one seeing: that is, comprehension is the knowledge by which all that is knowable in the thing is known, as perfectly as the knowability of the object requires. This definition embraces both comprehensions, the extensive as well as the intensive. These things having been premised, two points especially are to be resolved in the Question: first, indeed, whether God is so incomprehensible that He cannot be perfectly comprehended by any creature, whether existing or creatable: second, whether this incomprehensibility is proper to God alone.

First conclusion. — God is altogether incomprehensible by every creature, whether existing or creatable.

Proof 1. From the Lateran Council, cap. Damnamus, in which it is said that God is a certain one supreme thing, incomprehensible and ineffable; and in the Council of Basel, sess. 22., this proposition of Augustine of Rome is condemned as erroneous in faith: the soul of Christ sees God as clearly and intensely as God sees Himself; since God comprehends Himself through a clear and intense knowledge of Himself, it follows that the soul of Christ does not comprehend Him; whence not without reason Albert the Great says in 3. dist. 1. art. 1.: God alone comprehends Himself: for if we were to say that He is concluded within the comprehension of the capacity of the soul of Christ, it seems to me that this would redound to the blasphemy of the Deity of Christ: therefore if the soul of Christ, which sees God more perfectly than the other blessed, still does not comprehend Him, much less is He comprehended by the other blessed.

Proof 2. From Sacred Scripture. Hieremiae 32. God is called great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought: Iob. 11.: Will you perhaps comprehend the footsteps of God, and find the Almighty even to perfection? As if to say that this cannot be done. Rom. 11.: How incomprehensible are His judgments, and unsearchable His ways! Hence St. Paul rightly warns, cap. 13.: Do not labor, for you will not comprehend, because, first to Timothy 6., He dwells in inaccessible light; whom no man has seen, nor can see, namely comprehensively; for it is certain that God is seen intuitively by the blessed: whence that vision of which Paul speaks, and which he says is impossible, is to be understood of comprehensive vision.

The same is proved by the holy Fathers. First, indeed, Cyprian, or whoever is the author of the book De Cardinalibus operibus Christi, where, speaking of the Seraphim who stood above the throne of God, and flew around it, Isaiae 6.: They stand, he says, showing the immobility of eternity; by their flight, however, His height is so raised on high that, however high the heart of man may ascend, God is exalted, and escapes every opportunity of comprehension. With him agrees St. Augustine, Sermone 38. de tempore: To touch God somewhat with your mind, he says, is great blessedness; but to comprehend Him is altogether impossible. And Bede, on that passage of 1. Ioannis cap. 1.: We shall see Him as He is, he says, we are promised to see God, for to comprehend cannot be granted. And St. Gregory, 10. Moralium cap. 7., weighing that word of Job, chapter eleven, Will you perhaps comprehend His footsteps?, says: In the summit of retribution the Almighty can be found through the species of contemplation; but He cannot, however, be found unto perfection: because if we sometimes behold Him in His brightness, we do not, nevertheless, fully contemplate His essence. Finally, Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesi 6.:

The Angels see, he says, as they grasp, and the Archangels as they are able: the Thrones and Dominations, indeed more than they, but still less than befits the goodness of God: but the Holy Spirit alone sees as is fitting: for He searches all things, even the depths of God; and the only-begotten Son of God also knows as is fitting, since He is a partaker of the paternal Deity.

Proof 4. by reason. In order that some object be comprehended, it does not suffice that it be seen as a whole, but further it is required that it be known totally and as much as it is knowable: so that the knowing power of the intellect altogether equals and exhausts the knowability of the object: but although God is seen as a whole by the blessed, He is nevertheless not seen totally, nor is His knowability exhausted by the beatific vision: therefore He is not comprehended by them. The major is evident from the definition of comprehension assigned in Note 3. The minor is proved: since God is in every way infinite, He has infinite intelligibility and knowability: whence, in order that He be perfectly comprehended, an infinite intellective power is required: but the power of any created or creatable intellect cannot be infinite: therefore it can neither equal, nor consequently comprehend, His intelligibility. Add that even if created knowledge were of infinite power, it would still not be comprehensive of God, because, since it would be created and dependent, it could not know as perfectly as He is knowable, and so the knowledge would be more imperfect than the known object.

You will say. To comprehend God is to know Him whole and totally: but the blessed see God whole and totally: therefore they comprehend God. The major is evident from what has been said. The minor, however, is proved: When it is said that to comprehend God is to know Him totally, the word 'totally' either signifies the mode of the one seeing, or the mode of the thing seen: if the first, God is seen totally, because he who sees God elicits that vision with his whole power and all his strength and effort: if the second, He is also seen totally, because He is seen as He is: therefore the blessed see God totally, and so they comprehend Him. — I answer. The word 'totally' signifies the mode both of the knowable object and of the knowing intellect; so that, just as the object is infinitely knowable, it cannot be known totally unless its infinite knowability be perceived and exhausted; it likewise signifies the mode of the power, because, since comprehension is an action commensurate with the perfection of the object, the intellect cannot totally comprehend an infinite thing unless it elicits an infinitely perfect vision: but a created intellect cannot elicit this, and so it cannot know God totally.

You will insist. An object that is wholly indivisible and has no degrees of visibility is either seen totally or is not seen at all; God, on account of His simplicity, is supremely indivisible and has many degrees of perfection: therefore He is either seen totally or is not perceived at all. The major is evident; for if an indivisible were not seen whole and totally, there would have to be in it something which is not seen; but in an indivisible that is seen nothing can fail to be seen; otherwise it would not be indivisible, but would have parts of which one would be seen, the others not. The minor also stands from what has already been said about the simplicity of God, by which we proved that God has neither parts nor any degrees of perfection, but is wholly His own perfection. — I distinguish the major. That an indivisible, both really and formally, cannot be seen unless it be seen whole and totally, let it pass; that an indivisible only really, but formally divisible, cannot be seen unless it be seen whole, I deny: for since it has several formalities, one can be known while the other is not known. To the minor, I say that God is indeed indivisible really, but formally divisible, or rather distinguishable, because He includes several perfections, distinct both from His essence and from one another, and of which one can be seen without the other. Add that although God is seen whole, and all things that are in Him are perceived, He would nevertheless not be comprehended; neither by extensive comprehension, because not all the relations which He has to possible creatures would be perceived, which, since they are infinite in number, in order to be distinctly known require an infinite power of knowing, such as is not the power that is in a creature; nor would it be comprehensive intensively either, because God would not be known by an act equally perfect as He Himself is knowable; for He would be known by a creature with a knowledge finite, limited, and dependent; He Himself, however, is knowable independently and infinitely, as in fact He is known by the divine intellect.

Second conclusion. — God alone is incomprehensible intensively, but not extensively.

The first part is sufficiently established from what has already been said; for intensive incomprehensibility is founded on the infinite entity and intelligibility of God, perceptible by an infinitely perfect knowledge; but there is no creature which, of itself and in its entity, is infinitely knowable, and which requires an infinitely perfect act in order to be adequately known: therefore there is none which is incomprehensible intensively, and so God alone is incomprehensible in this way.

The second part also stands: because for extensive comprehension it is necessary not only to know the entity and intrinsic perfections of the object; but it is also necessary to know all the terms to which the power of that object, both passive and active, can extend itself: but this cannot be done even in the least creature, and there is none which does not extend itself to infinite terms; for fire, v. g., can produce an infinite number of fires, and water can successively receive an infinite number of heats, and so of the others; therefore, since the active and passive power of a creature of this kind cannot be adequately known unless all its terms be likewise distinctly known: hence it comes about that, since those terms are infinite, no creature can be comprehended. Add that no creature can be assigned which does not have a real relation of dependence on God, because a real relation cannot be adequately known and comprehended unless its foundation and term be known and comprehended, at least extensively; therefore, since God, who is the term of this relation, cannot be comprehended, neither will that relation be able to be comprehended. Hence St. Basil, Epistola 168. ad Eunomium, rightly laughs at him as raving and mad, because he said that he had comprehended God; if you have not yet grasped with your knowledge the nature of the tiniest ant, he says, how do you glory in imagining that you comprehend the incomprehensible God? By these words he indicates that the very tiniest living beings are incomprehensible, at least extensively; how much more, therefore, will God, the Creator of all, be deemed incomprehensible?