Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. The beatific visions can be said to be unequal in two ways: namely, intensively, and according to the grades of perfection, so that one perceives God more clearly or more perfectly than another; and extensively, that is, with respect to the more numerous secondary objects to which it extends, if namely one of the blessed perceives more creatures than another. But the question here concerns the former inequality, not the latter.

Note 2. In general a twofold principle of the intensive inequality in the beatific vision can be assigned; one indeed moral, namely the diverse merits of angels and men, so that whoever has had more and more excellent virtues will also receive a fuller beatitude, and consequently a more perfect vision, as the reward of his merits; the other physical, which is traced back either to the unequal light of glory, or to the more excellent or less perfect intellect actively and physically concurring with the light of glory itself to form the beatific vision. Again, this inequality of intellects can be considered either according to specific grades or according to individual grades. In the former way, angels can be said to have a more excellent intellect than men, because the angelic nature is more perfect than the human nature. In the latter way, one man can be said to be more excellent than another, since substances have individual perfections according to which one is said to be more perfect than another, and to have more vigorous and more active faculties, as we have demonstrated in the physics.

Note 3. Regarding the resolution of the present question there is a twofold controversy: the first, that of the heretics asserting that there is no inequality in the beatific vision, but that all the blessed without exception have an altogether equal beatitude; the first champion of which error was Jovinian, who, as St. Jerome reports in lib. 2. against him, asserted that there are only two orders, of sheep and goats; one of the just, the other of sinners; some standing at the right hand, others at the left. And so, in the manner of the Stoics, he said that all sins are as equal as the merits of deeds rightly done; adding that between John and the last penitent there is no distance. This shamelessness of an unlearned man was broken by St. Jerome by the authority of the divine Scriptures. The other controversy, however, is moved among the scholastic theologians, some of whom with St. Thomas affirm that the inequality of the beatific vision has no other physical cause than the inequality of the light of glory; others contend with the Subtle Doctor that this inequality can also arise from the diverse perfection of the intellect, whether specific or individual. Two things therefore are to be resolved in this question: first, whether the beatific visions are unequal; second, what is the physical cause of this inequality.

First conclusion. — It is certain that some beatific visions are unequal among themselves.

For thus it was defined in the Council of Florence in the letters of union, where it is decreed that the blessed see clearly the Lord himself, three and one, as he is; yet according to the diversity of merits one more perfectly than another. The Council of Trent decrees the same thing, Session 6. cap. 10. and 16. and Canon 24. and 32., where it defines that the justified man through good works can grow in sanctity and merits, and not only truly merit the increase of grace and the attainment of eternal life itself, if however he departs in grace, but also the increase of glory.

The same truth is proved from Sacred Scripture, first, 1. Corinth. 3. Each one will receive his own reward according to his own labor: therefore whoever has labored more will receive a greater reward. Likewise 2. Corinth. 5. That each one may receive what he has done in the body: and so whoever has undergone more bodily pressures and sharper pains for the glory of God receives a greater happiness. And cap. 9: He who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, and he who sows in blessings will also reap from blessings. This disparity of sowing in this life and of reaping in eternal beatitude is explained in Matth. 13. by the parable of the seed cast into the ground and yielding an unequal fruit, one indeed a hundredfold fruit, another sixtyfold, another thirtyfold. So that just as from one grain a hundred, or sixty, or thirty other grains are formed, so too will the fruit of men be unequal in the recompense of good works. Again in the same Epistle to the Corinthians it is said: other is the brightness of the Sun, other the brightness of the Moon, other the brightness of the stars: for star differs from star in brightness, so also the resurrection of the dead; on which passage St. Fulgentius, lib. 3. ad Trasimondum, one life of the heavenly kingdom is promised to those reborn through true faith, although a differing glory is granted to those who will reign, blessed Paul saying, Other the brightness of the Sun, etc. Finally Christ the Lord, Ioannis 14., speaking to the Apostles, says: in my Father's house there are many mansions; which words are not to be understood of the diverse grades and orders of the Church militant, as Jovinian wished, but of the diversity of the reward of the blessed; for Christ adds: I go to prepare a place for you, that where I am, you also may be. For how, says Tertullian in the Scorpiaco cap. 6., could there be many mansions with the Father, if not according to the variety of merits? how will star differ from star in glory, unless according to the diversity of rays? St. Gregory also weighs this passage thus, lib. 35. of the Morals cap. 14. With the Father indeed, he says, there are many mansions, because in that life of beatitude, which is not unequal, each one according to his unequal merit receives an unequal place: but he does not feel the losses of that very inequality; because as much as he has perceived suffices for him.

Reason persuades the same thing: for beatitude is granted either as an inheritance, or as a crown, or as a reward: therefore a fuller inheritance ought to be given to those who have had a more perfect character of sonship, by reason of more excellent sanctity; a more illustrious crown granted to those who have obtained more victories; and a greater reward is to be repaid to those who have labored more.

You will say. Christ seems to explode this inequality of reward in Matth. 20. in that famous parable of the workers called at different times to the cultivation of the vineyard, because although they labored unequally, nevertheless all received the same denarius as the reward of their labor; whence the workers called first complain, and murmur against the father of the family, that he made the last equal to them in reward: therefore, Jovinian used to say, although the merits of men were varied and their labor diverse, nevertheless the reward and compensation of all in beatitude was one and the same.

I answer 1. In parables, not all the words, nor all the sentences, should be considered, but only what the end and aim of them is; for, as Tertullian says, lib. De pudicitia cap. 9. There are things which are placed simply to structure and arrange and weave the parable, so that they may be led to that point where the example is procured: whence St. Chrysostom concludes, Homily 64. on Matthew, that one should not scrutinize all that the parable contains, but understand the aim for which they were instituted; and once that has been perceived and used, inquire nothing further. St. Augustine elegantly weighs this truth, lib. De Civit. Dei cap. 11.

Just as, he says, in citharas and musical instruments of this kind not all things that are touched resound with something tuneful, but only the strings: yet the rest are fabricated in the whole body of the cithara for this reason, that there might be a place where those strings, which the craftsman is about to tune and strike for the sweetness of the song, might be bound, from which and to which they might be stretched; so in these Prophetic narratives, which are chosen by the Prophetic spirit from the deeds of men, either they already resound with something by the signification of future things: or if they signify nothing of the sort, they are interposed for this, that there might be that from which those signifying things, as resounding ones, are connected.

Therefore not all things are to be weighed which are set forth in this celebrated parable, v. g. the murmur of the workers, but only what the aim of this parable is must be considered.

I answer 2. The aim and end of this parable is assigned variously by various interpreters: for some will that Christ in this parable shows that the way and manner of obtaining the heavenly Kingdom is not to be estimated by human judgments, nor from what is found in the custom of men: but that the whole affair is administered by the gratuitous will of God alone, and according to his choice, so that those whom we sometimes judge most fit to obtain eternal happiness nevertheless, beyond the opinion of all, often fall short of it: on the contrary, those whom we think altogether alien from a share in that happiness become partakers of it by the beneficence of God. The close of the parable, conceived in these words, Many are called, but few are chosen, seems to indicate this sense as the end of the parable. — Others explain the parable in this way, that God the Father is signified by the name of the father of the family, who called men, workers, into his Church through faith and grace at different hours; that is, either at the diverse times of the world, or at the diverse ages of men, or finally under the diverse states of the law of nature, of the written law, and of the Gospel. But at the end of the world the Steward, that is, Christ the judge, will render to each one what is just, beginning from the last, that is, from those called last, up to the first. But the last are taken as first, either because they are compensated after one hour of labor; in which way the first seem to have received, because they were less delayed, as St. Augustine explains, serm. 59. cap. 1. Or because the first were first in dignity, as being more strenuous workers, who namely in a short time did as much work as those who had labored the whole day. Finally, the denarius is equal, either because they enjoy the same beatific object; or, as St. Augustine, just now praised, explains, That denarius is eternal life, and in eternal life all will be equal. For although they will shine with a diversity of merits, one more, another less; yet what pertains to eternal life will be equal to all. For it will not be longer for one, shorter for another, what is equally everlasting. With whom Jerome agrees, lib. 3. against Jovinian: but one denarius, he says, is not one reward, but one life, and one liberation from gehenna. St. Ambrose preluded to these things in cap. 15. of Luke: O that you would deign to hire us also as laborers, albeit coming late! For you hire even at the eleventh hour, and deign to pay an equal wage: an equal wage of life, not of glory. Finally St. Prosper, lib. 3. De vita contemplativa, cap. 4., uses the equal denarius for equal satiety; for just as, he says, bodily satiety holds all equally full, although individuals have taken in food not equally, but according to their capacity: so all the Saints, although they may have been distinguished by some diversity of their grades, will be perfected by one beatitude, because they are secure as blessed by one perfection. — And so the equality of compensation in those laboring for an unequal time is regarded, either with respect to the same essential beatific object, because namely it is the vision of the same God; or with respect to duration, because the happiness of all will be eternal; or with respect to the blessed life, because all are to be blessed; or with respect to satiety, because all will be filled according to their capacity; or with respect to equal work, because those called last in a short time, but with greater effort and more burning fervor, accomplished as much work and obtained as much merit as others, who labored with more relaxed effort for a longer time: or finally, because those called last, through a more eager will and a more ardent desire, attained the merits of the first, as St. Gregory Nazianzen explains, Oration 50. Although, he says, those who entered first contributed more as to the measure of labor, yet not so as to the mea- sure of will, on account of which perhaps even a greater reward was owed to the last, whence it happens that in the last the alacrity of will, and the heat and equity of the spirit, is compensated with the longer delay of the first. But this equality of the denarius and of the reward must not be understood as an equality of beatitude, which from the other cited texts of Scripture is known to be diverse according to the diversity of merits.

Second conclusion. — The inequality of the beatific vision arises physically not only from the inequality of the light of glory, but also from the unequal perfection, both specific and individual, of the blessed intellect.

This is the position of the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 13. q. 3., where although he speaks at length about the beatific vision, and speaks only of the fruition or beatific love, which he says is commensurated with the activity of the will; nevertheless his disciples rightly gather, on account of the parity of reason, that the same must be said of the beatific vision as to be commensurated with the natural activity of the intellect. Add that in 1. dist. 50. quaest. 6. he affirms that the inequality of beatitude arises also from the unequal activity of the potency.

Proof of the conclusion. Whenever two causes concur to produce the same effect, that effect grows in perfection according to the power and activity of each cause: but to the beatific vision not only the light of glory, but also the created intellect concurs efficiently: therefore, just as the beatific vision is judged to be more perfect where the light is more perfect, so likewise it will be more perfect where the intellect is more vigorous. The minor is established from the preceding Questions, in which it has already been intimated that the intellect and the light of glory are productive principles of the beatific vision, and that both concur actively to its formation. The major, moreover, is urged by experience itself: for it is evident that a more vigorous visual power produces a more perfect vision, even with equal light; nay, sometimes even the vision becomes more perfect when the light in the medium itself is intensified, although the strength and power of the potency does not increase. Likewise, two artisans of unequal skill with an equal instrument; e.g., two painters, of whom one is more skilled than the other, with an equal brush will produce a picture of unequal perfection: therefore an effect can be more perfect where one of its productive causes is more perfect.

The Thomists reply. The major is true when the effect proceeds from causes of the same order as itself, but not so when it proceeds from causes of a different order: but, they say, the beatific vision, since it is supernatural, proceeds from the light of glory, which is of the supernatural order, and from the intellect only insofar as it is elevated through such a light: therefore the intellect concurs with the beatific vision only insofar as it is elevated solely through the light of glory; and consequently it does not concur with it according to its greater natural activity.

On the contrary. The intellect concurs with the beatific vision according to that by which it is elevated; but the more perfect intellect is elevated according to all the grades of its power and activity: therefore it concurs with that vision according to its more perfect activity; and consequently the more perfect intellect also elicits a more perfect vision. The adversaries admit the major. The minor is proved: the intellect through the light of glory is elevated according to what it is really, that is, according to all the grades of power innate to it by nature and really identified with it: therefore the more perfect intellect is elevated according to its more perfect activity, and so it must elicit a more excellent vision. It is confirmed: either the intellect is elevated only according to some grades of activity, or according to none, or according to all. Not the first, because there is no stronger reason why it should be elevated according to two grades rather than three, or four, or five, etc. Then because grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it: therefore glory, which is consummated grace, ought not to destroy the power and activity of the intellect: but it would destroy and lull it to sleep, if the intellect were elevated only according to some grades of activity; because it would not act as much as it could act. Finally, because, as the adversaries themselves admit, the grades of activity are not distinguished really, but only virtually: and so one grade cannot really be elevated without the others being elevated likewise. Nor the second, for the same reasons: therefore it must be admitted that the blessed intellect is elevated according to all the grades of its perfection and activity.

They reply a second time. A more perfect cause does not always produce a more perfect effect: for although the sun is more perfect than fire, it does not nevertheless produce a heat more perfect in species. Likewise, if God, in place of baptismal water, should determine to confer grace through the application of a golden seal, the greater perfection of the gold would not contribute to producing a more perfect grace: therefore by parity, although the intellect is more perfect, it does not follow that it concurs in forming a more perfect vision.

But this reply in no way breaks the force of the aforementioned argument, nor does the example of the sun hinder anything; first because the sun does not have a productive power of a heat of another species than that which is produced by fire, for heats are not given different in species; but diversity can obtain in the beatific vision, since one can be more perfect than another: therefore there is no parity between the production of heat and of beatitude. Then because fire produces heat in the highest grade of heat, and consequently it is no wonder if another natural cause, such as the sun, cannot produce a more perfect heat: but the beatific vision is not produced in the highest grade by an intellect of lesser activity; and so a more perfect vision can be formed by another, more perfect intellect: thus that adduced example in no way stands in the way of the truth of the conclusion. But much less does the example of baptismal water and of the golden seal accomplish anything: first because in our opinion neither water nor gold would concur physically to produce grace, but only morally, as in fact all the Sacraments concur: then because, although they would concur physically to the production of grace, yet since the gold would not supply that concurrence through some power proper to itself, but through some supernatural quality, or through the obediential potency, by which it would be of the same kind in it as in the water; hence it comes about that the gold, although more excellent in nature, could not concur by its more excellent proper power to the formation of grace; but the intellect concurs with the beatific vision through its own proper power, which is not of the same kind and perfection in it as in a less perfect intellect: therefore it is no wonder if it can elicit a more perfect vision. Add that if the adversaries' consequence held, namely that a more perfect cause does not elicit a more perfect effect, it would follow that a more perfect intellect could not even produce a more perfect natural effect; which, however, the adversaries do not concede.

Proof 2. If a more perfect intellect could not produce a more excellent beatific vision, it would be chiefly because that vision is a supernatural effect, to which the intellect cannot concur through naturally more excellent activity: but this reason is null; first because, notwithstanding the supernaturalness of the vision itself, the intellect concurs with it immediately, and is the reason why this vision is intuitive, and why it is vital: why, therefore, could not a more excellent intellect in like manner be the reason why this vision is more perfect? Then because the will with the same habit of Hope and Charity produces more perfect acts of those virtues, by bringing to bear a greater effort and striving; otherwise men would in vain be invited to a greater and more excellent love of God, for this would not be in their power and freedom, if a more intense love of God came only from a more intense habit of charity: therefore by parity a more excellent intellect, by bringing to bear its striving, can elicit a more perfect vision notwithstanding its supernaturalness. Finally, because the intellect elevated to the supernatural order through the light of glory, in the same way, with proportion preserved, is related to the beatific vision as the intellect enlightened by light, or by a natural impressed species, is related to natural vision; because through each light it is constituted in the ultimate disposition and in first act for acting, although in a different order: but the same intellect with the same light, or the same impressed species, can attain the object more clearly and more perfectly, when it exerts all its powers and brings to bear all its striving: therefore by parity also a more perfect intellect elevated through the light of glory will be able to elicit a more perfect beatific vision; namely, if it unfolds all its powers and brings to bear all its strivings.

You will say 1. The perfection of a supernatural effect is to be measured according to the perfection of the supernatural principle: but where there is only an equal light of glory, there only is there an equal supernatural principle: therefore in like manner there only will there be an equality of vision. — I distinguish the major. It is to be measured according to the perfection of a principle supernatural or supernaturally elevated, I concede: according to the perfection of a principle alone intrinsically supernatural, such as the light alone is, I deny: similarly, with the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied: for since the more perfect intellect is elevated to the supernatural order through the light of glory; hence together with that light it makes a single adequate principle of the vision itself: whence, just as the light, although inanimate, is said to be the principle of this vision, because it is a vital act, namely by reason of its consortium with the intellect, which is the intrinsically vital principle, why should not in like manner the intellect be said to be the principle of the same supernatural vision because of its consortium with the intrinsically supernatural light of glory? Add that the proportion of the elevated intellect with the beatific vision, insofar as it is supernatural, is greater than that of the light of glory itself with the same vision, insofar as it is vital; because the elevated intellect is at least extrinsically supernatural, and constituted in the supernatural order: but the light of glory is not even extrinsically vital: therefore if this can be the principle of a vital act; why shall not that in like manner be able to be the true principle of a supernatural act?

You will insist. The intellect, even elevated, does not concur on its own part with the beatific vision except through the obediential potency distinct from the natural potency and activity: but this obediential potency is equal in every blessed intellect, just as it is in the other creatures: therefore on its own part it concurs equally with the beatific vision; and so if there is inequality in it, it does not arise from the part of the intellect. — I answer 1. It is false that the blessed intellect concurs with the beatific vision only through the obediential potency; for it concurs with it actively through its elevated natural power; for it is truly the active and productive principle of the blessed vision itself, as has been proved. I answer 2. It is likewise false that the obediential potency of the intellect is really distinct from its natural activity; for it is the very natural activity itself, insofar as it is elevable to the supernatural order through the light of glory: whence since this activity is more or less perfect in various intellects, that obediential potency is likewise to be said to be greater or lesser.

You will press. That obediential and natural power is only inchoate, and is completed and perfected only through the light of glory; therefore where there will be an equal light, there only will there be an equal complete and adequate power: and consequently the complete and adequate notion of the vision is to be sought only from the complete and adequate light of glory. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is inchoate and incomplete, that is, it is not total, and requires the consortium of some other cause, I concede: that is, it requires something intrinsically perfecting and completing that potency in its natural activity, I deny. It requires indeed the light of glory as a partial concause, elevating it to the supernatural order and concurring with it actively to produce the beatific vision; not, however, as a form intrinsically completing and effecting its natural activity. Add that just as the eye is completed by the visible impressed species, and the intellect by the intelligible one, so in like manner the blessed intellect is completed by the light of glory: whence just as a more perfect natural eye and intellect, completed through that species, elicit a more perfect vision and intellection, so in like manner a more perfect blessed intellect, elevated through the light of glory, elicits a more excellent beatific vision.

You will say 2. If the inequality of the vision were sought from the natural perfection of the created intellect, some grade of beatitude would be given which would not correspond to merits and grace, but only to nature. Likewise, one blessed man or Angel would, through his natural endowments, distinguish himself in supernatural things from another less blessed one: but these are false and absurd, and savor of the heresy of Pelagius: therefore, etc. The sequel of the major is proved: let it be supposed, namely, that one intellect is naturally more perfect than another by two grades, and that each has a light of glory as of six, according to his merits and according to the measure of grace and charity which he had in the way; in such a case the naturally more perfect intellect will see God, e.g., as of ten; and the other, less perfect, will see only as of eight: therefore in such a case these two grades of glory, which he who is endowed with a more perfect and more penetrating intellect will enjoy, will not correspond to the light of glory, nor consequently to merits or to grace and charity, but will be reduced to the natural perfection alone of the created intellect; and so one man or Angel, more blessed through his natural endowments, would distinguish himself from another less blessed one. Add that the Council of Florence in the Decree of union defines that one Blessed one will see more perfectly than another according to the diversity of merits. Whence Suarez, lib. 2. cap. 21., says that our opinion is little consonant with the principles of Faith, because, he says, the beatific vision is given as the reward of the sons of God, and therefore it cannot happen that anyone without more merits and greater grace should see more perfectly. — Molina and Tataretus reply by denying the sequel of the major, because, they say, in such a case either so much light of glory will not be given to him who is endowed with a more vigorous intellect: or if so much light of glory is conferred upon him, God will not grant him a concurrence equal to that of the other, who has equal merits and a less perfect intellect. But this response seems to be less conformed to the order of things, and to the disposition of divine Providence, by which it supplies to each natural cause a concurrence commensurate with its activity, nor tempers it, except by reason of some miracle to be worked. It seems, moreover, inconvenient and unbecoming to the state of beatitude that such a miracle should be perpetual, to the prejudice of the activity and natural perfection of the intellect. Add that if God withdraws the concurrence from the more perfect intellect, lest it elicit the beatific vision according to a striving proportioned to its natural activity, He should also withdraw it from the more perfect will, lest it love Him with a striving proportioned to its activity, which is absurd; otherwise men would in vain be invited to love God with all their strength, since, according to that response, He could not be so loved by one having an equal habit of charity and a more vigorous will. Likewise it is absurd that some light of glory be withdrawn from him who has merit equal to another's, but a more vigorous intellect. For since the light of glory is given according to the proportion of merits, and according to the measure of grace and charity which a man had at the instant of death; it is certain that he who is endowed with a more perfect intellect and has equal merits will also have an equal light of glory; otherwise he would be of a worse condition in supernatural things, and would be deprived of a thing owed to him condignly; which is altogether absurd and repugnant to the ordinance of divine Providence and Justice. Therefore I answer by distinguishing the major: some grade of beatitude in the notion of reward would not correspond to merits and grace, I deny: in the notion of active and productive principle of the beatific vision, I concede: therefore although the blessed vision is wholly a reward, it is not, however, a reward in every respect: but only insofar as it proceeds from God rewarding, and as it has an order to merits and grace, of which it is the crown and reward: insofar, however, as it expresses a respect and order to the intellect from which it is elicited, precisely it does not have the notion of reward, but of effect, which can be more perfect, insofar as it comes from a more perfect cause: whence although beatitude is equal in those having an equal light of glory, insofar as precisely it is a reward: it can nevertheless be said to be unequal, insofar as it is an effect elicited by a more vigorous and more perfect intellect. From this, however, it does not follow that the Blessed one distinguishes himself through natural endowments, because that greater activity of the intellect does not produce a more perfect vision, except insofar as that intellect is elevated to the supernatural order; and therefore although there is a difference and inequality among the beatific visions insofar as they are effects proceeding from more or less active intellects, this distinguishing, nevertheless, is not done by the forces of nature, since that greater activity does not unfold all its powers except insofar as it is elevated through the light of glory. Hence it is evident how much Suarez hallucinates, and passes an unjust censure. To the Council of Florence I say that it is to be understood de facto and according to the common opinion of the Philosophers asserting that spiritual substances do not have greater or lesser grades of perfection, and consequently that no intellect is from itself more active and more vigorous than another, but only by reason of the disposition of the organs while it is joined to the body. Or the Council intends only to assign the sufficient cause of unequal beatitude, not, however, an exhaustive one, just as, e.g., it is commonly said that one man sees more clearly than another because he has clearer and more perfect eyes, although the clearer vision sometimes arises not only from the part of the more vigorous eye, but also from the part of a greater light and a more excellent visible species.

You will insist. The Subtle Doctor in 4. dist. 15. affirms that the inferior will with equal merit will have equal beatitude with equality of quantity, not of perfection: therefore he judges that beatitude has no proportion with the perfection of each potency. — I deny the consequence. For the Doctor is understood only of the inferior will having indeed equal merit and equal light, but bringing to bear a greater striving than the more perfect will brings to bear: and so it will be able to have equal beatitude with equality of quantity, that is, to elicit a vision which has equal grades of perfection with the vision elicited by a more perfect will bringing to bear a lesser striving; not, however, with equality of proportion, because the beatitude of each would not have proportion with the perfection of each potency; since the beatitude of the inferior potency would be equal to the beatitude of the more excellent potency.

You will say finally. If the beatific vision is more perfect by reason of the more perfect intellect, it follows that the beatitude of Christ is not the highest and greatest of all, but that a more excellent one can be given: but the consequent is false: therefore, so is the antecedent. The major is evident: for since the Angelic intellect is more excellent than the human intellect of Christ, who was made a little less than the Angels, it evidently follows that if an Angel had a light of glory equal to that of Christ, he would produce a more perfect vision by reason of his more perfect intellect; and consequently he would have a more excellent beatitude. The minor is also established, because in the opinion of all, Christ has such beatitude than which a greater cannot be. — I answer. I deny the sequel of the major, and to its proof I say that it is indeed true that an Angel would see God more perfectly than Christ, if he had a light of glory equal to His: but because God wills to perfect Christ with the highest and greatest perfection possible, hence it comes about that just as in the way He granted him the greatest and highest grace, than which a greater cannot be granted; so likewise in the homeland He grants him the greatest and highest light of glory, than which no other greater can be assigned. And therefore since the Angel does not have a light of glory equal to that of Christ, but one much lower and less perfect, hence it comes about that however vigorous an intellect he may have, he does not on that account elicit a vision equal to the beatific vision of Christ.

You will insist. On the hypothesis that an equal light were granted to the Angel, then the Angel would be more blessed than Christ, because by reason of his more perfect intellect he would elicit a more perfect vision, and consequently Christ would not have a greater beatitude, than which none more perfect can be. — I answer. This hypothesis is impossible; for God, as is supposed, granted to Christ the highest light of glory, and so He cannot grant an equal light to the Angel: for where something is the highest and most perfect, it does not admit an equal perfection in another, and consequently it implies a contradiction that an equal light of glory be granted to the Angel as to Christ; and so the hypothesis collapses, nor is it permissible to infer anything from it.