Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. A threefold knowledge is distinguished in us: the first is called simple apprehension, by which some object is perceived and apprehended by the intellect, affirming or denying nothing about it. The second is called judicative, by which the intellect either asserts that the apprehended terms are mutually connected, and it is called composition, or denies that they are connected, and it is called division. The third, finally, is discursive, by which the intellect judges that the truth of one proposition rightly follows from others with which it has a necessary connection. Moreover, judicative and discursive cognition is distinguished as twofold: for one is formal, the other virtual. Formal discourse presupposes two acts, namely judgment and simple apprehension: formal judgment, however, presupposes simple apprehension: virtual judgment and virtual discourse, however, presuppose no act. For virtual judgment is a single and simple act equivalent to two, by which one simultaneously apprehends an object and affirms or denies that it is such: similarly, virtual discourse is a single and simple act, by which one apprehends and judges and knows that a proposition is duly inferred from other propositions so clearly, as if through the various acts of formal discourse he knew this perfect inference.

Note 2. Again, a twofold cognition is distinguished, namely direct, by which an object is known first and per se, and reflex, by which the intellect reflects upon its own formed cognition, knows it, and by means of it attains the object about which it was engaged. Moreover, reflex cognition can again be distinguished as twofold, one indeed reflex upon the potency, the other upon the action. The former is that by which any vital potency experiences itself acting: which experience is not indeed had through other acts, but through the same ones which it elicits; otherwise there would be an infinite regress; for if a potency had to experience eliciting the first act through another, a second act, it would also experience eliciting the second through a third, and so there would be an infinite regress. The latter, however, is that by which the intellect reflects upon a prior action elicited by itself. The former is called reflex improperly, the latter, however, properly. Which again can be distinguished as twofold, namely formally reflex, and virtually reflex. The first is a second act of the intellect reflecting itself upon a prior really distinct act: the latter, however, is one and the same act, by which the intellect knows a thing, and at the same time notices and judges that it knows.

Note 3. There are three measures of the duration of things, namely eternity, aevum, and time. Eternity is the measure of a thing immutable both as to entity and as to operation. Aevum is the measure of a thing immutable as to entity, but mutable as to operation and the accidents which it can receive. Time, finally, is the measure of a thing mutable both as to entity and as to operation. Whence time has in itself before and after only intrinsically: aevum has in itself before and after only extrinsically: eternity, however, has neither before nor after intrinsically nor extrinsically. Hence eternal things are wholly permanent, and in no way successive: aeviternal things, however, are intrinsically permanent and extrinsically successive: temporal things, however, are intrinsically successive and variable.

First conclusion. — The beatific vision is formally simple knowledge: virtually, however, it is judicative and discursive.

Proof of the first part. The greater perfection is to be attributed to the beatific vision, which can be admitted in it without any repugnance and inconvenience: but for cognition to be simple is a greater perfection than for it to be composite, as is evident concerning divine cognition, which is wholly simple; nor does any repugnance appear why this simple knowledge should not be attributed to the beatific vision: therefore it ought to be called simple knowledge. Again, every intuitive cognition, both corporeal and intellectual, is simple knowledge, as is evident: but the beatific vision is intuitive, as has been proved: therefore it is simple. Finally, if the vision of God were not simple knowledge, it would have to be either a judgment or a discourse; and consequently it would have to presuppose another apprehension of the beatific object: but this is false; for that presupposed apprehension would either be intuitive knowledge, and so the beatific vision itself, or it would be abstractive, and so the judgment or discourse consequent upon it could in no way be intuitive vision. For knowledge consequent upon abstractive cognition is necessarily abstractive, not, however, intuitive; and so the beatific vision either is formally simple, or it is not intuitive. Whence the Doctor rightly in 2. dist. 1. quaest. 5. num. 3. expressly asserts that the blessed soul does not reason discursively about the beatific object.

Proof of the second part. The beatific vision is most clear and most certain: but it would not be such unless the blessed intellect judged that it sees God: therefore that vision is at least virtually judicative. Again, the Blessed one, by seeing God, judges him to be omnipotent, because he is an infinite being, and wholly independent, and so his vision is judicative and discursive. Finally, if anything stood in the way of that vision being at least virtually judicative and discursive, it would chiefly be because it would be repugnant that a most simple act should be equivalent to distinct acts of judgment and discourse: but this is false. For while one clearly and intuitively beholds some object, v. g. the Blessed one seeing God, he also knows and discerns that it is God, that it is Wise, etc. and consequently it must be concluded with St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 14. art. 1. quaest. 3. that nothing prevents it being conceded that the blessed soul most certainly judges that to be the supreme light which it beholds. With this the Doctor agrees in quaest. 3. Prolog. num. 27. where he concedes that the beatific vision has all the conditions of science, one of which is that it be discursive. But the beatific vision cannot be formally discursive, as was proved in the prior part, which the Doctor himself also asserts by saying that the blessed soul does not reason discursively about the beatific object: therefore he judges that the beatific vision is at least virtually discursive.

You will say. St. Augustine, or whoever is the Author of the book De vera religione, affirms that no one can judge concerning the supreme truth: therefore the vision of the Blessed cannot be judicative. — St. Bonaventure responds in 1. distinct. 3. quaest. 1. to the fourth argument, that someone can judge concerning another thing in two ways: In the first way, by discerning whether it is or is not, and in this way judgment befits every knowing intellect with respect to every object: in the other way, by approving or disapproving, whether it ought to be so, and thus he does not judge concerning the truth, but according to it concerning other things, as Augustine says in De vera religione, that the judge does not judge concerning the law, but according to it judges concerning other things. And of this way it is true, what Augustine says, that no one judges concerning that truth, yet no one, however, judges without it: and of this way it is true what he objects, that the one who judges can pass judgment upon the thing judged. But of the first it is not true that he can pass judgment upon it; he can, however, be directed toward the object, with its assistance.

Second conclusion. — The beatific vision is a direct cognition formally, and only virtually reflex.

Proof of the first part. Reflex cognition formally presupposes direct cognition: but the beatific vision does not presuppose a prior cognition of the beatific object; for that prior cognition would either be beatific or not. If the first; therefore it would not require another beatifying cognition: if the second; therefore it would not be an intuitive vision of God, against the supposition; for the intuitive vision of God is supremely delightful from itself: for just as an act, v. g., has delight from the perception of a delightful object, without apprehending that perception and delight through a reflex act; so likewise the Blessed one perceives the greatest delight from the vision of the beatific object, without apprehending that perception and delight through another reflex act. Again, if there were any reason for admitting a reflex act in the beatific vision, it would chiefly be that the Blessed one might be made certain of the perpetuity and security of his vision, which security he cannot perceive through a direct act: but this reason is null, both because the Blessed one could perceive this security through another act following the act of beatific vision: and because the Doctor says in 4. dist. 49. qu. 6. that security is not of the essence of beatitude. Because security, he says, presupposes certainty about the continuation of beatitude: but the first certain apprehension follows the whole of beatitude by order of nature, since it is an act not tending toward the beatific object, but reflex upon the act: and consequently, the whole of beatitude posited essentially can be without certainty: therefore much more without security. By which the Doctor affirms three things: First, that the beatific vision is a direct act: second, that security is not of the essence of beatitude, but only its accidental property: third, that that security is not perceived through the beatific vision, but only through another subsequent and reflex act. Finally, so far is it from being the case that the beatific vision is reflex knowledge, indeed it does not seem necessary that that beatific vision should be known through another reflex beatific vision; both because otherwise there would be several beatific visions, which we shall prove in the following Conclusion to be false: and because, by the reason by which the first beatific vision should be seen through another reflex beatific vision, by the same reason it should be seen through a third, and so on to infinity, which no one would admit. For the reason why the first should be seen through the second is that since vision is a created being pertaining to the state of the Blessed, that vision also should be seen in the Word: but this reason also holds of the second reflex vision, and likewise of the third, and so on to infinity. That, however, this direct and intuitive vision, although pertaining to the state of the Blessed, should nevertheless not be seen through another vision, is evident; because the Blessed one, by seeing God, also sees that he sees; and so his vision is virtually reflex, as will be proved in the second part of the Conclusion.

Proof of the second part. That vision is virtually reflex by which one judges and perceives that he sees: but the Blessed one through the beatific vision judges and perceives that he sees God; otherwise his cognition and vision would be supremely imperfect, and less delightful: therefore it is virtually reflex.

Again: if anything stood in the way of the beatific vision being able to be called virtually reflex, it would chiefly be because by the same act one could not simultaneously see the object and perceive that he sees: but this is false: both because light manifests itself and other things besides itself, why therefore will not the beatific vision, which is supremely luminous, also represent God and itself? And because by the same act God is seen and the Creature represented in God; why therefore will not vision also, by seeing God, be able to see itself as well, since it is a Creature? and finally, because the knowledge by which God knows himself is virtually reflex: for God by the same act by which he knows himself also perceives that he knows: why therefore will not the beatific vision, which is the supreme participation of divine knowledge, know itself along with the beatific object?

You will say. The beatific vision cannot see itself in the Word, unless it is representable in it before it is seen: but the beatific vision cannot be representable in the Word before it is seen: therefore neither can it see itself. The minor is evident; for the object of cognition must be prior to that cognition; since the cause precedes the effect: but the object is the cause of the cognition which is born of the object and the potency. The minor is proved: the vision cannot be representable in the Word before it itself is, whether according to the esse of essence, or according to the esse of future or present existence. For although something can be represented in the Word according to its esse of essence and futurity before it is according to the esse of present existence, nevertheless it must at least by nature first have the esse of essence and futurity, before it is represented according to that esse: therefore by parity, the beatific vision, in order to be represented according to its esse of existence, must first have that esse of existence, before it is representable: but it cannot have that esse of present existence, except while it actually is: otherwise it would at the same time be existing, because it would be represented in that priority of nature, and not be existing, because it is not yet conceived to be elicited by the intellect: which is a manifest contradiction, and consequently that beatific vision is not virtually reflex.

I distinguish the major. The beatific vision cannot see itself, unless it is first representable with priority of nature, as a primary and motive object, I deny: as a secondary object, and only terminative, I concede. And so the beatific vision has a twofold object: a primary and motive one, which is the divine Essence itself; and a secondary one, and only terminative, such as are all Creatures, which are seen in the divine Essence as secondary objects. Since therefore the beatific vision is a creature, it is also seen in the divine Essence as a secondary object. I likewise distinguish the minor: that vision cannot be represented before it exists, if it were a primary and motive object, I concede: if it is only a secondary object, I deny. And so the divine Essence is indeed proximately and immediately representable through the beatific vision, because it is its primary and moving object, and therefore it must be at least prior by nature to the vision itself: since, however, this vision itself is only a secondary object, it is not necessary that it be deemed to exist prior by nature than it is known; because it does not have the notion of a visible object primarily, but only secondarily, nor is it seen in the prior instant of nature, in which the divine Essence is seen; but only in the posterior one, in which creatures are represented and beheld.

Third conclusion. — The beatific vision is wholly invariable and permanent, so that whatever the Blessed see in the Word, they have seen it from the beginning of their beatitude.

This is more in conformity with the mind of the holy Fathers, especially Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate cap. 16. where, speaking of the beatific vision, he says: Our thoughts will not be unstable, going from some to others and returning; but we shall see all our knowledge at once in one concept. With this St. Bernard agrees, 5. de Consideratione toward the end: For then, he says, the fragile edge of our mind, however vehemently it strains, will not in any way leap apart or spring back into its plurality; it will collect itself, will unite itself the more, and will conform itself to that unity, or rather to that one unity. And the same in Serm. 4. on the words of Isaiah in these words, The seraphim stood above it; six wings to one, and six wings to the other, and with two they flew, he says: To what end then the wings, if they stand? and if they stand, how do they fly? To which question he responds thus: I believe, however, that as in flight eagerness is promised, so also in standing immobility. Likewise in Serm. 30. in Cant. speaking of the excellence of the divine Vision, he says: That vision stands, because the form stands which is then seen: for it is, and admits no change from that which it is, was, or will be.

Proof of the conclusion. The beatific vision is the ultimate end of man, and so his supreme rest; for every motion therefore tends toward an end, that in attaining it it may rest: but there would be no rest there, indeed there would be a perpetual and eternal motion of the intellective potency, if the blessed thoughts and visions succeeded one another, nor were it a single, invariable, and permanent act: therefore it must be such. Secondly, if such a vision were not invariable and permanent, it would follow that the Blessed from the very beginning of their beatitude would not be fully and adequately satiated, since they would not have those succeeding beatific visions to be terminated at the various objects of beatitude: but this seems absurd. For since those succeeding thoughts would be made ever new and new through eternity, it would also come about that through eternity the Blessed one would not be adequately blessed: but would desire ever a new and new vision of an object to be newly represented. Finally: if any reason would persuade this succession of acts in the beatific vision, it would chiefly be because one and the same vision could not be terminated at all the secondary objects which are represented in the divine Essence: but this reason is null; for if a created vision can distinctly represent an object simply infinite, which is God; why likewise could it not represent all created objects, which however great their number, are nevertheless not infinite, as we have already said?

You will say 1. This assertion seems to attribute too much perfection to the created vision; for how could it come about that a limited and finite act could represent so many and so diverse secondary objects? Especially the beatific vision of the soul of Christ, by which it sees in the Word all things which have happened from the beginning of the world until the day of judgment: therefore this assertion seems less fitting.

I deny the antecedent. For the disproportion between the very act of created vision and God to be seen supernaturally and intuitively is greater than that which exists between the vision itself and those secondary objects, as is evident, since the former is infinite, these latter, however, intensively finite. Therefore since the act of created vision can tend toward the infinite God notwithstanding its limitation and finiteness, much more will it be able to be engaged about those secondary objects finite in number, which are represented in the Word itself.

You will say 2. One and the same created act cannot represent some thing, now as future, now as present, now as past, since these can scarcely be explained even of divine science, which is of infinite activity: but the beatific vision represents the things which happen in the world, now as future, when in reality they do not yet exist; and as present, while they actually are; and as past, when they have passed away: therefore it cannot be one and the same act. It is confirmed. An act is distinguished in species according to the specific variation of the object, not only formal, but also sometimes material: but those things, represented in the divine Essence in various ways according to the various differences of time, differ among themselves in species: therefore those representing visions also differ.

I answer 1. The beatific vision is not to be conceived as if the object were now represented once as future, now precisely as present, now once as past; for these differences, thus precisely considered, would constitute various material notions of the object, to which created visions specifically diverse would have to correspond: but the beatific vision itself is to be conceived thus, that from its first being it represents the secondary object according to that time which is future and is to have existence: so that this vision, immediately from its inception, has at the same time perceived future things for that time in which they were future, and did not yet exist; and at the same time has seen present things, for that time in which they were to have existence; and at the same time likewise past things, for that time in which they were no longer to exist: whence neither is a variety of acts necessary, nor a successive termination and representation of the same act, because all these objects according to the various vicissitudes of time are attained at once conjointly by the one and same act of the beatific vision itself.

I answer 2. That even if there were a diverse termination and successive representation of the same act, there would not on that account be an intrinsic change of the same act; because that termination is not made with respect to the primary object, but only with respect to the secondary object, which is not sufficient to vary the act, as the Doctor teaches in 1. d. q. 2. a. 2. where he says:

Every act having a first object on which it essentially depends, and a second object on which it does not essentially depend, but tends into it by virtue of the first; although it cannot remain the same act unless it has a relation to the first object, it can nevertheless remain the same without a relation to the second object, because it does not depend on it.

Example: The act of vision of the divine Essence, and of other things in the divine essence, is the same: but the essence in itself is the first object; the things seen are the secondary object; the same vision, however, could not remain unless it were of the same essence; but it could remain without the things seen being in it. By which the Doctor affirms that the same beatific vision is at once terminated at the divine Essence as at a primary object; at Creatures, however, as at a secondary one; he moreover teaches that the vision cannot subsist as the same, if a variation of the primary object were made; but that it can remain the same, even if a change of the secondary object be made. And so a various and successive termination at Creatures represented in the divine Word would not import an intrinsic variation and succession in the beatific vision.

You will say 3. All Theologians confess that there are various operations and actions in the Blessed succeeding one another through the whole of eternity: therefore it is false that the beatific vision is a single and invariable act.

I answer. Besides the act of beatific vision in the Word, there are again two kinds of operations in the Blessed: for some follow upon the beatific vision per se and necessarily, as love, fruition, joy, etc.; others, however, are annexed to it only per accidens, as illuminations, revelations, and judicative and discursive cognitions, which are made by the Blessed outside the Word; which operations indeed do not pertain precisely to the beatific vision itself, but to the other knowledge, which is infused science, by which the Blessed know things outside the Word: but this variety of acts imports no change in the beatific vision, since it is connected to it only per accidens.

You will say 4. The beatific vision which some wayfarers had was of the same species, and of the same notion with that which they now have as comprehensors, as being terminated at the same object and through the same light of glory; but that one was subject to change and vicissitude, as is evident: therefore this one also is subject to vicissitude.

I distinguish the major. It was of the same notion, as to state, I deny; as to the means and the object, let it pass. And so that beatific vision, which some wayfarers are said to have had before death, was not the same as to state with that which they now have as comprehensors; because it had not been granted to them by way of a perfect and permanent state, but by way of a transient state, which did not interfere with the state of the way. But it is otherwise with comprehensors, to whom the beatific vision is granted by way of a permanent and wholly invariable state.

From these things gather that the beatific vision is measured by participated eternity, since indeed it has no before and after in entity, as have the things which are measured by time: nor likewise does it have succession in operation, as the things which are measured by aevum: but it is a single and invariable act, whole at once and always standing, like eternity.