Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. That object is called the primary object of the beatific vision which is perceived by the blessed first, and per se, and not by reason of another, and which terminates their vision; that, however, is called secondary which is seen through another, in which it is contained either eminently or virtually. These two objects differ, moreover, in that the primary is at once the material and the formal object, that is, that which is seen and the reason of seeing, or as it were the medium, by which the rest are perceived; the secondary object, however, is only the material object, because it is seen only through the first, which must be known before the second is seen.

Note 2. Of those things which are in God, some are contained in Him formally, as the essence, the attributes, and the relations; others only eminently and virtually, as all creatures, both existing, future, and past, as well as possible ones. Again, of those things which are in God formally, some are necessary, as the attributes and the relations; others, however, free, as the decrees of the divine will. Finally, of the necessary ones, some are absolute and express no order to creatures, as certain divine attributes and all intrinsic modes; others, however, express a certain respect, at least of reason, to creatures, as Omnipotence, Knowledge, Ideas, etc.

Note 3. Regarding the primary object and those things which are formally in God, a twofold controversy is debated among theologians: the first indeed, whether in fact all the blessed see all those things which are formally in God, whether they be necessary, or absolute, or relative. The second, whether at least by the extraordinary power of God one attribute, or one divine Person, can be seen without the other Persons and attributes.

First conclusion. — The blessed who see God see formally and distinctly the very essence of God, the Trinity of persons, and all the attributes, according to their proper notions.

This seems to be of the faith defined in the Council of Florence in the Letters of union, where it is said: the one and triune God is seen by the blessed; and it is gathered from various passages of Sacred Scripture.

First indeed, Ioannis, 17: This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God, which text St. Augustine thus expounds, in the first book De Trinitate, ch. 8. This will happen, he says, when the Lord comes and illuminates the hidden things of darkness; this will be our morning, of which it is said in the Psalm, In the morning I will stand before you, and I will see, that is, when the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, shall have led the just, in whom He now reigns while they live by faith, to the contemplation of God and the Father. Second, Ioannis, 4: He who sees me, sees the Father also; which passage the same Augustine, expounding it in Ps. 48. Perhaps, he says, we shall be blessed by seeing the Father and not the Son; hear Christ himself; He who sees me, sees the Father also. For when the one God is seen, the Trinity is seen, etc. Third, from the first Epistle of Ioannis, cap. 3: When He appears, we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is; but God is in Himself one, and triune, just, wise, etc. Therefore He is seen as such by the blessed.

Second. The holy Fathers affirm the same thing distinctly; especially Nazianzen, in Oration 11, where he says thus: That illumination of the supreme Trinity will be purer, no longer fleeing the mind bound and diffused through the senses, but offering its whole self to the whole mind to be contemplated and held, and shining upon our souls with the entire light of the Divinity. And in Oration 15. A light brighter than every light, he says, will receive them, and the contemplation of the holy and royal Trinity, illuminating them before and more clearly, and mingling its whole self with the whole mind. Likewise Augustine, in the book De Catechizandis rudibus, ch. 25. God, he says, will be all delights, and the holy fellowship of the City living in Him and from Him wisely and blessedly: for we shall be made, as we hope and expect promised by Him, equal to His angels; and together with them we shall equally enjoy that Trinity.

Third and finally. The same is urged by theological reason. The beatific vision is quidditative and intuitive: therefore it extends to all those things which pertain to God's quiddity and entity, and consequently to the essence, the attributes, the relations, etc., which are really identified with the essence itself. Then, the beatific vision is the reward of our faith; For, Augustine says in the book De Diligendo Deo, ch. 18, what they believed here, they will see there; according to that saying of the Psalm: As we have heard, namely through faith, because faith comes from hearing, so we have seen in the City of the Lord of hosts, and so what is here obscurely revealed by faith in the way is clearly known in the homeland: but through faith those things which pertain to the divine Nature, the attributes, and the Persons are obscurely revealed to us: therefore they are manifested in the homeland through the species and clear vision. Finally, if the essence were seen without the Persons, that vision would be neither connatural, nor wholly complete and quieting. Not indeed quieting and complete, because something would remain for the blessed to desire and to see. Not even connatural, because intuitive and quieting vision naturally requires that, the essence being seen, the mode in which it subsists be also seen, and all its perfections be seen: but such would not be the vision unless with the essence all those things which it formally comprises were perceived at the same time: therefore, in order that the vision of the blessed be complete and wholly perfect, it is necessary that, the essence being seen, all those things which are formally contained in it be seen likewise.

You will say 1. If the blessed saw all those things which are formally in God, they would see them either confusedly or distinctly. Neither can be said. Not the first, because confused vision conflicts with intuitive and beatific vision. Not the second either, because if those things were seen distinctly, this would be chiefly either because they are distinct, or because they are seen through distinct acts: that is, that distinction holds either on the part of the object, or on the part of the act: but those things which are formally in God cannot be seen as distinct, on account of their supreme identity and simplicity; nor can they be seen through distinct acts, because in the beatific vision there is no variation and multiplicity of acts: therefore those things which are formally in God are seen neither confusedly nor distinctly, and so are not seen.

I answer. The beatific vision is distinct, not because it is made through distinct acts, or is borne upon distinct objects, but because it has no confusion and obscurity mixed in, as much with respect to the act as with respect to the object, which is perceived evidently, clearly, and distinctly. Whence in form: that vision is distinct, insofar as distinction is opposed to obscurity and lack of evidence, I concede: insofar as it is opposed to identity and simplicity, I deny: and so the proofs of the minor collapse.

You will say 2. The attributes which express some respect to creatures, such as omnipotence, knowledge, idea, etc., cannot be seen intuitively and connotatively, unless likewise all possible and existing creatures are seen: but all possible and existing creatures cannot be seen by the blessed: both because they are infinite, and consequently cannot be attained by the created intellect, which is of finite power and activity: and because if all of them were seen, the divine omnipotence would be comprehended, which implies a contradiction, as will appear below when treating of the incomprehensibility of God.

I distinguish the major. That they cannot be seen according to their primary notion, and insofar as they are such attributes of the divine Essence, I deny: that they cannot be seen according to their secondary notion, that is, according to their extension to the objects at which they terminate, or can terminate, I concede; for thus, omnipotence being seen, all possibles would have to be seen. But it is not necessary for the beatific vision of the attributes that they be seen according to their secondary notions and the relations which they have to creatures, otherwise their vision would have to be comprehensive, which implies a contradiction. As for the ideas existing in the divine mind, I say that although the blessed do not see all of them, because they do not see all the ideated and possible creatures, it suffices that they see in God that attribute by reason of which the divine Essence is called the exemplar of all existing or possible creatures, and so they see all those ideas at least in common; they see, however, some in particular, more or fewer according to the proportion of the light of glory and the different manifestation.

You will say 3. If the blessed see the divine Persons and attributes, those are seen either as the primary object, or as the secondary: but neither can be said. Not the first, because the essence is the primary object: not the second either, otherwise they would not be seen in themselves: therefore they are not seen at all.

I answer. The Persons and the attributes are seen as the primary object, not indeed as the motive object, but as the terminative object; for the divine Essence first moves to the vision of itself and of those things which are formally in it; nevertheless the vision terminates primarily and immediately not only upon it, but upon all those things which formally inhere in it, and so those things are seen primarily, if not motivatively, at least terminatively.

You will say 4. The free decrees of God are formally in Him: but they are not seen by the blessed: therefore whatever is formally in God is not seen by the blessed. The major will be established from what is to be said about the freedom of God. The minor, however, is proved: those decrees cannot be seen, without likewise all the objects being seen which are determined as future, or touched by such decrees: but all those are not seen by the blessed: therefore neither are all those decrees which are formally in God.

I deny the minor. For since those decrees are intrinsic acts existing formally in God, they can be seen just as rightly by the same act by which God is seen, as the other divine perfections existing in Him are seen. To the proof, I deny the minor, for nothing prevents the blessed, in seeing the free decrees, from also seeing all those things which are decreed, and especially those which in some way concern them, as we will set out in the following Question.

Second conclusion. — By the extraordinary power of God the divine Essence can be seen without the attributes and the Persons: and one attribute without another: and one Person without another not correlative to it. This is the teaching of the Doctor in 1. distinction 1. q. 2., with all his followers, and of other theologians of better note, against the Thomists.

Proof first. That can be brought about by the extraordinary power of God which involves no contradiction: but there is no contradiction that the essence be seen without the attributes, etc. I prove: if such a vision were repugnant and involved some contradiction, this would be chiefly either because it is an intuitive vision, or because it is a quidditative one, or because it is beatificative: but from neither head can such contradiction and repugnance be derived.

— Not indeed because it is an intuitive vision: for it is not of the notion of intuitive vision that it be adequate, or that through it the object be perceived according to all the formalities really identified with it: for the eye intuitively sees whiteness without seeing in it the notion of quality, of inherence, and of dependence both on the subject and on God, which nevertheless are really identified with that whiteness itself. Similarly, when we discern someone coming from afar, and do not know whether it is a man or a beast; we see him under the notion of a living being and of an animal, although we do not see him under the notion of a rational animal: therefore an object can be seen intuitively under one formality and notion, without being seen under another.

Nor does it avail to reply with the more recent Thomists that this is indeed true of imperfect knowledge, such as the knowledge of the senses and of the intellect conjoined with the body; not, however, of the most excellent intuitive vision, such as the beatific vision is. Whence they bring forward a threefold reason of disparity. The first, they say, holds from the limitation of the sensitive power, which is concerned only with some determinate formality, for example, the eye with the visibility of color, not, however, with other formalities which have not the notion of the luminous and the colored, nor consequently the notion of the visible; the created intellect, however, has for its adequate object being under the notion of the true, under which are contained all the predicates, as much constitutive as modificative, of the thing which is known. Whence if the knowledge is perfect and clear and intuitive, such as the beatific vision is, it necessarily extends to all that which pertains to the nature and quiddity and mode of the object which is known. The second reason of disparity they bring forward is this; that sensitive vision takes place through some medium, through which species are emitted, namely through the air; but since that medium is sometimes obscure, it comes about that the vision is imperfect; it is otherwise, however, with the beatific vision, which does not take place through any species, or image, or created medium, but through an immediate union with God himself, and so this vision cannot be obscured or halved, such that one formality of the object is seen and not another. Finally, they derive the third reason of disparity from the part of the object seen: for this, they say, is the difference between God seen and creatures, that creatures are composed of parts, each of which is not the whole itself; and therefore it can happen that in them one part is seen while another is not seen; it is otherwise, however, with God, who since He is most simple and pure act, there is nothing in Him which is not Himself: and consequently, it is repugnant that something of God be seen, and the whole which is in God not be seen.

— But this reply does not weaken the force of the argument; first, for it is certain that intuitive vision, by its formal notion, does not require that it terminate adequately upon all the formalities of the object that are really identified with one another, since one can be perceived by the bodily eye while another is not perceived. Second, if the eye can naturally see one formality of its object without seeing another, why should the intellect, at least supernaturally, not also be able to see one formality of its object without seeing another identified with it? Indeed, in fact the Angel naturally sees his own essence intuitively, and yet he does not see the obediential potency by which he could be united hypostatically to some divine personality; nor does he likewise see the potency which he has for seeing the triune God, otherwise he would naturally know the possibility of the Incarnation and the mystery of the Trinity; yet both of these potencies are really identified with his essence: therefore, of formalities that are identified, one can be seen intuitively without the others being seen, even naturally, and so much the more through an extraordinary power. Finally, the Blessed one who sees the knowledge of God insofar as it is representative of some possibles does not see the same knowledge insofar as it represents other possibles, and yet that knowledge, according to the same real notion, represents all possibles; therefore both the intellect and the bodily eye can see one formality without seeing another, and hence the first ground of disparity brought forward by the adversaries is null.

— Nor do the others press more strongly; because the clarity of the medium, or the immediate and evident manifestation of the object, does not prevent one of its formalities from being apprehended while another is not perceived, when they are visible in different ways, such as the divine essence, perfections, and relations, which, although they do not produce a true composition, yet because they are formally distinguished from one another, one can be seen without another being seen; and so on the part of intuitive vision there is no repugnance that the essence be seen while the attributes and personalities are not seen.

Nor does it repugn from the fact that this vision is quidditative. First, because it is not necessary that intuitive vision be quidditative, as is evident in the vision of the bodily eye. Second, because vision, even quidditative, can be inadequate; for the knowledge of the Angel, by which he knows his own substance and entity, is quidditative, and nevertheless it is inadequate; for he does not perceive all the relations which he has to creatures, whether possible or existing; nor does he know the obediential potency which he has for the vision of the mystery of the Trinity, as has been said, although this potency is really identified with his essence; and so quidditative and essential knowledge can be inadequate; finally, because neither the attributes nor the personalities are of the formal concept of the divine Essence: indeed, they are formally distinguished from it; therefore they do not require to be seen with a quidditative vision, nor is the blessed vision, insofar as it terminates upon them, rightly called quidditative, but only intuitive.

Finally, nor does it repugn from the fact that this vision is beatific. First, because, the Persons not being seen, God still remains the supreme good, and the ultimate end infinitely perfect, and hence He is sufficiently the beatifying object, and so it is not necessary for the beatific vision that the Persons be seen. The antecedent is evident: for God does not have from the relations that He is the supreme good and the ultimate end; but He has this from the fact that He is an uncreated being, infinitely perfect, and pure act, all of which proceeds from the absolute essence. And consequently, with the Persons set aside, there still remains in God the entire notion of the supreme good and of the ultimate end. Second, because if by impossibility God were not triune, nor had personal notions, His vision would be no less beatific; for it would be the possession of an infinite good: therefore the personal relations do not per se contribute to the notion of the beatific vision; and so the vision would be no less beatific if it terminated upon the essence, but not upon the persons. Finally, because, as will be proved in the treatise De Trinitate, the eternal Father in that prior sign in which He is understood to generate His Son is conceived also as blessed; for beatitude belongs to Him essentially: but for that sign the Son is not yet understood as generated, since He receives divine being through such knowledge or diction, nor consequently the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son: therefore the beatific knowledge is true in the Father antecedently to the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit; and so for created beatitude, which is a participation of uncreated beatitude, the knowledge of the Persons is not absolutely necessary.

— Nor does it avail to reply with Vasquez, disp. 18. n. 18., and some Thomists, that the eternal Father in that sign in which He is understood to generate the Son is not conceived as blessed, but only as God: for this is evidently false, first because in that sign all the essential and absolute things are understood to belong to the Father: but beatitude is something essential and absolute: therefore for that sign it is understood to belong to the Father, otherwise He would not have the essential and absolute things from Himself. Then also because in that notional sign the Father is understood to have everything which He communicates to the Son; but He communicates to Him uncreated beatitude: therefore He is understood to have it. Finally, because beatitude is the possession of the divine Essence through love and knowledge; but in that sign the eternal Father so possesses the Deity, and hence He is truly to be called Blessed. Add that if by impossibility there were only a single Person in the divine, as the Jews and Mohammedans believe, that Person would truly be deemed blessed: therefore the Trinity of Persons is not formally required for the notion of the beatific object; and so the vision can be beatific even if the three Persons are not seen.

Nor does it avail to reply with other Thomists that in that sign the eternal Father does not see His essence except with the Person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit seen, because, they say, this is not a priority in which there is knowledge and the state of beatitude, but only a priority from which, that is, of origin; and so it can be conceived thus, but in reality it is not so, since there is no instant in which the Father exists and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not exist.

I answer: that even if that sign is not a real instant, nevertheless it is a true instant of knowledge and of origin, which suffices that the eternal Father can truly be conceived as blessed, just as He is truly conceived as generating and producing the Son and the Holy Spirit: this, however, suffices to persuade that the beatific vision can be conceived without terminating upon the Persons, and so it can be beatific although it is not adequate.

Proof 2., and at the same time the principal foundation of the adversaries is overturned. If anything hindered that the essence could be seen without the attributes and the personalities, it would be above all their identity and supreme simplicity: but these do not hinder that the essence can be seen without them. I prove it: notwithstanding such simplicity and identity, the divine Essence is communicated, but the Person is not: likewise one Person is really united immediately, and not another; for the eternal Father communicates the divine Nature to the Son, but not Paternity; and in the Incarnation, the Person of the Word is united to the humanity, but not the Person of the Father: therefore much more will the nature be able to be communicated and united intentionally through knowledge without the Persons, and one Person without another. The antecedent is evident: the consequence also is evident, since vision is more extrinsic than the very communication of the nature ad intra, or than the union of the humanity with the Person, it follows that the former can prescind more than the latter, and hence be seen more easily without each other: therefore, just as notwithstanding the supreme identity of the nature with the Person, the divine Essence is communicated by the Father, and not Paternity; and the Person of the Word is united immediately to the humanity, but not the person of the Father; so notwithstanding that identity, the essence will be able to be seen without the Persons, and one Person without another.

To these the Thomists reply: that there is a disparity, because the person is not communicable as the essence is: but in truth both the essence and the person are something visible; and so, one being seen, the other must necessarily be seen.

On the contrary. Notwithstanding the supreme identity of the essence and the person, the essence is communicable, but the person is not: therefore, even notwithstanding the same identity, the essence will be visible without the person being seen; or that repugnance does not arise from simplicity and identity. Add that if the virtual distinction, in the opinion of the Thomists, suffices to save the contradiction of the one, why will it not likewise suffice to save the contradiction of the other? Finally: although both the person and the essence are visible, that visibility does not prevent them from being something distinct at least virtually: therefore neither will it prevent one from being perceived while the other is not perceived. Finally, if, with the divine Essence seen and the attributes seen, all the visible things identified with them would necessarily have to be seen, it would follow also that, God being seen, all possible creatures would necessarily be seen in particular. The adversaries do not admit the consequence: therefore neither should they admit that from the supreme identity and visibility of the things that are in God, one cannot be seen without another. The major is proved: it implies a contradiction that the knowledge of God about Peter, e.g., be seen formally and distinctly in particular, without Peter being seen in particular: the same is to be said of all the other possible creatures: but he who sees God necessarily sees formally and distinctly the knowledge of God, insofar as it is representative of Peter in particular, and of each of the possibles; therefore if, one visible thing being seen, it is necessary that any other visible thing identified with that visible thing be seen by the Blessed, it follows that the Blessed one necessarily sees all the possibles in particular. The major is evident; for it implies a contradiction that the image be known distinctly as representative of some thing in particular, without that thing being known in particular; but the knowledge about Peter in particular is an image representative of him in particular; therefore it implies a contradiction that the knowledge be known as representative of Peter in particular, without Peter being known in particular. The minor also is evident. For the adversaries concede that all the things which are in God formally are necessarily and distinctly seen by the Blessed: but the knowledge insofar as it is representative of Peter in particular is in God formally; therefore it is necessarily seen in particular, if it is true that one visible thing cannot be seen by the Blessed without that whole visible thing really identified with it being likewise seen.

You will say 1. Christ the Lord, Ioannis 11., proves that, the Son being seen, the Father is seen, because the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; this is on account of the unity of nature, saying: Philip, he who sees me sees the Father: but if one Person could be seen without another, it would not follow from the unity of nature that, the Son being seen, the Father would be seen: whence rightly Nazianzen, Oratione 49., Rightly, he says, he who sees the Son sees also the Father, because by unity of substance and majesty of Divinity they are one: and August. 1. De Trinit. cap. 8., Whether therefore we hear, Show us the Son: or whether we hear, Show us the Father, it amounts to the same, because neither can be shown without the other: therefore one Person cannot be seen without another.

I answer 1. with St. Chrysostom, Homil. 73. in Ioannem, and Cyril, lib. 9. in eumdem cap. 37. et sequentibus, and Tertullian, lib. contra Praxean, cap. 24., that the sense of that passage is this, that he who sees me through faith, and believes my words and works, must needs, in seeing me, that is, my Divinity through faith, see also the Father, because the Father abiding in me Himself does the miraculous works which I do, and through them testifies that He is my Father, and that I am His only-begotten Son: which exposition is gathered from the following words: How do you say, Show us the Father? do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words which I speak to you I do not speak from myself; for the Father abiding in me Himself does the works.

I answer 2. That Christ's argument is the best; namely, that from the unity of the nature of the Father and of the Son it is rightly gathered that, the Son being seen, the Father is seen; not that this inference is necessary; but because it is connatural, and is made according to the ordinary power.

You will say 2. The beatific vision is intuitive, by which God is seen as He is in Himself: but God as He is in Himself has the essence, the persons, and the attributes simultaneously identified: therefore if He is seen as God in Himself, all those things must be seen. Then, it implies a contradiction that the identification of the essence and of the attributes and persons be seen, without the essence and those things which are identified with it being seen: but it implies a contradiction that God be seen as He is in Himself, without that identification being seen: therefore it implies a contradiction that God be seen as He is in Himself, without the essence and attributes being seen. Finally, a thing cannot be seen as it is in itself without being seen as existing and subsisting: but it cannot be seen as subsisting and existing without existence and subsistence being seen, and hence the personalities, which are modes of subsisting: therefore he who sees God necessarily sees the personalities.

I distinguish the major. Intuitive knowledge is borne upon the thing as it is in itself, either adequately or inadequately, I concede; adequately only, I deny. To the minor I say that when God is seen adequately, all the things with which He is identified are seen, I concede: if He is not seen adequately, that all those things must be seen, I deny: and so I acknowledge that the mode in which God exists adequately and in the concrete is three Persons; but not if He is considered inadequately, because as such He can be known to exist in a single person. The same is to be said of the attributes. It does not, however, imply a contradiction that intuitive knowledge be inadequate, and be borne upon the thing considered in the abstract, and conceive it without subsistence; for the Demons intuitively knew Christ, whose personality, nevertheless, they did not know.

You will insist. Intuitive vision, which terminates upon an object that is entirely simple and indivisible, perceives it according to everything that it is; otherwise either the vision would not be intuitive, or the object would not be indivisible: but the essence of God with the Persons and attributes is something simply one and indivisible: therefore the essence of God cannot be seen unless it is seen with the attributes and Persons.

I distinguish the major. If that is indivisible and simple both really and formally, I concede: if it is indivisible only really, but not formally, I deny: but God is indivisible only really; for His essence, attributes, and Persons are distinguished formally, as has been proved.

You will say 3. The divine Essence cannot be seen without being seen as the supreme good, and as the root and foundation of Omniscience and Omnipotence, and of the other attributes, and as it is the root of fecundity ad intra, that is, of productiveness through intellect and will: but as such it cannot be seen without the attributes and relations being seen: therefore, etc. The major is proved, because whatever concept would be had of the divine Essence without those modes being conceived would be imperfect, and in no way could the notion of the supreme good belong to it.

I distinguish the major. If the root and foundation of the attributes and of fecundity is considered formally, I deny; for the essence as essence is considered absolutely, and without any order to the attributes and to those things which flow from it: if it is considered really, and according to every habitude and virtue which it has, I concede the major, and with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. In the same way the proof of the major is to be distinguished. And so the divine Essence can be considered in two ways, namely either formally according to the sole concept of the essence, and thus it could be seen without the persons and attributes: or really, and insofar as it involves the attributes and persons which flow from it and are identified with it, and thus it cannot be seen without the persons and attributes. In order, however, that all the other objections to be formed may be more easily solved, it must be noted that I have said that one person can indeed be seen without another not correlative to it: for I acknowledge that the Father under the notion of Father cannot be seen without the Son being seen; at least as He is the term of Paternity; although He could be seen as He is a divine supposit. The same is to be said of the rest.