Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Having now set forth the two principles that come to the cognitive power from without, so as to complete it in order to elicit its own operation — namely, the impressed species on the part of the object, and the light of glory on the part of the power, which place it in actu primo so that it may exercise its action — we must now decide how the intellect, equipped with such an impressed species or with the light of glory, concurs in forming the beatific vision: namely, whether it produces it physically and actively, or whether it only receives it as produced by the light of glory or by God alone; moreover, whether it produces it as the principal cause or only as an instrumental cause.

Note 1. Two intellects are commonly distinguished, according to the diversity of their function: one, indeed, the agent intellect, and the other the patient intellect. The former is that which, as it were, receives the sensible species sent in by the external senses and the phantasy, and at their presence fashions and expresses the intelligible species, or spiritual representative images of the things that are perceived by the senses. The latter, however, is said to be the intellect itself which receives in itself the spiritual image thus formed, so that through it it may formally become understanding: whence intellection is said to consist inchoately in that action of the intellect by which it produces the image itself, but consummately in the reception of the same image. For intellection consists formally in this, that it assimilates the intellect to the thing understood and makes it formally understanding: but this is achieved inchoately through the productive action of that spiritual image, which is commonly called the true mental word; and completely through the reception of that same word and image; for that image, since it is the expressed likeness of the thing understood, without doubt by informing the intellect and adhering to it assimilates it to the known object, and so makes it completely understanding.

Note 2. Since speech is twofold — the one external and sensible, the other internal and spiritual — a twofold word is likewise commonly distinguished: one, indeed, the word of the mouth, by which men, in speaking to others, set forth to them their own internal concepts; the other, the word of the mind, which is the internal speech itself, or the formation of the concept, by which the intellect expresses the likeness and image of the object it beholds. This word of the mind is defined by the Doctor in 1. dist. 27. quaest. 3. as an act of intellection produced by the fruitful memory, having being only dependently upon actual cognition. It is called an act of intellection, which constitutes the soul formally understanding, just as heat constitutes a thing hot. Secondly, it is formed by the fruitful memory, that is, by the intellect informed and, as it were, pregnant with the intelligible species of the object. The rest is added to signify that complete intellection consists in the presence of the word itself, which has being only as long as the cognition of the object itself endures.

Note 3. An efficient cause is commonly distinguished as twofold: one, indeed, principal, and the other instrumental. The former is that which physically influences the effect through a power proper and intrinsic to itself: the latter, however, is that which influences only through the power of another that moves it; for it is more probable that an instrumental cause is not properly active of itself, as we have taught with the Doctor in 4. dist. 1. quaest. 3. n. 14., in the Physics q. 5. on the instrumental cause. But whether the created intellect has the character of a principal cause or only of an instrumental one in the beatific vision will have to be decided in this Question, in which three things are proposed to be resolved: first, whether the created intellect concurs physically in the beatific vision; second, whether it concurs as a principal cause; third, whether it produces a mental word.

First conclusion. — The intellect concurs partially with the light of glory in physically, actively, and immediately producing the beatific vision.

Proof. First, indeed, because every intellection is produced by the mind, just as volition is produced by the will: therefore the beatific cognition and vision is also physically produced by the created intellect, just as beatific love is produced by the created will. The antecedent is clear from the common opinion of the holy Fathers, which St. Augustine thus weighs in lib. 9. De Trinitate, last chapter: The mind itself, he says, is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge as its offspring; for when the mind knows itself, it begets a knowledge of itself and is the parent of its own knowledge. The consequence is also clear: for the intellect must concur no less in forming the beatific vision than the will in eliciting beatific love: but the will concurs actively and physically in beatific love and in the other supernatural acts; otherwise there would be no freedom and no indifference in meritorious acts, which are truly supernatural: therefore the intellect also concurs physically in forming the supernatural vision. — Moreover, the beatific vision is a vital act: therefore it must be produced connaturally and physically by a vital power: but by no other than the intellect: therefore the intellect concurs physically in forming the beatific vision. — Finally, the nobler mode of operating is to be attributed to the created intellect, insofar as it can be attributed without any contradiction and repugnance: but the operation by which cognition itself is produced is nobler than its reception: therefore the physical production of the beatific vision must be attributed to the created intellect. The major is clear, for it is nobler to act than to undergo, because action imports greater power and independence; whereas undergoing has dependence and a certain weakness and infirmity attached; for whatever undergoes, is by that very fact overcome and surpassed. I prove the minor: if anything stood in the way of the intellect being said to concur actively in forming the beatific vision, it would be chiefly that the vision is of the supernatural order: but this reason does not stand in the way; both because in fact a natural power cooperates in supernatural acts; for example, the will in the act of charity and of contrition, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6. can. 4., where he is anathematized who should say that man's free choice cooperates in nothing by assenting to God who excites and calls, but like some inanimate thing does nothing at all and behaves merely passively: therefore the Council judges that the created will can cooperate in a meritorious act, which is of the supernatural order: why, then, should the intellect also not be able to cooperate in the beatific vision, even though it is supernatural? Then because (says Poncius) the beatific vision could be supernatural, even though a natural cause concurred in it; for just as the impressed intelligible species, to the production of which the corporeal phantasm concurs, is spiritual; and just as man is said to be corporeal, although a spiritual soul concurs in constituting him; so the vision could be supernatural, even though some natural cause concurred in it, provided that another supernatural cause, such as the light of glory, also concurs at the same time. Add that that is called supernatural which cannot be produced without a supernatural principle, whether another principle, which is natural, concurs in it or not: therefore, since the beatific vision cannot be produced without supernatural aid, it will be no less to be called supernatural, although the intellect concurs actively in its production — the intellect which is, indeed, a power natural of itself, but elevated by the light of glory to the supernatural order.

You will say 1. The intellect cannot actively concur in the beatific vision without likewise actively concurring in its supernaturality: but it cannot actively concur in its supernaturality, but only in its vitality: therefore neither in its entity. The major is clear: the minor is proved: the intellect can no more concur in the supernaturality of the beatific vision than the light of glory can concur in its vitality: but the light of glory does not of itself concur in vitality, because it is an inanimate principle: therefore by parity of reasoning the intellect will likewise be unable to concur in supernaturality, and consequently will not concur in the entity of the vision either, which is formally supernatural. Add that the vitality itself of the beatific vision is also formally supernatural, and so if the intellect does not concur immediately and precisely in supernaturality, neither would it concur in vitality, and consequently it would not concur physically in the beatific vision.

I answer. Since those formalities of vitality and supernaturality are not really distinct from the act of vision, but result only from the diverse mode in which that act is said to proceed from its causes, therefore the act of beatific vision according to its real entity, and so according to its vitality and supernaturality, really proceeds both from the intellect and from the light of glory, although it is not said to proceed from each separately precisely according to its formalities. For in order that the act be said to proceed from the light according to the formality of vitality, it would have to be called vital precisely insofar as it is from the light, which is impossible; for since the light is in the soul, it cannot be called the principle of vitality itself precisely per se, but only insofar as it concurs physically in the entity of the vision, which is at once supernatural and vital: whence the minor must be denied, namely, that the intellect concurs in the vision only insofar as it is vital, but not insofar as it is supernatural. For since it concurs in the entity of the vision, it also concurs in everything that is really identified with the vision itself; and hence in supernaturality, which is really the same as the vision itself.

You will insist. The beatific vision is adequately and formally supernatural: therefore it must proceed adequately from a supernatural principle: but the intellect precisely is not a supernatural principle; for it acts through a power innate to itself, which is entirely natural of itself and intrinsically: therefore that vision cannot proceed physically from the intellect.

I deny the major. For from it there would follow that the vision itself would not be produced by the light either, because since it is vital, it would require an adequate vital principle, which the light is not. And therefore it suffices for the notion of the adequate principle of this vision that it be produced by one principle formally supernatural, such as the light, and by another supernatural only extrinsically and through elevation, such as the beatific intellect; for the beatific intellect, elevated through the light of glory, forms with it a single adequate principle of the vision, which is wholly produced by both jointly, both insofar as it is vital and insofar as it is supernatural; because both the light and the intellect concur in the entity of the vision itself, which is really vital and supernatural.

You will say 2. The Subtle Doctor affirms in several places that the intellect behaves merely passively with respect to intellection, which he judges to be caused principally by the object, and above all with respect to the beatific vision. For in 1. d. 3. q. 8. n. 2., when he had proved that the intellective part has the more principal causality with respect to the cognitions that are naturally fitting to us in the present state; because, he says, that cause is more principal by which, when it acts, another cause co-acts, and not conversely: but with our intellect acting to intellection, the object in itself, or in its species, co-acts, etc.; he concludes: Nevertheless some object greatly exceeding the capacity of the intellective part, for instance, the beatific object, as clearly seen, could be held to have the whole causality with respect to the vision, or a more principal causality than the intellective part, and this on account of the excellence of such an object and on account of the defect of the intellective part. Therefore the Doctor judges that the beatific intellect does not concur actively in the beatific vision.

I distinguish. That he judges this probably, I concede: assertively, I deny, as is clear from the words just quoted. Indeed, he leans more toward our opinion than toward the opposite one: for he adds: but about this in the fourth book, where he affirms that he will set forth a fuller discussion of this matter and a clearer opinion. But it is established from 4. d. 4. q. 11. n. 9. that he judges the intellect to be productive of the beatific vision; for there, disputing about the necessity of the light of glory, he says: If, however, something supernatural is placed in the blessed person prior to the operations, this will not be for the sake of reception, but for the sake of action, so that the operation by which he attains God may be elicited in the blessed person. And so he openly acknowledges that the intellect is active and productive together with the light of glory itself, if it is given — as indeed we have proved more than sufficiently, even on the Doctor's own opinion, that it is really given in the preceding Question. It is confirmed from Quodlib. q. 14., where, when he had adduced several authorities from St. Augustine by which he would prove that the beatific vision is produced either by the beatific object or by the intellect, and had brought forward several reasons to demonstrate that the intellect is not only a passive and receptive faculty but also an active and productive one, he finally concludes: I concede, therefore, the authorities adduced earlier, to whatever affirmations, whether about the intellect or about the object: it is indeed true that each of these is in some way active to intellection; but active partially; both, however, integrate one total active.

Second conclusion. — The intellect, together with the light of glory, concurs in the beatific vision as the principal cause.

This is the common opinion among the Scotists.

Proof, first. That cause concurs in an effect as principal which produces it through a power intrinsic and connatural to itself: but the created intellect so produces the beatific vision; for it produces it through its innate power of understanding elevated by the light of glory: therefore it is its principal cause. For in this the principal cause differs from the instrumental one, that the latter operates only through an external power acquired from elsewhere: but the former through an internal power of acting connatural to itself. Next, the intellect equipped with the light of glory is the principal cause of the beatific vision, if no other besides itself can be assigned; but besides the intellect no other cause of the beatific vision can be assigned. I prove it: that cause is to be called principal of the vision which is said to see God: but besides the intellect there is nothing that can be said to see God; for that other thing, if there were any, would be chiefly either God or the light of glory: but neither God nor the light of glory can be said to see God with a created vision: therefore neither can be called the principal cause of beatitude. Finally, the vision is a vital effect: therefore it requires a principal cause by which it is vital; that cause, however, is neither God, because since it is an internal and immanent action, it cannot have a merely external cause, such as God is; nor is it the light of glory, because since it is inanimate it cannot be called the principle of a vital action, least of all an immanent one: therefore it remains that the intellect be called the principal cause of the beatific vision.

You will say 1. Whenever a cause is more ignoble than the effect it produces, it must be called an instrumental cause, not a principal one: but the intellect, even equipped with the light of glory, is more ignoble than the beatific vision: therefore it is its instrumental cause, not its principal one. The major is certain: for although it can happen that an instrument is sometimes nobler than the effect it produces, through obediential power, for example, if an Angel were to produce an ant; yet all acknowledge that a cause more ignoble than the effect produced can never rightly be called principal; because a nobler effect is never proportioned and connatural to a less noble cause. The minor, therefore, is proved: an entity adequately vital and intrinsically supernatural is nobler than an entity vital and supernatural only inadequately: but the intellect equipped with the light of glory is supernatural only inadequately; likewise the light of glory is vital only inadequately, that is, by reason of the intellect to which it is joined: therefore the beatific vision is nobler than the intellect even equipped with the light of glory; and hence the latter cannot be its principal cause.

I deny the minor. For since the intellect is a substantial faculty only formally distinct from the soul, and is also elevated to the supernatural order by the benefit of the light of glory, it is certain that it is far more excellent than the beatific vision, which is only an accident, and so less perfect than a substance. Nor does it matter that the intellect is only extrinsically supernatural; because even a natural substance is nobler than any supernatural accident, according to the notion of being; for an accident, however supernatural, is always dependent on a subject; and so is less noble than the substance to which it inheres and on which it depends: therefore much more will the intellect, elevated to the supernatural order, be nobler than the beatific vision; and so on this ground it must not be called an instrumental cause with respect to it.

You will say 2. An active obediential power is always instrumental, since it produces an effect disproportionate and due to that cause alone by which it is elevated: but the intellect, even equipped with the light of glory, acts through an obediential power divinely elevated: therefore it does not produce the beatific vision as a principal cause, but as an instrumental one. — I distinguish the major: when that obediential power has absolutely no proportion with the effect to be produced — just as, for example, the Sacraments have absolutely no proportion with sanctifying grace, to the production of which they concur effectively and instrumentally in the opinion of the Thomists — I concede: when that power has some proportion, at least inchoate, with the effect to be produced, I deny. But the intellect of itself has at least an inchoate proportion with the beatific vision, as we have already often said, and needs only the light of glory so that this inchoate power may be elevated to a higher and supernatural order: and hence it produces that beatific vision through a power innate to itself, and as a principal cause. Add that since that beatific vision is a vital act, it has a connatural proportion with the intellect.

You will say 3. The intellect is therefore called the principal cause of the beatific vision because, since this is a vital act, it must necessarily be produced by a vital faculty: but according to the common opinion of the Doctors, above all of the Subtle Doctor in the places cited by Smising n. 279., God alone can produce a vital and immanent act in a vital power without its effective concurrence, in which case, says Smising, the power will rightly be denominated knowing, or appetitive: therefore from the vitality of the beatific cognition it is not rightly inferred that the created intellect is its principal cause.

I distinguish the major. That the notion of principal causality in the intellect is gathered from vitality according to the ordinary law, I concede: according to an extraordinary mode of operating, I deny. I indeed acknowledge that God can produce a vital act in a natural faculty without that faculty's concurrence; but from this the intellect is nonetheless to be regarded as the ordinary principal cause of that vision. Just as fire is no less called the principal cause of combustion, although God could produce it independently of the concurrence of fire itself.

Third conclusion. — In the beatific vision there is given an expressed species, or mental word.

This is the common opinion among the Theologians, against certain recent Thomists.

Proof, first. The word is a likeness of the object, produced and expressed by the intellect: but in the beatific vision this likeness is given: therefore a word is also given. The major is clear from Philosophy. The minor, however, is proved: first indeed from Sacred Scripture, 1. Ioannis 3: When he appears, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is. Secondly, from Augustine, lib. 14. De Trinitate cap. 17, where, speaking of the beatific vision, he says: In this image the likeness will then be perfect, when the vision of God will be perfect: and lib. 15. cap. 16.: When, he says, we shall see him as he is, then our word will not be false. St. Augustine therefore holds that a word is produced in the beatific vision. Thirdly, finally, from St. Thomas 1. p. q. 27. a. 1., where he says: Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, which is the conception of the thing understood. As if he would say that in every intelligent nature, both human and Angelic, there is given a procession of the word; from which he infers, against the Arians and Sabellians, against whom he chiefly disputes, that a Word is also given in God, who, since he is an intelligent nature, and at the supreme grade of intellectuality, must also have within himself a procession of the Word: but St. Thomas's reasoning and inference would be vain and null if there were some created intellection, and that the most perfect, such as the beatific vision, in which a word were not produced: for the Arian could reply that a word is indeed produced through imperfect cognition; but not through the most perfect cognition of a creature; and so from the production of a word by creatures it would not be rightly inferred that the same production of a word would be in God, the most perfect of all intelligent beings. That this, however, is the genuine mind of Saint Thomas, is clear moreover from the treatise De veritate q. 4. a. 2., where, when he had said: The word is something really proceeding from another, he adds: which is universally true of everything that is understood by us, whether it is seen through essence or through a likeness: therefore St. Thomas holds that even in the beatific vision, in which God is seen through essence, a word is formed.

Secondly. The beatific vision is an action; but no action is given without a term distinct from it and produced; for an action is the effecting of some term, or is a way and a tending toward a term: therefore in the beatific vision some produced term must be given: but that term is called the mental word: therefore the mental word is given in the beatific vision. The major is proved: every real thing that did not exist before must be made anew by some action, unless it is the action itself; for nothing is newly real unless it is really made: but the vision of God is real, which did not exist before in the intellect before it was beatified: therefore either it must be made anew by a real action, or it must be the action itself.

Thirdly. If anything stood in the way of the beatific vision being a mental word, or productive of a word, it would be chiefly because the divine Essence is of itself present to the beatific intellect in the notion of an immediately intelligible object: but this presence and immediate intelligibility of the object does not hinder the production of the Word: for the eternal Father produces the Word, although his cognition is intuitive, and the divine Essence is maximally present to him and supremely and immediately intelligible by him: therefore the supreme presence and intelligibility of the divine Essence does not hinder the production of the word.

You will say 1. The word is that which is immediately understood, and by means of which the object is perceived: but God is not perceived in the beatific vision through any means: for if anything mediated between God and the beatific intellect, the beatific vision would no longer be immediate nor intuitive: therefore in the beatific vision no word is given.

I deny the major. For that word is the formal notion of knowing the object, not that which is known: whence although the word is perceived, the object is nonetheless immediately known, because it is not the medium in which, but the medium by which, the object is seen.

You will say 2. If a word is produced through the beatific vision, it is chiefly because every intellection is productive of a word: but the consequent is false, for the Son and the Holy Spirit understand the divine Essence, and yet produce no word: therefore not every intellection is productive of a word; and hence it is not rightly inferred that a word is given in the beatific vision.

I distinguish the major in two ways. First, indeed: every intellection is productive of a word when the word, or term, is really distinguishable from the one producing it, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Whence to the minor I say that indeed the Son and the Holy Spirit do not produce a word through their intellection, because they only understand by the essential intellection, which is not distinguishable from any conceivable term, since it is absolute and common to the three persons. I distinguish the same major a second way: then intellection is productive of a word when it is not exhausted by a word already produced, I concede; when it is already exhausted by a word produced, I deny; but the intellection of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is already exhausted by the Word produced by the cognition and intellection of the Father. These things will become clearer in the Treatise on the Trinity.

You will say 3. If a word, or expressed species of God, were given, God could be seen intuitively even if he were not present: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is proved: whoever saw this expressed species would see God represented through it as he is in himself formally; therefore whoever saw this species would see God as he is in himself: but to see God as he is in himself is to see God intuitively: therefore whoever saw this species would see God intuitively, even if he were absent.

I deny the major. For that species, or mental word, is not an objective species in which, as in a medium previously known, God would be seen intuitively; for it is impossible that there be given some creature that contains eminently and formally all cognoscibility; but it would be only the medium by which God is in fact known by the one seeing him: therefore although someone might see this mental word, he would not on that account be said to see God intuitively through the sight of this word, because such a word is not the reason for seeing God, except for him who uses that word itself to perceive and see God in fact.