Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

From what has been said it is clear that, for forming the intuitive vision of God, some divine aid is necessarily required, by which the weak keenness of the created mind, once strengthened, may be able to be fixed upon the most splendid Sun of the Divinity; this supernatural aid, however, is customarily called the light of glory, for this reason, that received in the beatific intellect it presents God as visible to it, so that it can behold him with unveiled face and be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as the holy Apostle speaks. And it is rightly called light, because together with the beatific intellect it concurs in forming the intuitive vision of God, which, since it is a manifestation and representation of the Divinity, is rightly called light: For everything that is manifested is light, says the Apostle to the Ephesians 5. Whether this light, however, must necessarily be admitted, such that with it set aside the divine Essence is neither seen nor can be seen, the Authors do not agree among themselves: but what ought more truly to be established, in order that it may appear

Note 1. The light of glory is distinguished from the impressed species, which is also light, in this, that the light of glory stands on the part of the potency, which it completes, elevates, strengthens, and disposes to the beatific vision antecedently to the representation of the object, if it be habitual light; the species, however, stands on the part of the object which it represents, and of which it is the deputy, so that together with the potency it concurs in forming the vision. And it is certain that these two are diverse, for it can happen that the object is at times sufficiently present to the eye, whether through itself immediately, like light, for example, which the Subtle Doctor asserts can be seen without any impressed species, or through an impressed species, as all other objects are seen, especially corporeal ones; and yet the eye will not be able to look upon it on account of its own weakness and infirmity, especially when the object is so bathed in immense light that the eye cannot stretch toward it unless it is first strengthened and fortified by aid. On the contrary, however, the eye can be so excellently disposed that it needs no help on its own part for beholding the object, which it nevertheless cannot see for lack of manifestation or of an impressed species, namely if the object be in the midst of darkness, through which that species cannot be poured out, nor the object manifested.

Note 2. A threefold light of glory can be distinguished, namely objective, habitual, and actual. The first is the very divine Essence itself, concurring immediately and effectively after the manner of an object with the beatific intellect to form the vision of itself. The second is called the supernatural quality received in the beatific intellect, elevating and strengthening and completing it antecedently to the act, and making it proximately powerful so that it can form the actual vision of God, namely in that way in which consummated habitual charity informs and perfects the will for eliciting the beatific love. The third can be called an actual quality, likewise supernatural, by which the intellect is perfected and completed, not indeed antecedently to the act, but in the production of the act itself, just as that is called actual grace which in fact and in act concurs to a supernatural act, so that when the act ceases, it itself likewise ceases and comes to an end. In this it differs from habitual grace, that this inheres persistently in the soul, completes it, and establishes it in first act capable of operation. For supernatural habits differ most from natural ones in this, that the latter concur only to the mode, the former, however, to the substance of the act; the natural ones bestow only facility, the supernatural ones, however, confer force and complete activity.

Note 3. A threefold office of the light of glory is distinguished by some Theologians: The first is to constitute the beatific intellect in first act for eliciting the intuitive vision of God, namely by elevating, strengthening, and uniting it with the beatific object. The second is to dispose it to receive the divine vision, which, since it is a supernatural form, they say, cannot be received in the intellect unless it be disposed by some supernatural aid for this reception. The third some place in the disposition for eliciting the beatific vision; for they think that the light of glory does not concur efficiently, neither as a principal nor an instrumental cause, but only after the manner of an ultimate disposition for producing the beatific vision. Whether these are true, however, must be resolved. Three things, therefore, are here proposed for discussion: First, whether the light of glory must necessarily be admitted. Second, whether that light is habitual, or only actual, or objective. Third, whether it concurs to the beatific vision as an efficient cause, principal or instrumental, or only as a disposition; and that as much for eliciting the vision as for receiving it.

First conclusion. — The light of glory is necessarily required so that the created intellect can see God intuitively. This is of faith defined in the Council of Vienne in Clement. Ad nostrum, De haereticis, where the errors and articles of the Beguards are condemned, among which this was the fifth: That every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself, and does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God. This error the Church proscribes, and decrees that the soul needs the light of glory to see God and to enjoy him blessedly.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: Psalm 25: That they may please before God in the light of the living. Apocalypse 21: The city has no need of the Sun, for the clarity of God will illuminate it. Cap. 22: They will see his face, and they will not need the light of the Sun, because the Lord will illuminate them, and they will reign forever. But this is gathered especially from Psalm 55: With you is the fountain of life, and in your light we will see light; for although the primary sense is that in the Son we will see the Father, or in Christ we will see God, as is clear from the Council of Nicaea, and from Epistle 1 of Pope Evaristus to the Bishops of Africa, as Origen also interprets, lib. 1. De principiis, c. 8; in the light we will see light, that is, in your Word and wisdom we will see you the Father; for what else is to be called the light of God, in which one sees light, than the power of God by which one is illuminated, or perceives the truth of all things, or knows God himself, who is called truth?; nevertheless the other Fathers customarily interpret this prophetic text of the light of glory, especially St. Augustine, or whoever else is the author of the book of the Soliloquiorum, where in c. 36 he says:

We will see your light in your light. But what sort of light? An immense light, an incorporeal light, an incorruptible light, an incomprehensible light, an unfailing light, an inextinguishable light, an inaccessible light, an uncreated light, a truthful light, a divine light, which illuminates the eyes of the Angels, which gladdens the youth of the Saints, which is the light of lights and the fountain of life, which you are, Lord my God: you indeed are the light in whose light we will see light, you namely in yourself, in the splendor of your countenance, when we will see you face to face.

Secondly, the same thing is gathered from the other holy Fathers; for holy Dionysius, when he speaks of the intuition of God, calls it everywhere an illumination and enlightenment, especially in the first chapter de Divinis Nominibus, where he says: That the blessed minds are raised constantly and immovably toward the ray shining upon them, and are lifted up with a fitting love of the illuminations granted them, with a certain sacred reverence, temperately and holily, as it were upon wings raised on high. Likewise Irenaeus lib. 1. cap. 37: Just as, he says, those who see the light are within the light and perceive its clar- ity, so also those who see God are within God, perceiving his clarity; the clarity, however, gives them life; those who see God, therefore, perceive life. Similarly St. Gregory, expounding those words of Job c. 36: He hides light in his nostrils, and announces to his friend, that the possession of it is his, has this: The friend of truth, he says, is the right lover of action. Whence also truth itself says to his Disciples: You are my friends, if you do what I command you; concerning this light, therefore, and the eternal fatherland, God announces to his friend that the possession of it is his, so that he may by no means despair through the frailty of his weakness, but know the more certainly that he will possess the clarity of that light, the more he now tramples under foot the darkness of the vices that assail him.

Thirdly, finally, this truth is proved by reason: Every potency which from itself and from its own nature is insufficient and disproportionate for eliciting some act and beholding an object, needs to be strengthened and elevated for eliciting this vision: but the created intellect from its own nature is insufficient for seeing God, as was proved above: therefore it needs some superadded virtue, which is called the light of glory. Next, in order that the intellect be connaturally united with the divine Essence, or with an intelligible species, it must be complete in the notion of an intellective potency: but the intellect is not so complete from its own nature: therefore it needs the light of glory, by which it may be completed. Finally, a threefold knowledge of God is customarily distinguished by Theologians, by which Philosophers, the Faithful, and the Blessed ascend to God by a threefold grade: the first is natural, arising from things which are perceived by the senses; the second surpasses nature, by which God, the author of grace, shows himself through revelation in the mysteries of the Christian Religion, as it were through lattices; the third, finally, is more divine, by which God, as the fountain of beatitude, with unveiled face offers himself to be beheld by blessed minds. This threefold knowledge, however, can be had only through an infused light, for God, as author of nature, is perceived by the light of natural reason, and as author of grace, in this mortal life, is known by the ray of faith: therefore he must likewise be seen by the Blessed clearly and intuitively only by the most splendid light of glory. The first knowledge is likened to a night vision, which discerns the object only by a scanty light. The second, to the dawn, which indeed casts off the darkness of the senses and the fog of phantasms, but nevertheless does not yet bring out into the open day the truths which it declares. The third, however, is full midday, which the bride of the Canticles once longed for in the first chapter, in these words: Show me, whom my soul loves, where you pasture, where you lie down at midday. Which words St. Bernard interprets so excellently, Serm. 33. in Cantica:

for here you pasture, but not in satiety, nor is it permitted to lie down, but one must stand and keep watch on account of the fears of the night. Alas! neither is there clear light, nor full refreshment, nor a safe abode; and therefore show me where you pasture, where you lie down at midday: your face, Lord, I seek; your face is midday, midday is your clear and intuitive vision, or truly midday is the fullness of fervor and light, the standing still of the sun, the extermination of shadows, the drying up of marshes, the driving away of foul odors, or the perennial solstice, when the day will no longer decline, and the noonday light, or the springlike weather, or the pearly beauty, or the autumnal abundance, and that no one seem to have found it, or the rest and holiday of winter.

You will say 1. The light of glory would therefore be required so that the intellect might be disposed and become proportioned with God in seeing: but the intellect even furnished with the light of glory would not be proportioned with God in seeing; for God always remains infinite and incomprehensible: therefore, etc. I distinguish the minor. It would not be proportioned according to entity and the perfection of being, I concede; according to cognoscibility and the notion of object, I deny. For although God has no entitative proportion with the beatific intellect, which is always finite, while he is infinite, nevertheless he has proportion in the notion of an object knowable in a finite mode, because between God visible and the created intellect seeing there is no simply infinite distance, but only according to a diverse order, natural and supernatural. Whence this distance and improportion can be overcome by some created light of the supernatural order, which is a certain participation of divine intellectuality, such as is the light of glory.

You will insist. The light of glory cannot strengthen and perfect the intellect for eliciting the vision, unless it has a power similar to the intellect: but the light of glory does not have a power similar to the created intellect, for this is vital, that, however, is a quality devoid of life: therefore it cannot perfect and strengthen the intellect for eliciting the beatific vision, which is a vital action. I answer 1. by denying the major: for species and other habits, although they are not vital and are essentially distinguished from the potencies in which they reside, nevertheless perfect them and help them elicit their actions. Secondly, I distinguish the minor: the light of glory is not a vital power as that which, as if from itself it were the elicitive principle of a vital act and formally had life, I concede; it is not a vital power as that by which, or a certain force ordered to elevating the intellect to a higher and more perfect life, I deny: for just as a seed, for example, although it is not animate nor living as that which, nevertheless because it is a certain instrumental force ordered by nature to the generation of a living being, can be called living as that by which: so although the light of glory does not have life from itself as that which, it nevertheless has it as that by which, because it strengthens the intellective soul, already of itself living with a natural intellectual life, so as to elevate it to elicit the act of a more perfect life, namely the beatific.

You will say 2. The light of glory would therefore be required so that it might determine the intellect to the beatific vision: but the intellect is sufficiently determined to that vision by the divine Essence united to it in the notion of an intelligible species: therefore the light of glory is superfluous. I distinguish the major. The light of glory is required, so that it may determine the intellect to the beatific vision on the part of the potency, I concede; on the part of the object, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: the created intellect is sufficiently determined by the manifestation of the divine Essence to its vision, with the determination standing on the part of the object, I concede; on the part of the potency, I deny. For since every cognition is made from the object and the potency, a twofold determination is especially required for intuitive cognition: one on the part of the object, by which it is made through the expressed species emitted by it, or through the immediate manifestation and union of itself after the manner of an impressed species; the other, however, on the part of the potency, which completes and strengthens it for eliciting such an act.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that the light of glory is a habitual quality distinct from the impressed species and from the actual concurrence. This is the more common opinion of the Doctors, and it seems more conformable to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, especially in 1. dist. 17. q. 3. n. 36, where to the argument which he had proposed to himself in this way: Without an informing habit there can be vision: therefore also most perfect fruition, he submits this single solution, and so from his own opinion: I answer, he says, no one commonly denies in glory the habit of the light of glory in the intellect, and this, on the part of the intellect, can be posited as corresponding to charity on the part of the will. As if he would say that just as habitual charity is required in the fatherland, to strengthen and complete the will for eliciting the beatific love, so likewise some habitual light is desired, which may complete and perfect the intellect for eliciting the beatific vision: this, however, is the light of glory; and therefore from the mind of the Doctor the light of glory is a habitual quality.

Proof of the conclusion. And first indeed, that the light of glory is not an impressed species. The light of glory is necessarily required for seeing God: but for that an impressed species is not necessary: therefore the light of glory is not an impressed species. Next, even if an impressed species were given in the beatific vision, the light of glory would be desired beyond it none the less: therefore this is distinguished from the impressed species. The antecedent is proved: for eliciting the beatific vision it is necessary that the intellect be completed not only on the part of the object, but also on the part of the potency; but by the impressed species it is completed only on the part of the object, of which that species is the deputy: therefore beyond the impressed species the light of glory is still desired. The major is proved: more things are required for supernatural acts than for natural ones: but for eliciting natural acts it suffices that the visual potency, for example, be completed on the part of the moving object, concurring through itself immediately, or through a species, for eliciting the natural vision: therefore for the supernatural vision something is required, besides the impressed species, which completes the intellect on its own part. Finally, without the impressed species, either the created intellect is complete on its own part, or not. If it is: therefore that species is not the light of glory, which is necessarily required for completing the created intellect in order to the supernatural vision. If it is not complete from itself: therefore on its own part it requires something by which it may be completed. That which would complete it, however, cannot be the impressed species, because it does not stand on the part of the potency, but on the part of the object which it represents and whose role it plays: therefore the light of glory is distinguished from the impressed species.

It is confirmed. A species supplying the place of the object adds no power to the potency for beholding it, but supposes it; for however much the visible species of the present object be placed before a wounded or weak eye, its visual power is neither healed nor strengthened: therefore the defect of power which is in the created eye for seeing God cannot be supplied by the impressed species of the divine Essence, but beyond it some light is required which intrinsically affects the potency, and perfects and strengthens it for eliciting the act. Next, the created intellect is related to the beatific vision, inasmuch as it is a supernatural act, in the same way as it is related to the act of faith, which is likewise of the supernatural order: but the improportion which is in the intellect for eliciting the act of faith is not supplied by the mere species of the believable object, for however much the believable object be proposed, the intellect will not elicit the act of faith unless it be elevated and strengthened by some supernatural aid received in itself: therefore by a like reasoning, however much the beatific object be manifested, it cannot be seen by the created intellect unless it first be elevated by some light perfecting it and completing it in first act for eliciting the vision, just as by the light of faith it is elevated for believing.

The second and third part are also proved. Namely, that that light ought rather to be called habitual than actual. Every efficient cause, before it produces its effect and elicits it in act, must be constituted in first act, powerful for that production and operation: but the created intellect cannot connaturally be so constituted except by habitual light: therefore the light of glory is rather habitual than actual. The major is clear: for first act is presupposed to second. Whence before some act or effect is produced, its productive power must be presupposed, and so a potency capable of that operation and production. The minor is proved: it involves a contradiction for some cause to be constituted powerful in first act by something standing on the part of second act, for first act precedes second at least by a priority of nature, and nothing is earlier constituted in its being by something which is posterior to it; but the actual light of glory, if there were any, would rather stand on the part of second act; for it would be the very actual influx of God, together with the created intellect itself: therefore the created intellect cannot be made intrinsically powerful in first act for seeing God by the actual light alone, at least connaturally. Next; the intellect cannot be made connaturally powerful in first act for the beatific vision by that which influences the effect more than the potency; but that actual light would influence the vision itself more than the intellect; for it would be the very actual influx of God passing through the light into the intellect, but not persevering in it. Finally, the beatific vision lasts through all eternity: therefore it is elicited more connaturally from persevering principles than from passing ones succeeding one another by turns: but actual light is a passing principle, habitual light, however, is a persevering principle: therefore the blessed vision is made more connaturally through habitual light than through actual; and so that light of glory ought rather to be called habitual than actual.

You will say. The Subtle Doctor manifestly opposes this opinion in several places, especially in 1. dist. 14. quaest. 2., where he says:

in whatever instant naturally prior to the vision itself, there is no cause naturally prior to the vision itself, for up to that instant of nature in which the intellect sees, the intellect does not have whence it could come into that vision: but only the intellect itself in itself, and the object which can elicit the vision itself, naturally precede: and dist. 31. qu. unica num. 2. he says: It is not necessary to posit any habit created in the soul itself in the fatherland, which would be the principle of seeing or holding the object, at least any other besides charity; because a habit is not placed in a potency except to facilitate and enable the potency for eliciting the act. And in 4. dist. 39. qu. 11. n. 10., when he had said that it is gathered from both Scripture and faith that the habit of charity is necessary in the Blessed for eliciting the beatific love, he concludes: But the light of glory for the vision does not seem to me necessary to posit, because what is said about natural corporeal light, that it is required not only on account of the object, but on account of the eye, seems to me to be a certain metaphor. For the more the object is in itself light, the less light is required on account of it, nor is it required on account of the reception, as was said; whence it seems to me less necessary to posit light than a species, because if a species is posited, this is so that memory may be perfect on the part of the intellect: but whether such a species is to be posited on account of the formal operation and perfection of the potency, will be said elsewhere; therefore the Doctor does not think that the light of glory is a habitual quality. I deny the antecedent. For in the aforesaid and other similar places the Doctor intends nothing other than that the light of glory is not required only as a disposition for receiving the vision, nor only for the ornament and decoration of the intellect itself, nor that the object become actually visible and intelligible: but that it is desired after the manner of a concause perfecting the intellect itself, not indeed for receiving, but for eliciting the beatific vision: which he openly indicates in the aforesaid question 11; for when he had said in num. 10: But if the intellect is made merely passive, having itself only in the notion of a recipient of the act of vision, since no form is required on the part of the intellect for the reception alone, as was shown above, then the light of glory is not required: he adds in n. 12 that the light itself is required to elevate the potency in order to operation, and to complete it, and to make it, from imperfect and remote, perfect and proximately powerful for eliciting the vision. For, answering this argument posed against him, that if the intellect is not from itself active and powerful for eliciting the beatific vision, it cannot be made powerful for eliciting it by some habit, I say, he says, that now it has remote potency, then, however, proximate. Whence just as the intellect is without a habit, I say, here and there the same nature, so being able to see is here and there the same potency: but now it is remote, then it will be proximate. But if the potency is passive and receptive, then the light of glory is not required.

Third conclusion. — The created intellect can be elevated to see God by the objective light alone, that is, by the wholly extrinsic concurrence of God, and without any intrinsic light, whether habitual and permanent, or actual and transient. This likewise seems the more common view among Theologians, against some more recent Thomists.

Proof, first. The created intellect could not be so elevated for this reason, because for the beatific vision an habitual or actual light would be essentially and necessarily required, in such a way that God could in no way supply that light itself: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is evident: the minor is proved. That light of glory would be desired essentially for the beatific vision, chiefly because that vision is of the supernatural order: but that light is not so required on account of the supernaturalness of the vision: therefore it is not required essentially, etc. The major is certain, for since the vision is vital and supernatural, the intellect concurs with it sufficiently of itself inasmuch as it is vital: and therefore it requires light and supernatural aid only inasmuch as that vision is supernatural. The minor is proved, first indeed concerning habitual light: if the habitual light of glory were required essentially on account of the supernaturalness of the vision, the habit of faith would also be required essentially for every act of faith, and the habit of charity for every act of charity; because the acts themselves are also supernatural: but the consequent is false, because when a man is first converted from sin through an act of charity, that act precedes the habit, and causes it: but to say that that same act which causes the habit is caused by that very habit which it causes is most absurd; otherwise the same thing could, under the same concept, presuppose its own existence; for an effect presupposes its cause, and the cause of its cause; therefore it would presuppose itself as the cause of its own cause.

Second: the omnipotence of God can no more supply the defect of the species through extrinsic assistance than the defect of the light: but it can supply the defect of the species: therefore also that of the light. Finally, God can do through Himself whatever second causes do by concurring only efficiently, not vitally; for He can heat without fire, illuminate without the sun: but that light concurs only effectively, and not vitally: therefore God can supply its defect through Himself, especially since no contradiction suggests the contrary, as will be evident in the solution of the arguments.

You will say 1. It implies a contradiction that a second act be given without a first act; for being able to act is prior to acting: but the light of glory is the first act with respect to the vision: therefore the vision of God without actual or habitual light implies a contradiction. Again, it implies a contradiction that a vision be able to come to be without a potency: but the light of glory is the whole potency of the intellect seeing supernaturally: therefore it implies a contradiction that the intellect be able to see supernaturally without light. Finally, the beatific vision depends on the light inasmuch as it is supernatural just as it depends on the intellect inasmuch as it is vital: but inasmuch as it is vital, it depends essentially on the intellect, so that it cannot be elicited without it: therefore also inasmuch as it is supernatural it depends essentially on the light. I distinguish the minor of the first argument. The light is the first act with respect to the vision, necessary according to the ordinary power, so that the vision is produced connaturally, I concede; necessary absolutely, so that such a vision is produced simply, I deny: for God through His omnipotence can supply and discharge the role of that light which would constitute the intellect in first or second act for acting. I likewise distinguish the minor of the second argument: the light is a potency, so that the beatific vision is produced connaturally, I concede: so that it is produced simply, I deny. Finally I deny the major of the third argument: for it is false that the vision depends on the light inasmuch as it is supernatural just as it depends on the intellect inasmuch as it is a vital act; for no created or uncreated cause concurs in the vision precisely inasmuch as it is vital, except the intellect itself, which alone produces it immanently; but God always concurs in that vision inasmuch as it is supernatural, and that as the principal cause, whether immediately through His more abundant and extraordinary concurrence, or through the mediation of an habitual or actual light produced by Him alone.

You will say 2. The created vision cannot be supplied by the mere extrinsic assistance of the uncreated knowledge of God: therefore neither will the created light be able to be supplied by the mere assistance of divine omnipotence. I deny the consequence. For the difference is that the created vision has the character of a formal cause, because it renders the intellect formally seeing: but the light of glory, whether habitual or actual, concurs in the beatific vision only effectively, as will be established below, and therefore it is no wonder that God, who cannot supply the formal effect of the vision, because He cannot have the character of a form, can supply the effect of the light, because He can have, and in fact has, the character of a cause.

You will say 3. Light is required to manifest the object formally: but God cannot formally manifest the object by Himself alone: therefore He cannot even supply the defect of the light. The major is evident; because corporeal vision, e.g., cannot be formed unless the object is first illuminated, nor can first principles be known unless they are illumined by the light of the intellect, which illumination and illumining is not done by effecting something, but only by illuminating and manifesting the object; therefore the created intellect cannot see God, unless God is illuminated by a light which illumines, not by effecting, but by formally affecting the potency. I distinguish the major. Light is required to manifest the object formally, so that it is the formal illumination and manifestation of it, I deny the major: so that it concurs effectively in producing the vision by which the object is formally seen, I concede the major: and in this sense I deny the minor: for God through His more abundant concurrence can act with the intellective potency to form the vision of Himself.

You will say 4. In order for the intellect to concur effectively in forming the supernatural vision, it must first be elevated and constituted in first act, made powerful for producing it: but it cannot be so elevated and constituted through mere external assistance, unless it receives into itself something intrinsic; but that intrinsic thing which would be posited is the light: therefore it cannot be made powerful without light. The minor is proved: from that special assistance and union of God with the created intellect, either some intrinsic power is derived into the intellect itself, or no power is intrinsically added to it. If the first, the point is gained, for such a superadded power is a certain participation of divine intellectuality, and hence also the light of glory, whether habitual or actual: but if the second is affirmed, it follows that from such assistance and more abundant concurrence the created intellect could not be made intrinsically powerful for eliciting the blessed vision; for it implies a contradiction that what is not powerful for something be made powerful for it, unless it is intrinsically changed. For the potency for operating is not some extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic one; nor can something be made from non-powerful into intrinsically powerful without something intrinsically received into itself: for the same remaining the same is always apt to do the same: therefore if the created intellect receives nothing intrinsic into itself, it cannot be made powerful for forming the beatific vision. I deny the minor. For in this hypothesis the created intellect would not be judged to be constituted in first act for eliciting the beatific vision otherwise than because it has another assisting cause, elevating it to a higher and supernatural order, so that with the concurrence of that cause it can elicit that vision: but for that it can be equally elevated through extrinsic assistance and the more abundant concurrence of God as through an intrinsic light received into itself; and accordingly it is not necessary that it receive something intrinsic into itself. To the proof of the minor I say that from this divine assistance nothing indeed is received in the intellect by way of a quality intrinsically affecting it; nevertheless the intellect itself is extrinsically elevated and strengthened by the aid of that concurrence, so that it is made powerful for eliciting the vision which with the common and general concurrence of God it could not have elicited.

You will insist. From this it follows that God alone produces the beatific vision at the presence of the human intellect: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is proved: then God alone is judged to produce the act at the presence of the created intellect, when this intellect is not more intrinsically powerful through that divine assistance than it was before: but in this case the intellect would not be more intrinsically powerful than it was; since it would receive nothing intrinsic into itself: therefore it cannot elicit that vision, and hence God alone is the author of its production. I deny the major. For although the created intellect receives nothing intrinsic into itself through that more abundant concurrence, nevertheless, in order for it to be made powerful, it suffices that it be externally aided and elevated to the supernatural order, so that it elicits such a vision: for if one man, incapable of carrying some burden, becomes capable of that lifting and carrying through the assistance of another man, who indeed adds no intrinsic powers to him, but only provides external assistance, much more will the created intellect, through the more abundant concurrence of God, on whom it depends essentially in operating, be able to become capable of eliciting some act which with its own and usual powers it could not elicit.

You will say finally. This opinion directly attacks the Council of Vienne, the Clementine Ad nostrum, etc., in which the errors of the Beguards and Beguines are condemned, who said that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God; and hence according to the mind of the Council light is required for the beatific vision: but that more abundant concurrence is not light: therefore it does not suffice for eliciting the beatific vision. I deny the major. For the Council defines nothing else than that some supernatural aid is required for eliciting the vision itself, whether meanwhile that aid be something intrinsic or extrinsic. For the intention of the Council was to condemn the error of the Beguines and Beguards, who said that the soul would be blessed by itself and by its natural powers; to repulse which error it sufficed to decree that the beatific vision cannot be elicited without some supernatural aid, whether meanwhile that aid be something extrinsic or intrinsic, created or uncreated, partial or total, which the Council left undecided, granting to the Scholastics, not an occasion of erring (as some wrongly opine), but the liberty of opining and disputing in that matter and opinion, which could be agitated and weighed on both sides by authorities and reasons.

You will insist. The Council expressly affirms that light is desired for eliciting the beatific vision: but that more abundant concurrence is not light: therefore the Council judges that more abundant concurrence not to suffice. I answer. Indeed, the Council requires light, but does not decree whether that light is objective, or actual, or habitual. Nor is there any reason for you to press the force of the word light, as if it properly belonged only to intrinsic actual or habitual aid; for it is certain that this word light belongs only metaphorically to intrinsic aid, whether habitual or actual, the appellation being drawn, namely, from corporeal light, without which an object cannot be seen. And indeed by this reasoning the more abundant concurrence of God can also rightly be called light; for God Himself is light: and sacred Scripture not rarely calls that actual aid light, as in Psalm 12: Enlighten my eyes, and elsewhere: whence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5, calls the actual aid preceding the infusion of the habits an illumination: hence St. Augustine, lib. 12, De Genesi ad litteram, cap. 31, says that the light by which the soul is illumined, so that it may discern all things truly understood, whether in itself or in Him, is God Himself.

You will insist finally: The Council condemns two errors: first, that any intellectual nature is blessed naturally in itself: second, that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it: therefore the Council judges that in fact light is required which elevates the soul: but it cannot be so elevated through that more abundant concurrence: therefore the light required by the Council cannot be understood of that concurrence. Again: the Council seems to require such an elevation for the acts of the beatific vision as is required for the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity: but to elicit these acts it is necessary that the potency be elevated through intrinsic aid, whether habitual or actual: therefore likewise such aid will be necessary for the beatific vision.

I answer to the first. The Council condemns a single error, that the soul is blessed naturally from itself and needs no supernatural aid, which was the mind of the Beguines and Beguards, against whom the Council decrees that the soul cannot naturally be blessed, and that God can be seen only with some aiding light elevating the potency. It does not decree, however, whether that aiding light is something intrinsic or extrinsic; but only that through it the potency is elevated to the supernatural order, which can be done equally through external aid as through internal, because such an elevation of the potency consists in this, that it be rendered powerful for doing something exceeding its natural powers; and that it can accomplish with an external more abundant concurrence.

To the second. I deny the major, for the Council determines nothing else than that some supernatural principle is required for eliciting the beatific vision, just as the habit of faith, hope, and charity is required for eliciting the supernatural acts; but it does not decree whether that supernatural principle is something intrinsic or extrinsic. Add that the Council speaks of fact and of the present state: but we speak of the possible state, and of the good pleasure of God: so that God through a more abundant concurrence could supply, if He willed, the efficacy of the light: which in fact we admit to be more probably the habitual light, and hence the Council neither opposes us, nor we it.

Last conclusion. — The light of glory has no other office, nor any other influx into the beatific vision, than the concurrence of an efficient cause effectively concurring with the intellect to form that vision.

This is the more common opinion, against the Thomists affirming that the light is desired to dispose the intellect to receive the beatific vision, and to effect the union of the intellect itself with the beatific object.

The conclusion is proved. Supernatural habits are desired for no other reason than that the potency, insufficient from itself for eliciting supernatural acts, is made powerful through those habits for producing such acts, and concurs connaturally with them in their production: therefore since the light of glory is a supernatural habit, it is judged to have no other influx into the created intellect than to elevate it and concur with it in forming the beatific vision.

The antecedent is proved. For the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, e.g., have no other influx, either into the potency or into the act, than an effective one; nor are they judged to dispose the potency for eliciting and receiving acts in any other way than by concurring efficiently in the production of those acts. Again: if the light of glory had another influx besides the effective one, it would be chiefly because it should dispose the intellect to receive the vision, so that without this disposition the act of vision could not be received in the intellect; but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The Thomists admit the major. The minor indeed is proved: if the intellect could not receive the vision without some previous formal disposition, this would be chiefly either because that act, since it is supernatural in substance, could not be received in the intellect, which is a natural potency, except with this previous disposition; or because such a vision is an act of such a nature that it requires this supernatural disposition for its reception: but neither can be said. Not the first, both because the habits of faith, hope, and charity are supernatural forms in substance, and yet are received in a natural potency without any previous supernatural disposition: and because if a supernatural disposition were necessarily desired in a natural potency for receiving a supernatural form, there would be a process to infinity; for since that disposing form would also be supernatural, it would pre-require another form in the natural potency for its reception, and this another, and so to infinity: therefore from the fact that the vision is a supernatural form, the intellect should not be disposed to receive it through another supernatural form. Nor the second: for no particular reason can be assigned in the beatific vision on account of which it would specially require such a disposition, unless perhaps because it is a more perfect form than the other supernatural forms are: but from this head such a disposition is not required; for if a less perfect supernatural form can be received without such a disposition, why not also a more perfect one?

You will say 1. The light of glory is required in the intellect for eliciting the blessed vision for this reason, because the intellect from its nature is disproportionate to that production: but the intellect is not less disproportionate to receiving the vision than to producing it: therefore if on account of that disproportion the blessed vision, as it is an action, requires light, it also requires it as it is a reception.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that the vision, as it is an action, must proceed from an effective principle operating connaturally; for an effect proceeds from the power of its cause, which virtually pre-contains it, and this vision can proceed from such a principle without there being given a process to infinity: but the vision, as it is a passion, does not require to be received in a principle receiving connaturally, that is, which is of the same status with such a received form; because otherwise there would have to be a process to infinity, as has been said: whence rightly the Doctor, in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 11. n. 8, when he had said that the human soul is from itself immediately receptive of beatitude, and is not disposed for that reception through something accidental, otherwise it would be blessed only secundum quid, and only mediately, concludes: Therefore I say that the human soul in pure naturals is the immediate susceptive of beatitude: and hence the created intellect, from the mere powers of nature, is receptive of the beatific vision; nor does it need for that reception any previous supernatural form, although it needs one for the production of that vision.