Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It is a commonplace among the philosophers that all cognition whatsoever arises from the object and the potency; for the potency concurs per se and immediately toward the formation of that cognition, while the object does so either by itself or through a vicarious species of itself, especially when it is not present and proportioned to the knowing potency. For since it is necessary, as the Philosopher says in 3. De anima, cap. 3., that the things themselves, or their forms, be in the soul; and since it is equally certain that the things themselves are not received in their own right in the knowing faculty — for who would say that a stone is known as substantially present in the intellect? — it is necessary that they be in it through vicarious impressed species of themselves. Whether, however, such a species of God is given, especially in the beatific vision, in order that this may be resolved more evidently

Note 1. A twofold representative species of an object is customarily distinguished: for one is called impressed, the other expressed. The former is a virtual likeness of some object, that is, a certain intentional quality effectively concurring with the intellect toward producing cognition, namely by completing the potency itself and determining it from the object toward producing this cognition. It is called a likeness, because it represents the object and exhibits it as present to the knowing potency. It is called virtual, for it does not represent the object formally, but virtually, because it concurs in place of the object toward forming cognition. For since all cognition is born from the potency and the object, the potency indeed always concurs through itself toward forming cognition, while the object does so sometimes through a vicarious species of itself, as has already been said. It is called an intentional quality, because it is ordered toward cognition and the intellect, whose operation is sometimes called intention. The latter species, namely the expressed one, is the internal term of cognition, which in the intellect is called the mental word, in the imagination the phantasm, and it is itself formed by the intellect and the concurring object as the image and expression of the object itself.

Note 2. A threefold office of the impressed species is distinguished: the first is to unite the object to the potency and to make the potency itself intentionally similar to the object. The second is to determine the potency, indifferent to various cognitions, so that it knows one object rather than another. The third is to complete the potency from the side of the object. For cognition has two formalities: it is a vital act, and a formal representation of the thing known; and toward both the species and the potency concur efficiently; but the potency seems to concur chiefly toward cognition insofar as it is a vital act, while the object and its vicarious species concur chiefly toward cognition insofar as it is the image and likeness of the object itself: so that the species is said to concur effectively toward cognition because it provides everything that the object itself would provide, if it concurred per se and immediately toward forming such cognition.

Note 3. A threefold likeness can be distinguished in the intellective potency with respect to the object. The first is a certain power and efficacy of such an intellect for eliciting cognition about such an object, namely by expressing in itself the likeness and image of that object, by which the intellect itself is as it were informed and enlightened: whence that well-worn philosophical saying: the intellect in understanding becomes all things. The second is from the side of the object itself, yet impressed upon the potency and received in it; and it is the impressed species itself acting in place of the object, exhibiting it as present to the potency and concurring with it toward forming the expressed image of the object itself. The third, finally, is from the side of the means, and is that thing which, when known, leads to the cognition of another; thus the image of someone, when known, leads into the cognition of the one it represents.

With these things premised, there is a celebrated controversy among the theologians, namely whether God concurs through himself in the role of object, or through some vicarious species of himself, toward beatific cognition; and in order that these things may be resolved, three things must be discussed here. First, it must be determined whether an impressed species of God is possible, by which He concurs in His place toward the beatific vision. Second, whether that species is in fact given in the Blessed. Third, in what way God is said to concur through himself with the beatific intellect toward forming the vision of Himself.

First conclusion. — An impressed species of the divine essence is not impossible. This is against the Thomists.

Proof. That which does not imply a contradiction ought not to be judged impossible: but that an impressed species of the divine essence exists does not imply a contradiction. I prove it. The existence of such a species would be repugnant and would involve a contradiction chiefly either because it is a virtual likeness of God, or because it determines the potency, or because it concurs effectively with the potency toward forming the vision of the divine essence; for these three are the offices of the impressed species, as was said in the second note. But from none of these heads is its existence repugnant. Not indeed because it is a likeness of God, since the Thomists themselves admit an expressed species and concede that the intuitive vision of God is an expressed likeness of the divine essence: therefore an impressed species is not repugnant insofar as it is a likeness of the divine essence. Nor again because it is determinative of the potency, for that some quality be produced to determine a potency in itself indifferent, so that it may be borne toward and operate upon some object, involves no contradiction, as is apparent; since habits and natural impressed species continually provide this. Nor from the third head, since the light of glory concurs with the intellect efficiently toward forming the beatific vision: why therefore could there not be produced an impressed species which concurs with the same intellect toward seeing God?

It is confirmed. By no argument can the impossibility of the impressed species be proved by which it would not equally be proved that the expressed species is impossible: but the Thomists do not admit the second: therefore they ought not to admit the first either. The major is proved. The strongest arguments which seem to prove the impossibility of the impressed species are drawn either from the disproportion of the object, or from the office of the species itself, or from other reasons which could suggest this implication: but the same reasons also suggest that the expressed species implies a contradiction. I prove it. The first argument, which St. Thomas brings forward in quest. 12. art. 2. against the possibility of the impressed species, is that a thing of a higher order cannot be represented through a species of a lower order; and consequently some created and finite species cannot represent God. But this argument equally shows that God cannot be represented through the expressed species: because the formal representation, which is made through the expressed species, is created and finite just as much as the virtual representation, which would be made through the impressed species: therefore, etc.

The second argument is: since God alone is His own being, no created thing can be a likeness of God as He is in Himself; otherwise this likeness would equally be its own being. But this tells more against the expressed species than against the impressed one; for the former represents God more nobly and more expressly, since it is a formal likeness of Him, than the latter, which is only a virtual likeness of God, namely insofar as it concurs effectively with the intellect toward forming that expressed species.

The modern Thomists reply. That this is the difference between the two species: that the impressed species is a perfection of the object, while the expressed species is a perfection and complement of the perfectible subject. They confirm it. For if, they say, the intellect were its own intellection, it could not receive an expressed species nor be perfected through it. On the contrary. The impressed species is called a perfection of the object for this reason: because it represents it extrinsically and virtually, namely insofar as it concurs in the place and stead of the object with the intellect toward forming the expressed species: but the expressed species too is an extrinsic likeness of the object, represents it formally, and concurs in its place after the manner of a form: therefore it is as much an extrinsic perfection of the object as the expressed species. The minor is evident: for if God could be the formal representation of Himself, that is, have the notion of a form, representing Himself formally to the created intellect, certainly no expressed species would be wanted in the vision of Him, as is evident; and consequently this species concurs in the place of God in the role of object toward representing Him formally. To the confirmation. I concede that if the created intellect were its own intellection, it would not want an expressed species through which it would be perfected, just as God does not require one, because He is His own intellection: but since it is indifferent whether it understands through itself intrinsically and immediately or through a vision superadded from without, it can be perfected through a species, both impressed and expressed.

They reply a second time. That there is a disparity between the two species: because God has intrinsically in Himself the notion of an impressed species with respect to any created intellect, insofar as He is visible per se, but He does not have from Himself the notion of an expressed species, because He is not from Himself seen, but through the act of the seeing potency; and so the latter could be given outside God, but not the former. On the contrary. If the impressed species is repugnant for this reason, that God can supply its office through Himself, it would follow that the light of glory is also repugnant, and likewise all created causes whose office God can supply. Whence if the impressed species is not possible for this reason, that it is not judged necessary for the vision of God, it likewise follows that the light of glory itself is repugnant, since God can supply its office: but the Thomists do not concede the consequent: therefore they ought not to admit the antecedent either.

Others assign the difference that the impressed species, if it were given, would have to represent God comprehensively, which does not belong to the expressed species: but no created species can represent God comprehensively, as is evident: therefore neither can such a species be given. They prove the major. Because the species proceeds from the object naturally and necessarily, as its natural image: therefore it represents the object as much as it is representable, and so comprehensively: but the expressed species, since it proceeds from a limited potency and a finite light of glory, ought not to be comprehensive and infinite in representing. On the contrary. When the object moves freely, the species proceeding from it is emitted not naturally but freely; and so it proceeds more or less perfect according to its will: but God, as He is the beatific object, freely moves the creature toward the vision of Himself: therefore the species emitted by Him represents insofar as He wills to be represented, and so it is not comprehensive. Add. that even if it proceeded from Him naturally, it would not on that account have to be infinite and comprehensive, because its limitation would be drawn from the side of its own nature, which is finite. Just as if God acted naturally ad extra, the effects proceeding from Him would not necessarily be infinite, because essential infinity is repugnant to a creature, but they would only be most perfect insofar as they can be. The same must be said by way of analogy of the impressed species.

The Thomists object 1: He who is pure act and simply infinite cannot be represented through something created and finite: but God is pure act and simply infinite: therefore He cannot be represented through an impressed species. I answer. First, this argument tells equally, indeed more, against the expressed species than against the impressed one, because, as we have said, the expressed species is a more vivid and more perfect likeness of the object. Second, I distinguish the major. He cannot be represented substantially, so that a substance equally perfect representing Him is given, I concede; He cannot be represented intentionally and after the manner of a likeness, I deny: for to represent intentionally some being which is pure act, it is not necessary that the representing thing be likewise pure act; for our concepts truly represent that of which they are concepts, although they are not of the same nature.

You will press. The species representing an object must be more, or at least equally, immaterial as the object itself which it represents: but no species can be of the same, and consequently much less of greater, immateriality with God: therefore neither can a representative impressed species of God be given. To prove the major and the minor, they distinguish with Gonet four orders or grades of immateriality belonging to knowable things. The first is that of sensible things, as they are in individual matter, whose immateriality consists in a certain actuality which they have, sufficient to change the sense. The second is that of the quiddities of material things, which, although in reality they have being in individual matter, are nevertheless abstracted from it by the intellect. The third is that of spiritual things, which have being wholly separated from matter, though not from potentiality, such as the Angels. The fourth is that of the being which is separated not only from matter but also from potentiality, of which kind is God alone, who is pure act. To these correspond four other grades, or orders, of immateriality of species. The first is that of sensible species, representing material singulars. The second is that of species abstracted from phantasms, representing quiddities and material natures abstracted from singulars. The third is that of intelligible species, which are in no way abstracted from phantasms, yet are not pure acts, but have a potentiality mixed in, such as the species by which the Angels know. The fourth is that of the species which is wholly separated from matter and potentiality and is pure act, such as the divine Essence with respect to the divine intellect. When therefore we say, they say, that the species must agree with the object in grade of immateriality, this is to be understood in this way: that if the object has the immateriality of the first order, the species too must have the immateriality of the first order, and so on for the second, third, and fourth grade: whence, since no created or creatable species can attain the fourth grade of immateriality, otherwise it would be pure act, and its own being by essence like God, no created species can be given which represents God quidditatively. They confirm it. Any created or creatable species is further from God than the sensible species is from the quiddity of a material thing, and than the species abstracted from phantasms is from the quiddity and substance of an Angel: but it is repugnant that the essence and quiddity of a material thing be known through a sensible species, and that an Angel be seen quidditatively through a species abstracted from phantasms; therefore a fortiori it is repugnant that God be seen quidditatively through some created species.

I answer 1. This argument can be turned back against the Thomists themselves; for the impressed species need not be of the same immateriality with God any more than the expressed one, which they nevertheless affirm with St. Thomas in q. 27. art. 1. and lib. 3. Contra gentes, cap. 11., where he teaches that the word is formed by every created intellect by the very fact that it understands; and so the word, or expressed species, is formed by the Blessed, as we shall prove more fully below against the more modern Thomists, who, pressed by the weight of this argument, deny that an expressed species is made in the beatific vision: but this species, since it is created and finite, is not of the same immateriality with God: therefore neither need the impressed species be such. Add. that the species by which a lower Angel quidditatively knows a higher one, and by which the separated soul understands the nature of the Angels, is not of the same immateriality with the higher Angel, nor with the Angelic substance, and consequently it is not necessary that the species be of the same immateriality with the object which it represents. I readily confess indeed that the intelligible species of a material object is more immaterial than the object itself, because it is intentional; but the matter does not stand thus in the other species, especially in those which represent wholly spiritual things. To the confirmation I say that any created species is further from God than the material species is from the substance of an Angel, in respect of entity, I concede; in respect of representation, I deny: for the intentional species representing God agrees more with God than the sensible species does with a spiritual nature.

They object 2. The impressed species is essentially ordered to supplying the place of the object, when the latter is either absent or disproportionate to the knowing potency: but God is neither an absent nor a disproportionate object for the intellect elevated by the light of glory: therefore a representative species of Him is not possible. I deny the major. For the impressed species is ordered not only to supplying the place of an absent and disproportionate object, but also to supplying the place of an object that does not act per se nor concur immediately to its own vision; for just as an Angel, e.g., although it understands itself through its own substance, can nevertheless interrupt this way of knowing itself and suspend the concurrence of its substance toward the cognition of itself, so that it knows itself through an impressed species given to it by God; so God can suspend the concurrence of His essence concurring by way of object toward the beatific vision, and substitute for Himself an impressed species which acts in His place.

They object 3. No object which is through its essence proximately intelligible can be represented through an impressed species: but God is through His essence proximately intelligible: therefore He cannot be represented through a species. The major is proved. When something belongs essentially to an object, it cannot be attributed to it through a superadded form: therefore if the object has from itself proximate intelligibility, it implies a contradiction that it receive it from a species. They prove the antecedent with various examples: for, they say, accidents could not be ordered toward producing a substance, and a potency capable of operation, if that potency had in itself the highest facility and power in operating. Likewise, because light, visible of itself, is the reason for seeing other objects, yet it cannot be made visible through another. Similarly God, because He is infinite and immense of Himself, cannot be such through a superadded form: therefore, since He is as intelligible as He is immense, He will not be able to be such through an expressed species. It is confirmed. This species cannot concur in place of the object, if God, even with such a species posited, cannot but concur immediately by way of object toward the beatific vision: but so it is; for just as He cannot strip Himself of effective concurrence, so neither of objective concurrence. I distinguish the major. An object essentially intelligible through itself cannot be made intelligible through another, if it cannot suspend the concurrence of its intelligibility immediately, I concede: if it can, I deny: but God can suspend the concurrence of His essence acting by way of its object. To the proof I say that intelligibility in first act belongs to God essentially, but not intelligibility in second act, for this is subject to His freedom; and so it can belong to Him through a superadded form. Nor do the adduced examples prove the contrary. For if a substance had from itself that it would be operative without an accident, and a potency without a habit, it could not receive the power of operating from a habit and accidents, because it could not suspend its own activity. The same is to be said of light. Similarly God cannot be made immense and infinite through something superadded, because He is immense and infinite both in first act and in second act. To the confirmation I say that if God concurred toward the beatific vision by means of an impressed species, He would not concur immediately objectively, but only mediately; He would however concur immediately only effectively. The reason for the disparity is that there is no created act toward which God ought not to concur effectively by way of universal cause; but there can be some act toward which He does not concur immediately in the role of object, as has been said; for since God freely moves the created intellect toward the vision of Himself, He can not move it per se, and substitute an impressed species for Himself.

They object 4. The intuitive vision of God demands to be made connaturally by God, both as by its proper and particular cause and as by its proximately moving object: therefore it cannot be made through an impressed species. The consequence is proved by induction from other actions which by their nature so demand to be done by God that they cannot be done by any other, such as creation, transubstantiation, etc., which it is certain cannot be done except immediately by God. I deny the consequence. To its proof I say that it can be denied that the aforesaid actions must so arise immediately from God that they cannot proceed from another. For why could God not grant to some creature the power of sustaining quantity without a subject, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who judge that a creature can be elevated to produce a supernatural effect efficaciously, and even to create? etc.

Finally they object: If an impressed species of the divine nature were possible, an Angel could actually see the species naturally, and consequently could see by natural powers the divine Essence represented through such a species: but the consequence is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is evident as to the former part; because since such a species is a finite and created being, it could be known by the Angelic intellect, which can see any finite being actually existing and sufficiently presented to it; because the bodily eye, seeing the visible species refracted in a mirror, sees the object represented by such a species, as St. Augustine holds in lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 8. Therefore likewise the eye of the mind, seeing the species of the divine Nature, will see the divine Nature itself represented by such a species. I deny the major with respect to both parts. And indeed as to the first, since that species would be of the supernatural order, it could not be perceived by an Angel by natural powers, who cannot naturally know supernatural things, as even the Thomists admit. I likewise deny the second with the Doctor, quaest. 14. Quodlibetica, n. 26.; for that species, says the Doctor, would be the medium quo, not however the medium quod of the beatific vision: and this is the distinction between the two media, that the medium quo need not be known, nor formally or eminently contain the represented object: whereas the medium quod must contain the represented object formally or eminently. I said eminently, or formally representative, for although the statue of Caesar, v. g., does not contain Caesar eminently, since it is more imperfect than a true man; nor even formally, because it is not a true man; it nevertheless contains him formally representative, namely according to the notion of such a figure and color. And therefore it must first be known that it is an image of Caesar, before it is known to represent Caesar. For it does not absolutely suffice to know the image in order to know the prototype, but it is further required that this image be known under the formal notion of such an image, as St. Augustine writes of the image of the divine Trinity impressed upon man, lib. 15. cap. 24.

Those therefore, he says, who see their own mind, in so far as it can be seen, and in it that Trinity, about which I have disputed in many ways, as I was able, and yet do not believe or understand it to be an image of God: they do indeed see a mirror. but to such an extent they do not see through the mirror him who is to be seen through the mirror: that they do not even know that the mirror itself which they see is a mirror, that is, an image.

Therefore, in order that an impressed species, or any other image, may lead to the knowledge of something else, three things are required: first, that it contain the represented object either formally or eminently: second, that it be known under the notion of an image, and of such a representation: third, that this knowledge be terminated at the object present, so as to be intuitive, or at the object absent, if it is to be abstractive. Since, therefore, an impressed species need not be known in this way, nor does it so contain God, it does not follow that from its knowledge the divine Essence is seen. Nor does it matter that the intellect which has such an impressed species can through it attain the divine essence; for from this it does not follow that any other intellect which saw such a species could through it likewise perceive that divine Essence: because, says the Doctor, intuitive knowledge is terminated at the object, as it is present in itself, or in another in which it is contained formally or eminently: but when the species, or image, of the object is seen, neither is the object contained formally or eminently in the species; for it could happen that the object is not present: therefore, once the impressed species is seen, the object represented by it is not on that account seen: but it is further required that, for this vision, the object move under the notion of being present, at least mediately.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that in fact no impressed species is given in the intellect of the Blessed which would determine it to the beatific vision, or effectively concur with it in forming that vision. This is the common opinion, and

Proof 1. Whenever the object is duly present and applied to the power, and sufficiently proportioned, an impressed species is in no way required: but so it is in the vision of God; for the divine Essence is duly present and proportioned to the beatific intellect; therefore an impressed species is not required in it. The major is evident: for whenever the principal cause can act through itself, it is not necessary that its power operate instrumentally: but whenever the object is present and proportioned, it can act just as connaturally as a species: therefore then a species is in no way required; for species are necessary only to supply for the absence and disproportion of objects; and consequently they are sought in vain where the object is present and proportioned. The minor is likewise certain; since the divine Essence is intimately present to the beatific intellect, which sees God face to face, and as he is: it is also proportioned to it, since it is elevated through the light of glory to the supernatural and, as it were, divine order.

Secondly: An impressed species is not required where the object itself provides everything that its vicarious species could provide: but the divine Essence provides everything that its vicarious impressed species would provide with respect to the divine vision: therefore such a species is not required. The minor is certain; for an impressed species is desired for this reason, that it may supply the office and place of the object. The major is proved: a species, as vicarious of the object, has only three offices: first, that it complete the activity of the power and constitute it in first act for operating: second, that it determine its indifference to action: third, that it assimilate it intentionally to the object, or, that it be the virtual image of the object: but God, present and proportioned through himself, can complete the activity of the power in first act, and determine its indifference, and concur with it in expressing his image through the mental word, or through the species: therefore he can provide everything that the vicarious species of the object would provide; and hence that species is not necessary.

You will say 1. When God can effect something through secondary causes without any repugnance, he effects it more naturally through them than with only his particular concurrence: but if an impressed species were given determining the intellect to vision, and effectively concurring with it in forming the likeness of God, that likeness, or expressed species, would be made through secondary causes with the universal concurrence of God: therefore the vision would be brought about in a more connatural way through an impressed species than immediately by God. I distinguish the major. When such an action does not of itself require to be done by God immediately, I concede: otherwise, I deny: but the beatific vision, since it is intuitive, and maximally evident, and most excellent, requires to be done by God in the most excellent way; and hence it demands to be done by him immediately; for what is produced immediately by God, whether by way of an efficient cause or by way of a motive object, is nobler and more perfect than what arises from him through a secondary cause alone.

You will insist. The divine Essence does not duly supply the concurrence of a species, if the vision can be brought about more connaturally through a species than without a species: but it would be brought about more connaturally in this way. I prove it. The intellect is completed and constituted in first act, able to act, in a more connatural way through something intrinsic than through something altogether extrinsic: but the essence of God would constitute the intellect in first act only extrinsically, whereas a species would do this intrinsically: therefore the intellect is completed for the beatific vision more connaturally through an impressed species than through the divine essence immediately concurring in the notion of object. I deny the minor. and I distinguish the major of its proof: the intellect is constituted in first act more connaturally through something intrinsic than through something extrinsic, if that through which it is constituted pertains to the side of the power, I concede: if it pertains to the side of the object, I deny: but an impressed species pertains to the side of the object, and hence the power can operate connaturally without it, because it is not necessary that it be intrinsically complete on the side of the object. For it must be noted that a vital act must indeed proceed from intrinsic principles, inasmuch as it is precisely vital, not however inasmuch as it is a representation of the object.

You will say 2. An impressed species is necessary where the object cannot provide what the species itself can provide: but the essence of God cannot provide what an impressed species would provide. I prove it. The essence of God cannot supply an impressed species, unless it first constitutes the intellect in first act, able to operate, and hence unless it informs the intellect: but it cannot inform the intellect: therefore neither can it supply the place of a species. Next, it cannot supply the lack of a species, if it cannot render the intellect similar to the object: but the divine Essence cannot render the intellect similar to itself, for this likeness cannot come about except through information; but an essence cannot inform the intellect. Finally, a species unites the object intelligibly to the knowing power: but this union does not occur without information: therefore, since the divine essence cannot inform the intellect, neither can it supply the place of a species. I distinguish the major. The divine Essence cannot supply the place of a species, as it is an accident, unless it informs the intellect, I concede; it cannot supply the species, insofar as it is vicarious of the object, I deny: for this, the extrinsic assistance of the divine essence with the determined will of God, by which God wills to be freely seen by a creature, suffices. To the proof, I deny that the intellect cannot be constituted able in first act except through the information of something intrinsic, for only the extrinsic assistance of the divine Essence suffices for this, since even without any light of glory, but with only a more abundant concurrence of God, the beatific vision can come about, as we will prove below. To the latter proof I say that no other assimilation and union of the intellect with the object is absolutely required than the presence and proportion of the object; but this presence and proportion comes about independently of an impressed species, and through the divine extrinsic assistance alone: therefore for the divine vision an impressed species is not absolutely required.

Third conclusion. — The concurrence which God provides by way of object for the beatific vision is not from the divine essence precisely and formally; but from the will of God, or omnipotence. This is the common opinion, and

Proof 1. All the actions of God ad extra are free: therefore they come about dependently on the will and omnipotence. The antecedent is evident; the consequence is proved: if the essence concurred, that concurrence would be necessary: but God does not necessarily concur to the beatific vision, but only freely: therefore such concurrence is not from the essence, and hence is from the will. Next: The divine Essence concurs in the place and stead of the impressed species through that by which it contains the species itself: but it contains the impressed species itself through omnipotence, for if it were to produce it, it would not produce it except through omnipotence: therefore it does not supply its concurrence except through omnipotence. Finally: If the divine Essence concurred immediately to the beatific vision inasmuch as it is an entity, that concurrence would not of itself be free; but only from the fact that it was joined with the general concurrence of divine omnipotence elevating the created intellect and freely conserving the light of glory: but it seems absurd to assert that the concurrence of God is not of itself immediately free: therefore it is equally absurd that the divine essence concurs to the beatific vision inasmuch as it is an entity, not however insofar as it is really the will, or omnipotence.

You will say 1. The divine Essence is immediately intelligible through itself, even inasmuch as it abstracts from divine omnipotence and precedes it in the notion of object: therefore it immediately concurs with the created intellect to its own knowledge. Next, the divine Essence immediately terminates the vision: therefore it also immediately moves the intellect to form the vision, otherwise it would be only a terminative object, not a motive one. Finally, the Essence itself with respect to the divine intellection fulfills the office of an impressed species: therefore also with respect to created intellection. I distinguish the first major. that it is immediately intelligible proximately and formally, I deny: only remotely and radically, I concede: for the divine Essence cannot be said to be proximately intelligible except inasmuch as it is proportioned to the intellect; but it is not proportioned except inasmuch as the intellect is elevated; nor is it elevated except through omnipotence; and consequently the divine Essence is not proximately and formally intelligible except through omnipotence. To the second, I say that the divine Essence is a true motive and at the same time terminative object, although it does not terminate in the same way as it moves, for it terminates immediately, but moves only through the mediation of divine omnipotence. To the third, I say that there is not the same reason concerning the uncreated and the created beatific vision, because the divine vision is not free, but natural, and hence the divine Essence determines the intellect of God through itself, proximately and immediately, to its own vision, and therefore it cannot have the notion, nor play the part of a species with respect to that vision; but it is otherwise with created knowledge, which, since it is freely produced, also requires that God freely concur to its production, which cannot happen except through the divine will, or omnipotence.

You will say 2. The Essence, as essence, is the beatific object, not however the essence as will, or as willing: therefore to move to the beatific act belongs to the divine essence inasmuch as it is essence, not however inasmuch as it is omnipotent. It is confirmed. if, by the impossible, God were not omnipotent and willing, nevertheless his essence could move the created intellect to its own vision: therefore, precisely for that vision, it does not move inasmuch as it is omnipotent: but inasmuch as it is essence. He distinguishes the antecedent. The Doctor, q. 14. Quodl.: that the Essence is the immediate beatific object in the notion of terminating, he concedes; in the notion of moving, he denies: for it moves, he says, only remotely, and through the act of the will elevating such an intellect to its own vision. To the confirmation he says that that willing and omnipotent essence could cause nothing at all ad extra, and hence could not elevate the intellect to its own vision, and therefore could not even be seen.

You ask first: Would the beatific vision, which would be brought about through an impressed species, be intuitive? I affirm. for that vision is deemed intuitive which is terminated at the object present, and moving through its presence, at least mediately, to its own intuition: but so it would be, if the beatific vision were brought about through a species; for the divine essence would move the beatific intellect to its own vision through such an impressed species, and consequently that vision would be intuitive. You will say. A vision is not deemed intuitive which is not terminated at the object present, and moving immediately: but if an impressed species were given, the divine essence would not move, nor immediately terminate, the operation of the beatific intellect: therefore it would not be intuitive. I distinguish the major. moving immediately as the object quod, I concede; as the object quo, I deny. And so the divine Essence would move the beatific intellect and terminate its operation as the object quod, and adequate; but the species would move only as the object quo, and hence the vision would be no less intuitive.

You ask second: Could an intuitive vision of some object come about at least by divine power, in no way influencing or moving per se, either immediately or mediately, and even with the object itself absent? I affirm with our Aureolus, question 2. of the Prologue, art. 3. And the reason is that intuitive vision is an absolute quality depending on the object in the genus of efficient cause: but God can supply the efficacy of the efficient cause, and conserve the effect independently of its concurrence: therefore he will also be able, with the object absent, to conserve the intuitive vision of it, and hence the vision of an even absent object can be intuitive. You will say. Intuitive vision depends not only on the object really present in the genus of moving or causing, but also in the notion of terminating: but God cannot supply the termination, because it is reduced to the genus of formal cause, for from it the act is specified, as from a form: therefore he will not be able to supply the absence of the object in intuitive vision. I distinguish the major. it concurs in the notion of terminating per se, or through another similar to itself, I concede; through itself alone, I deny; for when the object appears in a mirror through the species emitted by itself, although that object is not really present to the mirror, but only intentionally, and through its species and image, it is nevertheless said to terminate the vision, not indeed per se, but through another bearing its likeness.

You will say 2. This response directly fights against the Subtle Doctor; for in several places he seems openly to teach that intuitive knowledge absolutely cannot be caused without the immediate concurrence of the object, and without any impressed species either emitted by the object or infused by God: so he teaches in 2. dist. 3. q. 11. and dist. 9. q. 2. and dist. 14. q. 3. and elsewhere, in which places the Doctor seems to require the concurrence of the immediate object for vision. I answer. that the Doctor does not oppose us in this matter, because first, as Smisingus notes in Dist. 6. q. 1. n. 12., the Doctor everywhere admits that the knowledge of the senses is intuitive, which nevertheless comes about through species, as he himself teaches in the first book, dist. 3. q. 6., and in 2. dist. 9. q. 2. Secondly, he affirms that our intellect forms intuitive knowledge of the object represented in the phantasm, as is evident from 2. dist. 3. q. 9. But this kind of knowledge of the intellect comes about through the species produced by the agent intellect and the phantasm: therefore he judges that an impressed species does not obstruct intuitive vision.

But in order that his mind may appear more evidently, and that all his sentences may be solved more easily, by which he seems for the most part to deny that knowledge can be called intuitive when it comes about through a species, it must be known that he distinguishes a twofold impressed species: one indeed, which proceeds from the object moving at least mediately, and present, and which has only the notion of the object quo, or of the medium by which the object moves to its own vision; another however, which is fitted to remain and to move the intellect to the knowledge of the object, even with the object itself absent, and consequently which has the notion of the object quod. The Doctor, however, judges that the former species can naturally concur to intuitive vision, since it does not exclude, but imports, the presence of the object moving at least mediately; but whether the other species can also concur divinely to intuitive vision, the Doctor is undecided. And it should be said, more fittingly to his mind, that that species, with the object absent, cannot concur to bringing about an intuitive vision, in the absence of that same object, although it can concur, at least divinely, in conserving the intuitive vision which had been produced in the presence of the object.