Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Three productive principles of the divine vision can be distinguished: the first on the part of the object, namely the impressed species; the second on the part of the aid, namely the light of glory; the third on the part of the soul and of the rational substance, namely the intellective potency, all of which are to be treated in this Section.

It is a commonplace among the philosophers that all cognition whatsoever arises from the object and the potency; for the potency concurs per se and immediately toward the formation of that cognition, while the object does so either by itself or through a vicarious species of itself, especially when it is not present and proportioned to the knowing potency. For since it is necessary, as the Philosopher says in 3. De anima, cap. 3., that the things themselves, or their forms, be in the soul; and since it is equally certain that the things themselves are not received in their own right in the knowing faculty — for who would say that a stone is known as substantially present in the intellect? — it is necessary that they be in it through vicarious impressed species of themselves. Whether, however, such a species of God is given, especially in the beatific vision, in order that this may be resolved more evidently

Note 1. A twofold representative species of an object is customarily distinguished: for one is called impressed, the other expressed. The former is a virtual likeness of some object, that is, a certain intentional quality effectively concurring with the intellect toward producing cognition, namely by completing the potency itself and determining it from the object toward producing this cognition. It is called a likeness, because it represents the object and exhibits it as present to the knowing potency. It is called virtual, for it does not represent the object formally, but virtually, because it concurs in place of the object toward forming cognition. For since all cognition is born from the potency and the object, the potency indeed always concurs through itself toward forming cognition, while the object does so sometimes through a vicarious species of itself, as has already been said. It is called an intentional quality, because it is ordered toward cognition and the intellect, whose operation is sometimes called intention. The latter species, namely the expressed one, is the internal term of cognition, which in the intellect is called the mental word, in the imagination the phantasm, and it is itself formed by the intellect and the concurring object as the image and expression of the object itself.

Note 2. A threefold office of the impressed species is distinguished: the first is to unite the object to the potency and to make the potency itself intentionally similar to the object. The second is to determine the potency, indifferent to various cognitions, so that it knows one object rather than another. The third is to complete the potency from the side of the object. For cognition has two formalities: it is a vital act, and a formal representation of the thing known; and toward both the species and the potency concur efficiently; but the potency seems to concur chiefly toward cognition insofar as it is a vital act, while the object and its vicarious species concur chiefly toward cognition insofar as it is the image and likeness of the object itself: so that the species is said to concur effectively toward cognition because it provides everything that the object itself would provide, if it concurred per se and immediately toward forming such cognition.

Note 3. A threefold likeness can be distinguished in the intellective potency with respect to the object. The first is a certain power and efficacy of such an intellect for eliciting cognition about such an object, namely by expressing in itself the likeness and image of that object, by which the intellect itself is as it were informed and enlightened: whence that well-worn philosophical saying: the intellect in understanding becomes all things. The second is from the side of the object itself, yet impressed upon the potency and received in it; and it is the impressed species itself acting in place of the object, exhibiting it as present to the potency and concurring with it toward forming the expressed image of the object itself. The third, finally, is from the side of the means, and is that thing which, when known, leads to the cognition of another; thus the image of someone, when known, leads into the cognition of the one it represents.

With these things premised, there is a celebrated controversy among the theologians, namely whether God concurs through himself in the role of object, or through some vicarious species of himself, toward beatific cognition; and in order that these things may be resolved, three things must be discussed here. First, it must be determined whether an impressed species of God is possible, by which He concurs in His place toward the beatific vision. Second, whether that species is in fact given in the Blessed. Third, in what way God is said to concur through himself with the beatific intellect toward forming the vision of Himself.

First conclusion. — An impressed species of the divine essence is not impossible. This is against the Thomists.

Proof. That which does not imply a contradiction ought not to be judged impossible: but that an impressed species of the divine essence exists does not imply a contradiction. I prove it. The existence of such a species would be repugnant and would involve a contradiction chiefly either because it is a virtual likeness of God, or because it determines the potency, or because it concurs effectively with the potency toward forming the vision of the divine essence; for these three are the offices of the impressed species, as was said in the second note. But from none of these heads is its existence repugnant. Not indeed because it is a likeness of God, since the Thomists themselves admit an expressed species and concede that the intuitive vision of God is an expressed likeness of the divine essence: therefore an impressed species is not repugnant insofar as it is a likeness of the divine essence. Nor again because it is determinative of the potency, for that some quality be produced to determine a potency in itself indifferent, so that it may be borne toward and operate upon some object, involves no contradiction, as is apparent; since habits and natural impressed species continually provide this. Nor from the third head, since the light of glory concurs with the intellect efficiently toward forming the beatific vision: why therefore could there not be produced an impressed species which concurs with the same intellect toward seeing God?

It is confirmed. By no argument can the impossibility of the impressed species be proved by which it would not equally be proved that the expressed species is impossible: but the Thomists do not admit the second: therefore they ought not to admit the first either. The major is proved. The strongest arguments which seem to prove the impossibility of the impressed species are drawn either from the disproportion of the object, or from the office of the species itself, or from other reasons which could suggest this implication: but the same reasons also suggest that the expressed species implies a contradiction. I prove it. The first argument, which St. Thomas brings forward in quest. 12. art. 2. against the possibility of the impressed species, is that a thing of a higher order cannot be represented through a species of a lower order; and consequently some created and finite species cannot represent God. But this argument equally shows that God cannot be represented through the expressed species: because the formal representation, which is made through the expressed species, is created and finite just as much as the virtual representation, which would be made through the impressed species: therefore, etc.

The second argument is: since God alone is His own being, no created thing can be a likeness of God as He is in Himself; otherwise this likeness would equally be its own being. But this tells more against the expressed species than against the impressed one; for the former represents God more nobly and more expressly, since it is a formal likeness of Him, than the latter, which is only a virtual likeness of God, namely insofar as it concurs effectively with the intellect toward forming that expressed species.

The modern Thomists reply. That this is the difference between the two species: that the impressed species is a perfection of the object, while the expressed species is a perfection and complement of the perfectible subject. They confirm it. For if, they say, the intellect were its own intellection, it could not receive an expressed species nor be perfected through it. On the contrary. The impressed species is called a perfection of the object for this reason: because it represents it extrinsically and virtually, namely insofar as it concurs in the place and stead of the object with the intellect toward forming the expressed species: but the expressed species too is an extrinsic likeness of the object, represents it formally, and concurs in its place after the manner of a form: therefore it is as much an extrinsic perfection of the object as the expressed species. The minor is evident: for if God could be the formal representation of Himself, that is, have the notion of a form, representing Himself formally to the created intellect, certainly no expressed species would be wanted in the vision of Him, as is evident; and consequently this species concurs in the place of God in the role of object toward representing Him formally. To the confirmation. I concede that if the created intellect were its own intellection, it would not want an expressed species through which it would be perfected, just as God does not require one, because He is His own intellection: but since it is indifferent whether it understands through itself intrinsically and immediately or through a vision superadded from without, it can be perfected through a species, both impressed and expressed.

They reply a second time. That there is a disparity between the two species: because God has intrinsically in Himself the notion of an impressed species with respect to any created intellect, insofar as He is visible per se, but He does not have from Himself the notion of an expressed species, because He is not from Himself seen, but through the act of the seeing potency; and so the latter could be given outside God, but not the former. On the contrary. If the impressed species is repugnant for this reason, that God can supply its office through Himself, it would follow that the light of glory is also repugnant, and likewise all created causes whose office God can supply. Whence if the impressed species is not possible for this reason, that it is not judged necessary for the vision of God, it likewise follows that the light of glory itself is repugnant, since God can supply its office: but the Thomists do not concede the consequent: therefore they ought not to admit the antecedent either.

Others assign the difference that the impressed species, if it were given, would have to represent God comprehensively, which does not belong to the expressed species: but no created species can represent God comprehensively, as is evident: therefore neither can such a species be given. They prove the major. Because the species proceeds from the object naturally and necessarily, as its natural image: therefore it represents the object as much as it is representable, and so comprehensively: but the expressed species, since it proceeds from a limited potency and a finite light of glory, ought not to be comprehensive and infinite in representing. On the contrary. When the object moves freely, the species proceeding from it is emitted not naturally but freely; and so it proceeds more or less perfect according to its will: but God, as He is the beatific object, freely moves the creature toward the vision of Himself: therefore the species emitted by Him represents insofar as He wills to be represented, and so it is not comprehensive. Add. that even if it proceeded from Him naturally, it would not on that account have to be infinite and comprehensive, because its limitation would be drawn from the side of its own nature, which is finite. Just as if God acted naturally ad extra, the effects proceeding from Him would not necessarily be infinite, because essential infinity is repugnant to a creature, but they would only be most perfect insofar as they can be. The same must be said by way of analogy of the impressed species.

The Thomists object 1: He who is pure act and simply infinite cannot be represented through something created and finite: but God is pure act and simply infinite: therefore He cannot be represented through an impressed species. I answer. First, this argument tells equally, indeed more, against the expressed species than against the impressed one, because, as we have said, the expressed species is a more vivid and more perfect likeness of the object. Second, I distinguish the major. He cannot be represented substantially, so that a substance equally perfect representing Him is given, I concede; He cannot be represented intentionally and after the manner of a likeness, I deny: for to represent intentionally some being which is pure act, it is not necessary that the representing thing be likewise pure act; for our concepts truly represent that of which they are concepts, although they are not of the same nature.

You will press. The species representing an object must be more, or at least equally, immaterial as the object itself which it represents: but no species can be of the same, and consequently much less of greater, immateriality with God: therefore neither can a representative impressed species of God be given. To prove the major and the minor, they distinguish with Gonet four orders or grades of immateriality belonging to knowable things. The first is that of sensible things, as they are in individual matter, whose immateriality consists in a certain actuality which they have, sufficient to change the sense. The second is that of the quiddities of material things, which, although in reality they have being in individual matter, are nevertheless abstracted from it by the intellect. The third is that of spiritual things, which have being wholly separated from matter, though not from potentiality, such as the Angels. The fourth is that of the being which is separated not only from matter but also from potentiality, of which kind is God alone, who is pure act. To these correspond four other grades, or orders, of immateriality of species. The first is that of sensible species, representing material singulars. The second is that of species abstracted from phantasms, representing quiddities and material natures abstracted from singulars. The third is that of intelligible species, which are in no way abstracted from phantasms, yet are not pure acts, but have a potentiality mixed in, such as the species by which the Angels know. The fourth is that of the species which is wholly separated from matter and potentiality and is pure act, such as the divine Essence with respect to the divine intellect. When therefore we say, they say, that the species must agree with the object in grade of immateriality, this is to be understood in this way: that if the object has the immateriality of the first order, the species too must have the immateriality of the first order, and so on for the second, third, and fourth grade: whence, since no created or creatable species can attain the fourth grade of immateriality, otherwise it would be pure act, and its own being by essence like God, no created species can be given which represents God quidditatively. They confirm it. Any created or creatable species is further from God than the sensible species is from the quiddity of a material thing, and than the species abstracted from phantasms is from the quiddity and substance of an Angel: but it is repugnant that the essence and quiddity of a material thing be known through a sensible species, and that an Angel be seen quidditatively through a species abstracted from phantasms; therefore a fortiori it is repugnant that God be seen quidditatively through some created species.

I answer 1. This argument can be turned back against the Thomists themselves; for the impressed species need not be of the same immateriality with God any more than the expressed one, which they nevertheless affirm with St. Thomas in q. 27. art. 1. and lib. 3. Contra gentes, cap. 11., where he teaches that the word is formed by every created intellect by the very fact that it understands; and so the word, or expressed species, is formed by the Blessed, as we shall prove more fully below against the more modern Thomists, who, pressed by the weight of this argument, deny that an expressed species is made in the beatific vision: but this species, since it is created and finite, is not of the same immateriality with God: therefore neither need the impressed species be such. Add. that the species by which a lower Angel quidditatively knows a higher one, and by which the separated soul understands the nature of the Angels, is not of the same immateriality with the higher Angel, nor with the Angelic substance, and consequently it is not necessary that the species be of the same immateriality with the object which it represents. I readily confess indeed that the intelligible species of a material object is more immaterial than the object itself, because it is intentional; but the matter does not stand thus in the other species, especially in those which represent wholly spiritual things. To the confirmation I say that any created species is further from God than the material species is from the substance of an Angel, in respect of entity, I concede; in respect of representation, I deny: for the intentional species representing God agrees more with God than the sensible species does with a spiritual nature.

They object 2. The impressed species is essentially ordered to supplying the place of the object, when the latter is either absent or disproportionate to the knowing potency: but God is neither an absent nor a disproportionate object for the intellect elevated by the light of glory: therefore a representative species of Him is not possible. I deny the major. For the impressed species is ordered not only to supplying the place of an absent and disproportionate object, but also to supplying the place of an object that does not act per se nor concur immediately to its own vision; for just as an Angel, e.g., although it understands itself through its own substance, can nevertheless interrupt this way of knowing itself and suspend the concurrence of its substance toward the cognition of itself, so that it knows itself through an impressed species given to it by God; so God can suspend the concurrence of His essence concurring by way of object toward the beatific vision, and substitute for Himself an impressed species which acts in His place.

They object 3. No object which is through its essence proximately intelligible can be represented through an impressed species: but God is through His essence proximately intelligible: therefore He cannot be represented through a species. The major is proved. When something belongs essentially to an object, it cannot be attributed to it through a superadded form: therefore if the object has from itself proximate intelligibility, it implies a contradiction that it receive it from a species. They prove the antecedent with various examples: for, they say, accidents could not be ordered toward producing a substance, and a potency capable of operation, if that potency had in itself the highest facility and power in operating. Likewise, because light, visible of itself, is the reason for seeing other objects, yet it cannot be made visible through another. Similarly God, because He is infinite and immense of Himself, cannot be such through a superadded form: therefore, since He is as intelligible as He is immense, He will not be able to be such through an expressed species. It is confirmed. This species cannot concur in place of the object, if God, even with such a species posited, cannot but concur immediately by way of object toward the beatific vision: but so it is; for just as He cannot strip Himself of effective concurrence, so neither of objective concurrence. I distinguish the major. An object essentially intelligible through itself cannot be made intelligible through another, if it cannot suspend the concurrence of its intelligibility immediately, I concede: if it can, I deny: but God can suspend the concurrence of His essence acting by way of its object. To the proof I say that intelligibility in first act belongs to God essentially, but not intelligibility in second act, for this is subject to His freedom; and so it can belong to Him through a superadded form. Nor do the adduced examples prove the contrary. For if a substance had from itself that it would be operative without an accident, and a potency without a habit, it could not receive the power of operating from a habit and accidents, because it could not suspend its own activity. The same is to be said of light. Similarly God cannot be made immense and infinite through something superadded, because He is immense and infinite both in first act and in second act. To the confirmation I say that if God concurred toward the beatific vision by means of an impressed species, He would not concur immediately objectively, but only mediately; He would however concur immediately only effectively. The reason for the disparity is that there is no created act toward which God ought not to concur effectively by way of universal cause; but there can be some act toward which He does not concur immediately in the role of object, as has been said; for since God freely moves the created intellect toward the vision of Himself, He can not move it per se, and substitute an impressed species for Himself.

They object 4. The intuitive vision of God demands to be made connaturally by God, both as by its proper and particular cause and as by its proximately moving object: therefore it cannot be made through an impressed species. The consequence is proved by induction from other actions which by their nature so demand to be done by God that they cannot be done by any other, such as creation, transubstantiation, etc., which it is certain cannot be done except immediately by God. I deny the consequence. To its proof I say that it can be denied that the aforesaid actions must so arise immediately from God that they cannot proceed from another. For why could God not grant to some creature the power of sustaining quantity without a subject, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who judge that a creature can be elevated to produce a supernatural effect efficaciously, and even to create? etc.

Finally they object: If an impressed species of the divine nature were possible, an Angel could actually see the species naturally, and consequently could see by natural powers the divine Essence represented through such a species: but the consequence is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is evident as to the former part; because since such a species is a finite and created being, it could be known by the Angelic intellect, which can see any finite being actually existing and sufficiently presented to it; because the bodily eye, seeing the visible species refracted in a mirror, sees the object represented by such a species, as St. Augustine holds in lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 8. Therefore likewise the eye of the mind, seeing the species of the divine Nature, will see the divine Nature itself represented by such a species. I deny the major with respect to both parts. And indeed as to the first, since that species would be of the supernatural order, it could not be perceived by an Angel by natural powers, who cannot naturally know supernatural things, as even the Thomists admit. I likewise deny the second with the Doctor, quaest. 14. Quodlibetica, n. 26.; for that species, says the Doctor, would be the medium quo, not however the medium quod of the beatific vision: and this is the distinction between the two media, that the medium quo need not be known, nor formally or eminently contain the represented object: whereas the medium quod must contain the represented object formally or eminently. I said eminently, or formally representative, for although the statue of Caesar, v. g., does not contain Caesar eminently, since it is more imperfect than a true man; nor even formally, because it is not a true man; it nevertheless contains him formally representative, namely according to the notion of such a figure and color. And therefore it must first be known that it is an image of Caesar, before it is known to represent Caesar. For it does not absolutely suffice to know the image in order to know the prototype, but it is further required that this image be known under the formal notion of such an image, as St. Augustine writes of the image of the divine Trinity impressed upon man, lib. 15. cap. 24.

Those therefore, he says, who see their own mind, in so far as it can be seen, and in it that Trinity, about which I have disputed in many ways, as I was able, and yet do not believe or understand it to be an image of God: they do indeed see a mirror. but to such an extent they do not see through the mirror him who is to be seen through the mirror: that they do not even know that the mirror itself which they see is a mirror, that is, an image.

Therefore, in order that an impressed species, or any other image, may lead to the knowledge of something else, three things are required: first, that it contain the represented object either formally or eminently: second, that it be known under the notion of an image, and of such a representation: third, that this knowledge be terminated at the object present, so as to be intuitive, or at the object absent, if it is to be abstractive. Since, therefore, an impressed species need not be known in this way, nor does it so contain God, it does not follow that from its knowledge the divine Essence is seen. Nor does it matter that the intellect which has such an impressed species can through it attain the divine essence; for from this it does not follow that any other intellect which saw such a species could through it likewise perceive that divine Essence: because, says the Doctor, intuitive knowledge is terminated at the object, as it is present in itself, or in another in which it is contained formally or eminently: but when the species, or image, of the object is seen, neither is the object contained formally or eminently in the species; for it could happen that the object is not present: therefore, once the impressed species is seen, the object represented by it is not on that account seen: but it is further required that, for this vision, the object move under the notion of being present, at least mediately.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that in fact no impressed species is given in the intellect of the Blessed which would determine it to the beatific vision, or effectively concur with it in forming that vision. This is the common opinion, and

Proof 1. Whenever the object is duly present and applied to the power, and sufficiently proportioned, an impressed species is in no way required: but so it is in the vision of God; for the divine Essence is duly present and proportioned to the beatific intellect; therefore an impressed species is not required in it. The major is evident: for whenever the principal cause can act through itself, it is not necessary that its power operate instrumentally: but whenever the object is present and proportioned, it can act just as connaturally as a species: therefore then a species is in no way required; for species are necessary only to supply for the absence and disproportion of objects; and consequently they are sought in vain where the object is present and proportioned. The minor is likewise certain; since the divine Essence is intimately present to the beatific intellect, which sees God face to face, and as he is: it is also proportioned to it, since it is elevated through the light of glory to the supernatural and, as it were, divine order.

Secondly: An impressed species is not required where the object itself provides everything that its vicarious species could provide: but the divine Essence provides everything that its vicarious impressed species would provide with respect to the divine vision: therefore such a species is not required. The minor is certain; for an impressed species is desired for this reason, that it may supply the office and place of the object. The major is proved: a species, as vicarious of the object, has only three offices: first, that it complete the activity of the power and constitute it in first act for operating: second, that it determine its indifference to action: third, that it assimilate it intentionally to the object, or, that it be the virtual image of the object: but God, present and proportioned through himself, can complete the activity of the power in first act, and determine its indifference, and concur with it in expressing his image through the mental word, or through the species: therefore he can provide everything that the vicarious species of the object would provide; and hence that species is not necessary.

You will say 1. When God can effect something through secondary causes without any repugnance, he effects it more naturally through them than with only his particular concurrence: but if an impressed species were given determining the intellect to vision, and effectively concurring with it in forming the likeness of God, that likeness, or expressed species, would be made through secondary causes with the universal concurrence of God: therefore the vision would be brought about in a more connatural way through an impressed species than immediately by God. I distinguish the major. When such an action does not of itself require to be done by God immediately, I concede: otherwise, I deny: but the beatific vision, since it is intuitive, and maximally evident, and most excellent, requires to be done by God in the most excellent way; and hence it demands to be done by him immediately; for what is produced immediately by God, whether by way of an efficient cause or by way of a motive object, is nobler and more perfect than what arises from him through a secondary cause alone.

You will insist. The divine Essence does not duly supply the concurrence of a species, if the vision can be brought about more connaturally through a species than without a species: but it would be brought about more connaturally in this way. I prove it. The intellect is completed and constituted in first act, able to act, in a more connatural way through something intrinsic than through something altogether extrinsic: but the essence of God would constitute the intellect in first act only extrinsically, whereas a species would do this intrinsically: therefore the intellect is completed for the beatific vision more connaturally through an impressed species than through the divine essence immediately concurring in the notion of object. I deny the minor. and I distinguish the major of its proof: the intellect is constituted in first act more connaturally through something intrinsic than through something extrinsic, if that through which it is constituted pertains to the side of the power, I concede: if it pertains to the side of the object, I deny: but an impressed species pertains to the side of the object, and hence the power can operate connaturally without it, because it is not necessary that it be intrinsically complete on the side of the object. For it must be noted that a vital act must indeed proceed from intrinsic principles, inasmuch as it is precisely vital, not however inasmuch as it is a representation of the object.

You will say 2. An impressed species is necessary where the object cannot provide what the species itself can provide: but the essence of God cannot provide what an impressed species would provide. I prove it. The essence of God cannot supply an impressed species, unless it first constitutes the intellect in first act, able to operate, and hence unless it informs the intellect: but it cannot inform the intellect: therefore neither can it supply the place of a species. Next, it cannot supply the lack of a species, if it cannot render the intellect similar to the object: but the divine Essence cannot render the intellect similar to itself, for this likeness cannot come about except through information; but an essence cannot inform the intellect. Finally, a species unites the object intelligibly to the knowing power: but this union does not occur without information: therefore, since the divine essence cannot inform the intellect, neither can it supply the place of a species. I distinguish the major. The divine Essence cannot supply the place of a species, as it is an accident, unless it informs the intellect, I concede; it cannot supply the species, insofar as it is vicarious of the object, I deny: for this, the extrinsic assistance of the divine essence with the determined will of God, by which God wills to be freely seen by a creature, suffices. To the proof, I deny that the intellect cannot be constituted able in first act except through the information of something intrinsic, for only the extrinsic assistance of the divine Essence suffices for this, since even without any light of glory, but with only a more abundant concurrence of God, the beatific vision can come about, as we will prove below. To the latter proof I say that no other assimilation and union of the intellect with the object is absolutely required than the presence and proportion of the object; but this presence and proportion comes about independently of an impressed species, and through the divine extrinsic assistance alone: therefore for the divine vision an impressed species is not absolutely required.

Third conclusion. — The concurrence which God provides by way of object for the beatific vision is not from the divine essence precisely and formally; but from the will of God, or omnipotence. This is the common opinion, and

Proof 1. All the actions of God ad extra are free: therefore they come about dependently on the will and omnipotence. The antecedent is evident; the consequence is proved: if the essence concurred, that concurrence would be necessary: but God does not necessarily concur to the beatific vision, but only freely: therefore such concurrence is not from the essence, and hence is from the will. Next: The divine Essence concurs in the place and stead of the impressed species through that by which it contains the species itself: but it contains the impressed species itself through omnipotence, for if it were to produce it, it would not produce it except through omnipotence: therefore it does not supply its concurrence except through omnipotence. Finally: If the divine Essence concurred immediately to the beatific vision inasmuch as it is an entity, that concurrence would not of itself be free; but only from the fact that it was joined with the general concurrence of divine omnipotence elevating the created intellect and freely conserving the light of glory: but it seems absurd to assert that the concurrence of God is not of itself immediately free: therefore it is equally absurd that the divine essence concurs to the beatific vision inasmuch as it is an entity, not however insofar as it is really the will, or omnipotence.

You will say 1. The divine Essence is immediately intelligible through itself, even inasmuch as it abstracts from divine omnipotence and precedes it in the notion of object: therefore it immediately concurs with the created intellect to its own knowledge. Next, the divine Essence immediately terminates the vision: therefore it also immediately moves the intellect to form the vision, otherwise it would be only a terminative object, not a motive one. Finally, the Essence itself with respect to the divine intellection fulfills the office of an impressed species: therefore also with respect to created intellection. I distinguish the first major. that it is immediately intelligible proximately and formally, I deny: only remotely and radically, I concede: for the divine Essence cannot be said to be proximately intelligible except inasmuch as it is proportioned to the intellect; but it is not proportioned except inasmuch as the intellect is elevated; nor is it elevated except through omnipotence; and consequently the divine Essence is not proximately and formally intelligible except through omnipotence. To the second, I say that the divine Essence is a true motive and at the same time terminative object, although it does not terminate in the same way as it moves, for it terminates immediately, but moves only through the mediation of divine omnipotence. To the third, I say that there is not the same reason concerning the uncreated and the created beatific vision, because the divine vision is not free, but natural, and hence the divine Essence determines the intellect of God through itself, proximately and immediately, to its own vision, and therefore it cannot have the notion, nor play the part of a species with respect to that vision; but it is otherwise with created knowledge, which, since it is freely produced, also requires that God freely concur to its production, which cannot happen except through the divine will, or omnipotence.

You will say 2. The Essence, as essence, is the beatific object, not however the essence as will, or as willing: therefore to move to the beatific act belongs to the divine essence inasmuch as it is essence, not however inasmuch as it is omnipotent. It is confirmed. if, by the impossible, God were not omnipotent and willing, nevertheless his essence could move the created intellect to its own vision: therefore, precisely for that vision, it does not move inasmuch as it is omnipotent: but inasmuch as it is essence. He distinguishes the antecedent. The Doctor, q. 14. Quodl.: that the Essence is the immediate beatific object in the notion of terminating, he concedes; in the notion of moving, he denies: for it moves, he says, only remotely, and through the act of the will elevating such an intellect to its own vision. To the confirmation he says that that willing and omnipotent essence could cause nothing at all ad extra, and hence could not elevate the intellect to its own vision, and therefore could not even be seen.

You ask first: Would the beatific vision, which would be brought about through an impressed species, be intuitive? I affirm. for that vision is deemed intuitive which is terminated at the object present, and moving through its presence, at least mediately, to its own intuition: but so it would be, if the beatific vision were brought about through a species; for the divine essence would move the beatific intellect to its own vision through such an impressed species, and consequently that vision would be intuitive. You will say. A vision is not deemed intuitive which is not terminated at the object present, and moving immediately: but if an impressed species were given, the divine essence would not move, nor immediately terminate, the operation of the beatific intellect: therefore it would not be intuitive. I distinguish the major. moving immediately as the object quod, I concede; as the object quo, I deny. And so the divine Essence would move the beatific intellect and terminate its operation as the object quod, and adequate; but the species would move only as the object quo, and hence the vision would be no less intuitive.

You ask second: Could an intuitive vision of some object come about at least by divine power, in no way influencing or moving per se, either immediately or mediately, and even with the object itself absent? I affirm with our Aureolus, question 2. of the Prologue, art. 3. And the reason is that intuitive vision is an absolute quality depending on the object in the genus of efficient cause: but God can supply the efficacy of the efficient cause, and conserve the effect independently of its concurrence: therefore he will also be able, with the object absent, to conserve the intuitive vision of it, and hence the vision of an even absent object can be intuitive. You will say. Intuitive vision depends not only on the object really present in the genus of moving or causing, but also in the notion of terminating: but God cannot supply the termination, because it is reduced to the genus of formal cause, for from it the act is specified, as from a form: therefore he will not be able to supply the absence of the object in intuitive vision. I distinguish the major. it concurs in the notion of terminating per se, or through another similar to itself, I concede; through itself alone, I deny; for when the object appears in a mirror through the species emitted by itself, although that object is not really present to the mirror, but only intentionally, and through its species and image, it is nevertheless said to terminate the vision, not indeed per se, but through another bearing its likeness.

You will say 2. This response directly fights against the Subtle Doctor; for in several places he seems openly to teach that intuitive knowledge absolutely cannot be caused without the immediate concurrence of the object, and without any impressed species either emitted by the object or infused by God: so he teaches in 2. dist. 3. q. 11. and dist. 9. q. 2. and dist. 14. q. 3. and elsewhere, in which places the Doctor seems to require the concurrence of the immediate object for vision. I answer. that the Doctor does not oppose us in this matter, because first, as Smisingus notes in Dist. 6. q. 1. n. 12., the Doctor everywhere admits that the knowledge of the senses is intuitive, which nevertheless comes about through species, as he himself teaches in the first book, dist. 3. q. 6., and in 2. dist. 9. q. 2. Secondly, he affirms that our intellect forms intuitive knowledge of the object represented in the phantasm, as is evident from 2. dist. 3. q. 9. But this kind of knowledge of the intellect comes about through the species produced by the agent intellect and the phantasm: therefore he judges that an impressed species does not obstruct intuitive vision.

But in order that his mind may appear more evidently, and that all his sentences may be solved more easily, by which he seems for the most part to deny that knowledge can be called intuitive when it comes about through a species, it must be known that he distinguishes a twofold impressed species: one indeed, which proceeds from the object moving at least mediately, and present, and which has only the notion of the object quo, or of the medium by which the object moves to its own vision; another however, which is fitted to remain and to move the intellect to the knowledge of the object, even with the object itself absent, and consequently which has the notion of the object quod. The Doctor, however, judges that the former species can naturally concur to intuitive vision, since it does not exclude, but imports, the presence of the object moving at least mediately; but whether the other species can also concur divinely to intuitive vision, the Doctor is undecided. And it should be said, more fittingly to his mind, that that species, with the object absent, cannot concur to bringing about an intuitive vision, in the absence of that same object, although it can concur, at least divinely, in conserving the intuitive vision which had been produced in the presence of the object.

From what has been said it is clear that, for forming the intuitive vision of God, some divine aid is necessarily required, by which the weak keenness of the created mind, once strengthened, may be able to be fixed upon the most splendid Sun of the Divinity; this supernatural aid, however, is customarily called the light of glory, for this reason, that received in the beatific intellect it presents God as visible to it, so that it can behold him with unveiled face and be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as the holy Apostle speaks. And it is rightly called light, because together with the beatific intellect it concurs in forming the intuitive vision of God, which, since it is a manifestation and representation of the Divinity, is rightly called light: For everything that is manifested is light, says the Apostle to the Ephesians 5. Whether this light, however, must necessarily be admitted, such that with it set aside the divine Essence is neither seen nor can be seen, the Authors do not agree among themselves: but what ought more truly to be established, in order that it may appear

Note 1. The light of glory is distinguished from the impressed species, which is also light, in this, that the light of glory stands on the part of the potency, which it completes, elevates, strengthens, and disposes to the beatific vision antecedently to the representation of the object, if it be habitual light; the species, however, stands on the part of the object which it represents, and of which it is the deputy, so that together with the potency it concurs in forming the vision. And it is certain that these two are diverse, for it can happen that the object is at times sufficiently present to the eye, whether through itself immediately, like light, for example, which the Subtle Doctor asserts can be seen without any impressed species, or through an impressed species, as all other objects are seen, especially corporeal ones; and yet the eye will not be able to look upon it on account of its own weakness and infirmity, especially when the object is so bathed in immense light that the eye cannot stretch toward it unless it is first strengthened and fortified by aid. On the contrary, however, the eye can be so excellently disposed that it needs no help on its own part for beholding the object, which it nevertheless cannot see for lack of manifestation or of an impressed species, namely if the object be in the midst of darkness, through which that species cannot be poured out, nor the object manifested.

Note 2. A threefold light of glory can be distinguished, namely objective, habitual, and actual. The first is the very divine Essence itself, concurring immediately and effectively after the manner of an object with the beatific intellect to form the vision of itself. The second is called the supernatural quality received in the beatific intellect, elevating and strengthening and completing it antecedently to the act, and making it proximately powerful so that it can form the actual vision of God, namely in that way in which consummated habitual charity informs and perfects the will for eliciting the beatific love. The third can be called an actual quality, likewise supernatural, by which the intellect is perfected and completed, not indeed antecedently to the act, but in the production of the act itself, just as that is called actual grace which in fact and in act concurs to a supernatural act, so that when the act ceases, it itself likewise ceases and comes to an end. In this it differs from habitual grace, that this inheres persistently in the soul, completes it, and establishes it in first act capable of operation. For supernatural habits differ most from natural ones in this, that the latter concur only to the mode, the former, however, to the substance of the act; the natural ones bestow only facility, the supernatural ones, however, confer force and complete activity.

Note 3. A threefold office of the light of glory is distinguished by some Theologians: The first is to constitute the beatific intellect in first act for eliciting the intuitive vision of God, namely by elevating, strengthening, and uniting it with the beatific object. The second is to dispose it to receive the divine vision, which, since it is a supernatural form, they say, cannot be received in the intellect unless it be disposed by some supernatural aid for this reception. The third some place in the disposition for eliciting the beatific vision; for they think that the light of glory does not concur efficiently, neither as a principal nor an instrumental cause, but only after the manner of an ultimate disposition for producing the beatific vision. Whether these are true, however, must be resolved. Three things, therefore, are here proposed for discussion: First, whether the light of glory must necessarily be admitted. Second, whether that light is habitual, or only actual, or objective. Third, whether it concurs to the beatific vision as an efficient cause, principal or instrumental, or only as a disposition; and that as much for eliciting the vision as for receiving it.

First conclusion. — The light of glory is necessarily required so that the created intellect can see God intuitively. This is of faith defined in the Council of Vienne in Clement. Ad nostrum, De haereticis, where the errors and articles of the Beguards are condemned, among which this was the fifth: That every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself, and does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God. This error the Church proscribes, and decrees that the soul needs the light of glory to see God and to enjoy him blessedly.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture: Psalm 25: That they may please before God in the light of the living. Apocalypse 21: The city has no need of the Sun, for the clarity of God will illuminate it. Cap. 22: They will see his face, and they will not need the light of the Sun, because the Lord will illuminate them, and they will reign forever. But this is gathered especially from Psalm 55: With you is the fountain of life, and in your light we will see light; for although the primary sense is that in the Son we will see the Father, or in Christ we will see God, as is clear from the Council of Nicaea, and from Epistle 1 of Pope Evaristus to the Bishops of Africa, as Origen also interprets, lib. 1. De principiis, c. 8; in the light we will see light, that is, in your Word and wisdom we will see you the Father; for what else is to be called the light of God, in which one sees light, than the power of God by which one is illuminated, or perceives the truth of all things, or knows God himself, who is called truth?; nevertheless the other Fathers customarily interpret this prophetic text of the light of glory, especially St. Augustine, or whoever else is the author of the book of the Soliloquiorum, where in c. 36 he says:

We will see your light in your light. But what sort of light? An immense light, an incorporeal light, an incorruptible light, an incomprehensible light, an unfailing light, an inextinguishable light, an inaccessible light, an uncreated light, a truthful light, a divine light, which illuminates the eyes of the Angels, which gladdens the youth of the Saints, which is the light of lights and the fountain of life, which you are, Lord my God: you indeed are the light in whose light we will see light, you namely in yourself, in the splendor of your countenance, when we will see you face to face.

Secondly, the same thing is gathered from the other holy Fathers; for holy Dionysius, when he speaks of the intuition of God, calls it everywhere an illumination and enlightenment, especially in the first chapter de Divinis Nominibus, where he says: That the blessed minds are raised constantly and immovably toward the ray shining upon them, and are lifted up with a fitting love of the illuminations granted them, with a certain sacred reverence, temperately and holily, as it were upon wings raised on high. Likewise Irenaeus lib. 1. cap. 37: Just as, he says, those who see the light are within the light and perceive its clar- ity, so also those who see God are within God, perceiving his clarity; the clarity, however, gives them life; those who see God, therefore, perceive life. Similarly St. Gregory, expounding those words of Job c. 36: He hides light in his nostrils, and announces to his friend, that the possession of it is his, has this: The friend of truth, he says, is the right lover of action. Whence also truth itself says to his Disciples: You are my friends, if you do what I command you; concerning this light, therefore, and the eternal fatherland, God announces to his friend that the possession of it is his, so that he may by no means despair through the frailty of his weakness, but know the more certainly that he will possess the clarity of that light, the more he now tramples under foot the darkness of the vices that assail him.

Thirdly, finally, this truth is proved by reason: Every potency which from itself and from its own nature is insufficient and disproportionate for eliciting some act and beholding an object, needs to be strengthened and elevated for eliciting this vision: but the created intellect from its own nature is insufficient for seeing God, as was proved above: therefore it needs some superadded virtue, which is called the light of glory. Next, in order that the intellect be connaturally united with the divine Essence, or with an intelligible species, it must be complete in the notion of an intellective potency: but the intellect is not so complete from its own nature: therefore it needs the light of glory, by which it may be completed. Finally, a threefold knowledge of God is customarily distinguished by Theologians, by which Philosophers, the Faithful, and the Blessed ascend to God by a threefold grade: the first is natural, arising from things which are perceived by the senses; the second surpasses nature, by which God, the author of grace, shows himself through revelation in the mysteries of the Christian Religion, as it were through lattices; the third, finally, is more divine, by which God, as the fountain of beatitude, with unveiled face offers himself to be beheld by blessed minds. This threefold knowledge, however, can be had only through an infused light, for God, as author of nature, is perceived by the light of natural reason, and as author of grace, in this mortal life, is known by the ray of faith: therefore he must likewise be seen by the Blessed clearly and intuitively only by the most splendid light of glory. The first knowledge is likened to a night vision, which discerns the object only by a scanty light. The second, to the dawn, which indeed casts off the darkness of the senses and the fog of phantasms, but nevertheless does not yet bring out into the open day the truths which it declares. The third, however, is full midday, which the bride of the Canticles once longed for in the first chapter, in these words: Show me, whom my soul loves, where you pasture, where you lie down at midday. Which words St. Bernard interprets so excellently, Serm. 33. in Cantica:

for here you pasture, but not in satiety, nor is it permitted to lie down, but one must stand and keep watch on account of the fears of the night. Alas! neither is there clear light, nor full refreshment, nor a safe abode; and therefore show me where you pasture, where you lie down at midday: your face, Lord, I seek; your face is midday, midday is your clear and intuitive vision, or truly midday is the fullness of fervor and light, the standing still of the sun, the extermination of shadows, the drying up of marshes, the driving away of foul odors, or the perennial solstice, when the day will no longer decline, and the noonday light, or the springlike weather, or the pearly beauty, or the autumnal abundance, and that no one seem to have found it, or the rest and holiday of winter.

You will say 1. The light of glory would therefore be required so that the intellect might be disposed and become proportioned with God in seeing: but the intellect even furnished with the light of glory would not be proportioned with God in seeing; for God always remains infinite and incomprehensible: therefore, etc. I distinguish the minor. It would not be proportioned according to entity and the perfection of being, I concede; according to cognoscibility and the notion of object, I deny. For although God has no entitative proportion with the beatific intellect, which is always finite, while he is infinite, nevertheless he has proportion in the notion of an object knowable in a finite mode, because between God visible and the created intellect seeing there is no simply infinite distance, but only according to a diverse order, natural and supernatural. Whence this distance and improportion can be overcome by some created light of the supernatural order, which is a certain participation of divine intellectuality, such as is the light of glory.

You will insist. The light of glory cannot strengthen and perfect the intellect for eliciting the vision, unless it has a power similar to the intellect: but the light of glory does not have a power similar to the created intellect, for this is vital, that, however, is a quality devoid of life: therefore it cannot perfect and strengthen the intellect for eliciting the beatific vision, which is a vital action. I answer 1. by denying the major: for species and other habits, although they are not vital and are essentially distinguished from the potencies in which they reside, nevertheless perfect them and help them elicit their actions. Secondly, I distinguish the minor: the light of glory is not a vital power as that which, as if from itself it were the elicitive principle of a vital act and formally had life, I concede; it is not a vital power as that by which, or a certain force ordered to elevating the intellect to a higher and more perfect life, I deny: for just as a seed, for example, although it is not animate nor living as that which, nevertheless because it is a certain instrumental force ordered by nature to the generation of a living being, can be called living as that by which: so although the light of glory does not have life from itself as that which, it nevertheless has it as that by which, because it strengthens the intellective soul, already of itself living with a natural intellectual life, so as to elevate it to elicit the act of a more perfect life, namely the beatific.

You will say 2. The light of glory would therefore be required so that it might determine the intellect to the beatific vision: but the intellect is sufficiently determined to that vision by the divine Essence united to it in the notion of an intelligible species: therefore the light of glory is superfluous. I distinguish the major. The light of glory is required, so that it may determine the intellect to the beatific vision on the part of the potency, I concede; on the part of the object, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: the created intellect is sufficiently determined by the manifestation of the divine Essence to its vision, with the determination standing on the part of the object, I concede; on the part of the potency, I deny. For since every cognition is made from the object and the potency, a twofold determination is especially required for intuitive cognition: one on the part of the object, by which it is made through the expressed species emitted by it, or through the immediate manifestation and union of itself after the manner of an impressed species; the other, however, on the part of the potency, which completes and strengthens it for eliciting such an act.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that the light of glory is a habitual quality distinct from the impressed species and from the actual concurrence. This is the more common opinion of the Doctors, and it seems more conformable to the mind of the Subtle Doctor, especially in 1. dist. 17. q. 3. n. 36, where to the argument which he had proposed to himself in this way: Without an informing habit there can be vision: therefore also most perfect fruition, he submits this single solution, and so from his own opinion: I answer, he says, no one commonly denies in glory the habit of the light of glory in the intellect, and this, on the part of the intellect, can be posited as corresponding to charity on the part of the will. As if he would say that just as habitual charity is required in the fatherland, to strengthen and complete the will for eliciting the beatific love, so likewise some habitual light is desired, which may complete and perfect the intellect for eliciting the beatific vision: this, however, is the light of glory; and therefore from the mind of the Doctor the light of glory is a habitual quality.

Proof of the conclusion. And first indeed, that the light of glory is not an impressed species. The light of glory is necessarily required for seeing God: but for that an impressed species is not necessary: therefore the light of glory is not an impressed species. Next, even if an impressed species were given in the beatific vision, the light of glory would be desired beyond it none the less: therefore this is distinguished from the impressed species. The antecedent is proved: for eliciting the beatific vision it is necessary that the intellect be completed not only on the part of the object, but also on the part of the potency; but by the impressed species it is completed only on the part of the object, of which that species is the deputy: therefore beyond the impressed species the light of glory is still desired. The major is proved: more things are required for supernatural acts than for natural ones: but for eliciting natural acts it suffices that the visual potency, for example, be completed on the part of the moving object, concurring through itself immediately, or through a species, for eliciting the natural vision: therefore for the supernatural vision something is required, besides the impressed species, which completes the intellect on its own part. Finally, without the impressed species, either the created intellect is complete on its own part, or not. If it is: therefore that species is not the light of glory, which is necessarily required for completing the created intellect in order to the supernatural vision. If it is not complete from itself: therefore on its own part it requires something by which it may be completed. That which would complete it, however, cannot be the impressed species, because it does not stand on the part of the potency, but on the part of the object which it represents and whose role it plays: therefore the light of glory is distinguished from the impressed species.

It is confirmed. A species supplying the place of the object adds no power to the potency for beholding it, but supposes it; for however much the visible species of the present object be placed before a wounded or weak eye, its visual power is neither healed nor strengthened: therefore the defect of power which is in the created eye for seeing God cannot be supplied by the impressed species of the divine Essence, but beyond it some light is required which intrinsically affects the potency, and perfects and strengthens it for eliciting the act. Next, the created intellect is related to the beatific vision, inasmuch as it is a supernatural act, in the same way as it is related to the act of faith, which is likewise of the supernatural order: but the improportion which is in the intellect for eliciting the act of faith is not supplied by the mere species of the believable object, for however much the believable object be proposed, the intellect will not elicit the act of faith unless it be elevated and strengthened by some supernatural aid received in itself: therefore by a like reasoning, however much the beatific object be manifested, it cannot be seen by the created intellect unless it first be elevated by some light perfecting it and completing it in first act for eliciting the vision, just as by the light of faith it is elevated for believing.

The second and third part are also proved. Namely, that that light ought rather to be called habitual than actual. Every efficient cause, before it produces its effect and elicits it in act, must be constituted in first act, powerful for that production and operation: but the created intellect cannot connaturally be so constituted except by habitual light: therefore the light of glory is rather habitual than actual. The major is clear: for first act is presupposed to second. Whence before some act or effect is produced, its productive power must be presupposed, and so a potency capable of that operation and production. The minor is proved: it involves a contradiction for some cause to be constituted powerful in first act by something standing on the part of second act, for first act precedes second at least by a priority of nature, and nothing is earlier constituted in its being by something which is posterior to it; but the actual light of glory, if there were any, would rather stand on the part of second act; for it would be the very actual influx of God, together with the created intellect itself: therefore the created intellect cannot be made intrinsically powerful in first act for seeing God by the actual light alone, at least connaturally. Next; the intellect cannot be made connaturally powerful in first act for the beatific vision by that which influences the effect more than the potency; but that actual light would influence the vision itself more than the intellect; for it would be the very actual influx of God passing through the light into the intellect, but not persevering in it. Finally, the beatific vision lasts through all eternity: therefore it is elicited more connaturally from persevering principles than from passing ones succeeding one another by turns: but actual light is a passing principle, habitual light, however, is a persevering principle: therefore the blessed vision is made more connaturally through habitual light than through actual; and so that light of glory ought rather to be called habitual than actual.

You will say. The Subtle Doctor manifestly opposes this opinion in several places, especially in 1. dist. 14. quaest. 2., where he says:

in whatever instant naturally prior to the vision itself, there is no cause naturally prior to the vision itself, for up to that instant of nature in which the intellect sees, the intellect does not have whence it could come into that vision: but only the intellect itself in itself, and the object which can elicit the vision itself, naturally precede: and dist. 31. qu. unica num. 2. he says: It is not necessary to posit any habit created in the soul itself in the fatherland, which would be the principle of seeing or holding the object, at least any other besides charity; because a habit is not placed in a potency except to facilitate and enable the potency for eliciting the act. And in 4. dist. 39. qu. 11. n. 10., when he had said that it is gathered from both Scripture and faith that the habit of charity is necessary in the Blessed for eliciting the beatific love, he concludes: But the light of glory for the vision does not seem to me necessary to posit, because what is said about natural corporeal light, that it is required not only on account of the object, but on account of the eye, seems to me to be a certain metaphor. For the more the object is in itself light, the less light is required on account of it, nor is it required on account of the reception, as was said; whence it seems to me less necessary to posit light than a species, because if a species is posited, this is so that memory may be perfect on the part of the intellect: but whether such a species is to be posited on account of the formal operation and perfection of the potency, will be said elsewhere; therefore the Doctor does not think that the light of glory is a habitual quality. I deny the antecedent. For in the aforesaid and other similar places the Doctor intends nothing other than that the light of glory is not required only as a disposition for receiving the vision, nor only for the ornament and decoration of the intellect itself, nor that the object become actually visible and intelligible: but that it is desired after the manner of a concause perfecting the intellect itself, not indeed for receiving, but for eliciting the beatific vision: which he openly indicates in the aforesaid question 11; for when he had said in num. 10: But if the intellect is made merely passive, having itself only in the notion of a recipient of the act of vision, since no form is required on the part of the intellect for the reception alone, as was shown above, then the light of glory is not required: he adds in n. 12 that the light itself is required to elevate the potency in order to operation, and to complete it, and to make it, from imperfect and remote, perfect and proximately powerful for eliciting the vision. For, answering this argument posed against him, that if the intellect is not from itself active and powerful for eliciting the beatific vision, it cannot be made powerful for eliciting it by some habit, I say, he says, that now it has remote potency, then, however, proximate. Whence just as the intellect is without a habit, I say, here and there the same nature, so being able to see is here and there the same potency: but now it is remote, then it will be proximate. But if the potency is passive and receptive, then the light of glory is not required.

Third conclusion. — The created intellect can be elevated to see God by the objective light alone, that is, by the wholly extrinsic concurrence of God, and without any intrinsic light, whether habitual and permanent, or actual and transient. This likewise seems the more common view among Theologians, against some more recent Thomists.

Proof, first. The created intellect could not be so elevated for this reason, because for the beatific vision an habitual or actual light would be essentially and necessarily required, in such a way that God could in no way supply that light itself: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is evident: the minor is proved. That light of glory would be desired essentially for the beatific vision, chiefly because that vision is of the supernatural order: but that light is not so required on account of the supernaturalness of the vision: therefore it is not required essentially, etc. The major is certain, for since the vision is vital and supernatural, the intellect concurs with it sufficiently of itself inasmuch as it is vital: and therefore it requires light and supernatural aid only inasmuch as that vision is supernatural. The minor is proved, first indeed concerning habitual light: if the habitual light of glory were required essentially on account of the supernaturalness of the vision, the habit of faith would also be required essentially for every act of faith, and the habit of charity for every act of charity; because the acts themselves are also supernatural: but the consequent is false, because when a man is first converted from sin through an act of charity, that act precedes the habit, and causes it: but to say that that same act which causes the habit is caused by that very habit which it causes is most absurd; otherwise the same thing could, under the same concept, presuppose its own existence; for an effect presupposes its cause, and the cause of its cause; therefore it would presuppose itself as the cause of its own cause.

Second: the omnipotence of God can no more supply the defect of the species through extrinsic assistance than the defect of the light: but it can supply the defect of the species: therefore also that of the light. Finally, God can do through Himself whatever second causes do by concurring only efficiently, not vitally; for He can heat without fire, illuminate without the sun: but that light concurs only effectively, and not vitally: therefore God can supply its defect through Himself, especially since no contradiction suggests the contrary, as will be evident in the solution of the arguments.

You will say 1. It implies a contradiction that a second act be given without a first act; for being able to act is prior to acting: but the light of glory is the first act with respect to the vision: therefore the vision of God without actual or habitual light implies a contradiction. Again, it implies a contradiction that a vision be able to come to be without a potency: but the light of glory is the whole potency of the intellect seeing supernaturally: therefore it implies a contradiction that the intellect be able to see supernaturally without light. Finally, the beatific vision depends on the light inasmuch as it is supernatural just as it depends on the intellect inasmuch as it is vital: but inasmuch as it is vital, it depends essentially on the intellect, so that it cannot be elicited without it: therefore also inasmuch as it is supernatural it depends essentially on the light. I distinguish the minor of the first argument. The light is the first act with respect to the vision, necessary according to the ordinary power, so that the vision is produced connaturally, I concede; necessary absolutely, so that such a vision is produced simply, I deny: for God through His omnipotence can supply and discharge the role of that light which would constitute the intellect in first or second act for acting. I likewise distinguish the minor of the second argument: the light is a potency, so that the beatific vision is produced connaturally, I concede: so that it is produced simply, I deny. Finally I deny the major of the third argument: for it is false that the vision depends on the light inasmuch as it is supernatural just as it depends on the intellect inasmuch as it is a vital act; for no created or uncreated cause concurs in the vision precisely inasmuch as it is vital, except the intellect itself, which alone produces it immanently; but God always concurs in that vision inasmuch as it is supernatural, and that as the principal cause, whether immediately through His more abundant and extraordinary concurrence, or through the mediation of an habitual or actual light produced by Him alone.

You will say 2. The created vision cannot be supplied by the mere extrinsic assistance of the uncreated knowledge of God: therefore neither will the created light be able to be supplied by the mere assistance of divine omnipotence. I deny the consequence. For the difference is that the created vision has the character of a formal cause, because it renders the intellect formally seeing: but the light of glory, whether habitual or actual, concurs in the beatific vision only effectively, as will be established below, and therefore it is no wonder that God, who cannot supply the formal effect of the vision, because He cannot have the character of a form, can supply the effect of the light, because He can have, and in fact has, the character of a cause.

You will say 3. Light is required to manifest the object formally: but God cannot formally manifest the object by Himself alone: therefore He cannot even supply the defect of the light. The major is evident; because corporeal vision, e.g., cannot be formed unless the object is first illuminated, nor can first principles be known unless they are illumined by the light of the intellect, which illumination and illumining is not done by effecting something, but only by illuminating and manifesting the object; therefore the created intellect cannot see God, unless God is illuminated by a light which illumines, not by effecting, but by formally affecting the potency. I distinguish the major. Light is required to manifest the object formally, so that it is the formal illumination and manifestation of it, I deny the major: so that it concurs effectively in producing the vision by which the object is formally seen, I concede the major: and in this sense I deny the minor: for God through His more abundant concurrence can act with the intellective potency to form the vision of Himself.

You will say 4. In order for the intellect to concur effectively in forming the supernatural vision, it must first be elevated and constituted in first act, made powerful for producing it: but it cannot be so elevated and constituted through mere external assistance, unless it receives into itself something intrinsic; but that intrinsic thing which would be posited is the light: therefore it cannot be made powerful without light. The minor is proved: from that special assistance and union of God with the created intellect, either some intrinsic power is derived into the intellect itself, or no power is intrinsically added to it. If the first, the point is gained, for such a superadded power is a certain participation of divine intellectuality, and hence also the light of glory, whether habitual or actual: but if the second is affirmed, it follows that from such assistance and more abundant concurrence the created intellect could not be made intrinsically powerful for eliciting the blessed vision; for it implies a contradiction that what is not powerful for something be made powerful for it, unless it is intrinsically changed. For the potency for operating is not some extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic one; nor can something be made from non-powerful into intrinsically powerful without something intrinsically received into itself: for the same remaining the same is always apt to do the same: therefore if the created intellect receives nothing intrinsic into itself, it cannot be made powerful for forming the beatific vision. I deny the minor. For in this hypothesis the created intellect would not be judged to be constituted in first act for eliciting the beatific vision otherwise than because it has another assisting cause, elevating it to a higher and supernatural order, so that with the concurrence of that cause it can elicit that vision: but for that it can be equally elevated through extrinsic assistance and the more abundant concurrence of God as through an intrinsic light received into itself; and accordingly it is not necessary that it receive something intrinsic into itself. To the proof of the minor I say that from this divine assistance nothing indeed is received in the intellect by way of a quality intrinsically affecting it; nevertheless the intellect itself is extrinsically elevated and strengthened by the aid of that concurrence, so that it is made powerful for eliciting the vision which with the common and general concurrence of God it could not have elicited.

You will insist. From this it follows that God alone produces the beatific vision at the presence of the human intellect: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is proved: then God alone is judged to produce the act at the presence of the created intellect, when this intellect is not more intrinsically powerful through that divine assistance than it was before: but in this case the intellect would not be more intrinsically powerful than it was; since it would receive nothing intrinsic into itself: therefore it cannot elicit that vision, and hence God alone is the author of its production. I deny the major. For although the created intellect receives nothing intrinsic into itself through that more abundant concurrence, nevertheless, in order for it to be made powerful, it suffices that it be externally aided and elevated to the supernatural order, so that it elicits such a vision: for if one man, incapable of carrying some burden, becomes capable of that lifting and carrying through the assistance of another man, who indeed adds no intrinsic powers to him, but only provides external assistance, much more will the created intellect, through the more abundant concurrence of God, on whom it depends essentially in operating, be able to become capable of eliciting some act which with its own and usual powers it could not elicit.

You will say finally. This opinion directly attacks the Council of Vienne, the Clementine Ad nostrum, etc., in which the errors of the Beguards and Beguines are condemned, who said that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God; and hence according to the mind of the Council light is required for the beatific vision: but that more abundant concurrence is not light: therefore it does not suffice for eliciting the beatific vision. I deny the major. For the Council defines nothing else than that some supernatural aid is required for eliciting the vision itself, whether meanwhile that aid be something intrinsic or extrinsic. For the intention of the Council was to condemn the error of the Beguines and Beguards, who said that the soul would be blessed by itself and by its natural powers; to repulse which error it sufficed to decree that the beatific vision cannot be elicited without some supernatural aid, whether meanwhile that aid be something extrinsic or intrinsic, created or uncreated, partial or total, which the Council left undecided, granting to the Scholastics, not an occasion of erring (as some wrongly opine), but the liberty of opining and disputing in that matter and opinion, which could be agitated and weighed on both sides by authorities and reasons.

You will insist. The Council expressly affirms that light is desired for eliciting the beatific vision: but that more abundant concurrence is not light: therefore the Council judges that more abundant concurrence not to suffice. I answer. Indeed, the Council requires light, but does not decree whether that light is objective, or actual, or habitual. Nor is there any reason for you to press the force of the word light, as if it properly belonged only to intrinsic actual or habitual aid; for it is certain that this word light belongs only metaphorically to intrinsic aid, whether habitual or actual, the appellation being drawn, namely, from corporeal light, without which an object cannot be seen. And indeed by this reasoning the more abundant concurrence of God can also rightly be called light; for God Himself is light: and sacred Scripture not rarely calls that actual aid light, as in Psalm 12: Enlighten my eyes, and elsewhere: whence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5, calls the actual aid preceding the infusion of the habits an illumination: hence St. Augustine, lib. 12, De Genesi ad litteram, cap. 31, says that the light by which the soul is illumined, so that it may discern all things truly understood, whether in itself or in Him, is God Himself.

You will insist finally: The Council condemns two errors: first, that any intellectual nature is blessed naturally in itself: second, that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it: therefore the Council judges that in fact light is required which elevates the soul: but it cannot be so elevated through that more abundant concurrence: therefore the light required by the Council cannot be understood of that concurrence. Again: the Council seems to require such an elevation for the acts of the beatific vision as is required for the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity: but to elicit these acts it is necessary that the potency be elevated through intrinsic aid, whether habitual or actual: therefore likewise such aid will be necessary for the beatific vision.

I answer to the first. The Council condemns a single error, that the soul is blessed naturally from itself and needs no supernatural aid, which was the mind of the Beguines and Beguards, against whom the Council decrees that the soul cannot naturally be blessed, and that God can be seen only with some aiding light elevating the potency. It does not decree, however, whether that aiding light is something intrinsic or extrinsic; but only that through it the potency is elevated to the supernatural order, which can be done equally through external aid as through internal, because such an elevation of the potency consists in this, that it be rendered powerful for doing something exceeding its natural powers; and that it can accomplish with an external more abundant concurrence.

To the second. I deny the major, for the Council determines nothing else than that some supernatural principle is required for eliciting the beatific vision, just as the habit of faith, hope, and charity is required for eliciting the supernatural acts; but it does not decree whether that supernatural principle is something intrinsic or extrinsic. Add that the Council speaks of fact and of the present state: but we speak of the possible state, and of the good pleasure of God: so that God through a more abundant concurrence could supply, if He willed, the efficacy of the light: which in fact we admit to be more probably the habitual light, and hence the Council neither opposes us, nor we it.

Last conclusion. — The light of glory has no other office, nor any other influx into the beatific vision, than the concurrence of an efficient cause effectively concurring with the intellect to form that vision.

This is the more common opinion, against the Thomists affirming that the light is desired to dispose the intellect to receive the beatific vision, and to effect the union of the intellect itself with the beatific object.

The conclusion is proved. Supernatural habits are desired for no other reason than that the potency, insufficient from itself for eliciting supernatural acts, is made powerful through those habits for producing such acts, and concurs connaturally with them in their production: therefore since the light of glory is a supernatural habit, it is judged to have no other influx into the created intellect than to elevate it and concur with it in forming the beatific vision.

The antecedent is proved. For the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, e.g., have no other influx, either into the potency or into the act, than an effective one; nor are they judged to dispose the potency for eliciting and receiving acts in any other way than by concurring efficiently in the production of those acts. Again: if the light of glory had another influx besides the effective one, it would be chiefly because it should dispose the intellect to receive the vision, so that without this disposition the act of vision could not be received in the intellect; but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The Thomists admit the major. The minor indeed is proved: if the intellect could not receive the vision without some previous formal disposition, this would be chiefly either because that act, since it is supernatural in substance, could not be received in the intellect, which is a natural potency, except with this previous disposition; or because such a vision is an act of such a nature that it requires this supernatural disposition for its reception: but neither can be said. Not the first, both because the habits of faith, hope, and charity are supernatural forms in substance, and yet are received in a natural potency without any previous supernatural disposition: and because if a supernatural disposition were necessarily desired in a natural potency for receiving a supernatural form, there would be a process to infinity; for since that disposing form would also be supernatural, it would pre-require another form in the natural potency for its reception, and this another, and so to infinity: therefore from the fact that the vision is a supernatural form, the intellect should not be disposed to receive it through another supernatural form. Nor the second: for no particular reason can be assigned in the beatific vision on account of which it would specially require such a disposition, unless perhaps because it is a more perfect form than the other supernatural forms are: but from this head such a disposition is not required; for if a less perfect supernatural form can be received without such a disposition, why not also a more perfect one?

You will say 1. The light of glory is required in the intellect for eliciting the blessed vision for this reason, because the intellect from its nature is disproportionate to that production: but the intellect is not less disproportionate to receiving the vision than to producing it: therefore if on account of that disproportion the blessed vision, as it is an action, requires light, it also requires it as it is a reception.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that the vision, as it is an action, must proceed from an effective principle operating connaturally; for an effect proceeds from the power of its cause, which virtually pre-contains it, and this vision can proceed from such a principle without there being given a process to infinity: but the vision, as it is a passion, does not require to be received in a principle receiving connaturally, that is, which is of the same status with such a received form; because otherwise there would have to be a process to infinity, as has been said: whence rightly the Doctor, in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 11. n. 8, when he had said that the human soul is from itself immediately receptive of beatitude, and is not disposed for that reception through something accidental, otherwise it would be blessed only secundum quid, and only mediately, concludes: Therefore I say that the human soul in pure naturals is the immediate susceptive of beatitude: and hence the created intellect, from the mere powers of nature, is receptive of the beatific vision; nor does it need for that reception any previous supernatural form, although it needs one for the production of that vision.

Having now set forth the two principles that come to the cognitive power from without, so as to complete it in order to elicit its own operation — namely, the impressed species on the part of the object, and the light of glory on the part of the power, which place it in actu primo so that it may exercise its action — we must now decide how the intellect, equipped with such an impressed species or with the light of glory, concurs in forming the beatific vision: namely, whether it produces it physically and actively, or whether it only receives it as produced by the light of glory or by God alone; moreover, whether it produces it as the principal cause or only as an instrumental cause.

Note 1. Two intellects are commonly distinguished, according to the diversity of their function: one, indeed, the agent intellect, and the other the patient intellect. The former is that which, as it were, receives the sensible species sent in by the external senses and the phantasy, and at their presence fashions and expresses the intelligible species, or spiritual representative images of the things that are perceived by the senses. The latter, however, is said to be the intellect itself which receives in itself the spiritual image thus formed, so that through it it may formally become understanding: whence intellection is said to consist inchoately in that action of the intellect by which it produces the image itself, but consummately in the reception of the same image. For intellection consists formally in this, that it assimilates the intellect to the thing understood and makes it formally understanding: but this is achieved inchoately through the productive action of that spiritual image, which is commonly called the true mental word; and completely through the reception of that same word and image; for that image, since it is the expressed likeness of the thing understood, without doubt by informing the intellect and adhering to it assimilates it to the known object, and so makes it completely understanding.

Note 2. Since speech is twofold — the one external and sensible, the other internal and spiritual — a twofold word is likewise commonly distinguished: one, indeed, the word of the mouth, by which men, in speaking to others, set forth to them their own internal concepts; the other, the word of the mind, which is the internal speech itself, or the formation of the concept, by which the intellect expresses the likeness and image of the object it beholds. This word of the mind is defined by the Doctor in 1. dist. 27. quaest. 3. as an act of intellection produced by the fruitful memory, having being only dependently upon actual cognition. It is called an act of intellection, which constitutes the soul formally understanding, just as heat constitutes a thing hot. Secondly, it is formed by the fruitful memory, that is, by the intellect informed and, as it were, pregnant with the intelligible species of the object. The rest is added to signify that complete intellection consists in the presence of the word itself, which has being only as long as the cognition of the object itself endures.

Note 3. An efficient cause is commonly distinguished as twofold: one, indeed, principal, and the other instrumental. The former is that which physically influences the effect through a power proper and intrinsic to itself: the latter, however, is that which influences only through the power of another that moves it; for it is more probable that an instrumental cause is not properly active of itself, as we have taught with the Doctor in 4. dist. 1. quaest. 3. n. 14., in the Physics q. 5. on the instrumental cause. But whether the created intellect has the character of a principal cause or only of an instrumental one in the beatific vision will have to be decided in this Question, in which three things are proposed to be resolved: first, whether the created intellect concurs physically in the beatific vision; second, whether it concurs as a principal cause; third, whether it produces a mental word.

First conclusion. — The intellect concurs partially with the light of glory in physically, actively, and immediately producing the beatific vision.

Proof. First, indeed, because every intellection is produced by the mind, just as volition is produced by the will: therefore the beatific cognition and vision is also physically produced by the created intellect, just as beatific love is produced by the created will. The antecedent is clear from the common opinion of the holy Fathers, which St. Augustine thus weighs in lib. 9. De Trinitate, last chapter: The mind itself, he says, is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge as its offspring; for when the mind knows itself, it begets a knowledge of itself and is the parent of its own knowledge. The consequence is also clear: for the intellect must concur no less in forming the beatific vision than the will in eliciting beatific love: but the will concurs actively and physically in beatific love and in the other supernatural acts; otherwise there would be no freedom and no indifference in meritorious acts, which are truly supernatural: therefore the intellect also concurs physically in forming the supernatural vision. — Moreover, the beatific vision is a vital act: therefore it must be produced connaturally and physically by a vital power: but by no other than the intellect: therefore the intellect concurs physically in forming the beatific vision. — Finally, the nobler mode of operating is to be attributed to the created intellect, insofar as it can be attributed without any contradiction and repugnance: but the operation by which cognition itself is produced is nobler than its reception: therefore the physical production of the beatific vision must be attributed to the created intellect. The major is clear, for it is nobler to act than to undergo, because action imports greater power and independence; whereas undergoing has dependence and a certain weakness and infirmity attached; for whatever undergoes, is by that very fact overcome and surpassed. I prove the minor: if anything stood in the way of the intellect being said to concur actively in forming the beatific vision, it would be chiefly that the vision is of the supernatural order: but this reason does not stand in the way; both because in fact a natural power cooperates in supernatural acts; for example, the will in the act of charity and of contrition, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6. can. 4., where he is anathematized who should say that man's free choice cooperates in nothing by assenting to God who excites and calls, but like some inanimate thing does nothing at all and behaves merely passively: therefore the Council judges that the created will can cooperate in a meritorious act, which is of the supernatural order: why, then, should the intellect also not be able to cooperate in the beatific vision, even though it is supernatural? Then because (says Poncius) the beatific vision could be supernatural, even though a natural cause concurred in it; for just as the impressed intelligible species, to the production of which the corporeal phantasm concurs, is spiritual; and just as man is said to be corporeal, although a spiritual soul concurs in constituting him; so the vision could be supernatural, even though some natural cause concurred in it, provided that another supernatural cause, such as the light of glory, also concurs at the same time. Add that that is called supernatural which cannot be produced without a supernatural principle, whether another principle, which is natural, concurs in it or not: therefore, since the beatific vision cannot be produced without supernatural aid, it will be no less to be called supernatural, although the intellect concurs actively in its production — the intellect which is, indeed, a power natural of itself, but elevated by the light of glory to the supernatural order.

You will say 1. The intellect cannot actively concur in the beatific vision without likewise actively concurring in its supernaturality: but it cannot actively concur in its supernaturality, but only in its vitality: therefore neither in its entity. The major is clear: the minor is proved: the intellect can no more concur in the supernaturality of the beatific vision than the light of glory can concur in its vitality: but the light of glory does not of itself concur in vitality, because it is an inanimate principle: therefore by parity of reasoning the intellect will likewise be unable to concur in supernaturality, and consequently will not concur in the entity of the vision either, which is formally supernatural. Add that the vitality itself of the beatific vision is also formally supernatural, and so if the intellect does not concur immediately and precisely in supernaturality, neither would it concur in vitality, and consequently it would not concur physically in the beatific vision.

I answer. Since those formalities of vitality and supernaturality are not really distinct from the act of vision, but result only from the diverse mode in which that act is said to proceed from its causes, therefore the act of beatific vision according to its real entity, and so according to its vitality and supernaturality, really proceeds both from the intellect and from the light of glory, although it is not said to proceed from each separately precisely according to its formalities. For in order that the act be said to proceed from the light according to the formality of vitality, it would have to be called vital precisely insofar as it is from the light, which is impossible; for since the light is in the soul, it cannot be called the principle of vitality itself precisely per se, but only insofar as it concurs physically in the entity of the vision, which is at once supernatural and vital: whence the minor must be denied, namely, that the intellect concurs in the vision only insofar as it is vital, but not insofar as it is supernatural. For since it concurs in the entity of the vision, it also concurs in everything that is really identified with the vision itself; and hence in supernaturality, which is really the same as the vision itself.

You will insist. The beatific vision is adequately and formally supernatural: therefore it must proceed adequately from a supernatural principle: but the intellect precisely is not a supernatural principle; for it acts through a power innate to itself, which is entirely natural of itself and intrinsically: therefore that vision cannot proceed physically from the intellect.

I deny the major. For from it there would follow that the vision itself would not be produced by the light either, because since it is vital, it would require an adequate vital principle, which the light is not. And therefore it suffices for the notion of the adequate principle of this vision that it be produced by one principle formally supernatural, such as the light, and by another supernatural only extrinsically and through elevation, such as the beatific intellect; for the beatific intellect, elevated through the light of glory, forms with it a single adequate principle of the vision, which is wholly produced by both jointly, both insofar as it is vital and insofar as it is supernatural; because both the light and the intellect concur in the entity of the vision itself, which is really vital and supernatural.

You will say 2. The Subtle Doctor affirms in several places that the intellect behaves merely passively with respect to intellection, which he judges to be caused principally by the object, and above all with respect to the beatific vision. For in 1. d. 3. q. 8. n. 2., when he had proved that the intellective part has the more principal causality with respect to the cognitions that are naturally fitting to us in the present state; because, he says, that cause is more principal by which, when it acts, another cause co-acts, and not conversely: but with our intellect acting to intellection, the object in itself, or in its species, co-acts, etc.; he concludes: Nevertheless some object greatly exceeding the capacity of the intellective part, for instance, the beatific object, as clearly seen, could be held to have the whole causality with respect to the vision, or a more principal causality than the intellective part, and this on account of the excellence of such an object and on account of the defect of the intellective part. Therefore the Doctor judges that the beatific intellect does not concur actively in the beatific vision.

I distinguish. That he judges this probably, I concede: assertively, I deny, as is clear from the words just quoted. Indeed, he leans more toward our opinion than toward the opposite one: for he adds: but about this in the fourth book, where he affirms that he will set forth a fuller discussion of this matter and a clearer opinion. But it is established from 4. d. 4. q. 11. n. 9. that he judges the intellect to be productive of the beatific vision; for there, disputing about the necessity of the light of glory, he says: If, however, something supernatural is placed in the blessed person prior to the operations, this will not be for the sake of reception, but for the sake of action, so that the operation by which he attains God may be elicited in the blessed person. And so he openly acknowledges that the intellect is active and productive together with the light of glory itself, if it is given — as indeed we have proved more than sufficiently, even on the Doctor's own opinion, that it is really given in the preceding Question. It is confirmed from Quodlib. q. 14., where, when he had adduced several authorities from St. Augustine by which he would prove that the beatific vision is produced either by the beatific object or by the intellect, and had brought forward several reasons to demonstrate that the intellect is not only a passive and receptive faculty but also an active and productive one, he finally concludes: I concede, therefore, the authorities adduced earlier, to whatever affirmations, whether about the intellect or about the object: it is indeed true that each of these is in some way active to intellection; but active partially; both, however, integrate one total active.

Second conclusion. — The intellect, together with the light of glory, concurs in the beatific vision as the principal cause.

This is the common opinion among the Scotists.

Proof, first. That cause concurs in an effect as principal which produces it through a power intrinsic and connatural to itself: but the created intellect so produces the beatific vision; for it produces it through its innate power of understanding elevated by the light of glory: therefore it is its principal cause. For in this the principal cause differs from the instrumental one, that the latter operates only through an external power acquired from elsewhere: but the former through an internal power of acting connatural to itself. Next, the intellect equipped with the light of glory is the principal cause of the beatific vision, if no other besides itself can be assigned; but besides the intellect no other cause of the beatific vision can be assigned. I prove it: that cause is to be called principal of the vision which is said to see God: but besides the intellect there is nothing that can be said to see God; for that other thing, if there were any, would be chiefly either God or the light of glory: but neither God nor the light of glory can be said to see God with a created vision: therefore neither can be called the principal cause of beatitude. Finally, the vision is a vital effect: therefore it requires a principal cause by which it is vital; that cause, however, is neither God, because since it is an internal and immanent action, it cannot have a merely external cause, such as God is; nor is it the light of glory, because since it is inanimate it cannot be called the principle of a vital action, least of all an immanent one: therefore it remains that the intellect be called the principal cause of the beatific vision.

You will say 1. Whenever a cause is more ignoble than the effect it produces, it must be called an instrumental cause, not a principal one: but the intellect, even equipped with the light of glory, is more ignoble than the beatific vision: therefore it is its instrumental cause, not its principal one. The major is certain: for although it can happen that an instrument is sometimes nobler than the effect it produces, through obediential power, for example, if an Angel were to produce an ant; yet all acknowledge that a cause more ignoble than the effect produced can never rightly be called principal; because a nobler effect is never proportioned and connatural to a less noble cause. The minor, therefore, is proved: an entity adequately vital and intrinsically supernatural is nobler than an entity vital and supernatural only inadequately: but the intellect equipped with the light of glory is supernatural only inadequately; likewise the light of glory is vital only inadequately, that is, by reason of the intellect to which it is joined: therefore the beatific vision is nobler than the intellect even equipped with the light of glory; and hence the latter cannot be its principal cause.

I deny the minor. For since the intellect is a substantial faculty only formally distinct from the soul, and is also elevated to the supernatural order by the benefit of the light of glory, it is certain that it is far more excellent than the beatific vision, which is only an accident, and so less perfect than a substance. Nor does it matter that the intellect is only extrinsically supernatural; because even a natural substance is nobler than any supernatural accident, according to the notion of being; for an accident, however supernatural, is always dependent on a subject; and so is less noble than the substance to which it inheres and on which it depends: therefore much more will the intellect, elevated to the supernatural order, be nobler than the beatific vision; and so on this ground it must not be called an instrumental cause with respect to it.

You will say 2. An active obediential power is always instrumental, since it produces an effect disproportionate and due to that cause alone by which it is elevated: but the intellect, even equipped with the light of glory, acts through an obediential power divinely elevated: therefore it does not produce the beatific vision as a principal cause, but as an instrumental one. — I distinguish the major: when that obediential power has absolutely no proportion with the effect to be produced — just as, for example, the Sacraments have absolutely no proportion with sanctifying grace, to the production of which they concur effectively and instrumentally in the opinion of the Thomists — I concede: when that power has some proportion, at least inchoate, with the effect to be produced, I deny. But the intellect of itself has at least an inchoate proportion with the beatific vision, as we have already often said, and needs only the light of glory so that this inchoate power may be elevated to a higher and supernatural order: and hence it produces that beatific vision through a power innate to itself, and as a principal cause. Add that since that beatific vision is a vital act, it has a connatural proportion with the intellect.

You will say 3. The intellect is therefore called the principal cause of the beatific vision because, since this is a vital act, it must necessarily be produced by a vital faculty: but according to the common opinion of the Doctors, above all of the Subtle Doctor in the places cited by Smising n. 279., God alone can produce a vital and immanent act in a vital power without its effective concurrence, in which case, says Smising, the power will rightly be denominated knowing, or appetitive: therefore from the vitality of the beatific cognition it is not rightly inferred that the created intellect is its principal cause.

I distinguish the major. That the notion of principal causality in the intellect is gathered from vitality according to the ordinary law, I concede: according to an extraordinary mode of operating, I deny. I indeed acknowledge that God can produce a vital act in a natural faculty without that faculty's concurrence; but from this the intellect is nonetheless to be regarded as the ordinary principal cause of that vision. Just as fire is no less called the principal cause of combustion, although God could produce it independently of the concurrence of fire itself.

Third conclusion. — In the beatific vision there is given an expressed species, or mental word.

This is the common opinion among the Theologians, against certain recent Thomists.

Proof, first. The word is a likeness of the object, produced and expressed by the intellect: but in the beatific vision this likeness is given: therefore a word is also given. The major is clear from Philosophy. The minor, however, is proved: first indeed from Sacred Scripture, 1. Ioannis 3: When he appears, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is. Secondly, from Augustine, lib. 14. De Trinitate cap. 17, where, speaking of the beatific vision, he says: In this image the likeness will then be perfect, when the vision of God will be perfect: and lib. 15. cap. 16.: When, he says, we shall see him as he is, then our word will not be false. St. Augustine therefore holds that a word is produced in the beatific vision. Thirdly, finally, from St. Thomas 1. p. q. 27. a. 1., where he says: Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, which is the conception of the thing understood. As if he would say that in every intelligent nature, both human and Angelic, there is given a procession of the word; from which he infers, against the Arians and Sabellians, against whom he chiefly disputes, that a Word is also given in God, who, since he is an intelligent nature, and at the supreme grade of intellectuality, must also have within himself a procession of the Word: but St. Thomas's reasoning and inference would be vain and null if there were some created intellection, and that the most perfect, such as the beatific vision, in which a word were not produced: for the Arian could reply that a word is indeed produced through imperfect cognition; but not through the most perfect cognition of a creature; and so from the production of a word by creatures it would not be rightly inferred that the same production of a word would be in God, the most perfect of all intelligent beings. That this, however, is the genuine mind of Saint Thomas, is clear moreover from the treatise De veritate q. 4. a. 2., where, when he had said: The word is something really proceeding from another, he adds: which is universally true of everything that is understood by us, whether it is seen through essence or through a likeness: therefore St. Thomas holds that even in the beatific vision, in which God is seen through essence, a word is formed.

Secondly. The beatific vision is an action; but no action is given without a term distinct from it and produced; for an action is the effecting of some term, or is a way and a tending toward a term: therefore in the beatific vision some produced term must be given: but that term is called the mental word: therefore the mental word is given in the beatific vision. The major is proved: every real thing that did not exist before must be made anew by some action, unless it is the action itself; for nothing is newly real unless it is really made: but the vision of God is real, which did not exist before in the intellect before it was beatified: therefore either it must be made anew by a real action, or it must be the action itself.

Thirdly. If anything stood in the way of the beatific vision being a mental word, or productive of a word, it would be chiefly because the divine Essence is of itself present to the beatific intellect in the notion of an immediately intelligible object: but this presence and immediate intelligibility of the object does not hinder the production of the Word: for the eternal Father produces the Word, although his cognition is intuitive, and the divine Essence is maximally present to him and supremely and immediately intelligible by him: therefore the supreme presence and intelligibility of the divine Essence does not hinder the production of the word.

You will say 1. The word is that which is immediately understood, and by means of which the object is perceived: but God is not perceived in the beatific vision through any means: for if anything mediated between God and the beatific intellect, the beatific vision would no longer be immediate nor intuitive: therefore in the beatific vision no word is given.

I deny the major. For that word is the formal notion of knowing the object, not that which is known: whence although the word is perceived, the object is nonetheless immediately known, because it is not the medium in which, but the medium by which, the object is seen.

You will say 2. If a word is produced through the beatific vision, it is chiefly because every intellection is productive of a word: but the consequent is false, for the Son and the Holy Spirit understand the divine Essence, and yet produce no word: therefore not every intellection is productive of a word; and hence it is not rightly inferred that a word is given in the beatific vision.

I distinguish the major in two ways. First, indeed: every intellection is productive of a word when the word, or term, is really distinguishable from the one producing it, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Whence to the minor I say that indeed the Son and the Holy Spirit do not produce a word through their intellection, because they only understand by the essential intellection, which is not distinguishable from any conceivable term, since it is absolute and common to the three persons. I distinguish the same major a second way: then intellection is productive of a word when it is not exhausted by a word already produced, I concede; when it is already exhausted by a word produced, I deny; but the intellection of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is already exhausted by the Word produced by the cognition and intellection of the Father. These things will become clearer in the Treatise on the Trinity.

You will say 3. If a word, or expressed species of God, were given, God could be seen intuitively even if he were not present: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is proved: whoever saw this expressed species would see God represented through it as he is in himself formally; therefore whoever saw this species would see God as he is in himself: but to see God as he is in himself is to see God intuitively: therefore whoever saw this species would see God intuitively, even if he were absent.

I deny the major. For that species, or mental word, is not an objective species in which, as in a medium previously known, God would be seen intuitively; for it is impossible that there be given some creature that contains eminently and formally all cognoscibility; but it would be only the medium by which God is in fact known by the one seeing him: therefore although someone might see this mental word, he would not on that account be said to see God intuitively through the sight of this word, because such a word is not the reason for seeing God, except for him who uses that word itself to perceive and see God in fact.