Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It is certain, and it already sufficiently stands by the light of faith, that the divine intuitive vision is not only possible, but is also in fact obtained by the Blessed, as was proved in the preceding Question by many oracles of Sacred Scripture, decrees of Councils, and authorities of the holy Fathers. It remains to be examined whether the possibility of this divine vision can also be demonstrated by some natural reason so evident and efficacious that no one but a pertinacious man can deny it to be possible: in order that this may be made more evident

Note 1. With the Doctor in 1. dist. 49. q. 10. n. 2., a twofold appetite can be distinguished in man, one innate, the other elicited. The former is the propensity of nature toward that which is perfective of itself and suitable to itself. The latter is an act of the will, or of the animal appetite, by which it desires or is inclined toward some good, true or presumed. These two appetites, however, are distinguished from each other; for, says the Doctor in 1. dist. 19. q. 10. n. 2., someone can by natural appetite shrink from death, because we do not wish to be unclothed according to the Apostle, and by a freely elicited act choose death, as the martyrs did. I said that the former is an inclination toward the good as suitable to oneself, namely as much to the agent as to the patient or recipient; for those extend the appetite too little who affirm that it is a potency of acting or of being acted upon universally, that is, with respect to whatever it can effect and by which it can be acted upon: for from that it would follow that the created intellect could desire error, the Angel his own annihilation, an accident its separation from its subject, and other things of this kind which they can undergo; which, however, is absurd.

Note 2. With the same Doctor ibid. num. 18., the elicited appetite is again twofold: one efficacious and absolute, which indeed imports the application of means to the attainment of the desired good; the other inefficacious, or unconditional, which does not require the aforesaid application of means. The former is a positive act of the will by which it tends absolutely toward the end and wills to obtain it, and is signified by the verb volo. The latter is a simple complacency, or a certain weak volition, by which the will indeed desires to attain the end, but does not will to apply the means to attaining it; for this reason it is rather called a velleity, signified by the verb vellem, than an absolute volition. The former, says the Doctor n. 13., is concerned only with the possible; the latter can also tend toward the impossible.

Note 3. That the intuitive vision of God cannot be proved naturally impossible: both because the false cannot be proved by evident reason, and because the arguments which can be formed against this possibility are soluble; and the more urgent ones which can be brought forward were proposed and solved by us above. Whether, however, its possibility can be proved naturally with no prior light of faith, or whether, revelation being supposed, there are some natural reasons persuading this possibility, is what must be resolved here.

First conclusion. — The possibility of the divine intuitive vision cannot be demonstrated by natural light, nor evidently known, without any revelation.

Proof 1. If that intuitive vision of God could become known naturally by some demonstration, it would be chiefly either a priori or a posteriori; namely, either through an effect contained in the cause, or through a cause connected with the effect: but neither can be said. Not indeed a posteriori, since that blessed vision produces no natural effect from the intuition of which it could itself be detected. Nor a priori; for every a priori demonstration must be made through a cause proximately containing the effect: but beatitude is not an effect that has a necessary connection with some natural cause evidently known and deductive of the knowledge of beatitude itself: therefore it is demonstrable neither a priori nor a posteriori. — Again, what is of the supernatural order has no necessary connection either with the effects or with the causes of the order of nature: but that divine vision is of the supernatural order, as stands by faith: therefore it has no necessary connection with any natural cause or any natural effect through which it could be demonstrated. — Finally, what is demonstrated by natural light becomes known either through innate principles or through sensible effects: but there are no innate principles nor any sensible effects by which the supernatural beatific vision could be evidently known: therefore it cannot be demonstrated. The minor, in which alone the difficulty lies, is evident: for supernatural things, such as intuitive vision is, are called supernatural to the extent that they exceed the whole order of nature; but they would not transcend the whole order of nature if they had a necessary connection with natural effects or principles: therefore etc.

Proof 2. The possibility of an end cannot be demonstrated unless the possibility of the means necessarily conducing to the attainment of the end is known: for since the end cannot be acquired except through the means ordered to it, so too it cannot be known as possible unless the means by which it is attainable are known: but the possibility of the means conducing to intuitive vision, namely grace, faith, hope, charity, cannot be known by natural light alone, since these means, being supernatural, transcend the grasp of natural light, as we have proved at greater length when treating of the necessity of theology. Therefore neither can the possibility of the beatific vision become known naturally.

Finally it is proved. If the possibility of supernatural beatitude were evidently knowable from the principles of nature alone, undoubtedly someone among so many most distinguished ancient philosophers would have known it: but according to St. Augustine, lib. 13. De Trinit. cap. 8. and 9., the philosophers were wholly ignorant of supernatural beatitude, for there, speaking of this beatitude, he says:

If faith be present, there is no question; for those who, attempting to discover these things by human arguments, scarcely a few, endowed with great genius, abounding in leisure and trained in the most subtle doctrines, were able to arrive at the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone. Yet for that soul they did not find a stable, that is, a true, happy life. Therefore it is a sign that it is not knowable by the light of nature alone.

Second conclusion. — The natural reasons by which the Thomists strive to persuade the possibility of the divine intuitive vision are in no way efficacious.**

Proof. Some Thomists, as has been said, strive by a twofold reason to prove the possibility of that divine vision: but neither reason assigned by them establishes this possibility. Not indeed the first, which they form thus: every man has a natural appetite for beatitude, as Augustine frequently teaches among others, lib. 13. De Trinit. cap. 8.: All men, he says, wish to be happy: truth proclaims it, nature compels it, to which the supremely good and immutably happy One has implanted this. And lib. 1. Confess. 1.: You have made us for Yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in You: but our beatitude is the clear vision of God: therefore men naturally desire that clear vision of God. But nature implanted nothing in vain and uselessly, and much less does it enkindle a natural desire with respect to an unattainable end: therefore since all men have an appetite for beatitude, which is the intuitive vision of God, it stands that it is naturally possible. —

I deny this last consequence. And to the argument from which it is drawn we answer with the Doctor in 1. dist. 19. q. 8. n. 2. that it fails in several respects: First indeed it supposes that desire is only with respect to a possible thing, which, however, is false; for it is certain that impossible things can be desired, at least with an inefficacious desire and by way of simple complacency; for many delight in the desire of honors, riches, and the like, which they know they cannot attain: so also Lucifer is said to have desired to make himself like the Most High, which, however, he judged impossible: therefore since both impossibles and possibles can be desired, from the appetite for some thing its possibility is not rightly inferred. Second, although the desire of beatitude is innate in men, it does not follow from that that this desire is borne naturally toward the intuitive vision of God. For since a twofold beatitude of man is to be distinguished, one natural, consisting in the perfect knowledge of God from creatures and in the love consequent upon such knowledge, the other supernatural, consisting in the immediate and intuitive vision of God, the desire connatural to man is borne determinately and distinctly toward natural beatitude alone; but toward the immediate vision of God man is not borne by such a desire, except insofar as it becomes known through the supernatural light of faith. Whence St. Augustine, when he had said in lib. 1. contra Iulianum: We should not, by natural instinct, will to be immortal and happy, unless we could be so; there declares that he is speaking of man elevated to supernatural beatitude, and not indeed of natural beatitude, as appears among other things from these words of his: If therefore, he says, for attaining the true beatitude, which the faith that is true in Christ promises to us as immortal, virtues profit a man nothing; in no way can they be true virtues. By which true beatitude and true virtue are opposed to that beatitude and to the other virtues which are called beatitude and virtues only secundum quid by comparison with the true beatitude, which is the intuitive vision of God, and with the true virtues which conduce to its attainment. — Nor does their latter reason press more strongly, which they form thus: every intellectual substance has naturally and necessarily an appetite for seeing the cause, once the effect is seen, nor can the human intellect rest perfectly in seeing the wonderful effects of God in this universe without desiring to see God their maker: therefore since by the forces of nature alone men see the effects of God and know that he is their cause, as the Apostle teaches Romanorum 1., so they can by the same forces elicit the desire of seeing God the maker of such wonders. — But this reason is easily solved by this distinction: the human appetite cannot rest, once a wonderful effect is seen, until it attains the vision of that cause, if it thinks that it is possible with respect to itself, I concede: if it thinks that it is impossible, or doubts its possibility, I deny; for it rests when it arrives at that which it judges it can arrive at; but it does not stand evident to man by any natural certainty that the intuitive vision of God is possible: therefore he cannot be naturally tormented for want of the vision of God, which he does not naturally know to be possible for himself.

Third conclusion. — Granted that someone has known through divine or human revelation the possibility or the futurition of the divine intuitive vision, he will be able to persuade it by the reasons of the Subtle Doctor in 4. dist. 49. q. 8., the first of which is formed thus: it is evident by natural light that the created intellect can know whatever is contained within its adequate object: but God clearly seen is contained under the adequate object of the created intellect: therefore it stands by natural light that God can be seen by the created intellect as he is in himself. The major is evident; for the intellect is not of a worse condition than sense: therefore just as sight, v. g., because it is concerned with the visible object in common, can also be concerned with any visible object in particular, so likewise the intellect attaining the intelligible object in common will also be able to attain any particular intelligible object comprehended under that common object. The Doctor proves the minor: the intelligible in common is being as such, insofar as it prescinds from material and spiritual being, substantial and accidental, natural and supernatural; for that is called the common and universal intelligible than which nothing broader and more universal can be given; but some more universal intelligible object could be given if it were not being as such prescinding, as is evident. That God clearly seen is contained under this adequate visible object, the Doctor proves: both because God clearly seen is perfectly intelligible: therefore it most of all pertains to the intelligible object in common; and because an intelligible potency is not deemed to understand its object in the most perfect way unless by a more perfect intellection it attains the most excellent intelligible: therefore since God is the most excellent intelligible object, and since the most perfect intellection and knowledge takes place through intuitive vision, it follows that God clearly seen is the most perfect intelligible object comprehended under the adequate object of the created intellect; and so that the created intellect is naturally ordered to seeing God, as to a particular object under its adequate object, and consequently that his intuitive vision is possible.

You will say. That what is asserted does not seem true, namely that the human intellect cannot rest except in the intuitive vision of the most perfectly intelligible object; for, you will say, its desire could be fulfilled and quieted in an abstractive and precisive cognition of it. Again, if the most perfect cognition of the supremely intelligible object were required for the satiety of its desire, it would follow that the created intellect could not be satiated except by the comprehension of the supreme intelligible; for this alone is the most perfect and adequate cognition.

I answer. It is true that the human intellect does not rest in the cognition of the supreme intelligible unless it attains it by the most perfect kind of cognition not implying contradiction, such as is intuitive cognition, not however abstractive: both because it is not agreed among all that this abstractive and precisive cognition exists, and because since this cognition is obscure and lacking in evidence, it is certain that the intellect does not rest in it, but of its own accord tends to the intuitive cognition of the object, which is far more perfect than the former. Although, moreover, the comprehensive cognition of the supreme intelligible is also far more perfect than simple intuitive cognition, yet because it implies a contradiction that a finite intellect could equal and comprehend an infinite object by its finite cognition, therefore the created intellect does not tend to this comprehensive cognition, but rests in the intuitive.

The latter reason of the Doctor is formed thus: It is evident by natural light that a perfection suitable to a lower potency can belong to a higher one, if both those faculties pertain to the same genus of operation: but the intuitive vision of an object belongs to sense, namely to the eye of the body, which is lower than the intellect: therefore in like manner the intuitive vision of the most excellent object, such as God is, ought to belong to the intellect.

It is confirmed. For just as sight is not perfectly quieted except in the attainment of the most beautiful visible object, so neither will the created intellect be able to rest, unless it attains intuitively the most excellent intelligible object, such as God is.

It is objected. Q. 1. disp. 20. cap. 2. n. 4. That the major proposition assumed by the Subtle Doctor, namely that a perfection suitable to a superior also belongs to an inferior, is only true when the object that is known is naturally proportioned to a natural potency; for if it is of the supernatural order, it will suffice that it be apprehended through foreign species and known by abstractive cognition.

I answer. That the reason of the Doctor truly supposes that uncreated being is an object proportioned to a natural potency, at least an inchoate one, inasmuch as it is contained under the most universal intelligible object; and that he therefore rightly concludes, namely from the prior line of reasoning, that the intellect cannot rest in the cognition of the most excellent object comprehended under the common object, unless it sees it intuitively.

Other Thomists reply, denying the major. For many perfections, they say, belong to the lower member of some genus which cannot belong to the higher: for incorruptibility belongs to heaven, which, however, does not belong to man, who is higher than heaven: evidence belongs to natural science: yet it does not belong to faith, which is higher. And the reason, they say, is at hand, for although such a perfection does not belong to the higher, yet another greater perfection can belong to it, by which it exceeds the other lower members of the same genus; and so it happens in the present case; for to be able to attain God abstractively, like all objects of the senses, is far greater, and something more excellent, than to be bound only to attaining sensible objects intuitively: the former, however, belongs to the intellect: the latter to the senses.

I answer. That both of these objections are false, and neither is to the point. The first, indeed: for here we are dealing with the perfections belonging to operative potencies, not with the perfections suited to things that do not operate. Then, it is false that the heavens are simply incorruptible; they are called incorruptible only because less corruptibility belongs to them than to mixed bodies. Finally, mixed bodies, such as the human body, can be said to be less perfect in the notion of body, however much they are ordered to the soul and to life, than the heavens, which, since they are simple bodies, can be said to be far more excellent than any mixed bodies whatsoever. The latter objection is likewise false: both because our natural science is not simply and absolutely clear and evident; for through it the essence and quiddity of any object does not shine forth, nor is it apprehended per se and as it is in itself, but only through effects and begged-for species; whence it always has something of obscurity and of non-evidence: and because faith is not judged to be more perfect in the notion of cognition than the most excellent knowledge; for this, by reason of its clarity and its perfect commensuration with its object, can be said to be more excellent than faith, although it is less true. Nor does it matter that faith is supernatural and producible by God alone: for not every supernatural form is absolutely more excellent than any natural form; for any substantial form is better than supernatural accidents, and the life of a horse, produced by another horse with the general concurrence of God, is more perfect in the notion of being than an accident producible by God alone; and so the aforesaid objection does not dissolve the force of the Doctor's argument.

Suarez replies. In Tract. 1. lib. 2. cap. 7., he holds that this inference of the Subtle Doctor is invalid, because it concludes: the created intellect is capable of intuitive knowledge; therefore it is also capable of the intuitive knowledge of God. This consequence, he says, is invalid: both because the object, since it is the most excellent and most elevated, can exceed the powers of the created intellect: and because corporeal sight, although it can intuit a visible thing, it does not follow that it can see any visible thing whatsoever; for the human eye reaches the light of the Moon, but not that of the Sun, except by squinting, and perhaps so excellent a light can be produced that no eye could naturally intuit it: and because from corporeal vision the consequence does not hold to the vision of the intellect regarding any intelligible whatsoever; otherwise it would have to be inferred that, just as corporeal sight can naturally extend to any visible thing, so the created intellect can naturally see any intelligible object, and consequently could see God by the powers of nature; which consequence is wholly false.

On the contrary. The Subtle Doctor does not intend to prove that the created intellect can see the uncreated object by natural powers, but only that this vision is absolutely possible, in whatever way it comes about, whether by the powers of nature or through divinely infused powers; whence the objections do not hold, because just as the eye can be engaged with any visible object whatsoever, so that no object, even the most excellent, could be given which it could not attain, either by its own powers or insofar as it can be elevated; so by a similar reasoning it is rightly concluded that there is no most excellent intelligible, visible by the intellect, which could not be perceived by that intellect itself, whether naturally or divinely; for the Doctor does not dispute about the mode of seeing God, but about its possibility, in whatever way at length this may come about.

Finally, some Thomists together with the same Suarez reply ibid. that the intellect does not concur by natural power, but by obediential power, to the intuitive vision; but it cannot be proved naturally that these acts are supernatural, and that the created intellect can be elevated to them, since those acts and this elevation exceed the order of nature; and hence they cannot be discovered naturally.

I answer. That although natural reason does not perceive what the intuitive vision of God is, nor know that some acts are supernatural in their entity, nevertheless it can perceive that the vision of a most excellently intelligible object is possible to the created intellect, in whatever way this vision may come about, whether by the powers of nature or through a divinely infused power; which alone the Doctor intends to prove, and hence his arguments sufficiently demonstrate the possibility of the beatific vision to the philosopher who has heard that this divine vision is either possible, or future, or already existing.

You will ask 1. Whether the intuitive vision of God can be naturally desired, both by innate appetite and by elicited appetite.

I answer. Affirmatively, with the Subtle Doctor, in 1. dist. 19. q. 10. n. 11. And first, indeed, that it can be desired by innate appetite, I prove thus: innate appetite is nothing other than the perfectibility of nature, or its inclination toward that which is perfective of itself: but this inclination toward the beatific vision, which is perfective of human nature, is in us. I prove it: all men have a natural propensity toward beatitude, as we said above from the mind of St. Augustine: therefore also toward supernatural beatitude. If anything stood in the way of the inclination toward the beatific vision being called natural, it would be chiefly because that beatitude is supernatural: but this reason does not stand in the way. I prove it first by a comparison from St. Augustine, lib. 1. De praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 1.: To be able, he says, to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, is the nature of men: to have faith, however, just as to have charity, is the grace of the faithful. From which I argue thus: what is the nature of men is natural: but the potency for having faith, which is supernatural, is the nature of men: therefore that potency is natural; and so supernaturality does not prevent some inclination from being called natural toward that which is supernatural; and consequently, although the beatific vision is supernatural, the inclination toward it can nonetheless be called natural. Secondly: this divine vision is the greatest perfection of the intellect; and so the intellect is perfectible through it: but this perfectibility is a natural appetite, no less than the perfectibility of matter with respect to substantial form, and of the corporeal eye with respect to the vision of a colored object: that appetite is likewise innate, because this inclination does not presuppose knowledge, nor is it something distinct from the intellect, nor does one who has such an inclination experience that he has it: therefore the intellect has an innate appetite for the intuitive vision of God. Finally, the Doctor says, quaest. 11. n. 8.: what is ordered to many ordered forms is maximally ordered to the most perfect: but the will is ordered to many volitions, and the intellect to many intellections: therefore maximally to beatitude, since it is the most perfect. Which argument, although it presses most strongly in favor of the elicited appetite, nevertheless also confirms the natural one, since nature is ordered of itself to that which is maximally perfective of itself, such as is the beatific vision. Whence the Doctor rightly concludes

The Doctor, quaest. 10. num. 13., concludes that in the damned there is a natural appetite with respect to beatitude, because the natural appetite does not add any perfection over absolute nature, but only the inclination of nature itself toward its own perfection: and therefore, nature remaining, that appetite remains. He adds: And if you should say that then that appetite will be in vain: you should also say that the damned are in vain men, and Angels, since the natural appetite does not add anything absolute over their nature.

I answer 2. With the same Doctor, ibid. num. 12., I hold that men also have a natural elicited appetite for the beatific vision. For it is evident that anyone can desire that divine beatitude itself without any supernatural help, when it is proposed to him, whether through faith, or through opinion, or through knowledge, that this vision is either possible, or future, or existing; for it is certain that many heretics desire that beatitude, although they have no supernatural principle concurring with their will to form such a desire: add that the beatific vision can be known by a natural abstractive concept: therefore it can also be naturally desired by an act which is natural, although it tends toward a supernatural object.

You will say. What is not, cannot be received: therefore what cannot naturally be, cannot naturally be received: but the intuitive vision of God cannot be naturally, since it is supernatural in substance: therefore it cannot be naturally received, and consequently there is no natural inclination or appetite toward it.

I deny the first consequence. For it implies a contradiction that that which is wholly not should be received; otherwise it would be and not be: it would be because it is received, but it would not be, as is supposed: but it does not imply a contradiction that that which is not natural can be naturally received, namely according to the inclination and capacity of a natural thing, which indeed extends itself to everything that is perfective of itself, in whatever way it can attain it, whether by the powers of nature or with divine aid assisting.

You will insist. A form is therefore called supernatural because it transcends the capacity of nature: but the intuitive vision would not transcend the capacity of the soul, if the soul had a natural capacity for receiving it: therefore either that vision is not supernatural, or the soul does not have that inclination and natural capacity toward it.

I distinguish the major. Insofar as it transcends the active and productive natural capacity, I concede: the receptive and passive, I deny. I confess indeed that some supernatural form wholly transcends the powers of any natural cause, nor can it be produced by any: but it does not transcend the natural receptive and passive capacity, which namely extends itself to every form whatsoever that is perfective of itself. Nor will this form for that reason be the less called supernatural, both because it is not required connaturally by any creature, and because it cannot be produced by any other than God.

You will press. To every passive and receptive potency there must correspond some natural productive potency: for a natural receptive potency would be in vain, which could not be reduced to act naturally; but it could not be reduced to act unless there were given an active potency naturally corresponding to it: but there is no natural potency that is productive of the intuitive vision of God: therefore neither is there a natural capacity and passive potency toward it.

I deny the major with its proof. For no potency is in vain which is reduced to act, in whatever way this reduction is made, whether naturally or supernaturally.

You will say 2. The innate appetite is from God, as the author of nature, and as infusing the natural form; but the appetite for the intuitive vision of God cannot be from the author of nature: therefore neither can an innate appetite toward it be given. The major is clear; the minor is proved: first, the appetite implanted by God as the author of nature tends only toward God, as He is the natural end: but God, as clearly seen, is not the natural end, but the supernatural: therefore the appetite for the intuitive vision of God cannot be from God, as the author of nature. Second, the author of nature does not give an appetite which he could not fulfill: but God, as the author of nature, cannot fulfill the appetite for the beatific vision, because he cannot fulfill that appetite unless by giving the means to the attainment of such a vision: but God, as the author of nature, does not bestow the means necessary for the beatific vision; for since those means are entitatively supernatural, namely grace, faith, hope, charity, and the light of glory, they proceed from God only as the author of grace and glory.

I deny the minor. Likewise both of its proofs; for the author of nature implanted in it a general appetite, both for the complete possession of Himself, and for everything that is perfective of that nature; whether in the meantime that possession of God and perfection of nature is acquired by the powers of nature alone, or by divinely infused aid: which is chiefly confirmed by that well-worn saying of St. Augustine: You have made us, Lord, for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You.

Add. That here the discourse is only of the inefficacious appetite, not of the efficacious one, namely applying the means to the attainment of the end; and therefore the aforesaid proofs of the minor do not press, which are to be understood only of the efficacious appetite; but we speak of the inefficacious.