Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Concerning the twofold resolution of this Question, there were not only various errors of the heretics, but also diverse opinions and judgments of the holy Doctors: and indeed concerning the first, some thought that the Blessed do not see the very essence of God, but only a certain most excellent light and brightness emanating from God, in which He offers Himself to be seen, just as the Sun through rays received in water or air, as St. Gregory reports, 18. Moralium cap. 18. in these words:

It should be known, he says, that there were some who said that even in that region of Blessedness God is seen indeed in His brightness, but is by no means seen in His nature; whom, of course, the falsity of excessive inquiry deceived, for in that simple and immutable essence brightness is not one thing and nature another; but His very nature is His brightness, His very brightness is His nature; for He Himself promises, saying: He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and I will manifest myself to him.

— The Armenians likewise taught this same opinion, as Armacanus testifies, lib. 14. De quaestionibus Armenorum, and Amalricus, condemned in the Lateran Council under Innocent III. This error is likewise attributed to Abailard and to his disciple Arnold, whose followers were called Arnoldists, as our Alphonsus a Castro reports, under the heading Beatitudo. Yet St. Bernard, Epist. 188. and 189., where he reports the errors of Abailard and Arnold, makes no mention of this error, just as also in Epistola 190., which Alphonsus himself cites. Some holy Fathers, whom Vasquez brings forward in the first part disp. 37. cap. 2. and the following, seem to have gone over to the same opinion. But that they were far from this error will clearly be established from what is to be said.

— Concerning the latter resolution of the question, however, there was the error of the Anthropomorphites, that God is corporeal, and therefore visible to bodily eyes by the powers of nature. But whether God is to be beheld by bodily eyes after the resurrection by supernatural power, or whether some body of so great activity could be created that it could exercise the divine vision, St. Augustine not only wavered in this opinion, but certain modern Doctors also vigorously defend it. But in order that it may appear what ought more truly to be said

Note 1. A threefold active and passive potency is distinguished by the Philosophers; for the first is either natural, which can do something according to the powers implanted by nature, such as is the power of speaking and of laughing in man; or supernatural, by which a faculty is elevated to eliciting an action that transcends natural powers, yet is perfective of the potency which elicits it, such as is the beatific vision elicited by the intellect endowed with the light of glory; or obediential, by which it can act in a manner neither proportioned to it nor perfective of its nature, but only insofar as it lies subject to the supreme dominion of its Creator, such as was the power of speaking in Balaam's ass. — Passive potency likewise, in ordination to the form which it can receive, is also threefold: namely, either natural, when it has a natural inclination to receive the form, as a stone to receive downward motion; or violent, when it receives a form against its natural inclination, as a stone thrown upward; or indifferent, when from itself it is not determined to either form, as an Angel to receive motion upward or downward. It must likewise be recalled, from those things which we said in art. 3. q. 2. De Theologia in communi, that a supernatural form is so called only in ordination to the agent that first produces it, not, however, in ordination to the subject that receives it.

Note 2. Obediential potency is the capacity of a creature by which, with the extraordinary concourse of God, it can produce some effect or receive some form, beyond its natural powers and the prescribed natural sphere of activity. It must likewise be observed that this potency, both subjectively and actively, does not extend to any act whatsoever to be elicited or form to be received. For an Angel, says the Doctor, in 1. dist. 12. quaest. 2. num. 8., cannot be white, because he is in no way receptive of this form; nor can a stone see, because it has neither an eye nor any faculty for eliciting vision.

Note 3. God can be understood or imagined to be visible supernaturally to the bodily eye in three ways: First indeed objectively, so that the vision is formally corporeal not only in itself, but also objectively, as tending toward God as a corporeal object, by expressing His light and image, in the way in which it expresses the colors and lineaments of visible objects, with this difference, however, that God is held to be an object exceeding the natural sphere of the visual power, and therefore it itself needs supernatural concourse in order to be able to attain it. Second, God can be understood to be visible by a vision indeed corporeal formally in itself, but expressing a spiritual object, as it is spiritual in itself, in the way (as far as concerns the object) in which it is expressed by spiritual and intellectual vision. This manner of seeing, although it is naturally impossible to the bodily eye, nevertheless does not seem to exceed its obediential potency, by which it can be elevated to seeing, with a corporeal and in itself divisible vision, something indivisible, for example a point of light, or a body placed in an indivisible, as the Body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist; from which one can suspect that the eye can also be elevated to seeing a spiritual substance. Third, finally, it can be imagined that the bodily eye can elicit a vision which is spiritual, because it is not repugnant that a material potency be elevated to producing something spiritual, and to acting upon a spirit, just as the Thomists judge that the Sacraments concur physically in producing grace, and that the fire of hell and of purgatory physically torments souls. These things presupposed, let it be

First conclusion. — God is not visible to the bodily eye even supernaturally.

This Conclusion is common among Theologians, most of whom affirm that it is of faith. And the holy Fathers confirm it with their judgments. For Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesi 9., it is impossible, he says, to contemplate God with the eyes of the flesh, for that which is devoid of body cannot fall into the eyes of the flesh. And St. Jerome, c. 21. in Isaiam, God, he says, is by no means set forth in words, nor is He contemplable by the eye, but He is seen by those of whom it is written: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. Whence Rabbi Moses, tract. De fundamentis Legis, cap. 4., says that he marvels greatly how any Christian should think that God is to be contemplated in any beautiful, in any sublime body; a body nonetheless.

Proof. This truth is proved by reason: It is repugnant that a vital potency be carried beyond the latitude of its adequate and specifying object, otherwise it could be carried beyond its own species and quiddity, which implies a contradiction; but God, since He is a spiritual and immaterial substance, is beyond the latitude of the adequate and specifying object of the bodily eye, and likewise of any other sensitive potency, whose adequate object is material and corporeal being; therefore God cannot be attained by the bodily eye. — It is confirmed: God, in the notion of a visible and spiritual object, is more distant from all sensible objects than one sensible object is from another sensible object, v. gr. than sound is from color: but it implies a contradiction that sound or odor be seen per se by the bodily eye, because sound and odor are outside the sphere of the operation of the eye, which is concerned only with visible things: therefore much more does it imply a contradiction that God be perceived by the bodily eye, or by another sense. — Then, if the bodily eye of man could supernaturally see God, the eye of a brute could also be elevated to the intuitive vision of God: for some brutes, such as the lynx and the eagle, have a more perfect eye: but this is absurd, for if brutes could supernaturally see God, they could also supernaturally love Him and enjoy Him: for love and enjoyment follow the vision of God; which things are most absurd. — Finally, if the eye could be elevated to seeing God, hearing could also be elevated to hearing Him. For just as God presents Himself as visible to the Angels and to the Blessed minds, so too He shows Himself as audible, while He speaks to them spiritually: but no one would say that God can be perceived by hearing: therefore neither by bodily sight.

It is proved secondly. If God is visible to the bodily eye, it is above all in one or the other of the three ways assigned in the 3rd Note: but He can be visible in none of these ways: therefore He can in no way be seen by the bodily eye, even supernaturally. Not indeed in the first way: for whatever is seen in such a way as it is, is corporeal, because it is luminous, colored, extended, and divisible: but since God is altogether spiritual, He is neither luminous, nor colored, nor divisible: therefore neither is He corporally visible. Nor in the second, because although absolutely a body placed in a single indivisible could be seen by the bodily eye, it is otherwise, however, with a spirit, which, since it is outside the sphere of the activity of the bodily eye itself, is much more outside the latitude of the object of sight than sound or odor; whence it comes about that it no less implies a contradiction for the bodily eye to see God as He is, than for it to see an odor or a sound. — Then, material and corporeal vision is a certain image and expression of the object: but it is impossible for God to be expressed quidditatively by any image: therefore also for Him to be seen by corporeal vision. The minor is evident: for just as it is impossible for God to be depicted and represented as He is in Himself, to be figured by some external image and by colors and lineaments, so likewise it is impossible for Him to be represented through an expressed material species and an internal image formed by the bodily eye. Not, finally, in the third: for no corporeal potency can physically act upon a spirit, as the Doctor expressly proves in 1. Whence he rightly concludes that neither are demons tormented by corporeal fire through the physical action of the fire itself, nor do the Sacraments concur physically, but only morally, in the production of grace. For if it is once admitted that some corporeal cause can act upon a spirit, no contradiction will appear why the bodily eye could not also be divinely elevated to seeing God. — Nor do I see why the Thomists, who admit the physical action of fire upon spirits and the physical causality of the Sacraments in the production of grace, could deny that the bodily eye can be elevated to perceiving a spiritual object.

Some indeed reply, that this is the difference, that vital potencies, such as the eye, cannot be carried beyond the latitude of their object, insofar as they are vital, although they can be taken up, insofar as they are creatures, to producing instrumentally any effect whatsoever which does not require being produced by a vital potency. — But this satisfies in no way, nor does it establish a sufficient disparity. First, because a vital potency is as much subject to the divine command, as vital, with respect to producing a vital effect as with respect to a non-vital effect; nor does it appear why it could be elevated more to a non-vital effect than to producing a vital one, for the object of the one is not more unlimited in its order than the object of the other. — Then, for that reason a vital potency could not be elevated to producing any vital effect whatsoever, chiefly either because that production of an effect must presuppose in the elevated potency itself some inchoate power, which must be completed through the elevation and supernatural concourse; or it prerequires nothing of the sort, but this whole activity depends on the will of God alone, that He would elevate it to whatever effect He willed. If the first, a vital potency has a greater inchoate power with respect to producing some vital effect than a non-vital one has with respect to a non-vital effect, and consequently the former could be elevated more to a vital effect than the latter to a non-vital one. If the second: therefore God will be able as much to elevate a vital potency to producing any vital act whatsoever, as a non-vital potency to forming any non-vital effect whatsoever, and so He will be able as much to elevate the bodily eye, which is a vital potency, to the vital act of the beatific vision, as the infernal fire to physically tormenting demons and the damned, and the Sacraments to physically producing grace.

You will object 1. Various passages of Sacred Scripture are brought forward, in which God is affirmed to have been seen at times by the bodily eye: first indeed, Genesis 32. Jacob says: I have seen the Lord face to face, and my soul has been saved. Second, Iob 14.: I know that my Redeemer lives, and in the last day I shall rise from the earth, and in my flesh I shall see God. Third, likewise St. Job says cap. 12.: With the hearing of the ear I have heard you, but now my eye sees you. Fourth, Isaias 6. says: I have seen the Lord sitting upon a throne. The other Prophets for the most part affirm the same thing: therefore God is truly visible naturally, or at least supernaturally, to the bodily eye.

I deny the consequence. and to the aforesaid passages of Scripture I answer, to the first, that the aforesaid words mean the same as: I have met with, and wrestled with God, namely by a Hebrew phrase, similar to that by which French combatants, provoking one another to single combat, are wont to say: We shall see each other face to face. Or it must be said absolutely that he saw the Lord, that is, the Angel, who in an assumed body discharged the part of God, as the Prophet Osee indicates c. 12., where, speaking of Jacob, he says: in his strength he was directed with the Angel, and he prevailed against the Angel, and he was strengthened; he wept, and besought him.

To the second. I say that St. Job speaks of the vision of Christ the Lord according to His humanity, in which, being about to judge all, He will show Himself visible to all after the resurrection; whence, after the aforesaid words, he adds: My Savior, which words, although they are not found in the Hebrew and in the Vulgate of Sixtus V., nevertheless agree most excellently with the preceding: I believe that my Redeemer lives.

To the third. I say that St. Job himself is to be understood in this way, as if he said: previously I had heard many things about Your providence, but now I discern its manifest indications in myself. Or it is understood that God is seen with the eye of the mind, of which St. Paul to the Ephesians 1.: May He give you the Spirit of wisdom in the knowledge of Him, enlightening the eyes of your heart, with which eyes of the mind it is also certain that Isaias, as well as the other Prophets, saw God, that is, knew Him more evidently. And so from these passages nothing is proven against the Conclusion.

You will object 2. St. Augustine, the most clear-sighted investigator of Christian truth, judges it more probable that God can be seen by the bodily eye; for although in Epist. 6. he had expressly affirmed that God is perceptible by no sense, above all by the eyes, and had proved this with these words of St. John: We know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is; therefore we shall see Him in so far as we shall be like Him, because even now we do not see in so far as we are unlike Him: hence, therefore, we shall see from that by which we shall be like, he concludes: but who, being most mad, would say that we are, or shall be, like God in body? He likewise adds in confirmation of this truth:

Why do they contend that this gift has been attributed to the eyes of Christ's body alone, and not also to the other senses? Therefore God will be a sound, so that He can be perceived even by the ears: and He will be a breath, so that He can be sensed by smell: and He will be some liquid, so that He can even be drunk; and He will be a mass, so that He can even be touched? No (they say), what then? Can God do that, and cannot do this? If they shall say that He cannot, why do they detract from the omnipotence of God? If they shall answer that He can, and wills not, why do they favor only the eyes, but mock the other senses of Christ's body?

Nevertheless, treating the same matter in Epist. 111. to Fortunatianus, Bishop of Sicca, and in Epist. 112. to Paulina, he seems to establish nothing certain on this matter, but, wholly doubtful and hesitating, at the end of the latter Epistle he promises that he will have a fuller treatment of this matter: But concerning the spiritual body, he says, if the Lord shall command, we shall test in another work what we may be able to dispute. In lib. 2. however of Retract. cap. 11. he says that he has sufficiently explained this truly most difficult Question in lib. 20. and 21. of De Civit. Dei.

Yet in this book, cap. 29., he seems more inclined to think that God will be seen by the Blessed with bodily eyes:

How now we discern the life of others, not indeed separated from the body, namely through the body, with those same eyes. Then, he says, each one knows his own life, which will then be in the body, and which quickens these earthly members and makes them living, by an interior sense, not through bodily eyes; but the lives of others, since they are invisible, he sees through the body. For whence do we discern living from non-living bodies, unless we see the bodies and the lives at the same time, which we cannot see except through the body? But we do not see lives without bodies with the eyes of the body.

But soon he decides the matter thus:

Wherefore it can happen, and it is very credible, that we shall then so see the mundane corporeal things of the new heaven and the new earth, that we shall see God, present everywhere and governing even all corporeal things, through the bodies which we shall bear and which we behold, wherever we shall have turned our eyes, with the clearest perspicuity, etc., just as men, among whom we live as living beings exercising vital movements, as soon as we look upon them we do not believe that they live, but we see it, since we cannot see their life without bodies, which nevertheless we discern in them through their bodies, with all ambiguity removed. Thus, wherever we shall carry those spiritual lights of our bodies, we shall behold the incorporeal God ruling all things, even through bodies.

— Some answer that in the aforesaid words Augustinus does not assert that the glorified eyes will see God immediately, as He is in Himself, but only that they will see certain wonderful corporeal effects, attesting and manifesting the presence and providence of God no less than the vital movements, which we discern in those whom we see, make known that they live, whose substance, however, and essential life in itself we do not behold with bodily eyes, but apprehend through the mind. Or, as he speaks

St. Thomas, explaining St. Augustine:

just as now our eyes see the life of someone, and life is not seen by the bodily eye as per se visible, namely as a sensible per accidens, which indeed is not known by sight, but immediately with the sense by some other knowing power, namely by the intellect. That, moreover, the divine presence is known from them through the intellect immediately upon the sight of bodies, comes about from two things: namely, from the perspicacity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine brightness in the renewed bodies. Likewise from their wonderful and ineffable beauty, which will breathe forth and declare the divine majesty.

— But this response does not sufficiently cohere with the mind of St. Augustine, who says in express words that it can come about, and that it is very credible, that God be seen by the bodily eye in bodies seen; for if by this vision he understood that He Himself is to be perceived by the mind, certainly he would not say that it is credible that God be perceived by the mind in bodies seen, but rather most certain, and altogether to be believed. Add that he himself sufficiently explains his doubtful opinion on this matter:

through those eyes, if this is only to be attributed to them, even the incorporeal nature is discerned, which it is either difficult or impossible to show by any examples or testimonies of the divine Scriptures; or, which is easier to understand, God will be so known and conspicuous to us, that He is seen by the spirit by each of us in each of us, seen by one in another, seen in Himself.

By which it appears, according to the former opinion, that he probably thinks God can be seen by the bodily eye. — Therefore I answer. 1. St. Augustine proposes this opinion there not absolutely, but only with doubt and a wavering mind; 2. that wherein St. Augustine hesitated in doubt has been constantly affirmed by the other holy Fathers, namely by Athanasius, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, and Jerome, whose opinion, in confirmation of this truth, Augustine himself relates in the aforesaid Epistle 111., where he concludes thus:

Such am I in the writings of others, such do I wish the readers of mine to be. Finally, in all those things which I have recounted about the little works of the Saints and Doctors, of Ambrose, Jerome, Athanasius, Gregory, and whatever other such things of others I could read, which I thought it long to recount, that God is not a body, nor has the members of a human form, nor is He divisible through the spaces of places, and is by nature immutably invisible, and is seen not through the same nature and substance, but through an assumed visible form, as He willed to have appeared to those to whom He appeared, when He is narrated to have been seen through the eyes of the body in the holy Scriptures, with the help of the Lord I believe unshakenly.

By which he confesses that his mind is not alien to the other Fathers of the Church; and so, since those holy Fathers judge that God is not visible to the bodily eye, it must be confessed that Augustine likewise so judged. Whence he rightly says in Epistle 6.:

Truly that light is God Himself, since God is light, and in Him there are no darknesses: but it is the light of purified minds, not of these bodily eyes. Therefore the mind will then be fit, which may see that light, which now it is not yet; but the eye of the body can see this neither now, nor will it be able to then.

And in Epist. 112. c. 23., when he had confirmed this same opinion with many arguments, he finally concludes: Not only what blessed Ambrose, but also what St. Jerome, I will say not only the divinity of the Father, but neither indeed of the Son, nor of the Holy Spirit, because in the Trinity there is one nature, can they behold with the eyes of the flesh, but with the eyes of the mind, of which the Narrator Himself says: Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God. For, just as the same Jerome elsewhere briefly and truly defined: an incorporeal thing is not seen by bodily eyes. From these things, therefore, it is clear that although St. Augustine somewhere seemed doubtful in this matter, yet elsewhere he asserted the opinion which we defend.

Second conclusion. — God can be clearly seen by a created intellect strengthened by the light of glory. This is of faith, and

Proof first. by very many texts of Sacred Scripture. Isaiae 33.: His eyes will see the King in his beauty; they will behold the land from afar; that is, as Gregory explains, in the very splendor of the Divinity, or, as the interlinear Gloss says, in the Deity itself. Psalmo 83.: They will go from strength to strength; the God of gods will be seen in Sion. Which St. Augustine, Lyran. and others interpret of the beatific vision. Prima Ioann. 3.: When He appears, we will be like Him, because we will see Him as He is; that is, immediately in Himself, as Pope Evaristus explains, in the Epistle to the Bishops of Africa, and the Council of Frankfurt in the Epistle to the Bishops of Spain. Primae ad Corinthios 13.: We see now through a mirror, and in an enigma, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know, even as I am known. Where the Apostle, with Irenaeus, lib. 5. cap. 7., and Augustine, lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 13., as interpreters, calls the knowledge through created species, which we have of God, specular and enigmatical, because it is mediated and obscure; for the mirror signifies creatures, which being known first, God is known as in a darkness; for the invisible things of God are perceived, being understood from the creation of the world. But the knowledge of the other life he says to be face to face, so that by this face he excludes every medium on the part of the knowing one, and by to face he excludes the medium on the part of the known; and so by both these particles the immediate intuition of God is expressed at once, wholly similar to corporeal intuition terminated immediately at a present object. Whence he adds: Now I know in part, that is, inadequately, but then I will know, even as I am known: that is, says Anselm, I will purely know Him Himself, as He has known me. Not that the Apostle builds an equality between the knowledge of the Blessed and the comprehension of God, by which He knows Himself and the Blessed themselves; but to designate the clarity and evidence of both knowledges: whence he does not say how much, but as I am known. With these agree those words Matth. 5.: Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God. And 18.: Their angels in the heavens always see the face of my Father.

This same truth was defined in the Council of Vienne, in the Clementine Ad nostrum, concerning the heretics, and in the Council of Florence, in the letters of Union, where it is said: The souls fully purged see God clearly, Three and One, as He is: and in the Council of Trent, session 2., on the invocation of the Saints, where it is decreed that they think impiously who deny that the Saints enjoying eternal beatitude are not to be invoked. This same truth the holy Fathers affirm, as may be seen in Vasquez, Disp. 37. cap. 5. Whether, however, it can be demonstrated by some natural reason, we will open in the following Question.

You will object 1. Various contexts of Sacred Scripture, by which it appears that the created intellect can neither be elevated, nor is in fact elevated, to the intuitive and clear vision of God. For 1. Ad Timotheum, 6.: God inhabits inaccessible light, whom no man has seen, nor can see. Likewise God is absolutely called invisible, ad Colossenses 1. and ad Hebraeos, 11. Add that sometimes Sacred Scripture pronounces the divine vision proper to the Son of God alone. Thus Ioann. 1.: No one has ever seen God; the Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him to us. Where Irenaeus, Athanasius, and Pope Evaristus read except the Only-begotten. Which is confirmed from that Ioann. 6.: Not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God; this one has seen the Father. Therefore, since the vision of God is proper to the Son Himself, it seems to be conceded to no creature.

— I answer. that by these, or similar texts of Sacred Scripture, the created intellect is not wholly barred from the vision of God; but Scripture only intends to designate and affirm that God is invisible intuitively to the bodily eyes, as St. Augustine explains, Epist. 111. and 112.: or that He cannot be seen by the powers of nature alone, as St. Ambrose expounds, in 1. caput Lucae: or that this cannot be beheld in the mortal state by a supernatural and beatific vision, as St. Gregory interprets, lib. 18. Moral. cap. 36.: or that He is not comprehended and naturally known by a creature, but by Himself and His Son, as St. Gregory himself indicates there, in the last chapter. Which of all these expositions fits and suits the text of Sacred Scripture will have to be judged from the end and scope of Scripture itself, and is to be gathered from the antecedent or subsequent words of that place.

You will object 2. Between the object and the potency there must be proportion: but between God and the created intellect there is none; for God is infinite, and the created intellect is finite: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major. There must be proportion in the notion of being and perfection, I deny; in the notion of object and habitude, I concede. For the ear, for example, although in the notion of perfection it has proportion with color, yet because in the notion of a cognoscible object it has none, therefore it cannot perceive it. But God clearly seen, although in the notion of perfection He has no proportion with the created intellect, yet has the proportion of a cognoscible object to the knowing potency, inasmuch as He participates in the common notion of the adequate object of the intellect, which is cognoscible being. Nor does it matter that between God to be known and the knowing intellect there is no proportion in entity and perfection; for this is not required for perfect knowledge; otherwise neither could God, as being infinite, know any finite object, for lack of such entitative proportion, nor could He Himself be known by us, not even by abstractive knowledge, for lack of such proportion.

You will say 3. An altogether supernatural object, as such, is not within the latitude of the adequate object of the intellect of a created potency: but God clearly seen is a supernatural object: therefore it is not within the latitude of the object of the created intellect. The Major is proved: that is not the object of a created potency by which this cannot be specified: but it cannot be specified by a supernatural object; for that which is natural according to itself cannot be specified by a supernatural being: therefore the supernatural object is not within the adequate object of a created potency. — I distinguish the major: inasmuch as the potency is natural reduplicatively and according to itself, I concede; inasmuch as it is in obediential potency, and its inchoate power is divinely elevated, that it cannot be specified by a supernatural being, I deny: for as such it is supernatural, at least connotatively, namely by reason of the elevating principle, namely the light of glory, and of the object to which it is elevated, namely God to be clearly seen. Whence, although the supernatural object is not contained within the latitude of the object of the created intellect, inasmuch as it is a natural potency, yet it is contained within its object, inasmuch as it is in obediential potency.

You will say 4. God cannot be seen in Himself, unless His infinity be seen, because it is essential to Him, and unless He be comprehended, since He is most simple: but infinity cannot be seen by a finite intellect, nor can His divine Nature be comprehended: therefore, etc. — I deny the major. for neither is it necessary that those who see God see all His infinity adequately, nor is it fitting that they know or comprehend Him totally, in such a way that He could not be known in a more perfect way by any other intellect. For just as the eye knows whiteness intuitively, although it does not perceive its dependence on God and on the subject, so can the created intellect see that God is infinite and incomprehensible, although it does not see what and how great His incomprehensibility and infinity are.

You will say 5. The quidditative vision of God cannot but be infinite: but our intellect can elicit an infinite vision by no powers: therefore neither can it know God quidditatively. The major is proved: knowledge grows in proportion to the increase of the perfection of the object: therefore the knowledge of an infinite object must necessarily be infinite. — I answer. denying the major, to whose proof I distinguish the consequence: if such knowledge attains the infinite object in an infinite and adequate way, I concede; if in an inadequate and finite way, I deny: for although our knowledge of the existence of God is terminated at an infinite object, yet it is not infinite, because it is not engaged with it in an infinite way.

You will say 6. God is more distant from the created intellect than an Angel from corporeal sight: but on account of this distance, the corporeal eye cannot be elevated to attain the Angel: therefore a fortiori the created intellect will not be able to be elevated to see God, as He is in Himself. — I answer. He is indeed more distant as to entity, but not as to the proportion of the habitude of the potency to the object; for God is contained within the latitude of the adequate object of the created intellect, which is concerned with intelligible being, and consequently with God, who is the first of all beings. But the Angel is in no way contained within the object of corporeal sight.

You will say 7. The created intellect cannot be elevated to the knowledge of all possible creatures: therefore neither to the clear vision of God. The antecedent is admitted by almost all Theologians. The consequence is proved: it is more difficult to know a being infinite simpliciter, such as God is, than a being infinite only secundum quid and as to number: but God is a being infinite simpliciter and according to substance; but possible creatures are infinite only by reason of numerical quantity: therefore, etc. — I deny the consequence. and also the proof of that Major; for although the divine Essence is in itself more perfect in the notion of being, and in the notion of object, than the collection of possible creatures, yet it is repugnant on a double head that the created intellect, which can see God, could know the collection of all possible creatures: both because, if it knew this collection, it would follow that it comprehends the divine omnipotence; for then some potency is comprehended when all that to which it can extend itself is known; but it is more difficult to comprehend the divine omnipotence than only to see the essence by a finite and limited vision: and because the knowledge of all possible creatures requires infinite intentional species, which a finite intellect can neither use nor be actuated by; but for the vision of the divine Essence it suffices that It itself be communicated to the intellect by way of an intelligible species, exhibiting Itself to be discerned in a finite, limited way, attempered by the light of glory.

You will say 8. St. Chrysostom affirms that God according to Himself is altogether invisible; for in homilia 14. in Ioannem he says that neither the Prophets nor the Archangels have ever seen God, and that to see Him is altogether impossible: That which is God Himself, he says, not only the Prophets, but neither the Angels nor the Archangels have seen; for that which is of a creatable nature, how will it be able to see that which is increatable? Whence in the same homily he asserts that the Angels indeed saw God in the assumed nature, which they did not see before. Hence in homil. 3. De incomprehensibili Dei natura, explaining the text of Isaiae, 6., where the Seraphim beholding the divine Majesty are said to have veiled their face, Because, he says, they did not see the pure light itself, nor the sincere substance itself, but what they saw was a condescension and an indulgence: as if he would say that the Seraphim, out of divine indulgence, saw a certain ineffable light representing God, as he himself explains, both in the aforesaid homily and in the others which he wrote against the Anomoeans.

— I answer. that St. Chrysostom by the aforesaid words and similar ones does not exclude the intuitive knowledge of God, but the comprehensive. For that he simply admits the clear vision of God after this life is clear from Epistola 5. ad Theodorum lapsum, and homil. 3. in Epistolam ad Philippenses, and 69. ad populum Antiochenum, where he asserts that the Blessed behold the King Himself, namely God, not through entry, not through an enigma, not through a mirror, but face to face, not through faith, but through species.

You will insist. By that knowledge he says that God is invisible by which the Eunomians and the Anomoeans pronounced Him visible: but they did not affirm that God is visible by comprehensive knowledge, but only by intuitive: therefore St. Chrysostom excludes not only comprehensive, but also intuitive knowledge. — I deny the minor. for it is clear from Theodoret, lib. 4. Fabularum haereticarum, under the title De Eunomio, that he arrogated to himself comprehensive knowledge of God: Eunomius dared to say, says Theodoretus, that he is ignorant of nothing of divine things, but knows the very substance of God exactly, and has the same knowledge of God which God Himself has of Himself, etc. Socrates testifies the same, lib. 1. Historiarum, cap. 7., where, introducing Eunomius and the Anomoeans speaking, thus, he says, God understands nothing more of His own essence than we; nor is it more known and perspicuous to Him than to us. Likewise Jerome on cap. 11. Matth. at those words: No one knows the Son, except the Father: let Eunomius blush, he says, who boasts that he has as much knowledge of the Father and of the Son as either has of the other. It is clear, therefore, that those heretics arrogated to themselves comprehensive knowledge of God; and consequently that St. Chrysostom affirms only the comprehensive knowledge of God to be impossible, but not the intuitive.