Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It is a commonplace among the Philosophers that there is a twofold seeing power: one corporeal, the other spiritual; of which the former is simply called the eye; the latter is called the intellect, and the eye of the mind. Each has a twofold order to the visible object, and regards it either as a cause or as the term of vision: for the visible object concurs efficiently with the seeing power, whether per se immediately or through a visible species emitted from itself, to form the act of vision; of which it is likewise the term, since every vision is terminated at the visible object.

— It is likewise certain that the visibility of an object is a peculiar perfection of the object itself, insofar as it is the cause of vision: for the power of causing is a special attribute of the cause itself, and distinct from its essence; especially when it is ordered to a transient and merely accidental effect, as happens in the present case; by which the causative power is distinguished from the communicative, or diffusive, power of intrinsic properties; for the latter is the very nature and essence of the thing, from which those properties arise and naturally flow. Although invisibility seems to be a mere privation of visibility, and a lack of the object's relation in the order of cause to forming vision, nevertheless it is something positive and intrinsic, because such a lack of power to cause vision is founded upon a special perfection of the being which is called invisible; for such an absence of power arises from the fact that the being has, whether in its essence or in its attributes, a certain limitation or illimitation, by reason of which there is no proportion between the visible object itself and the seeing power; but the limitation or illimitation of a being consists in its intrinsic mode, as was said in treating of infinity. That the power of terminating vision, especially intellective vision, is also something intrinsic in the intelligible object, is established from the Metaphysica, in which it has been proved that the cognoscibility, or truth, of a being is a special perfection of it.

These things being premised, three points are proposed in the present Question to be resolved: first, whether God is naturally visible to the corporeal eye. Second, whether by the forces of nature alone He can be attained clearly and intuitively by the intellect. Third, whether at least through divine omnipotence some creature could be produced so perfect that by its natural activity alone it could behold God intuitively, so that the intuitive and beatific vision of God be said to be connatural to it; so that these may be resolved more evidently

Note 1. With the Doctor, in 1. d. 3. q. 1. n. 2., 'natural' can be taken in three ways, namely as opposed to the voluntary, the supernatural, and the violent. In the first way, every power that is not free, or that acts from natural necessity, whatever effects it produces, is called natural. In the second way, every power, even a free one, acting according to the forces implanted in it by nature, is called natural. In the third way, every power acting even beyond its forces to produce some effect perfective of it can be called natural. To these I add a fourth: namely, that can be called natural which is opposed to the acquired: thus the power of seeing is natural, but that of playing the cithara is not so.

Note 2. The visible object, according to the relation which it has to the seeing power, is wont to be distinguished as twofold by the Philosophers, namely either as proportioned and connatural, toward which the power can be connaturally borne and without any divinely implanted activity and elevation; or as extensive and praeternatural, which indeed the power cannot attain by the forces alone implanted in it by nature; it can, however, if aided from above and elevated through divinely implanted activity. We speak of the former in the present Question; of the latter, however, speech will be made in the following one.

Note 3. The errors of heretics concerning the present truth have been various: for St. Augustine, lib. 2. De Trinit., cap. 8., and Gregory Nazianzenus, lib. De Fide, testify that certain Arians held that the Son of God is visible to corporeal eyes. But since they did not affirm Him to be truly God, indeed they contended that He is a certain most excellent creature, and the first of all, whom they asserted had appeared to the Fathers of the Old Testament in the form of His own body, as is clear from the disputation of Athanasius in the Council of Nicaea; therefore this error, as Smisingus rightly observes, does not pertain to the present place. — There were nevertheless other heretics older than Arius who affirmed that God is visible to corporeal eyes, as St. Irenaeus reports, lib. 4. cap. 37.; into which error Novatianus also fell, lib. De Trinit., which is reckoned among the works of Tertullian. — Other heretics likewise judged that God is naturally visible to the eye of the mind, which Aetius afterward, Eunomius, and the disciples of both, the Anomoeans, taught. Concerning Aetius, certainly, Epiphanius writes thus:

For he with his followers fell into that madness of vanity, that he boasted himself above all mortals to know God not by faith alone, but by nature according to knowledge: just as I mentioned somewhere above, they say that God is not known to them simply by some knowledge of faith; but just as anyone knows whatever is discerned by the eyes or handled with the hands. As if someone should take into his hands a stone, or wood, or an instrument of another material. Thus that most audacious man said: then I know God as much as myself: nay, I do not know myself so much as God.

That the error of all of these may be refuted, and the Catholic truth may appear, let it be

First conclusion. — God cannot be seen naturally by the corporeal eye. This seems to be of Faith; since it is plainly inferred from all those places of Sacred Scripture cited above, in which God is affirmed to be invisible, which must at least be understood of invisibility through the natural power of the corporeal eye. Likewise St. Paul says in Rom. 1.: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; by which he denotes that the invisible nature of God is known through this sensible and visible world; which discourse would certainly be futile, if the very nature of God were visible per se, and exhibited itself to be looked upon by corporeal eyes. Add that the Apostle himself, in 1. ad Corinth. 2., expressly affirms that eternal Beatitude, which is the very possession, vision, and love of God, is so excellent a good, and so far exceeds the forces of any natural cognitive faculty, that he justly said that the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him.

This same truth is strengthened by a theological argument to be deduced from the Spirituality and Immateriality of God: A corporeal faculty cannot by the forces of nature perceive a spiritual substance: but God is a most spiritual substance: therefore He cannot be conceived by the forces of nature by the corporeal eye. Titus Bostrensis proves the major, lib. 1. contra Manichaeos: For a body, he says, sees a body; the like directs its gaze into the like; nor can the eyes of an inferior nature see what is more excellent and more eminent in nature; much less what is of a contrary nature. But if what is of a more excellent nature, since it is not contrary except insofar as it is incorporeal, cannot at all be seen by an inferior as being corporeal; certainly the contrary cannot be seen by the contrary, if it exists at all. By these words he demonstrates the error of the Manichaeans, and argues against them because they affirm that primary matter saw God. — This same argument is confirmed by the holy Fulgentius in his response to the third question of Ferrandus, where he proves that God cannot be seen by corporeal eyes on account of His spirituality, and His absence of distance from all places.

For the eyes of the body, he says, have this property, that they not only see corporeal things, but cannot even see, unless there are intermediate intervals of some space between them and the things which they see. Hence it is that although they see very many other things, they cannot see themselves, nor do they see in themselves when they see outside themselves; for even the very keenness of vision is blunted, if something to be seen is joined to the eyes themselves. Whoever, therefore, thinks that God can be discerned by corporeal eyes, must first say that He is separated from those eyes by a corporeal space. Whoever, however, wishes to know with what eyes God is seen, let him think of God Himself, because He is wisdom, He is truth, He is charity: wherefore, with whatever eyes wisdom, truth, and charity are seen, with those same eyes is seen that wise and true Divinity. God, therefore, promises His vision not to the eyes of the body, but to the eyes of the soul, which He constituted capable of wisdom, truth, and charity.

The authorities and arguments which are wont to be objected against this Conclusion will be proposed and solved in the following Question, where we shall prove that God is invisible to the eyes of the body even supernaturally.

Second conclusion. — God is also invisible naturally to the created intellect. This is of Faith, determined in the Council of Vienne against the Beguines and Beguards, who are condemned by Clement V, because they asserted, as is related in the Clementine Ad nostrum, etc., that man can attain final Beatitude in the present according to every grade of perfection just as he will obtain it in the blessed life: and that every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself: and that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God and to enjoy Him beatifically: whence the Subtle Doctor concludes in 4. dist. 19. q. 11. num. 2. that this heresy is worse than the heresy of Pelagius, who held that man could be justified without grace.

The truth of this conclusion is gathered from Sacred Scripture, which constantly affirms that Beatitude, which it is certain consists in the possession of God through the love and vision of God, can be obtained only through grace and supernatural help. Thus Rom. 6.: The grace of God is life everlasting. And Ps. 83.: The Lord will give grace and glory: and as often as eternal life is promised, it is affirmed to be a special gift of God, and to be able to be had only through supernatural virtues. Thus Romanorum 6.: You have your fruit unto sanctification, but the end, life everlasting. — Add that for the Angels themselves the attainment of Beatitude is supernatural, nor did they obtain it except through supernatural works and infused habits, as the Theologians affirm with St. Augustine, lib. 12. De Civitate Dei, cap. 9., saying: it must be confessed with due praise of the Creator, that it pertains not only to holy men, but can also be said of the holy Angels, that the Charity of God has been poured forth in them by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to them: therefore much less will men be able to exercise that divine vision by the forces proper to their own nature. This very thing is insinuated in that wonderful vision of the Prophet Isaias, cap. 6., where he says among other things: I saw the Lord sitting upon a lofty throne, as it were transcending the forces of any created intellect, and he adds: The Seraphim, who stood around it, with two wings covered their faces, to signify the greatest disproportion which is between the Angelic intellect and the immense splendor of divine light. Hence St. Dionysius, cap. 5. De Divinis Nom., affirms that the blessed minds are divinely elevated to the beatific vision, and says that they are constantly and immovably raised up to the ray shining upon them, and by a fitting love of the illuminations granted to them are lifted aloft as it were on wings.

The modern Thomists strive to demonstrate this truth by a threefold natural argument taken from the Angelic Doctor, 3. contra Gentes cap. 52, but in vain; for those arguments do not conclude rightly, nor do they press anything.

They form the first thus: that which is proper to some superior nature cannot belong to an inferior nature, except through the action of the superior to which it is proper: just as heating does not befit water, except from the action of fire, to which it is connatural to be hot and to heat water: but to see God as He is in Himself is proper to the divine nature, because to operate according to one's proper form is proper to every operator: therefore, they say, no creature can attain to the vision of God as He is in Himself, except by the action of God elevating it to this sublime operation.

On the contrary: This argument begs the question, and supposes what is in controversy; for it had to be proved that the vision of the divine Essence is so proper and connatural to God alone, that it cannot naturally belong to any other intellectual creature; for this the Eunomians and Aetians denied, as also the Beguards, as was said above. Nor does it matter that God knows Himself through His proper form, or intellection: for this does not hinder that He can be naturally perceived by another intellect: for although an Angel perceives himself through his own intellection, he is no less able to be understood and known by another.

They prove secondly: If some created intellect naturally saw God, it would have the divine Essence connaturally united to itself by way of form and intelligible species: but this is repugnant: therefore, etc. The major is certain, because, they say, for the vision of God any other species distinct from the divine Essence is impossible, or at least useless. They prove the minor: First, because a form connatural and proper to some nature cannot be communicated to another naturally, but only supernaturally; as is clear by the example of uncreated subsistence, which, since it is connatural to God, cannot be communicated to any creature naturally, but only supernaturally: but the divine Essence, they say, as it has the notion of intelligible species, is the proper form of the divine intellect, just as subsistence is the proper term of the divine Essence: therefore it cannot be communicated to any creature naturally. Second, if a created nature could naturally be united to the divine Essence as to an intelligible species, it would have a natural power for that union, and consequently would have some efficacy upon the divine Essence; for he who can unite extremes must have dominion and efficacy over them: the consequence is absurd: therefore, so is the antecedent.

On the contrary: First, it is false that it is impossible for the divine Essence to inform a created intellect through its own species and image: for below we shall prove that this species, representative of the divine Essence and informative and perfective of the divine intellect, is not only possible, but can also be useful. Second, it is likewise false that the object of vision must necessarily inform the intellect of the one seeing; for it suffices that it terminate the vision, and objectively concur to its production through its own motion and excitation. Add that although in other visions this information might be desired, it would not be necessary in the vision of God; for such information could not be made through the inherence of the divine essence, but only through the assistance and intimate presence of it, namely by reason of its immensity, whereby God is present to everything, not only to the intellect but also to all beings. But this presence serves nothing for intuitive knowledge; otherwise God would be seen by every intellect. Nor do the proofs of the minor press: not indeed the first, because it is false that a form connatural to a nature cannot be communicated to another: for heat is connatural to fire, and yet it is communicated to water and the other subjects which are heated by fire. Not the second either; for although a created intellect saw God naturally, it would not on that account have any efficacy upon the divine Nature; since the divine Nature concurs to this vision in no other way than by way of the object moving and determining it, which concurrence does not disgrace God.

They prove thirdly, from the disproportion which is between the divine essence and the created intellect: To every intellectual nature, they say, it is proper to be understood according to the mode of its own substance: but the essence of God cannot be known quidditatively in the mode of some created substance: therefore it cannot be naturally seen by any created intellectual substance. The minor is certain, they say, because the essence of God, since it is pure act, and infinite, and subsisting per se, infinitely exceeds any created intellectual substance whatsoever. The major is proved: First indeed a priori: knowledge, they say, is made according as the known is in the knower: but the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, for whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver: therefore the knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of its own nature. Second they prove a posteriori, by induction: there are, they say, four genera of knowing things, and as many of knowable objects: the first order is of the sensitive faculties, which extend themselves to sensible objects: the second is of the rational soul, which, since it is at once intellective and the form of the body, therefore knows objects proportioned to its mode of being, namely spiritual and corporeal things dependently on phantasms: the third order is of the substance immune from body, namely the Angelic; for Angels have their own substance as connatural object, to the mode of which they know all things. Finally, the last order God constitutes, who, since He is most pure act and His own being, has no other species by which He understands, nor any other motive and terminative object than His own essence: therefore, since He is not in the same grade of immateriality with any created intellect, He cannot be connaturally seen by any.

But this argument presses no more than the preceding ones; for they will that the known object be understood in the mode of the knowing substance; either because it must be of the same nature at least by representation, or because it must be perceived in a finite mode, if the power is finite: but the first is false, otherwise it would follow that even the Blessed could not see God as God is, but only as He would be assimilated to the Blessed themselves, and accordingly would hold Himself in the manner of a creature: but the second does not hinder natural knowledge; for that God be known by a finite act detracts nothing from His vision, otherwise the Blessed could not see Him perfectly, since they can exercise only a finite vision. Nor do the proofs of the major establish anything either. Not indeed the first, for the known need not be in the knower otherwise than through its own expressed or impressed species; and accordingly, although the object be of a diverse and more perfect nature, it can no less be in a knower which is of a less perfect nature. Not the second either, because if God cannot be attained naturally by a created intellect, for the reason that He exceeds it in a more perfect mode of being, because God is pure act and infinitely immaterial, such as a created substance is not, and accordingly there is no proportion between the intellect and God; it follows that not even the Blessed can see God, because however much they are elevated through the light of glory, they never become pure acts and infinitely immaterial, and accordingly the greatest disproportion in the order of being always remains between them and God; and accordingly if on account of this disproportion a created intellect cannot by the forces of nature see God, neither, even elevated by the benefit of supernatural light, will it be able to perceive Him.

But if you reply that this disproportion is to be derived from the fact that God is of the supernatural order, but the creature of the natural order, and therefore the creature cannot by the forces of nature perceive God, because a power of an inferior order cannot naturally see that which is of a superior order, unless it be elevated to that superior order, as is wont to happen in the Blessed by the benefit of the light of glory.

On the contrary: when it is said that God is of the supernatural order, either it is understood that He is of such a nature that He cannot be seen naturally, and thus the principle is begged, and what had to be proved is supposed: or that He is infinite, uncreated, pure act, and supremely immaterial, and thus He could never be seen by a creature, however much elevated, since there is no creature which can be elevated to this order of infinite, uncreated, and pure act being. And so, setting aside those arguments.

The conclusion is proved by the argument which the Subtle Doctor supplies in 4. d. 49. q. 11. n. 9. and in the Quodlibetis q. 14. n. 10. art. 2: A created intellect cannot naturally see any object, unless it naturally has everything necessary for eliciting this vision: but a created intellect does not naturally have whatever is necessary for the intuitive vision of God: therefore neither can it see God naturally. The major is certain: for no power can exercise its act, unless it has everything required for the production of this act. The minor is also proved: The intuitive knowledge of an object requires the object present, and moving the power through its presence to elicit the vision: but God is not naturally present to the intellect under His own proper notion of the knowable, nor does He naturally move it to His own proper and immediate knowledge: therefore a created intellect does not naturally have whatever is required for the intuitive vision of God. The minor is clear: for since God is a voluntary object, He moves the power to His vision only insofar as He wills to be freely seen by it; for He is not seen necessarily, like any other objects which present themselves to our senses or intellect, but only most freely does He exhibit Himself to creatures to be looked upon, as He wills and to whom He wills. For although He is intimately present to all intellectual creatures, even to the damned and the demons, He is not however seen by them, namely because He does not will to manifest Himself to them. The Doctor confirms this with these words of the holy Ambrose on these words of St. Luke: And the Angel of the Lord appeared to him: Sensible things, he says, are not seen in like manner; and it is placed in His will to be seen, for it is of His nature not to be seen; if He does not will, He is not seen: if He wills, He is seen. — It is confirmed: if God naturally moved a created intellect to His vision through something other than His free manifestation, that other mover would either formally contain the divine nature, or eminently, or intentionally, that is, as an intelligible species perfectly representing God: but He cannot move through another thing which contains the divine nature formally or eminently, because there is nothing which participates eminently or formally in the divine being; otherwise there would be given something which would be either more perfect or equally perfect as God, which is contradictory. Nor yet through another thing which contains the divine being intentionally, and by way of an intentional species representing the divine nature, because although this species is possible, it cannot however be produced by any creature, but only by God alone; for since a species is expressed and the proper likeness of the object, it cannot be formed by any other than the object itself, unless perhaps it be made by omnipotent God through creation: therefore much more must the representative species of the divine Essence be formed by God Himself: but God produces nothing ad extra naturally, but freely: for He operates all things according to the counsel of His will: therefore whether He manifests Himself per se or through a species, He exhibits Himself to be seen not naturally, but most freely, and accordingly there is no created intellect which can behold Him by natural power.

Some reply that from this discourse of the Subtle Doctor it is proved that the vision of God is supernatural not in entity but only in mode, namely insofar as it can be produced by no natural cause, in the way in which the rational soul can be called supernatural.

On the contrary: for a form to be supernatural in substance, it is not only required that it be producible by God alone, but further it is required that it be produced in a substantial nature already fully constituted in its being of substance, and so be an accident, since no substance can be supernatural in entity, as we shall prove below. Hence the supernaturalness of that vision is not only in mode, but in entity, since this vision is produced through a free manifestation of God, and cannot be formed by the powers of nature.

You will say 1. Any potency can naturally tend toward everything that is contained under its adequate object: but God is contained under the adequate object of the created intellect: therefore the created intellect can naturally know God. The major is evident: for since the sensible is the adequate object of sense, sense can therefore be exercised about any particular sensible. The minor is also evident: for being, as such, which is common to God and creatures univocally, is the adequate object of the intellect itself, which is borne toward anything intelligible.

I distinguish the minor with the Doctor in the aforementioned quodlibetal question: that God is contained within the adequate object that naturally moves the intellect, and is attainable by it through the powers of nature by intuitive knowledge, I deny: that He is contained within the adequate object moving to abstractive and confused knowledge, I concede the minor; and I deny the consequence: for from this it only follows that God, insofar as He is the noblest species of being, can be known naturally, indeed by abstractive and confused knowledge, but not by intuitive and evident knowledge.

You will say 2. According to the Subtle Doctor, q. 1. Prolog. n. 20.: God clearly seen is the natural end of man and of the created intellect. But a natural end can be attained by the principles and means of nature: for how would it be a natural end, if natural means failed for attaining it? Therefore God can be seen naturally by the created intellect.

I answer that the Doctor indeed holds that God clearly seen is the natural end of man passively, so that human nature by itself, and without any elevation, can receive the beatific vision, I concede: actively, so that it can produce that vision by the powers of nature, I deny: for this was not the mind of the Doctor, as will appear more fully below, where we shall show how man can have a natural inclination to see God clearly, although he does not have natural means by which he can form this vision from himself.

Third conclusion. — No substance is creatable to which the beatific vision is connatural. This is common among theologians, against Durandus, Molina, and some other recent authors, whose opinion Vasquez calls inept; Nazarius, reckless; Bannes, notable ignorance.

Proof first. The intuitive vision of God cannot be connatural to any created intellect, unless there is given some object which formally, or eminently, or intentionally contains the divine nature, so that it can move such an intellect to its vision: but no such object is possible which contains the divine essence in either of these ways, as was proved in the confirmation of the preceding conclusion: therefore neither is any intellect possible to which such a vision is connatural. The major is proved: because the intellect cannot be moved to this vision naturally, except either by the divine essence, or by some object containing it in either of the assigned ways: but it cannot be moved by the divine Essence itself, because, as we said, it does not move ad extra by itself immediately, nor does it work anything naturally, but merely freely: therefore if any intellect is moved to its vision, this motion must come from some other object which contains the divine Essence; and since this cannot be given, it must also be acknowledged that such connaturalness of the vision cannot exist.

Proof second. If some creatable intellect could be given to which the beatific vision would be connatural, this would be chiefly because some supernatural substance could be given, to which the light of glory would be natural and from which it would flow as a property: but such a substance is not possible: therefore neither is the connaturalness of that vision. The major is admitted by the adversaries. The minor is proved: a substance would be called supernatural for this reason, either because it would connaturally require from itself some accident supernatural in its entity, e.g., the light of glory: or because it would exceed in perfection all other finite substances: or because it would transcend the physical and intentional powers of any created substance, so that it could be produced by no other, nor known naturally and intuitively: or finally because it would not have in itself the principles of a natural substance; for this supernaturalness does not seem able to be derived from any other source: but under none of these heads can that substance be called supernatural: therefore such a substance is not creatable.

The minor is evident as to the first part, for by the very fact that some substance would require some supernatural accident from its native principles, an evident and manifest contradiction would arise, namely, that that supernatural accident would be, and would not be, such at the same time: it would indeed be supernatural, as is supposed: but it would not be, because it would be required connaturally by that created substance; but what is required in this way is not above its nature, nor consequently is it considered to be supernatural. For the rational soul, although producible by God alone, is not considered natural on any other account than because it is required by the body, as its connatural form.

The same minor is also evident as to the second part; both because, by the more common opinion, no finite substance of such perfection can be given that a more perfect one could not still be produced, to infinity: therefore no substance can be given which is called supernatural because it exceeds others in perfection. Then, even if such a substance were given, it would not from its own nature require any supernatural form, and so would not on that account be considered supernatural, namely in the sense in which a supernatural substance is treated of here.

It is also evident as to the third part: for although some substance could not be produced and known naturally by any other created thing, it would not follow from this that it is supernatural: both because supernatural accidents, for instance the light of glory and the beatific vision, would not naturally belong to it, otherwise they would no longer be supernatural: and because, although the rational soul can be produced by no created substance, but by God alone, it is not on that account called supernatural: and finally, because no substance can be conceived which could not be reached and known, either by the Angels already created, at least by abstractive knowledge, or by other substances to be created of the same perfection as itself; hence no substance can be given which entirely exceeds the intentional powers of created substance.

Finally, it is evident as to the fourth part: for created substances, which in fact are natural, are called such for this reason, either because they have in themselves the nature and principle of motion and rest: or because they cannot be conceived so perfect that still more perfect ones to be produced could not be conceived: but every creatable substance would have in itself the principle of motion and rest, for it could be moved to intellection and love, and cease from both operations: nor would it be of such perfection that God could not produce a more perfect one still, and the human intellect conceive it: therefore, etc.

Proof third. If some intellectual substance were possible to which the beatific vision would be connatural, and from which the light of glory would flow as a property, it would follow that that beatific vision would not be simply and absolutely supernatural, but only secundum quid: but this cannot be said: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: for that is called supernatural simply and absolutely which transcends the powers and existence of the whole created and creatable nature, and can be produced by God alone, and is not required connaturally by any natural being as its form; for no other concept of supernaturalness is given; and if another is imagined, it will no longer be the same controversy: but if some creature were possible to which the beatific vision would be connatural, it would not exceed the powers of the whole creatable nature: therefore it would not be supernatural simply, but only secundum quid, namely with respect to creatures already existing. I pass over the other arguments customarily brought forward by authors, since they seem less effective.

You will say 1. If it were repugnant that some supernatural substance be given, this would be chiefly either because it is a created being, or because it is a substance: but under neither head is it repugnant. Not under the first: for the light of glory, the beatific vision, and the infused virtues are created beings, and yet supernatural. Nor under the second: for if an accident, which is of lesser perfection than a substance, can be elevated to the grade of supernaturalness, why should not a far more excellent substance also be able to become supernatural? Add that the divine Essence is a substance supernatural in entity; and hence it is not repugnant that some substance become supernatural.

I answer that it is repugnant that some created substance become supernatural precisely because it is a created substance: for by reason of both it is not immediately and per se unifiable with the supernatural end, that is, without the motion and help of an extrinsic agent of another order, otherwise it would be pure act, which is repugnant to a creature. But this reason does not apply to an accident, nor to the divine nature. Not indeed to an accident, which, since it is the very attainment of the supernatural object, does not from its immediate union with it follow that it is pure act: rather it is the act of the substantial potency elevating it and uniting it with the supernatural end. Hence there is no parallel reason regarding an accident and a created supernatural substance. But neither does it apply to the divine nature, which, since it is pure act, attains itself immediately, and without the benefit of an agent of another order.

You will insist. To every act there corresponds a potency of its own order: therefore since there are supernatural acts, namely the theological habits, the light of glory, the beatific vision: some supernatural potency which corresponds to them must also be given; but this can be none other than a substance: therefore a supernatural substance must be given.

I distinguish the major; that to every act there must correspond an active potency of the same order, I deny: since in natural things, which are produced by creation alone, such as the Angels, rational souls, and prime matter, there is no creative potency of the natural order. That a subjective potency must correspond to the informing act, I concede: and so to the beatific vision, the light of glory, and the other supernatural gifts there correspond a passive and subjective potency, namely, the intellectual substance. Add that from the supernaturalness of the form the supernaturalness of the subject cannot be proved, because, as we shall say in the following question, the supernaturalness of an act is derived from the producing principle, not from the receiving subject.

You will press: A supernatural substantial mode can be given: therefore the supernatural substance itself can also be given. The consequence is evident; for no difference, and no reason for disparity, seems able to be brought forward. The antecedent is proved: for the union of the divine Word with the humanity is a supernatural substantial mode. It is confirmed by the same example; for by reason of that union and substantial mode, human nature has a connatural immediate union with the supernatural end; for Christ, even as man, is not an adopted Son of God, but a natural one, and the beatific vision is owed to Him connaturally: therefore some supernatural substance can be understood as possible which has an immediate union with the supernatural end. I deny the consequence: for the reason of disparity is that the hypostatic union of the divine supposit with human nature is only that by which the created nature is formally united to the supernatural nature, and this formal unitive element, or means, by which the union is made, can be supernatural not only in the genus of substance, but also in the genus of accident: but a supernatural substance would not be that by which, but that which would be immediately united to the supernatural end; otherwise it would be pure act, and its own beatitude, which is repugnant. This repugnance is not found in a mode or in a supernatural accident, since it is not that which is united, but that by which the union is made, and is an incomplete being, ordered to something else, and hence cannot be pure act, nor its own being, nor its own beatitude: and since these are proper to God alone, they cannot be communicated to any creature, and hence no complete substantial creature can be supernatural. To the confirmation I say that it is false that Christ, as man, has an intrinsic connatural union with the supernatural end, and is the natural Son of God; for He does not have this from the intrinsic notion of human nature itself, but from the hypostatic union, and by reason of the supposit of the Word. Hence there is no parity.

You will say 2. God can create an intellect of such power and perfection that it equals the activity of the beatific intellect furnished with the light of glory: therefore also one that sees God naturally. The consequence is evident; otherwise it would not equal the activity of the beatific intellect. The antecedent is proved: the beatific intellect, even informed by the light of glory, is created and of finite power and perfection: but given any finite intellect, God can produce a more perfect one: therefore He will also be able to produce an intellect which by its natural power equals, indeed even exceeds, the beatific intellect, even one furnished with the light of glory.

I deny the antecedent: for although the beatific intellect furnished with the light of glory is of finite activity and perfection, it does not however follow from this that God can create some intellect which by its natural power equals its perfection and activity, because they are of different orders; that one indeed of a higher and supernatural order: but this one of a natural and lower order; but God cannot bring it about that a thing of a lower order, however great a perfection it is endowed with, can equal a thing of a higher order: for however much a material and corporeal creature is perfected, it will never be able to attain the perfection of the rational soul, nor of an Angel.

You will subsume. That intellect to be produced would not be of a lower order with respect to the intellect furnished with the light of glory: therefore there is no solution. The antecedent is proved: such an intellect can be conceived to be of a lower order in two ways, namely, either because it would be of a more imperfect species, just as man is said to be more imperfect than an Angel, or because it would be disproportionate to the vision of God, so that God to be seen would be considered entirely outside the object of that intellect, just as a brute animal is wholly disproportionate to intellection, and an object which is only intelligible, and in no way sensible, is outside the notion of the object of the cognitive potency of brute animals: but both are false: therefore so is that from which it follows. The antecedent is proved: First indeed, an intellect can be produced so perfect that by its nature it has a greater faculty of understanding than is the power of the intellect which is in fact furnished with the light of glory. For given any finite intellectual nature, or substance, God can create another, and another more perfect, to infinity, since there is no contradiction in this, and God is omnipotent, and infinitely participable substantially more and more by intellectual natures, just as by other substances multipliable to infinity: therefore, given any finite intellect, a substantially more perfect one can be given; for the more perfect an intellectual nature is, the more perfect is the intellect, which indeed is either the very substance and essence of such a nature, or a property flowing from it naturally and commensurate with it, and hence more perfect in a more perfect nature. But if a more perfect intellect can be given, and more perfect to infinity, it can reach, indeed even surpass, the distance which is between itself and another intellect furnished with the light of glory, because that distance is finite, and hence will gradually be diminished, and at length exhausted, indeed even surpassed, by an intellect more perfect to infinity.

The same minor is evident as to the second part: for the intellective potency is of itself universal, extending itself to all intelligible things, according to the activity and power proper to it, in which it differs from the sensitive potency, which is limited to the sensible object, and hence however much the sensitive potency of brute animals grows, it cannot attain an intelligible object, which is outside the sphere of the object of the sensitive potency: but God, to be seen clearly, is not entirely outside the sphere of the intellect already created, since in fact He is seen by the Blessed: therefore if the inchoate power which the created intellect in fact has for seeing God grows to infinity, it will be able to be increased to such a point that it equals the power of the intellect furnished with the light of glory.

I deny the antecedent, and likewise the minor of its proof; both because it is false that an intellect can be produced more perfect to infinity, otherwise there would be given a creature which from its nature and in its entity would be of infinite perfection, and hence would be God: which implies a contradiction, as we have said more fully when treating of divine infinity: and because, however much the natural power of the intellect would grow to infinity, it would always be more imperfect and of a lower order with respect to the intellect furnished with the light of glory, and hence would never equal its perfection in the power of understanding, because that increase would always be natural, and so would always be inferior to any finite supernatural light; wherefore, although a more perfect created intellect would naturally avail for understanding natural objects more perfectly, it would not however avail for seeing supernatural objects, nor would it ever attain the perfection of the intellect elevated and constituted in a higher order through the light of glory. Just as brute animals, although they were created one more perfect than another to infinity, would never attain the perfection of human nature, which is of a higher and more perfect order.