Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)

Scotus Academicus, seu universae Doctoris Subtilis theologica dogmata. Tomus primus. De Deo in se subsistente.


Dedicatio I: Reverendissimo Patri Aloysio Lauer ... (dedicatio editoris)

Praefatio I: Editor ad lectorem (praefatio editoris editionis 1900)

Praefatio II: Lectori studioso (Frassenii praefatio)

Index I: Index haereticorum, qui veritates catholicas et theologicas saeculo quovis impugnarunt

Approbatio I: Approbationes (Facultatis Parisiensis et Ordinis Fratrum Minorum)

Praefatio III: Divinae Sapientiae ... dignitas et natura in prooemiali tractatu delineata (praefatio)

Introductio I: Disputatio prooemialis. De Theologia in communi

Articulus I: De necessitate et existentia theologicae doctrinae

Quaestio I: An admittenda sit aliqua theologica et supernaturalis doctrina

Quaestio II: An theologia positiva sit utilis et necessaria

Quaestio III: An, et qualiter theologia scholastica Ecclesiae Dei prosit

Articulus II: De essentia theologiae

Quaestio I: An theologia Dei et Beatorum sit proprie dicenda scientia

Quaestio II: An theologia Viatorum perfectae scientiae characteres habeat

Quaestio III: An theologia nostra perfectae sapientiae titulo glorietur

Quaestio IV: An theologia nostra subalternetur scientiae Dei, et Beatorum

Quaestio V: Quodnam sit obiectum theologiae nostrae

Articulus III: De proprietatibus, et praecipuis characteribus nostrae theologiae

Quaestio I: An theologia nostra sit speculativa, vel practica

Quaestio II: An theologia nostra sit habitus supernaturalis

Quaestio III: An theologia nostra certior sit, et dignior scientiis naturalibus

Quaestio IV: An theologia nostra sit argumentativa, et adhaesiva

Quaestio V: Quinam sint loci ex quibus theologia argumenta sua depromit

Introductio II: Primi libri Sententiarum methodica explanatio

Tractatus I: De Deo in se subsistente

Disputatio I: De existentia et essentia Dei

Articulus I: De existentia Dei

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo nobis constet Deum existere

Quaestio II: An Deum existere sit per se notum

Quaestio III: An et quomodo demonstrari possit Deum existere

Quaestio IV: Quibus rationibus demonstrari possit Deum existere

Quaestio V: An et quomodo probari possit unicum esse Deum

Articulus II: De essentia, seu de praedicatis quidditativis Dei

Quaestio I: An et quomodo Deus possit definiri

Quaestio II: An rationes Entis, et Existentiae essentialiter Deo competant

Quaestio III: An Deus sit substantia completa, spiritualis, vivens

Articulus III: De ratione formali constitutiva, et ultimo distinctiva essentiae divinae

Quaestio I: An essentia divina ultimo constituatur, et distinguatur per Aseitatem, et Intellectionem, alterutro ex tribus modis statim assignatis

Quaestio II: Quaenam sit ratio formalis ultimo constitutiva, et distinctiva Dei

Disputatio II: De perfectionibus divinis in communi

Articulus I: De divinarum perfectionum conceptu, numero, et praecellentia

Quaestio I: Quot, et quae sint divinae essentiae perfectiones

Quaestio II: Quot, et qualiter divinae perfectiones essentiae divinae competant

Articulus II: De divinarum perfectionum identitate, et distinctione

Quaestio I: An divina attributa idem sint realiter cum essentia divina, an solo nomine ab ea diversa

Quaestio II: An attributa divina tum inter se, tum ab essentia formaliter, et actu distinguantur

Disputatio III: De perfectionibus modificantibus divinam essentiam, seu de attributis negativis

Articulus I: De simplicitate divina

Quaestio I: An Deus sit omnino simplex, et in quo formaliter consistat eius divina simplicitas

Quaestio II: An Deus omnem compositionem realem excludat

Quaestio III: An Deus omnem compositionem metaphysicam excludat

Quaestio IV: An summa simplicitas soli Deo conveniat

Articulus II: De infinitate Dei

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo probari possit Deum esse infinitum

Quaestio II: An, et quomodo Deus ratione suae infinitatis omnes omnino perfectiones contineat

Articulus III: De immensitate Dei

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo probari possit Deum esse immensum, et ubique

Quaestio II: An recte inferatur Dei praesentia secundum essentiam in omnibus rebus ex illius in ipsis operatione

Quaestio III: An Deus ratione suae immensitatis realiter sit extra mundum, et in spatiis imaginariis

Articulus IV: De aeternitate Dei

Quaestio I: Quid, et qualis sit aeternitas

Quaestio II: An, et quomodo aeternitas Deo conveniat

Quaestio III: Quomodo Deus ratione aeternitatis creaturae coexistat, et creatura Deo

Articulus V: De immutabilitate Dei

Quaestio I: An Deus sit omnino immutabilis

Quaestio II: An Deus sit immutabilis extrinsece

Articulus VI: De ineffabilitate Dei

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo Deus sit ineffabilis

Quaestio II: Quae, et quomodo nomina Deo conveniant

Articulus VII: De invisibilitate, et visibilitate Dei tam respectu Viatorum, quam Beatorum

§ I: De possibilitate, et existentia intuitivae visionis Dei

Quaestio I: An Deus sit invisibilis, vel visibilis naturaliter creaturae iam existenti, aut alicui creabili

Quaestio II: An Deus saltem supernaturaliter visibilis sit oculo mentis, et corporis

Quaestio III: An possibilitas divinae visionis intuitivae ratione naturali probari possit

Quaestio IV: An Deus visus fuerit intuitive ab aliquo hac in mortali vita degente

Quaestio V: An viri sancti statim post mortem Deum intuitive videant: et quae fuerit hac de re sanctorum Patrum, et Millenariorum sententia

§ II: De principiis productivis visionis beatificae

Quaestio I: An species impressa Dei sit possibilis, etc.

Quaestio II: An, quid, et quale sit lumen gloriae

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo intellectus concurrat ad formandam visionem beatificam

§ III: De obiecto visionis beatificae

Quaestio I: Quodnam sit obiectum primarium beatae visionis, et quomodo Deus videatur a beatis

Quaestio II: An, et quomodo Beati videant in Deo creaturas

§ IV: Quot, et quae sint beatae visionis proprietates

Quaestio I: An beata visio sit notitia simplex directa, et permanens

Quaestio II: An visiones beatificae sint inaequales, et unde inaequalitas oriatur

Articulus VIII: De incomprehensibilitate Dei

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo Deus sit incomprehensibilis

Disputatio IV: De divinis perfectionibus affirmantibus, seu de attributis Dei positivis

Quaestio I: An, et quomodo Unitas Deo conveniat

Quaestio II: Quid, et qualis sit entitativa Dei Veritas

That God is true, no Catholic doubts; for it is established by an article of faith that the Son of God is true God from true God: whence not undeservedly the Royal Psalmist in Psalmo 88. O Lord God of hosts, who is like to thee? Thou art mighty, O Lord, and thy truth is round about thee: as if he would say, God is so true and veracious that He is, as it were, wholly surrounded by truth, and composed of truth; so that of Him, as St. Augustine said of Christ in his Sermon on the Decalogue, it may deservedly be said, God is wholly truth: first, as regards being, because He alone properly and truly is, who said, I am who am. Second, as regards the intellect, because He is His own understanding. Third, as regards knowledge, because God is the God of sciences, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Fourth, as regards speech, according to that of Ioannis 17. Thy word is truth. Fifth, as regards promises, because God is faithful in all His words, and holy in all His works. There is therefore no reason for us to linger in proving the divine truth. Here only is it proposed for examination in what the divine truth consists, and in what manner it belongs to God, namely whether after the manner of an essential predicate, or only of an attributive one, which, so that it may be discovered more evidently

Note 1. The philosophers commonly distinguish a threefold truth, namely the truth of sign, of knowledge, and of being. The first is the conformity of our words with the inner concept of the mind: and this is the moral virtue opposed to lying. The second is the conformity of the intellect with the thing known, such as is the knowledge of divine faith and of human science, to which falsity, error, and opinion are opposed. The third, finally, is the formality of being, by which a thing is just as conceivable as it is according to its own nature: whence

Note 2. Entitative truth carries with it a habitude and transcendental relation of intelligibility to the intellect; for which reason the Doctor, in 1. dist. 49. q. 4. circa n. 11: perhaps, he says, neither true nor good, beyond being, express absolute notions — not that entitative truth is in reality in itself a solitary and simple transcendental relation, and an order which every being declares to the knowing intellect; but such that the concept of truth cannot be expressed without such an order to the intellect, of which it is the principal object. Just as, by parity, the good cannot be explained without an order to the appetite, of which it is the object and term: for the good is commonly said to be that which all things desire.

Note 3. From the Doctor in 2. Metaphysicorum number 8, entitative truth is such as being is:

For because, he says, truth is a property of being, therefore the being of a thing follows proportionally. So that each thing, in the mode in which it has being, also has truth: whence it happens that those things whose being is everlasting also have everlasting truth. Because also truth in the intellect arises from truth in the thing, therefore just as a thing has being, so also is it apt by nature to be known; whence it comes about that from the very being of the thing there always arises the conformity of truth, whether in the thing or in the intellect. Wherefore the Philosopher rightly concludes that each thing, just as it is disposed toward being, so it is disposed toward truth.

By these words the Doctor openly indicates that the truth of a thing is such as is its very entity: and so, if the entity be infinitely perfect, the entitative truth of the thing will likewise be such.

First conclusion. — The entitative truth of God is that supreme perfection of His, by which He alone is conceived to have the proper characters of the Godhead.

This is openly evident from what has been noted; for any being of things exists insofar as it has the characters proper to its entity, by which it is truly and intrinsically constituted in its being, and is distinguished from any other. Therefore for God to have entitative truth is nothing other than to claim for Himself the proper characters of the Godhead, by which He is separated and distinguished from the empty and false gods. Namely, that He is an infinite being, from Himself, necessarily existing by essence, produced by none, and productive of the rest. These words express the genuine characters of the true Godhead, by which the true God is distinguished from the empty and counterfeit deities of the nations. For all the gods of the nations are demons, says the Royal Prophet; and deservedly indeed, for the demons usurped certain counterfeit characters of the Godhead, namely the prediction and prophecy of future things, the stupendous and extraordinary working of signs and portents, the revelation of uncertain and hidden things, and other symbols of this kind of the true Godhead, which with rash use they claimed for themselves, so that they might be held by men as gods and be worshipped. Nor indeed, which is most to be lamented, was the labor of those proud and rebellious Angels vain and fruitless: for with these disguised signs of the Godhead they had so deceived men in the idols in which they dwelt, that they were held as gods.

This St. Paul openly confirms, 1. ad Corinthios 8., saying:

We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one. For although there are those who are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth (since indeed there are many gods and many lords), yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him.

By these words the holy Apostle assigns a twofold notion of the entitative truth of God, and two characters by which He is distinguished from the counterfeit gods. First, that the idol is nothing; not that the idol in reality has absolutely no entity at all: For there are also idols, says St. Augustine, 18. contra Faustum, but they are nothing for salvation: and he who worships a tree, not indeed by praying but by adoring, does not worship that which is nowhere, but that which ought not to be so worshipped. He alone is to be worshipped, who alone is the true God, and enjoying Him alone his worshiper is blessed, and not enjoying Him alone every mind is miserable, whatever other thing it may enjoy. But you, when you worship those things which are altogether not, but are feigned by the vanity of the other deceitful fables, hold the truth in injustice, you who change the truth of the divine being into a lie. Whence as often as Sacred Scripture attributes the name of God to certain creatures, it immediately adds some appellation by which they are distinguished from the true God. Thus when it is said, Psal. 81. God stood in the congregation of gods, and in the midst He judges gods: and a little after, I said: You are gods, and all of you the sons of the Most High; it immediately adds, But you shall die like men: assigning a disparity not only between Angels and men, who are called gods, because Angels are immortal, yet creatures and therefore dependent on God, while men are likewise gods by grace, participation, and divine adoption, but mortal gods; but also separating both Angels and men, who are called gods, from the true God.

Likewise, as often as the same Sacred Scripture commemorates the false deities of the nations, it immediately explains their emptiness, namely that they have mouths and will not speak, they have eyes and will not see, etc. It attests the same thing more openly by saying: All the gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens. That is, He is the supreme Creator and Arbiter of all things; which is the second notion and the other character by which St. Paul separates the true God from the false. Therefore the supreme entitative truth of God is nothing other than His divine perfection itself, by which He claims for Himself the proper characters of the Godhead, inasmuch as He is the supreme being, and the principle and moderator of other beings.

Second conclusion. — The entitative truth of God is not His essential and quidditative predicate; but an attribute perfecting His divine essence itself.

This truth is evident from what was said in the previous Question: for in the same manner, with proportion preserved, one must reason about the entitative truth of God as about His unity: but this, as has been proved, is not an essential predicate of God, but only a perfection of the essence: therefore the truth is likewise such. Add that the divine entitative truth is that perfection of God by which He is intelligible and conceivable as having the proper characters of the Godhead: therefore it is necessary that God first have those characters of the Godhead, at least by a priority of conception, before He be understood to have them; and so He is first conceivable under the notion of the Godhead than under the notion of the true Godhead: and thus that divine truth flows from His essence, and surrounds and perfects it.

You will say. God cannot be conceived as having the proper characters of the Godhead without being likewise conceived as true; for either He is conceived as having the proper characters of the Godhead, and thus He is conceived as the true God; or He is not so conceived, and thus He is not apprehended as God; nor consequently is He understood to have the true characters of the Godhead: so that entitative truth is to be counted among the essential predicates of the Godhead.

I distinguish the major. If God is conceived adequately, and according to all the formalities and perfections of the divine being, He cannot be understood as God without being likewise understood in the same concept as having the proper and genuine characters of the Godhead, I concede: if He is conceived only inadequately, and solely according to the notion of a being simply infinite, which are the two essential characters of the Godhead, He cannot be so conceived without being apprehended in the same concept as the true God, I deny: for first the intellect conceives God as an infinite being, then it apprehends that the notion of an infinite being is a genuine character of the Godhead, and thus afterwards it affirms that He is the true God, as one who has the perfect characters of the Godhead.

Quaestio III: An, et qualiter Bonitas Deo conveniat

Quaestio IV: An, et quae sit Dei Pulchritudo

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