Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It is certain, and already sufficiently proved, that God is so unique that the plurality of gods is judged no less impossible than the non-existence of any God; and hence it would be superfluous to dwell here on proving the unity of the Godhead, which we have openly demonstrated against the madness of the idolaters in the first Disputation of this Treatise. Three things, therefore, alone remain to be examined: first, indeed, in what way God is said to be one, that is, what is the source and origin of the divine Unity: second, how Unity belongs to God, whether in the manner of an essential predicate, or in the manner of a property affecting and illustrating the divine essence already quidditatively constituted: third, finally, whether this Unity so

restrains God from plurality, that He cannot enter into the society of any number, but must be called altogether innumerable. That these things may appear more evidently

Note 1. The philosophers rightly distinguish a threefold unity, namely transcendental, formal, and indivisible: the first is that by which any being whatsoever is undivided in itself; the second, that by which common and universal natures, both generic and specific, are said to be formally undivided in their inferiors; the third is that by which a singular nature is intrinsically and extrinsically indivisible into inferiors. The first unity befits every being; the second is proper to every universal nature, and to it alone; the third belongs to a singular nature alone. The first denies division, because any being that is one is undivided in itself; the second denies distinction, because universal natures in some inferior are not distinguished from themselves as they exist in other inferiors; the third, finally, denies plurality, for the singular and the individual excludes every multitude.

Note 2. Transcendental unity is rightly defined as the indivision of being from itself, and division from anything else. By these words is signified the twofold negation which this unity imports; namely, the negation of division in itself, when a being either includes the union of its parts; thus Peter is said to be one man; or the real identity of several formalities; thus God, although He involves several formally distinct perfections, is nevertheless truly called One; or the indivisibility of its concept; thus the concept of being is one, because it cannot be resolved into other concepts. Second, "one" also imports the negation of unity with another; and hence what is truly one must necessarily be distinguished from anything else. And so, that God be truly called one, He must be in Himself really undivided, and really distinct from anything else that is not God.

Note 3. According to the Subtle Doctor, in 1. d. 21. q. unica, three things are required for number: the first is that the unities which are the parts and principles of the number be of one and the same notion; for in numbering we do not say first Man, second Lion, third Stone: but the first substance is Man, the second Lion, the third Stone: or first man, second man, etc.: the second is that neither of the things numbered be included in the other, but that they be mutually distinct. The third, finally, is that the unities to be numbered be ordered to one another, and have potentiality and the notion of part with respect to the whole. For if any unity claimed for itself the actuality and perfection of the whole, it would also claim for itself the actuality and perfection of another unity contained in that same whole. Hence, although there might be several unities according to their formal notions, if nevertheless they eminently concurred in one, they would in no way constitute a number.

First conclusion. — The highest unity befits God on account of the various pre-eminences of the divinity itself.

And first indeed on account of the supereminent notion of being; for, says Plato in the Parmenide, of those things which are said to be one, each one is one in the way that its being is disposed: wherefore those which are less beings are said to be less one; but those which are more are also more one: therefore, since God is the greatest of all beings, He also claims for Himself the greatest and highest unity of being. This argument St. Augustine carefully weighs, lib. 1. De moribus Manichaeorum, cap. 6., where he thus discourses:

To be is nothing else than to be one; and so, in as much as each thing attains unity, in so much it is; for it is the operation, fittingness, and concord of unity, by which composite things are, in as much as they are. For simple things exist of themselves, because they are one; but those which are not simple imitate unity by the concord of their parts; and they are in so much as they attain unity.

Hence Boethius rightly, lib. 3. De Consolatione, prosa undecima: Everything that is, he says, endures and subsists as long as it is one: but it perishes and is dissolved at the same time as it has ceased to be one: and so, since God is the first of all beings, He also obtains the first unity.

Secondly, some holy Fathers gather this supreme unity of God from His highest simplicity, whereby it comes about that on account of His simplicity, which excels all things, He is named not only one, but also unity. This, throughout the whole theological treatment, says St. Dionysius, De divinis Nominibus, cap. 1.:

We thus see that that Divinity, the prince of all things, is celebrated by sacred preaching as both monad and unity, on account of the simplicity and singularity of its excellent indivisibility, and as unity for the expression of the supersubstantial fecundity which consists in the three Persons.

Whence, at the beginning of the chapter, he called God Unity, which makes every unity one. With him agrees St. Maximus the Martyr, in the Scholia on cap. 1. of the De coelesti Hierarchia, explaining those words of Dionysius: God is a monad, and a Unity subsisting in three: but that He is Unity and monad, he says, the impious Frugrius also confirms, writing thus in Centuriae secundae cap. 3.:

Since God is simple and indivisible, therefore He is a monad, for the monad too, to speak arithmetically, is simple and free from composition. He is called Unity, moreover, for this reason, that the holy Trinity is naturally united with Him, and He unites all those who draw near to Him; as it is written in the Gospel, that they may be one, even as we also are one.

But especially the root and reason of the divine unity arises from the Infinity of God; which, as we said in demonstrating that God is unique, supplies various arguments for proving the divine unity, both on the part of the infinite divine intellect, and on the part of the infinite will, of the infinite good, of infinite power, of the being infinite on every side, and of infinite dominion and virtue: for all these notions of divine infinity furnish so many valid arguments by which the divine unity, and God as unique, may be demonstrated, as we have already demonstrated.

Second conclusion. — Unity is not a quidditative predicate of God, but a divine property surrounding and illustrating the essence of God: both because the same seems to be the case with the entitative divine unity as with the created one; but created unity is not a quidditative predicate of the created being, but only its property: therefore by equal right the entitative divine unity is a perfection of the divine being, not truly a quidditative predicate of the divine essence: both because the divine essence can be conceived by a perfectly quidditative concept, and under the notion of infinite being, without the divine unity being conceived; and consequently unity does not have the notion of a constitutive predicate of the divine essence: finally, because unity itself arises from the essential notion, namely from the infinity of the divine being, and hence it itself does not enter into the essential notion of God.

You will say. Singularity is part of the quidditative concept of God: but unity is part of the concept of singularity; for the singular is that which is indivisible into several inferiors, as is plain in any individual nature: but this indivisibility is individual unity; and consequently unity must also be reckoned as part of the quiddity of God, and hence it is not His attribute.

I concede the major, but I deny the minor. For although in created things the formal notion of singularity is the same as that of numerical unity, it is not so in divine things; because in created things the indivisibility into several inferiors does not arise formally from the notion of the essence which is individuated, but from the individual difference itself; namely, it is the reason why the individual nature itself cannot be communicated to several inferiors; and hence in the individual nature itself the notion of individual unity is the same as that of singularity; because singularity and numerical unity formally arise from the individual difference. But it is otherwise in God, because the divine essence, from its precise concept, is such that indivisibility into several inferiors follows upon it: and consequently the foundation is different, and the notion of indivisibility and of singular unity is different in God and in a creature; although in both the entitative unity follows the essence, nor is it part of its formal concept.

Third conclusion. — Although God is supremely one, yet He cannot be said to be one by numerical unity.

Thus the Doctor, in 1. d. 24. q. unica, and St. Bonaventure, ibidem art. 1. q. 1. To these the holy Fathers lend their favor, especially Basil, who in Epist. 113., reporting the calumny of certain men who had objected to him the dogma of three gods, denies that God is one in number, but only one in nature. For whatever, he says, is said to be one in number, this is not truly one, nor simple in nature. But God by all confession is simple, and free from composition. God is therefore not one in number. With him agrees St. Cyril, in the excerpts of the commentaries, lib. 7. and 8. on John, where he traces back the cause of the multiplication of singulars to bodies: One, he says, is the definition of nature in all, and all are one by nature. But in that we are divided by bodies, we are no longer one, but many: which indeed cannot be said of the true and natural God. For He is without a body; although we understand the holy Trinity in its proper subsistences. With him agrees Boetius, lib. De Trinitate, where after he had set forth the threefold genus of unity, namely either one in genus, or in species, or in number, he removes those three from God, especially the last: because number is made by the difference and variety of accidents, he says, but in God there is no diversity, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents; and therefore no number, but only unity. For when God is repeated a third time, when the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are named, three unities do not make a plurality of number in that which they are; if we attend to the numberable things, and not to the number itself. The other Fathers add the reason why number must be kept away from God, because namely in every number there is an order of prior and posterior, and a grade of first and second, etc. Since therefore in God nothing is prior or posterior, namely in nature and dignity, neither is there number in Him. Whence Paschasius, lib. 1. De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 6.: When you hear "one", he says, number does not begin here, but infinite perfection is gathered together. What is "one" but an incommunicable name, which receives neither a posterior nor a prior? What is "one" but a simple, uncompounded, and undivided substance? What is "one" but incommunicable and unequal, and always the same, which can never be diverse from itself? By these words he touched all the notions of the divine Unity, namely that God is one because He is simple, and does not consist of parts, and that there are not many and diverse; and that the same remains without any variety and change. Finally, that in Him there is no grade of first and second. These things the Bishop Cerealis also clearly unfolds, lib. Contra Maximum Arianum, cap. 15.

God is not numbered, he says, because He is not subject to numbers. Our God therefore is one; for since the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist, no Christian will be able to say three Gods; because in nothing does their nature differ from one another: number, to be sure, requires order; equality does not admit it. For one follows the first, to another the third is applied: but since grades cannot be made out of equals, which could be subordinated; how is He numbered? Therefore since He will be one, He has no second. The second, to be sure, holds the order of the lesser, and the lesser makes further; the one indicates the posterior, the posterior marks the unequal. Remove the distance, and you will have nothing to number.

But the Subtle Doctor already praised proves that God cannot be numbered either ad intra or ad extra, because, as we said in the third Note, three conditions are required for number, of which the first and second cannot fit God: and so neither the divine essence with the three Persons, nor the Persons themselves mutually, nor God with creatures will constitute a number simply and perfectly, since in these no single notion can be simply common. And since God eminently contains all things, He can have no potentiality, and hence no numberability.

You will say. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are God: but those three Persons make the ternary number: therefore in God number must be admitted, and the divine unity does not exclude number.

It is confirmed. For St. Cyril, in 23. Thesauri, calls the Son another from the Father in number: and in the fragment of lib. 7., the one inheres in the other; and on that account they are not one in number. And St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratione 13., says that the monad was moved on account of its riches, and, having passed beyond the binary, ceased in the Trinity on account of perfection. And Eusebius, in the Creed, after he had said, that we say the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit one by one, this is because by the poverty of human speech we cannot express the three names together, not because we order them by three grades. Where the whole is one, there cannot be a third or a second. The whole therefore in the fullness of the Divinity is first, and that which seems last by the necessity of speech; he adds: In these three Persons number can be, order cannot be; for although the Trinity admits distinction, equality nevertheless knows no grade: therefore the highest unity of God does not exclude every number.

I answer. Indeed, by reason of the Persons, at least an imperfect number, which is made without any order of grade, can be conceded in God: nor do the holy Fathers deny this, who assert that a certain wonderful and ineffable commerce of unity and number is found in God: For although there is something ineffable, says St. Augustine, tract. 39. in Ioann., which cannot be explained in words, so that it is both a number and not a number. For see whether a number does not as it were appear, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, a Trinity. If three; three what? number fails. So God neither recedes from number, nor is He captured by number: because they are three, as it is a number. If you ask three what, it is not a number. Think that the three are one. With him agrees St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consid., cap. 7.:

Who will have this (so to speak) number without number? if three, how is it not a number? If one, where is number? Then, objecting to himself: Since those three Persons are that substance; and that one substance is the three Persons; who would deny number? He answers: For truly they are three: who would number them, however? for truly they are one. But if you think this easy to explain by saying three, tell me, what have you numbered? Natures? there is one. Essences? there is one. Substances? there is one. Deities? there is one. Not these, but the Persons I number, you say. Which are not that one Nature, that one Essence, that one Substance, that one Divinity. You are a Catholic; you will not grant this at all.

By which it is established that God excludes perfect number, and hence His divine unity is neither the principle nor the companion of number.