Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It is certain, and beyond controversy, that God is not ineffable with respect to Himself, as if He could not perfectly express Himself by some concept and mental word, and also take up some name, whether uttered by Himself or by others, for perfectly knowing and signifying Himself, in that way, namely, in which He uses our words and prayers, so that He perceives those things of which we speak to Him and by which we pray to Him. For since He knows Himself perfectly and comprehensively, it does not seem incongruous that He can also name Himself. It is likewise certain that God is not so ineffable with respect to us, as if no discourse about Him could be had, and no name could be imposed on Him by creatures; for this is shown to be false by experience itself. Inasmuch as there are several names by which we signify and designate God. It remains, therefore, to be inquired and resolved, whether there are any names which can make the divine essence known to creatures distinctly, essentially, and comprehensively. In order that this may be resolved the more evidently

Note 1. From the Subtle Doctor, in 1. dist. 22. q. 2. n. 7. A proper name can be attributed to some thing in two ways. First, insofar as it signifies that something truly belongs to it alone; thus omnipotent, immense, eternal can be called proper names of God. Second, insofar as they designate not only the peculiar property and perfection of the thing, but also its very essence and nature; thus the word man is proper to human nature, which it designates and expresses; which latter acceptation of a proper name is the more fitting.

Note 2. From the same, something can be named in various ways, but especially in four. First, when its proper name is uttered by someone who neither perceives the significate nor intends to signify anything by the utterance of this name; thus, v. g., a parrot can utter some name imposed on God, by which His divine nature itself would be signified to a man, whether a wayfarer or one of the Blessed, who would hear this name uttered, although the one uttering it would not perceive that signification. Second, when a name is indeed uttered to signify some concept which the utterer himself would nevertheless not perceive, although the hearer would understand the signification of that name; v. g., if someone should utter a Hebrew word whose signification he himself did not know, before a man skilled in the Hebrew language, who would perceive that signification. Third, when someone pronounces a word or name in order to open his concepts to another who understands the signification of the name or word, as happens in the ordinary conversations of men. Fourth and finally, when someone forms a name in order to express his own concepts to himself: thus for the most part we express our mental word by the word of the mouth.

Note 3. This is the distinction between distinct, quidditative, and comprehensive knowledge: that distinct knowledge is knowledge of a thing according to something proper to itself, whether that be an essential predicate, or only its property and peculiar perfection. Quidditative knowledge, however, is knowledge of a thing through its essential predicates, namely genus and difference. Comprehensive knowledge, indeed, is the apprehension of the thing itself, not only according to its properties and essential predicates, but also according to all the modes and grades of its perfection, and according to all the habitudes and respects which it can have to any terminus.

It must be seen, therefore, whether any names can be attributed to God which effect and signify this threefold knowledge of Him.

First conclusion. — God is not absolutely ineffable: but He can be designated by some name signifying distinct knowledge of Him. This Conclusion has two parts, of which the first is proved by experience itself, by which it is established that certain names are attributed to God which express and designate that supreme being, the principle and end of all others, such as are God, Creator, first Cause, etc.

It is evident also from Sacred Scripture, which attributes several names to God, in order to explain His supreme majesty, infinite power, and the rest of His divine excellences: whence St. Dionysius rightly observes, lib. De Divinis Nom. cap. 5., that God is at once anonymous and polyonymous, that is, void of name and of many names:

Void of name indeed, because it surpasses every name; but of many names, so that His infinite nature, which cannot be designated by a single word, may be illustrated and shine forth by many names, as by so many rays. Whence the theologians, says Dionysius in the same place, praise the cause and author of all things by many names drawn from all His effects, as good, as beautiful, as wise, as lovable, as God of Gods, as Lord of Lords, as Holy of Holies, as eternal, as Him who is: as the author of the ages, as the giver of life, as wisdom, as mind, as Word, as knower, as Him who eminently possesses the treasures of all knowledge, as power, as mighty, as King of kings, as the Ancient of Days, as Him who cannot be driven into old age, and immutable, as salvation, as justice, sanctification, redemption, as Him who surpasses all in greatness, and as in a gentle breeze. —

Since, therefore, it openly stands, both from the sacred writings and from the words of all the wise, that several names are attributed to God by which He is perceived by us; it is certain that He is not simply and absolutely ineffable. Which St. Augustine elegantly declares, lib. 1. De Doctr. Christ. cap. 6.: God is not even to be called ineffable, because when this is said, something is said, and there arises I know not what battle of words: since if that is ineffable which cannot be said, that is not ineffable which can even be called ineffable. As if he would say, by this very fact that God is called ineffable, He is not absolutely ineffable, since the word ineffable is an appellation of His, and His proper name.

The second part is proved also. A thing is known distinctly through a name when it is conceived and signified as distinct from others; and it is known according to some attribute peculiar to itself alone: but there are several names which lead us into distinct knowledge of God, and distinguish Him from any other being, such as are first cause, ultimate end, a being infinite in every way, etc. Therefore God can be known with distinct knowledge through some names proper to Him.

You will say. The Holy Fathers pronounce God absolutely unnameable: thus St. Dionysius, in the cited book, says: Of God there is neither sense, nor imagination, neither opinion, nor name, nor speech, nor touch, nor knowledge. And St. Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 49.: Truly this is God, he says, which when it is said cannot be said; when it is esteemed cannot be esteemed; when it is defined, grows by the very definition, etc. Whence in Orat. 34. he commends that sentence of Plato saying that to understand God is difficult, but to speak of Him is impossible: therefore God is ineffable.

I deny the antecedent. And I say that the Holy Fathers do not intend that God is ineffable in every way, otherwise they would openly contradict themselves as well as Sacred Scripture; but that the names which we attribute to God are far inferior to His divine majesty, and do not express Him so distinctly that He can be understood without any commerce with creatures. For the names which are attributed to God do not declare His divine essence distinctly, because we neither penetrate nor perceive it as it is in itself; but we only circumscribe it, either by attributing to Him, and that in the supreme degree, all the perfections which we observe to shine forth in creatures; or by removing from Him all the imperfections of creatures: for all the names of God are attributed to Him either by affirmation of perfection, or by negation of imperfection, or by habitude and respect to creatures: and hence they always have some commerce with creatures, and do not enunciate God as He is in Himself, perfectly distinct from all things.

Second conclusion. — A wayfarer can designate some name by which the essence of God is expressed, and which signifies the quidditative concept which He has of Himself, or the Blessed have of Him. This Conclusion is the Doctor's, in 1. dist. 22. q. 1. et. 2., and he proves it thus: If anything should hinder this designation and signification of a name from being possible, it would be chiefly because the imposition of a name requires that the name not signify the thing more perfectly than he who imposed the name conceives it: but this is false; therefore that also from which it follows is false.

He proves the minor: if we could not designate names to signify things in a more perfect way than we conceive them, it would follow that no name devised by us to signify a substance truly signifies the quiddity and essence of the substance itself, but only designates its properties, and makes known its sensible effects to those by whom such a name was designated: but the consequence is false: therefore also the antecedent.

The major is evident; for it is established that in this mortal state we can have no distinct quidditative concept of a substance in particular, v.g. of man or horse; but only a confused one, by which we conceive man or horse after the manner of certain things subsisting per se, and having an order to such or such operations, or accidents.

The minor is also evident; otherwise the statements would be useless and nugatory, by which the property of a substance or its effect is attributed to it, and predicated of it. For if the name of a substance does not signify its quidditative concept, but only expresses confusedly and without distinction all those things which pertain to the substance itself, whether they be property, effect, operation, or quiddity; it openly follows that the same thing is predicated of itself, when that property or effect is affirmed of the substance. V. g. when I say substance is endowed with quantity and whiteness, the sense would be: that which is endowed with quantity and whiteness; which repetition and predication is altogether nugatory.

The Doctor confirms first, since when Adam had imposed the name man, v. g., to express human nature, insofar as he himself knew it quidditatively and perfectly while he imposed that name (on the hypothesis, as I suppose, that he knew the essences of all things), it is certain that that name man is significative of human nature quidditatively and perfectly: but if some son of Adam, uttering this word man in his presence, had intended to designate and signify the quiddity of man, which he himself nevertheless had not known distinctly, it openly stands that Adam, hearing this word, would immediately have had the quidditative concept of human nature, although he who uttered it would not have such a concept: therefore likewise a son of Adam could have designated the name man, to signify human nature known to Adam himself, but not to his son.

— He confirms secondly. Although names are for the most part imposed on account of some properties or effects which move to such an imposition, just as, v. g., the hurting of the foot suited to a stone is the reason why that substance is called a stone: and the first formation of man from the earth was perhaps the occasion why the word man was taken up to signify human nature; nevertheless it is certain that those properties or effects are not precisely signified by those words, but the thing itself considered according to itself and quidditatively. Both because, when those words are heard, such properties or effects are not understood; but the entity or nature of the thing is conceived; for not as often as we hear the word stone uttered do we think of the hurting by a stone, but we designate the thing itself and the substance: and because different names in different languages signify entirely the same thing to those who understand those languages. For a Frenchman skilled in the Latin language, when he hears stone, conceives the same thing which is expressed by the French name la pierre: yet these different names could have been instituted on account of different motivating reasons drawn from the different properties of the thing; therefore it is certain that names are not always imposed to signify the thing according as it is conceived by the imposer of the name. The consequence is evident: for if they were so imposed, it would follow that since he who first designated the name of stone to signify the substance hurting the foot, then also whoever would hear this name would conceive nothing else than that foot-hurting power, which, however, is openly false.

Vasquez proves secondly, Disp. 57. cap. 2. n. 9. The measure of the signification of a name is not to be taken from him who imposed the name, nor precisely from him who uses the imposed name; but from him who hears and understands the concept of the speaker: but when wayfarers utter the name God, v. gr., the Blessed understand quidditatively and essentially that which wayfarers express and signify by this name: therefore that name, uttered and imposed by wayfarers, can distinctly signify the quiddity of the divine nature. He proves the major; because names are symbols and signs between him who speaks, or takes up a name, and him who hears: nay, rather they are said to signify the thing to the hearer of the name, than to the utterer himself; because they only lead the hearer into the understanding of the thing; but to signify is to bring it about that the thing is understood: but it can happen that he who hears the name conceives the thing much better than he who takes up, utters, or imposes the name understands it. He confirms the minor with these examples. First, someone can always conceive the already imposed word more distinctly than he who uses that word conceives it. For if someone

who has never been at Rome, when he speaks with a Roman about the site, majesty, riches, and excellence of that city, which he has learned only through report or reading; it is certain that the Roman, hearing the word Rome, perceives all these things better than he who utters such a name perceives them: therefore someone can signify a thing to another much more clearly and distinctly by a word already imposed for signifying it, than he himself understands it. Secondly, someone can also first impose a name signifying the thing more clearly to the hearers than the imposer himself conceives it: as if a king, v. g., sending an army to the Indies, should command the general that whatever city or island he first captured, he should call it by the name of Louis; then that name will designate that city or island more clearly to the general, and to the soldiers, and to the inhabitants, than to the king, who has never surveyed such a city or island; but has only an analogical concept of it by comparison with the other states or cities which he himself has seen.

You will say with Caietan. Words signify things by means of the formal concepts which the imposer of the word has, and the one using it to express the thing; therefore the distinct signification of the word and of the name arises from the distinct knowledge of the imposer of the name, or of the one using the already imposed name: and consequently, he cannot impose a name to signify the thing more distinctly than he himself conceives it.

I answer 1. That the antecedent is absolutely false, since a parrot, by uttering some name, leads into thought of the thing expressed by the name, of which, however, it has no formal concept. I deny the sequel likewise; for since the imposition of a name is made by an act of the will, knowledge of the thing to be signified by the name is required in no other way than because the will, since it is a blind potency, can neither be borne toward the unknown, nor know a thing except by the prior knowledge of the intellect: so neither can it institute any name for signifying a thing, unless it first know that thing, at least by a general and confused concept, nor is it required that it know it by a perfectly distinct and quidditative concept.

You will insist. A name cannot have any distinct signification except from the imposer; but the imposer cannot give what he does not have: but he does not have distinct and quidditative knowledge of the thing to be named, as is supposed: therefore he cannot give to the name a power to signify the thing more distinctly than he himself has known it.

I distinguish the antecedent. That a name has no signification except from the imposer, that is, that it is not ordered to signify this thing under such a concept, except because the imposer ordered it so, I concede: that it does not signify the thing itself more perfectly and distinctly to anyone perceiving the name and knowing its attribution to this thing to be signified, than the imposer himself has conceived and ordered it, I deny. For since the ordering of a word is made by an act of the will, for which the prior knowledge of the intellect is desired, it is not required that the knowledge of the thing in the intellect be as great as the intention of the imposer of the name that it signify the thing.

You will press. If the imposer in no way knew the thing to be named, his will could not order the name to signify it: therefore if he does not know it distinctly, he will not be able to give to the name any power to signify it distinctly.

I deny the consequence. For although some knowledge of the intellect is desired for the action of the will, it nevertheless does not follow that a more perfect knowledge precedes and generates a more perfect act of the will; because, given the same knowledge at different times, the same will can now love some thing more perfectly, now less perfectly, as is evident from experience. Nay, in the same instant in which it loved an object according to two grades of love, it can love it as four: therefore by a like argument, although some knowledge is required that a name be imposed to signify a thing, nevertheless it does not follow that distinct knowledge of the thing is desired, that a name be imposed to signify the thing distinctly.

You will insist finally. It is easier to conceive a thing than to explain it in words, as is evident both from experience and from those authorities of the holy Fathers, by which we said above that God is more easily conceived than expressed: therefore he who knows a thing imperfectly cannot signify it perfectly through words imposed by himself, otherwise it would be easier to explain and signify a thing than to know it.

I distinguish the antecedent. That it is easier to conceive a thing than to express it in words, when someone has words already imposed for signifying the thing as he conceives it, and the other also knows the signification of the word, and has the same concepts of the thing signified by the words as the speaker has, I deny the antecedent: when the speaker either does not have proper and already customary words by which he may express his concept of the thing; or the hearer does not know that the words are imposed for this signification, or does not have the same concepts of the thing, for signifying which the words are ordered and instituted, then it is more difficult to express the thing than to conceive it, I concede: I distinguish the consequence in like manner, that he cannot signify this perfectly to those who have known that thing perfectly, I deny; to those who would not conceive it, I concede: nor do we assert that very thing.

In order, however, that all the other reasons to be objected against this truth may be solved more easily, it is to be noted that four things are required, that one may have a perfect and distinct signification of a word and name. First indeed it is necessary that the hearer know that the word is imposed for signifying this thing determinately. Second, it is fitting that he have a concept and knowledge of the thing to be signified, before he perceives it through such a name: for since a word cannot of itself precisely cause knowledge of the thing, but only insofar as it excites the species of it in the mind of the hearer of the word, thence it comes about that it cannot signify, unless it presuppose the concept of the thing to be signified, and its intelligible species in the mind of the hearer. Third, he ought to know that the speaker uses the words to signify the thing in that way, for which signification they are ordered. Fourth and finally, both the speaker and the hearer ought to have at hand, both the words, and to remember the signification of the words which they use to express the thing. Which four conditions being presupposed, it is certain that it is not more difficult to express a thing than to conceive it.

Third conclusion. — Some name can be designated by creatures, by which God knows Himself comprehensively. So judge St. Bonaventure, and Bassolius, q. 1. a. 2., although they affirm that such a name cannot be imposed by a creature, but only by God; for the reason that (they say) the signification of a name cannot be more perfect than the knowledge of the imposer is; which foundation is shown to be false from the preceding conclusion; and therefore nothing stands in the way, from their doctrine, that a created intellect, even in this life, could impose on God a name by which He knows Himself comprehensively.

— The truth of the conclusion is evident moreover from this, that such is the signification of a name as is the concept which the hearer has of the thing signified by the name; but God has comprehensive knowledge of Himself, insofar as He conceives us to express Him by the name, whether of God, or of infinite being, etc. Therefore names signifying God can be designated by a creature, by which He knows Himself comprehensively.

You will say 1. We can signify nothing to God through words or names; therefore neither can we impose any name by which God knows Himself comprehensively. The antecedent is proved; the use of words was introduced for this reason only, that the conceived thing which lay hidden in the mind, the word itself being substituted in place of the concept itself, may be expressed and become known to the hearer: but since God beholds the hearts of men, and searches their thoughts, we can express or indicate nothing to Him by words, by manifesting our concepts, which He Himself did not know before: therefore neither can we signify anything by words.

I deny the major. To the proof of which I say, a thing is never understood better by virtue of the imposition than it is known to the imposer, whether by himself, or through those whom he uses for imposing the name, as causes in some way concurring to the imposition. I said by virtue of the imposition, because I do not deny that it can be understood better from elsewhere, namely by virtue of a more perfect intellect, or for another cause. In which way the Angels understand spiritual things much better on hearing the words which we form about them, than the institutors of such names have known them. I said also, than it is known to the imposer by himself, or through those whom he uses for imposing the name; because it suffices that those know it; nay, it even suffices to know in first act, that is, to be able naturally to know, impediments being removed, or connatural causes being applied and helping. For names are imposed by men for the sake of human society and commerce, that they may signify things in that way in which they are wont to fall under concepts, according to the natural faculty of understanding considered per se, and commonly put in use.

You will say 2. In order that some name be imposed which would signify God comprehensively, it would have to contain and express the infinite terminations which God has to possible things, and without which He cannot be known comprehensively: but this infinite signification of terminations can belong to no name; but infinite names are needed to express infinite things: therefore, etc.

I answer. For comprehensive signification it is not necessary that that name explain distinctly all the notions and habitudes of the significate whatsoever, but it suffices that it express them implicitly and confusedly. For just as the name man signifies human nature quidditatively, and yet does not explain distinctly all its essential predicates, so can some name signify a thing comprehensively, although it does not explain distinctly every knowable notion in the thing signified, but only confusedly; provided, however, that the one using such a name for comprehensive knowledge have from elsewhere a sufficient principle for such comprehensive knowledge of that thing; and that name is only an occasion of perceiving comprehensively the thing which he already knew sufficiently from elsewhere in that way. Whence I judge that the names God, He who is, infinite being, and whatever else is proper to God, signify the divine nature comprehensively according to themselves; because although they do not explain distinctly every notion of God, they nevertheless signify that nature to which all those notions belong.