Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

We have already said in the first note of the preceding question that a thing can be changed extrinsically in three ways, namely by termination, whether of conversion, or of operation, or of relation; now it must be resolved whether God is mutable or immutable in either one, or in both, of these ways.

Note 1. Since the conversion of things is at most threefold, namely either through total cessation, such as is annihilation; or transmutation, which occurs through the corruption of one form and the generation of another, the same subject, namely matter, remaining; or finally through transubstantiation, when a thing passes according to its total substance, namely matter or form, into the substance of another. So too the terminus of conversion can be threefold: the terminus of annihilation is indeed non-being, that of transmutation is a part or an acquired form, e.g. the form of fire is the terminus of the transmutation of wood into fire; the terminus of transubstantiation, however, is the whole entity of the thing into which another is said to be transubstantiated; thus the adorable body of Christ can be called the terminus of the conversion by which the whole substance of bread and wine is changed into it through the Eucharistic consecration.

It is certain, however, that God cannot have the notion of terminus through annihilation, nor through transformation, since He can neither cease to be, because He is an absolutely necessary being, nor receive any form, because He is altogether simple. But it is doubtful whether anything can be converted into Him by way of transubstantiation, which effects no substantial change in its terminus; for the adorable body of Christ is not changed really and substantially by the conversion of bread and wine into it, although it is changed according to place, because it begins to be where it was not previously present.

Note 2. Creatures can be said to be the terminus of the divine intellect and will in two ways, namely either according to ideal being, insofar as they are and are represented in the divine Essence from eternity, or according to real being, and insofar as they exist a parte rei and in themselves in time. In the former way they are called an eternal and intrinsic terminus, in the latter, however, they are called an extrinsic and temporal terminus. The former termination is invariable and eternal, the latter is contingent and temporal. It is certain that the divine intellection and volition are immutable and unchanged with respect to the former terminus; the difficulty therefore is only whether any change in God Himself accrues from their termination to creatures existing in themselves.

Note 3. Relations of two kinds and orders can be distinguished in God: some indeed are notional and constitutive of the divine Persons, such as Paternity, Filiation, and passive Spiration; others, however, are temporal and ordered to creatures, such as the relations of Creator, Lord, Redeemer, etc. are conceived to be. The former are altogether invariable and immutable, just as the divine Essence itself is, to which they belong from eternity. Whether, however, the latter introduce some temporal change in God through their coming or their going is what must be resolved in this question.

First conclusion. — God is not mutable by the conversion of Himself into another, nor of another into Himself. This seems to be most certain, and the holy Fathers inculcate it often, and especially Saint Augustine, lib. 3. contra Maximinum, cap. 12.: By this, he says, God alone has immortality, because He neither could nor can be changed by any conversion. And lib. 1. De moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 10.: If anyone thinks that something of the divine substance or nature can at some time suffer change or conversion, he will be condemned for astonishing madness and impiety. Likewise Origen, 1. Periarchon, cap. 2.: The Wisdom of God, he says, which is His only-begotten Son, since it is in all things inconvertible and immutable, and every good in Him is substantial, can surely never be changed or converted.

Whence Cyril of Alexandria, in his lib. De Fide ad Theodosium, a little after the beginning, calls the opposite error a delirium and a rudeness.

The theologians of better note defend and prove the same opinion, and indeed St. Thomas, who, 3. p. quaest. 2. art. 1., speaking of the divine Essence, says: Neither can it itself be converted into another, since it is incorruptible, nor another into it, since it is ingenerable.

The Subtle Doctor proves the same thing in q. 10. of the Quodlibet, expounding the passage of Boethius disputing against Eutyches: The Divinity, says the Doctor, no less exceeds any causative active power in the notion of terminus, than one natural being, compared to another natural being, exceeds any natural power.

This proposition is clear, because since the Divinity is infinite and uncausable, it can in no way be the terminus of a causative power; but anything created can be the terminus of a causative power, and this not only absolutely, but compared to any other created being, as succeeding it.

Then let the argument of Boethius be made from the locus a maiori. If by the whole of created power a thing cannot be changed immediately into a stone: therefore much more, or at least equally, can created nature not be converted into the Divinity by any active power.

By which the Doctor contends that the divine Nature can be subject to no conversion, because it is unproducible, both according to being simpliciter and according to being secundum quid, since it is a being by essence and necessarily existing.

For every conversive action is productive of the terminus ad quem according to being simpliciter, or being secundum quid: but God is neither producible according to being simpliciter nor according to being secundum quid: therefore neither convertible. The major is clear. For just as for a true conversion it is necessary that the terminus a quo, which is converted into another, cease to be according to that notion in which it is said to be converted, so it is necessary that the terminus ad quem begin to be under that notion according to which another is said to be converted into it, e.g. in order that wood be converted into fire, the wood must cease to be wood according to the proper notion of wood, and the fire must come to be according to the proper notion of fire; for conversion properly so called is an action by which one thing is turned into another and passes over to another being; one thing, however, cannot pass over into another, and that other be made from it, unless it itself ceases to be what it is, and unless the other becomes what it was not.

The minor likewise stands firm; otherwise God would not be a being by essence and necessarily existing, if He could be produced according to entity, or according to some part of entity.

You will say 1. A conversion can take place without any production and intrinsic change of the thing into which another is converted: therefore God, without any imperfection of His own, can be the terminus of conversion. The antecedent is proved from the Doctor at the place cited above, n. 9., where he distinguishes a threefold conversion, by which something is converted into a pre-existing thing. The first indeed takes place without real change in substantial and intrinsic being, but only in accidental and extrinsic being, just as, e.g., the body of Christ is said to be the terminus of the conversion of the substance of bread and wine, because it succeeds it and has a new ubi, although not in the same way in which that substance previously had it, and although it is not produced according to this being, it is nevertheless produced according to being here, that is, in this place. The second, by which something that previously was, but afterwards is not, is converted into another; thus wood is converted into fire. The third, finally, by which something is converted into another, both according to being simpliciter and secundum quid, without any novelty and change, both intrinsic and extrinsic, in the terminus ad quem of the conversion.

That this conversion, however, can take place is clear; for if a substance could be the terminus of conversion without its intrinsic change, but only through a change of an accident, it will also be able to be the terminus of such a conversion even though no change of an accident intervenes; for a substance does not receive from accidental being the power to be the terminus of conversion, because an accident is posterior to a substance, and what is prior does not receive its notion and power from what is posterior.

It is confirmed by the example of a conservative action, which terminates at the very same being formed by the first production, without any new production or real change, whether substantial or accidental, in the thing conserved.

I deny the antecedent. For no true conversion, as has been said, can take place without the cessation, whether total or partial, of the terminus a quo, and the production of the terminus ad quem, whether according to its total being or according to its partial being, substantial or accidental.

To the Doctor I say that there he does not speak definitively, but doubtfully and by way of disputation; for he does not absolutely judge that a true conversion can take place without any substantial or accidental novelty in the terminus ad quem of that conversion, for in the same place, n. 7., he requires that that terminus be conserved dependently on the cessation of the terminus a quo.

God, however, since He cannot be produced, so neither can He be conserved, whether dependently or independently, on the cessation of any being.

Add that the same Doctor, in 4. dist. 11. q. 3. n. 22., expressly affirms that transubstantiation necessarily effects something new in the terminus, namely in the body of Christ, to wit a new ubi, which that adorable body did not previously have; for nothing, he says, is properly the terminus of an action, namely of the genus of action, without receiving being through that action — and this at least according to that being according to which it is the formal terminus of that action. Whence also the Son of God, who is the terminus of the Father's active generation, receives through that generation being, and being a Person, and being God. Otherwise, if He receives none of it, it does not seem to be intelligible how there is there something terminating the generation which is an action of the genus of action.

To the confirmation. I say that there is no parity, for conservation is not per se some new action, but the continuation of the prior production: whence it need not have a new terminus distinct from the produced terminus, whereas conversion is a real action, and therefore it can neither be made nor understood without another new terminus that is likewise real.

You will say 2. The divine Word terminates the unitive action of the humanity with itself, without any mutation or imperfection of itself: therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will be able to terminate the conversive action of some creature into itself.

I deny the consequence. For that termination of the union of the human nature with the Word is not made by way of the terminus of a true and real action: but by way of the terminus of a relation, or insofar as it terminates the real respect which the humanity has to it, no respect to a creature resulting in it, except one of reason.

You will insist. For that reason God could not be the terminus of the conversion of something into himself, chiefly because he cannot terminate any real productive action: but this is false, for the proceeding Person in the divine is the terminus of a productive action: therefore to terminate a productive action does not repugn to the divine Being, nor consequently will it repugn to him to be the terminus of a conversive action.

I distinguish the minor. That he is the terminus of a productive action through true causality, which is an emanation of one from another with dependence, I deny; that it is the communication of the same nature, and of the same perfections, from another indeed really distinct, but through a relation by which he is really identified with the very nature communicated, and which communication is made without any dependence on the producer, and without any mutation in the terminus a quo, I concede: but conversion necessarily imports dependence on the converter, and cessation in the terminus a quo, because to be converted into another is nothing other than to be turned and changed into it, so that it begins to be to its own cessation and mutation: but these things cannot belong to God, as has already been said, and therefore God can neither be converted into another, nor anything into him.

You will say 3. From Tertullian, lib. De carne Christi, cap. 3., God can be changed into anything without any imperfection of himself: therefore he is convertible into another. The antecedent is evident, for when Tertullian had objected to himself on the part of Marcion, who denied that the divine Word truly put on a human nature in the Incarnation;

I deny, he says, that God was truly converted into a man, so as to be born and to be embodied in flesh, because he who is without end must also be inconvertible; for to be converted into another is the end of the former state. Conversion, therefore, does not befit him to whom an end does not befit. Clearly the nature of convertible things is under this law, that they do not remain in that into which they are converted, and so, by not remaining, they perish, while by being converted they lose what they were.

He answers:

Nothing is equal to God; his nature is distant from the condition of all things. If, therefore, the things which are distant from God, and from which God is distant, when they are converted, lose what they were, where will the diversity of the Divinity from the rest of things be, unless it contain the contrary, that is, that God can both be converted into all things and persevere as he is? Otherwise he will be equal to those things which, when converted, lose what they were, to which surely God is not equal in all things, if not in the outcome of the conversion:

Therefore Tertullian holds that God, although unchanged, can be changed into all things.

I distinguish. That he holds God can be changed into all things through the termination of dependence, and through the hypostatic union, I concede; through a true conversive action, of which we speak, I deny; for he adds that the Angels assumed a human appearance, that from this he might demonstrate that God could assume the same, against Marcion, who denied that the Son of God put on true flesh, whence he concludes: What, therefore, was allowed to the Angels, who are inferior to God — that, having been converted into human corpulence, the angels nevertheless remained — this you take away from the more powerful God, as if Christ, truly clothed with a man, could not persevere as God.

Second conclusion. — God is not mutable by the access, or recession of any relation. Thus the Doctor in 1. d. 30. q. 2.¹, and he proves it from the perfect simplicity of God, and from his supreme necessity of being. From perfect simplicity indeed, because, he says, God is perfectly simple, nothing is in him which is not himself, according to St. Augustine, lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10., God is simple, because he is what he has, that is, in God there is no real distinction, namely between the essential and the absolute, because the divine Essence, through its infinity, really identifies with itself whatever is in it: but this would be false, if any real relation receded from God: therefore, etc. The same thing is also evinced from the perfect necessity of being; for from the fact that God is the most necessary being, he has from himself, actually from eternity, and independently of anything whatsoever, whatever he can have: whence nothing is really identified with him which is not independent of the existence of any creature, so that although, if per impossibile no creature were possible, God would nonetheless contain in himself every perfection no less than he in fact embraces: but this would be false, if there were any real relation in him terminated at a creature, because it is impossible that such a relation exist, if the creature were not possible, or actually existing.

You will say 1. In time several relations come to God, for example those of Creator, Lord, Redeemer, etc., which are truly real, since they follow real foundations actually existing, and distinct from one another.

I answer. That satisfaction has already been given to this objection in the preceding question, where we said that these relations import no real mutation in God, but only in the creature, as St. Augustine expressly proves and explains in the words cited by us.

You will say 2. If mutability to a relation repugned to God, it would be chiefly because this would harm his real immutability: but it is not so: therefore he can be mutable in this way. The minor is proved, both from Boethius, lib. De Trinit., where he expressly proves that a relation effects no real mutation, and from St. Anselm, cap. 44. Monologii, where, having distinguished two kinds of accidents, some of which effect mutation in the things which they affect, such as are quantity and quality, while others import no such variation, such as are relations, he concludes.

It is therefore evident that of those things which are called accidents, some in some measure draw along commutability, while others in no way detract from immutability. Just as, therefore, the supreme nature never gives place in its simplicity to accidents effecting mutation, so according to those which in no way repugn to supreme immutability, it at times does not refuse to be called something, and yet nothing of its essence happens to it, whereby it could be understood as variable.

It is confirmed. The divine Essence, which in the prior sign of reason is pre-understood before the relations of origin, is not mutated by them in the posterior sign, but is only determined to constituting the divine persons: therefore by a like argument it would not be mutated by the advent of some real relation to a creature.

I deny the minor. For any thing whatsoever is truly and really judged to be mutated, whenever it receives or loses some real entity, whether absolute, because through its access or recession it truly has or does not have what it had previously had or had not. To Boethius and Anselm I say that they are to be understood in this way, that relations do not effect any sensible and physical mutation, such as quantity effects; but only an insensible and metaphysical one, namely on account of their most tenuous entity. As for the confirmation, however, I deny the parity; for the relations of origin effect mutation in the divine Essence for this reason, because they are not forms really distinct from it, nor can it exist without them, although it can be conceived apart from them; but it is otherwise with the relations which God would newly have to Creatures; for those would be really distinguished from his essence, since they would newly accrue to him, and this essence would have existed from eternity without them.

Third conclusion. — God is terminatively immutable according to the operations of the intellect, and of the will. The truth of this conclusion is evident from those things which we said in the proof of the last conclusion of the preceding question, where we proved the immutability of God's intellect and will more than sufficiently, and this same truth will be shown more fully in the treatise on the divine intellect and will.

You ask. Whether God alone is immutable.

I affirm. Both because he alone is pure act, altogether simple and infinite, which are the three principal reasons of his very divine immutability; whereas the creature, on the contrary, has a threefold opposite reason of mutation. First, for it is made from non-being, and tends to nothing. Second, because it is composed of matter and form, subject and accident, essence and existence, which can be separated from one another. Third, finally, since it is finite and imperfect, something of perfection can always be added to it or taken away from it.

In proof of this matter, it suffices to behold man himself, who never remains in the same state. For every day, says Zeno Veronensis, in his sermon De Patientia, he delights in changes, is eager for varieties, and thinks himself miserable, if he is the same to himself. Whence Georgius Venetus, lib. 1. Harmoniae, wittily calls man spherical and volatile. To him likewise fits that saying of Horatius, epist. 1. What he seeks he scorns, he repeats what he lately gave up: He seethes, and disagrees with the whole order of life, He tears down, builds up, changes squares for round things.