Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Three things are proposed for discussion in this Question: first, whether God is truly said to coexist with the creature, and eternity with time. Second, whether this coexistence is divisible like time, or entirely indivisible like eternity. Third, whether time and temporal things so coexist with eternity that they are always present to it and from eternity, so that compared with eternity they have nothing future nor past, but only present: which, in order that it may be discussed and resolved more fully

Note 1. The distinction between eternity and time is various, but especially threefold. First, eternity is an uncreated duration, entirely independent; time, however, is a created and dependent duration, since it is the duration of motion which depends on the mover. Second, eternity is an interminable and infinite duration both a priori and a posteriori; time, however, is a finite and limited duration, at least from the prior side, because it has its beginning, although perhaps it will not have an end, on the hypothesis that the circulations of the heavens will last forever. Third, eternity, like the aevum, is formally indivisible and wholly at once; the duration of time, however, is essentially flowing and successive, so that its parts can in no way really exist simultaneously; for the past no longer is, and the future does not yet exist.

Note 2. Something can be said to be divisible chiefly in three ways: first, formally, whose parts actually existing can actually be separated from one another: thus a two-foot quantity is divisible into two feet. Second, virtually, whose parts are not actually divided nor existing, but only by virtue and potency: thus the continuum is said to be divisible to infinity, not because it actually has infinite parts, but because it could have them, if namely it were divided again and again. Third, eminently, when an indivisible thing has from its perfection and excellence, but in a nobler way, all that perfection which divisible or divided things comprise.

Note 3. Creatures can be said to be present to God in three ways; namely, either objectively and ideally, insofar as they are always and from eternity known by him. Second, virtually, because he has the power to produce, preserve, and reproduce them when they have ceased to be. Third, really, when they coexist with the existing God through their actual and real existence.

First conclusion. — God truly coexists with the creature, and eternity with time.

This is the express opinion of the Subtle Doctor; for in q. 6. Quodlib. art. 6. he affirms that eternity is that divine perfection by which God can coexist with any difference of time: and in 1. d. 9. quaest. unica n. 6., teaching how it can be said of the divine Word that it has been begotten and that it is being begotten; and disclosing how the words of different times are attributed to God, he says:

I answer that they can more properly be said to consignify the now of eternity than the differences of time: yet not that now absolutely, because then there would be no variation in the different modes of signifying time, but insofar as it coexists with the parts of time, as when it is said, God has begotten, then the now of eternity is signified, so that the sense is: God has the act of generation in the now of eternity: insofar as that now coexisted with the past; God is begetting, that is, he has the act in the now of eternity, insofar as the now of eternity coexists with the present; and from this it is clear that, since that now truly coexists with any difference of time, we truly say of God the differences of all times.

Likewise, in d. 10 q. unica, resolving how it can be said that one who is predestined can be damned, he says: that predestination is an act always present, and that God can so freely will in the now of eternity what he wills, as if his will were determined to nothing: whence he concludes: the predestination of this one does not pass into the past; for although it coexisted with past things which have passed away, yet it itself has not passed away, if other things have passed away which coexisted with it, etc.

This truth is proved. First indeed from Sacred Scripture, which very often affirms that God is with time and reigns for ages of ages. The same is established from the Fathers. For St. Anselm, after he had taught, cap. 19. Monologii, that God is not properly in time nor in place, insofar as this signifies being contained and bounded by time or place; nevertheless adds that God is in time and place, insofar as he is present to both: but this presence is nothing other than coexistence. Whence in cap. 22 he says: Inevitable necessity demands that the supreme essence, whole, be absent from no place or time; it is necessary that it be simultaneously whole, present in all places and times. With him agrees Richard of St. Victor, lib. 2. De Trinit. c. 23.

Just as, he says, God is in every place presentially, so in every time he is eternally, in none temporally; for just as he who is supremely simple and uncompounded is not distinguished through places, so neither is he who is eternal and unchangeable varied through times.

The truth itself is evident also by reason; for to coexist with another is nothing other than to be present to the other according to existence, and to have duration together with it: but it is true that time with eternity, and God with the creature, have duration and existence: therefore also coexistence.

You will say 1. — God and his eternity prescind from all time and exceed it: therefore they do not coexist with it. The antecedent is evident from the authority of St. Augustine, lib. De vera Relig. cap. 19.: Eternal life, he says, surpasses temporal life by that very truth; nor do I catch sight, even by understanding, of what eternity is: for by the mind's gaze I separate all mutability from eternity, and in eternity itself I discern no spaces of time. And 5. De Trinit. cap. 1.: Let us understand God presiding without place … sempiternal without time. Ansel. In Prosol. cap. 19.: You were not yesterday, nor will you be tomorrow: but you are yesterday, and today and tomorrow, but simply you are outside all time.

I distinguish the antecedent. — That God, as he exists, absolutely prescinds from time and altogether passes beyond it, I concede: that, as he coexists and is present to it, I deny. It is certainly true that God, by reason of his eternal duration, passes beyond the duration of any creature and of time, since he has existed through the whole of eternity, while neither creature nor time yet existed: insofar, however, as his duration and eternity is conceived as it now is, it does not prescind from an existing creature nor from existing time, but coexists with both. The holy Fathers speak of the former, not of the latter.

You will say 2. — Coexistence is a real relation on the part of both terms, because it is a relation of equiparance: but neither to God nor to his eternity can a real relation belong with respect to creature and time, otherwise he would be mutable: therefore neither can coexistence.

I distinguish the major. — That coexistence is a relation in its formal concept, I deny: in its concomitant concept, let it pass. For coexistence, as such, does not formally signify a real relation, or precisely one of reason; but only the negation of distance between two things; although it concomitantly imports a real relation or one of reason, according as the coexisting things are capable of receiving that relation. Whence coexistence in the creature is a real relation, and a transcendental one, because it is inseparable from its foundation, which is the very existence of the creature: for just as it is absolutely repugnant that a creature exist without dependence on the Creator, so it is repugnant that it exist without coexistence with the Creator; but on the part of God this relation is only a relation of reason; since nothing real accrues to God through the existence of the creature.

You will say 3.¹ — The present cannot coexist with the past and the future, just as a point does not coexist with the whole line, because the indivisible is not coextended with the divisible: but eternity is always present: therefore it does not coexist with past or future time.

I distinguish the major. — That which is present and entirely indivisible both virtually and formally, like a point with respect to a line, cannot coexist with the divisible, I concede: that which is present and formally indivisible, but virtually divisible, cannot coexist with the divisible, I deny: for an Angel, although formally of itself it is indivisible, can nevertheless have a divisible local presence; as also the rational soul, which although in its substance it is indivisible, nevertheless actuates and informs a divisible body. Whence although eternity is formally and absolutely indivisible, nevertheless since it is virtually divisible, it will be able to coexist with the various parts of time, as he will disclose more fully

Second conclusion. — The coexistence of God and of eternity with time is successive and divisible, just as time itself.

This Conclusion is evident and is confirmed by all those places of Scripture by which the differences of time according to before and after are attributed to the divine existence. Thus Proverbiorum 8.: Before all the hills I was brought forth. Psal. 73.: God our King before the ages. Exodi 10.: The Lord will reign in eternity, and beyond; that is, beyond all determinate time, as St. Anselm explains in Prosologio, cap. 20. And this exposition is evident, for beyond eternity properly taken no duration can be imagined in which God is understood to reign. Likewise ad Ephesios 1.: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, etc., by which an imaginary past time is attributed to God, which is imagined to have preceded the foundation of the world.

Reason evidently confirms the same; for since coexistence is the simultaneous existence of two things, it cannot remain, unless the existence of both subsists: but the existence of time, coexisting with eternity, does not subsist, but is in perpetual flux, so that, one part departing, another succeeds: therefore it cannot come about that the coexistence of eternity with it ceases to be, and another anew succeeds with the succeeding part of time: and so there must be as many mutually succeeding parts of this coexistence as there are flowing parts in time.

Hence St. Augustine excellently confirms and explains all things, Tract. 99. in Ioannem, where, weighing that saying of John, cap. 16.: Whatsoever he shall hear, he will speak, he adds:

In the eternal, that which is sempiternal is without beginning and without end. Let a verb of any time be posited, whether past, present, or future, it is not posited mendaciously. For although that immutable and ineffable nature does not receive was and will be, but only is: for it truly is, which cannot be changed; … yet on account of the mutability of times in which our mortality is engaged, … we do not mendaciously say both was, and will be, and is; it was in past ages, it is in the present, it will be in the future: it was because it never was lacking: it will be because it never will be lacking: it is because it always is: for neither, like one who already is not, did it fall with the past; nor with the present, like one who does not remain, does it slip away; nor with the future, like one who had not yet been, will it arise. Accordingly, since human thought is varied according to the volumes of times, of him who could not, cannot, and will not be absent through any times, the verbs of any time are truly said.

From these words, as our Smisingus acutely notes, quaest. De Aeternitate, n. 81., three things may be gathered: first indeed, that the divine eternity truly coexists with the differences of times, since, as Augustine says, it was not lacking to them, that is, it is not at a distance from them. Second, that eternity itself coexists successively with those various differences of times, since has been, is, and will be are pronounced of it. Third, that this succession does not regard the nature, nor therefore the divine existence, which is wholly immutable and invariable, and subsists wholly at once: but only coexistence, which although on the part of the creature is consequently a real relation, on the part of God is only a relation of reason, which our intellect feigns, so that it may more easily perceive and explain that divine presence and simultaneous existence with the creature.

You will say 1. — There is no succession where there is no past or future, but only the present: but in God it is so. It is proved from St. Augustine, 5. De Trinitate: With God, he says, past and future things stand. And again: Thus, he says, those things which are called past have not passed away there, nor are those things which are called future awaited as lacking, that they may come; but all things are thought as present. All the other Fathers hold the same: therefore coexistence is not divisible.

I deny the minor. — For although the existence of God suffers no succession and division, nevertheless the coexistence itself of him with flowing and successive creatures is divisible and flowing.

To St. Augustine I say. — that he, like the other Fathers affirming the same, is to be understood of the objective presence of God, by which it comes about that, as Augustine himself, explaining that saying of Psalm 49. The beauty of the field is with me, says: All things are with him, constituted in the Word by a certain knowledge of the ineffable wisdom of God: whence he inquires: why are all things with him? then he answers: because even before all things were or were created, all things were known to him. With him agrees St. Gregory, lib. 4. Moralium, cap. 27., saying: Eternity does not have future being, for in it surely neither past things pass away, nor those things which are future come, because it beholds all things through the present. As if he would say: God, from eternity, through his infinite power of understanding, because he has present to himself future and past things, beholds them so openly as if they in fact existed in the nature of things.

You will say 2. — Eternity is the whole-at-once and perfect possession of life, that is, existence: therefore it suffers no succession.

I distinguish the consequence. — That it suffers no succession in its formal concept of eternity, and insofar as it is the duration of the divine essence, I concede: that insofar as it signifies the relation of its coexistence with creatures it is all at once, I deny. For since coexistence cannot subsist without the mutual existence of extremes coexisting with one another, it is necessary that if one flows, the other also flows, and accordingly the coexistence of eternity with time is necessarily successive.

You will say 3. — Whatever is in God is pure act, immutable and eternal; and accordingly excludes potency to the privation of a form held, and to the acquisition of a new one; and consequently imports no succession: but the coexistence of God with creatures and of eternity with time is in God: therefore the coexistence of God and of eternity with time cannot be successive.

I distinguish the major. — That whatever is in God intrinsically and really, by way of an essential or attributive predicate, is pure act, I concede; that whatever is in him only extrinsically, and by only an external denomination and a relation of reason, is pure act, invariable and eternal, I deny. For it is certain that the appellations of Lord, Creator, etc., which are attributed to God, and which import only a relation of reason, are not conceived by way of pure and eternal act, since they are attributed to God only in time, and from time. But coexistence is not something intrinsic to God, but is conceived by way of a relation of reason, which is feigned in God from his presence and simultaneous existence with the creature.

Third conclusion. — Temporal things do not coexist with God from eternity, nor with his eternity: then because to coexist supposes existence on the part of both terms: but creatures do not always exist in eternity; for it is certain that they were never truly and really from eternity, nor can they be said to exist in eternity; otherwise the past and the future would not befit them: therefore they do not coexist with eternity. Then because the coexistence of a created being with another is a real relation: therefore it cannot belong to a created thing before it exists in itself; because a real relation demands a real foundation, and consequently the real relation of coexistence requires the real existence of the thing which coexists with another: but the creature does not have real existence before it is in fact produced, and truly and properly exists in itself. Then finally because, since the finite cannot be made equal to the infinite, time, which is finite both from the part before and from the part after, cannot be made equal to eternity, which is infinite in both ways, and excludes every term of duration. Therefore neither can it coexist adequately with eternity, since this adequation imports equal duration.

You will say 1. Eternity is an indivisible duration and wholly at once: therefore what coexists with it at some time coexists with the whole of it, and consequently coexists always and from eternity; for to coexist with the whole of eternity is nothing other than to exist from eternity.

I deny the consequence. For there is a great difference between coexisting with the whole of eternity and coexisting with it totally: for the former only signifies presence, and an indivisible permanence on the part of eternity, by which permanence it truly befits eternity; but the latter signifies also an indivisible permanence on the part of time, and the interminable duration of it, according to which it would be said to coexist adequately with interminable eternity; but this interminability and indivisibility can in no way belong to time; and so time cannot coexist totally with eternity, although it coexists with its whole. Just as a foot, e.g., although it coexists with the whole rational soul, which is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the whole, nevertheless does not coexist with it totally, because it does not coexist with it where the head is, and where the other parts of the body are.

You will say 2. From Anselm, lib. De Concordia praescientiae divinae, et libero arbitrio, cap. 1.: Just as the same now of time encloses every place, however much the places are distant from one another, for all things are present to this indivisible now; so every time is enclosed by the eternal present, so that although the times are distant from one another, they are nevertheless simultaneously present to eternity: therefore St. Anselm judges that temporal things truly always coexist with eternity. — Which can be confirmed, because just as every place is present to the whole immensity, so is every time to the whole eternity.

I deny the consequence. For St. Anselm does not judge that times are present to eternity through a true permanence of themselves with it, and a real coexistence: for this permanence is against the nature of time, which is successive of itself: but he only intends that all times, or temporal things, are objectively present to God from eternity; for it is his to know the times, or the moments, which he has placed in his own power. — Or his meaning is that all the parts of time are present to this now of eternity; not that they in fact subsist, or have existed from eternity; but that that unchanged now of eternity coexisted with past time, coexists with the present, and will coexist with the future. — To the Confirmation I say that the example proves nothing, for just as all places are not truly present to the divine immensity from eternity, but only in time, and when they exist; so neither are temporal things really present to God from eternity, but only when they in fact exist.