Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. The use of Eternity among the ancients, both sacred and profane, was varied and manifold. — First, indeed, "eternal" signified the same as "ancient" in Genesis, 49.¹ where Jacob, foretelling the coming Messiah, calls him the desire of the everlasting hills, that is, of the ancient Saints; for which reason David also, Psalmo 75.² calls the holy Angels, or the ancient Patriarchs, "everlasting mountains," saying: Thou enlightenest wonderfully from the everlasting mountains, which usage of eternity he himself confirms in Psal. 76., where he calls years long past "eternal," saying: I remembered the days of old, and I had the eternal years in mind. — Secondly, eternity is sometimes taken for an age, or the period of any thing, and its long duration. Thus Exodi 15.³ it is said, The Lord shall reign for ever, and beyond, where another version has: he shall reign for an age, and beyond; for which reason also God promised Abraham a long-lived posterity and a stable dominion, in Genesis, 17., saying: I will give to thee, and to thy seed, all the land of Chanaan for an everlasting possession. — Thirdly, that is called "eternal" which has indeed a beginning of its duration, but will lack an end. Thus Matthaei 25. the reprobate shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting. — Fourthly, eternity can be taken for that thing which would have neither beginning nor end of its duration, yet would depend on a producing principle, for which reason some Philosophers judged that the world was produced from eternity, and would last into eternity. — Fifthly and finally, eternity is taken properly for the duration of him who acknowledges neither end, nor beginning, nor any productive cause of himself, in which way eternity is said to be proper to God alone.

Note 2. There is this distinction among the various following modes of duration: namely, time, aeviternity, sempiternity, and eternity: that Time is the duration of a successive thing according to before and after, which has a beginning and an end; Aeviternity, however, is the duration of a permanent thing, incorruptible from within, which has indeed a beginning, but will not have an end, such as is the duration of the Angels, and of the rational soul. Sempiternity, truly, can be said of those things which would lack beginning and end according to duration, yet would have dependence on an extrinsic producing principle, such as would be the duration of the world, or of some special creature, if it had been produced from eternity; or as Richardus Victorinus says, lib. 2. De Trinit., cap. 4.: That seems to be sempiternal, he says, which lacks beginning and end; but eternal, that which lacks both, and all mutability; and although perhaps neither is found without the other, yet a distinction is rightly made between the signification of the names. Whence he infers: What, therefore, is Eternity other than a duration without beginning and end, and lacking all mutability?

Note 3. Duration is wont to be called the measure of a thing persevering in its being; that this description may become known, a threefold genus of measure must be distinguished. First, there is the measure of Perfection, according to that saying of Arist. 1. Metaphysicorum, cap. 3.: In each genus there is one thing which is the measure of the rest under the same genus. Secondly, the measure of Notification, as an ell makes known the quantity of cloth. Thirdly, there is the measure of Duration, as time is called the measure of motion, aeviternity the measure of the Angels, and eternity is called by some the measure of God. These things being premised, three things are proposed for resolution in the present Question: first, indeed, what is the genuine definition or description of eternity; secondly, whether eternity can truly be called a duration; thirdly, whether it has the notion of measure with respect to God, or with respect to creatures.

First conclusion. — Eternity is rightly described by Boethius, lib. 5. De Consolatione, Prosa sexta: the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life; with which agrees that which Anselm had earlier handed down, cap. 21. Monologii, saying, What else is eternity, which belongs to that God alone, than interminable life, existing wholly simultaneous and perfect? But the individual words of the aforesaid Boethian description must be weighed, for each of them bears a varied and manifold sense. First, indeed, it is called Possession to designate its firmness, certainty, and indefectibility; for we are said to possess that which we hold firmly and inalienably, nor can we be removed from it in any way.

Secondly, possession is called life; for since life is the most excellent grade of the Divinity, it is not undeservedly taken for the other predicates of the Divinity, both essential and attributive, as the Doctor observes in Quodlibeto 6.: For this reason (he says) Christ, wishing to indicate that he received the whole Divinity from the Father through eternal generation, makes mention of life alone, saying Ioannis 5.: As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. Thirdly, interminable, that is, lacking every beginning and end, not only in act, but also by absolute potency. Fourthly, whole simultaneously, so that it may be distinguished from time, whose parts are never simultaneous; but are acquired through succession, so that at the presence of one, the rest vanish. By these particles also a double imperfection of time is excluded from eternity, namely the imperfection of division, which is excluded by the particle "whole," and the imperfection of succession, which is removed by the particle "simultaneous." Fifthly and finally, it is called perfect possession, both so that the now of time may be excluded, which although it is wholly simultaneous and has no parts, yet is not absolutely something perfect, nor is any thing held and possessed perfectly in it; and so that that possession may be denoted as independent, inalienable, and absolutely necessary. Or (as the Doctor observes in the cited place) it is called interminable, because it excludes ceasing; whole simultaneously, because it excludes succession; and perfect possession, because it excludes dependence, and participation. Or as the Seraphic Bonaventure observes, lib. 1. Compendii Theologici cap. 18.:

In this definition three conditions are laid down, which are inseparable from uncreated eternity, which is God: namely, interminability there, the possession of interminable life; likewise invariability there, whole simultaneously; for nothing is variable in God, but all is simultaneous; likewise simplicity there, perfect; for that is supremely perfect to which no addition is possible. By the first, God is separated from everything corruptible. By the second, from everything variable. By the third, from everything composite.

Or finally, as Alensis explains, q. 12. art. 2. membro 2.:

In the aforesaid definition three conditions are touched upon, which are inseparable from uncreated eternity, which are interminability, invariability, simplicity. For there is something which is terminable both on the part before, and on the part after, such as generable and corruptible things, by way of distinction from which eternity is called the possession of interminable life. Likewise some things are interminable, as perpetual, and yet are mutable, or variable, by way of distinction from which "whole simultaneously" is added; for nothing variable is whole simultaneously; rather, it has some things in act, some it does not yet have. Likewise there is a being which is interminable and invariable, but yet is composite of itself, such as the Angelic being, which has composition (as Boethius says) from that which is and that by which it is, by way of distinction from which "perfect" is added; for that is supremely perfect to which no addition is possible, and where no part is possible with respect to the whole, and by this simplicity God alone is perfect, who, whatever is in him, is himself. By the first, therefore, the being of eternity is separated from everything corruptible; by the second, from everything variable; by the third, from everything composite, whether it be composed of matter and form, or of that which is and that by which it is, or of differences.

Observation. — nevertheless with Smisingo, quest. 1. de Aeternitate, num. 3., simplicity is taken improperly to describe eternity, because, he says, that a thing be simple seems to relate to the duration of the thing per accidens, or materially, speaking of that simplicity which excludes composition from subject and form; for just as some beings that are more simple do not participate more in eternity, but rather in time, as accidents, which are acquired successively, inasmuch as they are thus produced, are measured by time, for their production is successive; while substances, which are composite, are measured by the aevum, which agrees more with eternity. Unless perhaps they take simplicity in that sense in which it denies composition from the act of existence and objective potency, by which simplicity coincides with the negation of dependence, or closely follows upon it; for by the very fact that something is wholly independent, it has no objective potency: but is a necessary being, and simply in act, and consequently eternal, and invariable.

Second conclusion. — Eternity is truly, and essentially called duration. This is common among Theologians against Aureolus, in 1. dist. 9. q. 2. art. 2., where he affirms that eternity is not properly the duration of the Divinity, but is the divine nature itself, inasmuch as it has the power of coexisting with an imaginary infinite time, just as immensity is called the divine power by which God can present himself present in every imaginable place.

The Conclusion is proved first: Eternity is related to God in the way that the aevum and time are related to creatures, for eternity, the aevum and time are three species placed under the same genus: but the aevum and time are under the genus of duration, for time is called the duration of successive and mutable things, the aevum, the duration of incorruptible and permanent things: therefore a pari, eternity also is to be called the duration of an immutable, and necessary being.

Secondly: Duration is nothing other than the permanence of a thing in its being, with the negation of its ceasing: but truly God remains in his being, and has the negation of ceasing, and of mutability by reason of his eternity; for eternity, as has been said, is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life. Therefore it is also the true duration of God.

Thirdly: If anything stands in the way of eternity being true duration, it is chiefly because, says Aureolus, every duration of itself formally imports succession, or extension to before and after: but this is openly false, rather, formal succession detracts from duration, for something is said to last as long as it remains in being, but when it loses permanence, it also loses duration: therefore the less it loses its being, the more perfectly it is judged to last: but in succession being is lost, for something does not persevere in the same way, nor is it tenaciously and perseveringly in act, but continually passes from potency to act: therefore succession is not formally of the concept of duration, inasmuch as it is precisely duration, but duration in itself prescinds from succession, and only imports the thing actually existing, and persevering: therefore since eternity signifies the perseverance of God in his actual existence without end, beginning, and any change, and dependence, it is truly to be called duration.

You will say 1. — from Aureolus: every duration is divisible according to before and after: but such divisibility does not belong to the divine existence: therefore neither does duration. The minor is evident, from divine immutability: the Major is proved. Every duration compared to another, is either greater, or lesser, or equal; for when it is asked how long something has lasted, the answer is given: so long, because it either was before, or after another, or simultaneous with another: but this is to exist, either according to before and after, or according to divisible coexistence: therefore duration is divisible.

I deny the major. — and to its proof I say, that when two durations are compared to one another according to magnitude, and divisibility, that comparison is not made according to the absolute existence of the things enduring, but according to coexistence, in which succession can be found, although their existence is not successive. Thus when eternity is said to be greater, or more long-lasting than the aevum, or time; and when God is said to have existed before the creature, nothing else is understood, than that the aevum and time and the creature did not coexist with God, and eternity, but no succession is signified in God, nor in eternity, as we shall prove more fully in the following question.

You will say 2. — Every duration is understood by way of a certain extension, and stay, which the enduring thing has: but that extension, and stay cannot be conceived according to a permanent, and simultaneous existence: therefore it must be successive, and divisible. The major is evident from our own experience; for no one can conceive duration otherwise. The minor is proved: The parts of extension cannot make a greater, or lesser quantity in duration, except according to their succession; for a three-foot piece of wood, v. g. is not judged to last longer than a two-foot piece of wood, because it has greater persevering extension: therefore, for the duration of things to be greater, or lesser, it must be successive.

I distinguish the major. — that it is so understood according to our imperfect mode of conceiving, I concede: according to the truth of the thing, I deny: for just as spiritual things cannot be apprehended positively, except by way of corporeal things, which are presented to our senses, so neither do we conceive eternal things in this state, except by way of temporal things, which have divisibility in their existence, although eternal and aeviternal things do not have such divisibility, but exist indivisibly and simultaneously.

You will say 3. — Divine eternity is related to duration in the way that divine immensity is related to place: but immensity does not place in God any permanent extension and magnitude, but only says the power by which God can reach and penetrate every place: therefore also eternity does not place in God any duration, or stay of the divine being formally, but only signifies the power by which God reaches every imaginable duration, without any succession.

I answer by distinguishing the major. — Eternity is related to time, and duration in the same way that immensity is related to place, and ubi; in this respect, that just as immensity does not infer in God any actual intrinsic divisibility, but only a virtual, and extrinsic one, as we have explained, so eternity is related to time, I concede; otherwise, I deny: for eternity, although it does not say formal and intrinsic extension, and succession, nevertheless imports and supposes a virtual one, and signifies that perfection of God by reason of which he can coexist divisibly with every successive, and divisible thing.

Third conclusion. — Divine eternity does not have the notion of measure, neither with respect to God, nor with respect to creatures. This is against the modern Thomists.

The first part is proved. — If it were a measure with respect to God, it would either be a passive measure, or rather the measurability of the divine Essence, or an active measure of the same: but neither can be said. Not the first, indeed, for a measure is called passive only with respect to an active one: but there is no active measure outside God, which could measure his essence according to duration. For if there were such a measure, it would above all be created duration; but this cannot be such, because created duration would measure the divine Essence, either by simple application, as an ell measures a single ell of cloth, or by repetition, as days repeated many times measure one year, and an ell applied many times measures the whole cloth: but in neither way can created duration measure the duration of the divine Essence: not by simple application, indeed, because created duration is finite, while uncreated is infinite, and consequently since they are not equal, one cannot measure the other by simple application. Nor by repetition either, for those things which are thus measured have a beginning, and an end: but the divine Essence has neither beginning, nor end of its existence, and duration: therefore it cannot be measured by created, and finite duration. — Nor does it have the notion of an active measure, because it would either measure precisely the divine being, or only its duration: not the first, because a measure must be homogeneous, or similar to the measured, as Aristotle teaches, 10. Metaphysicorum cap. 3.; for we measure weight by weight, not by extension, and we measure duration by duration, not by weight, or length; but eternity is not of a similar notion with the divine being as such: for the magnitude of that divine being is considered according to virtual intension, namely inasmuch as it virtually comprehends an infinite number of grades of perfection; but duration is attended to according to virtual extension, namely inasmuch as it can coexist with infinite time if it were given. Add that created duration does not measure created being as such, for many things last longer than others, although they have a less perfect being. — Nor can eternity be said to measure the duration of the divine being, because a measure must be distinguished from the measured. For it is, says Aristotle, in the cited cap. 2., that by which we know how great a thing is, or a measure leads us into the knowledge of the quantity of another: but eternity is the very duration of the divine being: therefore it cannot measure this duration, otherwise it would be said to be the measure of itself, and would lead into the knowledge of itself. — It must therefore be concluded with St. Thomas, in 1. dist. 19. quest. 1. art. 1. ad quartum, that the divine magnitude is in no way measurable, or measured, neither by another, nor by itself. First, because mensuration posits a termination, but the divine magnitude has no term, within, nor without, and therefore is called infinite, not indeed by privative extension, but by negation of term. Where he adds two other reasons: first, because if something were the measure of God, there would be something in God, which would not be God himself, for commensuration, he says, is not of one quantity to itself, but of two. Second, just as every mover is reduced to some unmoved mover, so every measure is reduced to some immeasurable measure: therefore, just as God is an unmoved mover, so he ought to be called an immeasurable measure. By which it is clear that the recent Thomists deviate far from the opinion of their Doctor.

The second part is proved. — namely, that Eternity cannot be the measure of the duration of created things. For it would measure that duration either by adequation, or simple application, or by repetition: but neither can be said. Not the first, indeed, since created duration is not equal to eternity; for that is finite, and limited; this is infinite, unlimited, and independent; but between the finite, and the infinite there is no equality. Nor the second either, for a measure by repetition is smaller than the measured; thus a day is smaller than a year, and an ell is shorter than a cloth of several ells: but eternity is not smaller than created duration; rather, it is infinitely greater: therefore in neither way can it be its measure.

It is confirmed. — If eternity could be said to be the measure of created successive things, it would either measure them according to one part of motion and time before another, or it would reach all the parts of time and motion simultaneously and indivisibly: but neither can be said: therefore it cannot be the measure of created things, at least of temporal and successive ones. The consequence is evident; the minor is also evident. For the first is against the notion of eternity, which, since it is whole simultaneously, and perfect possession, cannot have any succession, neither in itself, nor in measuring. But the second is against the nature of time, whose parts are in continuous flux, nor can they exist simultaneously, nor consequently coexist simultaneously, and permanently with another permanent, and indivisible thing, so as to be measured by it.

You will say. — A measure is that by which we know how great the duration of a thing is, or how great are the parts of an enduring thing: but by eternity we know how great, and how extended the duration of God is: therefore eternity has the true notion of measure with respect to God.

I distinguish the major. — By a measure we know the quantity of a thing definitely and distinctly, I concede: indefinitely, and confusedly, I deny: for a measure, as we have already said from Aristotle, must lead into a distinct, and determinate knowledge of the quantity of another, for it is assumed for this. Likewise I distinguish the minor: by eternity we know the duration of God distinctly and definitely, so that we could evidently say, the duration of God is so great, and not greater, nor lesser, just as it is said of any created thing that it has so many days, or months, or years, or ages, I deny: we know it indistinctly, confusedly, and indefinitely, so that we can say, the duration of God has no beginning, nor will have an end, I concede: but this does not suffice for the notion of a perfect measure, by which the extension of the measured must be distinctly made known.