Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Two things are proposed for resolution in the present Question. First, whether God is really so contained within the compass of this universe that He does not exist outside the world; second, whether, on the hypothesis that He is said to exist outside the world, He can for that reason truly be said to be present to the space which we feign and imagine beyond the heavens. But in solving this question there is a threefold opinion among the authors. For some affirm that God is really present to the imaginary spaces. Others, taking the opposite side, contend that He is so contained within the compass of the universe that He ought not to be said to be diffused and present outside the world. Finally, others, taking the middle way, affirm that indeed God is not truly present to the imaginary spaces, yet can be said to be poured out beyond the heavens, and not to be confined within the limits of the world: which dispute, that it may be settled the more evidently

Note 1. Not only among the theologians, but also among the ancient philosophers, there was a very great altercation about the diffusion and presence of God beyond the heavens; for, as Eusebius relates, lib. 15. De praeparatione Evangelica, the Pythagoreans and the Stoics affirmed that above the heaven there is a certain empty space, which they held to be infinite; Aristotle, however, in the first book De Coelo, cap. 3., says that neither can a body exist beyond the heaven, nor a place, nor a vacuum, nor time. Plato, moreover, in the Phaedrus introduces Stesichorus relating that above the heaven there is a certain most pleasant region, whose beauty cannot be explained in words: which opinion Cleomedes attacked; although the same man asserts that outside the world there is some empty space, filled with no body, but utterly void and lacking in things, and he proves this with several arguments, the investigation of which pertains more to philosophers than to theologians.

Note 2. By imaginary spaces nothing else is understood than certain empty and void intervals, which we conceive beyond the heavens after the manner of a place filled with no body; in almost the same way in which we imagine that, before the fabric of the world, there was a certain empty and void vastness in that same space which the world now occupies. Whether, however, God is really in those fictitious spaces through a true and real presence, this is what must be resolved here.

Note 3. God can be conceived to exist outside the world in two ways: namely, either negatively or positively. By the former way it is signified that God is not limited nor confined within the compass of the universe, because His infinite substance is circumscribed by no limits or bounds; by the latter, however, it is signified that God is positively and in the same way diffused through the imaginary and fictitious spaces beyond the heavens, in the way in which He is diffused and present throughout the whole world.

First conclusion. — God is truly not present to the imaginary spaces.

So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 37. quaest. unica¹; and with him commonly the other scholastic doctors, both ancient and modern.

Proof: God cannot be said to be present to nothing; but the imaginary spaces are nothing; therefore God cannot be present to them. The minor is clear; for, as Aristotle says in 4. Physicorum cap. 2., That which is somewhere is always itself something, and there is something else outside it: the place in which something is must be truly real, and distinct from the thing which it contains: whence he infers in cap. 5. that the world is not somewhere, for that which is somewhere is itself something, and there must be something else in which it is contained: but beyond the universe and the whole there is nothing. The minor is therefore proved: those spaces beyond the world are either real, or wholly fictitious; but in no way can they be called real: for either they would be independent and unproduced by God, or produced by Him from eternity and before the creation of the world; but to assert either is heretical: for the first, indeed, the Nicene Creed condemns, affirming that God is the Creator and maker of all things visible and invisible; the second, however, is repugnant to the Lateran Council, affirming in the chapter Firmiter that God established all things in time, and thus that nothing was created from eternity: therefore it remains to be inferred that those unbounded spaces which are conceived beyond the world are wholly fictitious, and that God does not exist in them any more than in a chimera and a goat-stag: but no one would say that God is truly and really present to chimeras: therefore neither is He to the imaginary spaces. — It is confirmed by the authority of the holy Fathers, who teach with one accord: that God, before the fabric of the world, was not somewhere, but in Himself: thus Tertullian, in the book against Praxeas, cap. 5.: Before all things, he says, God was alone, and He Himself was to Himself both world, and place, and all things. Likewise St. Augustine, in the book De Fide contra Manichaeos, marvels at their folly, because they ask where God was before Heaven and Earth were made. For he answers that He was in Himself: but more clearly in Ps. 12.: Before God made Heaven and Earth, he says, where did He dwell? He dwelt in Himself, God dwelt with Himself, and God is with Himself: the same in Epist. 57.: How, he says, is He everywhere if He is in Himself? Everywhere, namely, because He is absent nowhere: but in Himself, because He is not contained by those to whom He is present, as though He could not exist without them. With them St. Bernard agrees, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 6.: There is nothing, he says, that you should seek further, where God was: apart from Him nothing was, therefore He was in Himself; with which words he also brings forward the reason for the assertion, namely that God existed nowhere before the world was founded, because clearly there was nothing. To all of which the following ancient verses fit, which Denis the Carthusian relates on the first book, dist. 37. quaest. 1.: Tell me, where was He then, when apart from Him nothing was? Then where now, in Himself; since He Himself suffices to Himself. But this existence of God in Himself is to be understood not positively, as though He contained Himself after the manner of a space; but negatively, so that there is no place outside the world in which God exists; in that sense in which the holy Fathers say that God is the cause of Himself, not that He produced Himself, but that He acknowledges no producer of Himself.

You will say 1. Those imaginary spaces are a certain capacity for receiving any creature whatsoever which God can produce outside the world; but such a capacity really exists, otherwise God could not produce any creature outside the world; therefore God also exists in it. — I distinguish the major: They are a real capacity, really existing, I deny; a fictitious and imaginary one, I concede: for if that capacity were real, it would be either something positive or something negative: if it is something negative, certainly it is nothing, nor does it truly exist; for negations and mere privations are truly non-being, and to say that they actually exist is the same as to affirm that non-being is, and that the non-existent exists. If positive, it would be some creature really existing, or possible; if the former, then those spaces would no longer be imaginary, nor beyond the universe, since by the name of universe the collection of all creatures is signified: if the latter, it is certain that those spaces are nothing in act, nor, insofar as they are possible, do they signify anything other than the non-repugnance that God produce something after the manner of a place outside the world; but this possibility and non-repugnance imports nothing real in fact, and so God cannot be really present to it.

You will say 2. Actual presence outside the world is possible to God; therefore He has it in act. The antecedent is proved: if it were impossible, this would be most of all either because it simply repugns, or because it disgraces God. Not the first, because this impossibility would arise from the fact that actual presence says an essential order to an actual space: but this is false: both because actual presence can be given in a terminated vacuum, e.g., in a hall, if it were empty of air, and something were placed in its middle. Nor the second: for just as actual presence in the world does not disgrace God, so neither does actual presence outside the world disgrace Him, if it is possible. — I deny the antecedent: to its proof I say that presence outside the world repugns to God precisely because outside the world there is nothing to which God can be present; for it implies a contradiction that an actual presence of one thing to another be given — whether presence be something absolute or something relative — if there is not another thing to which the one can be present. To the confirmation I say that a presence cannot be given in a terminated vacuum which is terminated at the vacuum itself; although perhaps the presence of some thing could be given by respect to the circumference and parts of the hall itself in which there would be a vacuum; so that it would be true to say, such a thing is in this hall, but not elsewhere.

You will say 3. God has by reason of His immensity — and of the quantity of His power, as of bulk — that which an infinite body, if it were given, would have by reason of its quantity of bulk: but if an infinite body were given, its quantity of bulk would be so great that in fact it would not only be diffused through the whole world, but would also extend itself through the imaginary spaces; for if it were confined within the barriers of the universe, it would not be of infinite extension: therefore the quantity of power in God is also so great that in fact He is substantially diffused through all the imaginary spaces. — I distinguish the major: God has by reason of the quantity of bulk that which an infinite body would have by reason of the quantity of bulk, being disposed in the same way in order to place, I deny; being disposed differently, I concede the major: for an infinite body would be so diffused through the universe that it would exclude all other bodies through its impenetrability; God, however, although He penetrates all the parts of the universe, yet removes none from its place nor excludes it. I likewise distinguish the minor: An infinite body would be diffused beyond the universe positively, as though it had a real and true presence to the imaginary spaces, I deny; negatively, so that by reason of its infinity it would not be so contained within the world that it could not also extend itself to another world, if one were created, I concede. The same is to be said of God, and consequently the consequence is to be denied.

You will say 4. — From our opinion several absurd things follow, repugnant to God; therefore it is not to be admitted. For first, it follows that God can be changed: for He can produce some body outside this world and become present to it: but if He were not actually in the imaginary space in which such a body would be produced, God would acquire a new presence and would begin to be present where before He was not: therefore He would really be changed. Second, it would follow that God could be, as it were, divided from Himself: for if in the imaginary spaces He produced two bodies distant from one another, then either God would be in the middle of those bodies according to substance, or not; if the first, the point is had, because such a middle, in which He would be, is not real but imaginary: if the second, the divine substance would be divided from itself and, as it were, discontinuous, since it would be in those two bodies, but would not be in the middle. Third, it would follow that God can be moved per accidens: for to be moved per accidens is nothing else than to be moved at the motion of another, as the sailor is moved at the motion of the ship: but God could be moved at the motion of another; therefore He could be moved per accidens. The minor is proved: if God produced some body in the imaginary spaces, such a body could be moved in order to the world, and the world could be moved toward that body: therefore since God would be present to both, He would also be moved per accidens with either, just as the soul is moved per accidens at the motion of the body, and the body of Christ is moved at the motion of the species.

I answer to the first. — by denying the consequence: for just as God is not said to be changed when He produced the world and had a new presence to it, so neither would He be changed if He newly produced some body in the imaginary spaces and became present to it; for this whole change would have to be referred back to the effect itself, not to God; for remaining in Himself, says the Wise man, cap. 7., He renews all things.

To the second. — I deny the consequence: for if God produced two bodies distant from one another in imaginary space, He would not be in act, but only in power, in the space which is feigned to intervene between those two bodies; nor would His substance on that account be said to be distinct or discontinuous, both because there would truly be no real middle between His two presences, but only a fictitious one, and because when God becomes present to things, He does not come to them, but by drawing them out of nothing makes them present to Himself, as it were drawing them within the vastness and bosom of His immensity, and in this way, as it were, joining them to Himself and making them present, not otherwise than the sea draws all rivers to itself and receives them into its bosom; or as a sponge in a most vast ocean, as St. Augustine excellently noted, 1. Confessionum cap. 5.

I conceived of You, Lord, he says, encompassing me on every side and penetrating me, but infinite in every direction, as if the sea were everywhere, and on all sides through the immense infinite there were only sea, and it had within itself a sponge as large as you please, but finite nonetheless; the sponge would be full on every side, from every part of itself, from the immense sea: thus I thought the finite creature full of You, the infinite.

To the third. — I likewise deny the consequence: for in order that something be said to be moved per accidens at the motion of another, two things are required: first, indeed, that it be so in the body which is moved, circumscriptively or at least definitively, that it is not in another by which it is moved: second, that at the motion of the one it vary the distance which it previously had to the other. But both of these conditions would be lacking to God: for He would be present to both bodies, nor would He become less distant while one body approached the other.

You will say lastly. — God can place some body on high above the last and highest heaven, so that it has its feet placed upon the sphere of that last heaven, but its other bodily parts stretched out beyond and erect, or seated, as the Apostle seems in fact to hint that the body of Christ the Lord was carried up: for he says to the Ephesians, cap. 4.: He who descended is the same who also ascended above all the heavens: but in this case that body would have several of its parts in the imaginary spaces, since above the last and highest sphere no other real space is given, but only a fictitious one. Therefore that body, and much more God, can be in imaginary space.

I distinguish the minor. — That body would have several parts present in the imaginary space through a true and real presence, I deny; through a negative and fictitious one, I concede. For since, as is supposed, that space is nothing, no body and no real being can become truly and really present to it.

Second conclusion. — God is truly outside the world, not indeed positively, but negatively.

The first part is proved. — not only from Sacred Scripture, Iob. 22.: Do you not think that God is higher than heaven, and is raised above the top of the stars? And 3. Regum, cap. 8.: Whom the heavens of heavens cannot contain. Cajetan gathers the same from those words of Christ, Ioan. 12.: I have come as light into the world, that is, within the totality of creatures, outside which He previously was according to His Divinity. By a similar reason others prove from that passage to the Hebrews 1.: When again He brought the first-begotten into the world, as if He were saying that He had previously been outside the earthly world.

The holy Fathers also prove it. For St. Dionysius, cap. 9. De Divinis Nominibus: God, he says, is poured out externally over all magnitude, and is spread out beyond. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Apologia prima: God is in the universe, and above the universe. Hilary, 1. De Trinit.: God is present to the world as interior, He exceeds it as exterior. Augustine, in the first sermon De verbis Apostoli: Who is the almighty God? what but inestimable, ineffable, incomprehensible, beyond all things, outside all things, besides all things? And St. Damian, in Opusculum 6. De Divina Omnipotentia: He Himself, he says, remains within all things, He Himself above all things, He Himself below all things. He is higher through power, and lower through sustenance, and exterior through magnitude, and interior through subtlety. — Athenagoras, Oratione pro Christianis: God is unbegotten, and all things that are His; but He so excels the world that He fills from every side whatever is above it, and leaves no place empty. St. Gregory lib. 2. Mor. cap. 12.

He Himself remains within all things, and outside all things; He Himself above all things, and below all things; higher through power, lower through sustenance, exterior through magnitude, interior through subtlety; ruling on high, containing below, surrounding without, penetrating within; nor higher in one part and lower in another, or exterior in any part and interior in another, but one and the same, wholly everywhere, sustaining by presiding and presiding by sustaining, penetrating by surrounding and surrounding by penetrating.

St. Isidore, lib. 1. De summo bono, cap. 2.: The immensity of the divine magnitude is such that we understand Him to be within all things, but not enclosed, outside all things, but not excluded, and therefore interior, that He may contain all things, and the same exterior, that He may conclude all things with the uncircumscribed majesty of His magnitude. By that, therefore, which He is exterior, He is shown to be the creator; by that which He is interior, He is demonstrated to govern all things. — William of Paris presses this argument in a wonderful way, in the book De Universo, section 2. part 2. cap. 68., where, after he had reproved those who judge that God is enclosed and bounded by the limits of the world, he adds:

But the wise men, and especially the Doctors of the Christian people, rather say that it should be said that the world is in the Creator, than that the Creator is in the world, and that the Creator contains the world, than that the Creator is contained by the world. In this, however, that they say the Creator has nothing of Himself outside the world, they do not seem to speak truly, since outside each and every part of the world He has His whole self. For in heaven one cannot designate any part outside of which the Creator does not have His whole self. For just as He is in one part of heaven, so also in any other, etc.

The second part. — is sufficiently clear from the preceding conclusion; for since God is not positively present to the imaginary spaces, it follows that He is only negatively outside the heavens.

You will ask 1. — whether immensity belongs to God alone. All the Doctors affirm it, since there can be no creature which from its own nature demands, and has the power to present itself present everywhere; for although some creature could by divine omnipotence be made present through a replication of presence in infinite places, if they were given, it would nevertheless not on that account be deemed immense, because it would not require this ubiquity from its own nature and through its innate power, in the way in which God requires that ubiquity from His immense and unlimited nature.

You will ask 2. — whether immensity is some special perfection of God. I affirm it against Smisingus, Tractatu 2. d. 2. n. 1., where he judges that God's immensity arises from His infinity and immutability, and does not differ from them; the contrary of which I prove thus: That perfection is distinct from the others which has an effect different from them: but constituting God present, as to His substance, is an effect formally distinct from the other perfections of God: therefore it proceeds from some special perfection. The major is established; the minor is proved: if the substantial presence of God in things proceeds from some other perfection, it does so most of all from infinity, as Smisingus himself admits; but it does not proceed from infinity. I prove it: for either it would proceed from the infinity of the attributes, or from the infinity of the essence. Not the first: for although God is conceived as infinitely wise, e.g., good, just, etc., He is not on that account conceived as present everywhere. Nor the second: both because the infinity of the divine essence signifies and imports nothing else than that the predicates belonging to the divine essence and constituting it have no term and limitation in essential perfection, but this does not make God formally present everywhere: and because if this presence proceeded from the infinity of the essence, this would be most of all because, says Smisingus, for God to be present to things is nothing else than for Him to be undistant from them, and His presence imports nothing else than a simple undistance from things, and consequently says nothing positive, and is only a negation, which therefore does not infer a special perfection: but this is false: and because our presence is something positive, since it is a relation coming from without: therefore God is also present through something positive, not indeed superadded, but intrinsic to Himself: and because a special negation founded in repugnance to the opposite necessarily follows from some special positive, for the negation opposed to wisdom, e.g., does not belong to the divine Essence formally because the divine Essence is; but by reason of the wisdom opposed to that negation, which wisdom if the divine Essence did not have, it would certainly have the negation of it: but distance, opposed to undistance, is not a predicate immediately opposed per se formally to any predicate of the divine Essence: therefore undistance and ubiquity does not precisely belong to God by reason of the divine Essence immediately, but through some special divine perfection, which is expressed by the name of immensity: therefore it must be a special perfection.

You will ask 3. — whether the presence of God in things is divisible.

I answer 1. — that the virtual presence, that is, the power which God has to be everywhere by reason of His infinite and immense substance, is indivisible; for since the divine Essence is wholly simple and spiritual, and has no parts, it cannot be in a place divisibly, namely in that way in which bodies have some of their parts above, others below, others to the right, others to the left: whence Isidore of Seville, lib. 1. De summo bono, cap. 2.

Nor, he says, does God fill all things in parts, nor is it in any way to be thought that God is in all things such that each thing takes Him in according to the magnitude of its position, that is, the greatest more, the least less, while rather He Himself is wholly in all things, or all things in Him.

— St. Damascene agrees with him, lib. 1. cap. 14.: It must be known, he says, that the Divine Numen has no parts, and is wholly from the whole everywhere, not a part in a part, so that it is divided after the manner of bodies, but whole in all things, and whole above everything. Whence St. Ambrose, lib. De dignitate hominis, cap. 2., places the image of God, with which the rational soul is endowed, in this, that just as the one God is always wholly everywhere, vivifying, moving, and governing all things, as the Apostle confirms, that in Him we live, and move, and are, so the soul in its body thrives wholly everywhere, vivifying it, moving, and governing it. For it is not greater in the greater members of its body, and less in the lesser, but wholly in the least, and wholly in the greatest.

I answer 2. — that the actual presence of God is as manifold as there are things in which God exists: for this inexistence is not something real and positive in God, but is either a negation of distance, or a relation of reason founded on the fact that things exist within the bosom of the Divinity, and are altogether undistant from it. Whence since the relations are multiplied according to the multitude of the terms, and the created things are various, from which the divine substance is undistant, and toward which it is conceived to have a relation of reason resulting from the fiction of the human intellect, it follows that there are as many actual divine presences as such relations and undistances can be conceived and feigned; but as many of these can be feigned as there are in fact creatures in which God exists: therefore the actual divine presence is manifold and divisible.

From all these things it is clear in what way, by reason of His immensity, God is said to be everywhere, and unplaceable, and uncircumscribed. For He is said to be everywhere because He is substantially present to every place, every space, and every existing thing whatsoever, so that there is no thing at all so vile and small within which God is not present according to essence. He is said to be unplaceable because He can be concluded by no place or space; for however great a maximum space is thought of, He wholly exceeds it. Finally, He is said to be uncircumscribed because He can be contained by no circumference of place. Hence St. Athanasius, in the rescript to Liberius, affirms that God is incomprehensible to place, and St. Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide, cap. 16., affirms that God is uncircumscribed, and is not in a place, but that He Himself is a place to Himself, because clearly He is circumscribed by no place, nor closed in.