Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. The perfections which shine forth in creatures are of two kinds: for some are called simply simple; others, secundum quid. A simply simple perfection is said to be one which involves no imperfection, nor excludes another equal to it; of which sort are the pure or absolute perfections, as some speak: for instance, existence, spirituality, etc., which by St. Anselm, cap. 14. Monologii, is called a perfection which is better itself than not itself, in the whole breadth of being, as we have already noted in the first Question of the preceding Disputation. A perfection secundum quid is said to be one which in its concept has an imperfection so attached that it cannot be separated from it; whence absolutely it is not better for every being to have it than not to have it. Thus to be a body, although with respect to a stone, v. g., it is better than to lack a body, is nevertheless not better and more perfect with respect to all beings. Since it is better and more perfect to be incorporeal and a spiritual substance, as is clear in an Angel and the Soul, than to consist of a body like the rest of creatures.

Note 2. That some perfection can be contained in another in three ways: First indeed formally, as rationality in man; second eminently, as all corporeal creatures in man himself, who is called a little world, or an epitome of the world; third virtually, as heat in the Sun, and the plant in the seed. Moreover, something can be in another eminently in two ways: either formally, as the vegetative and the sentient are in the rational soul, which not only eminently contains the perfections of the vegetative and sentient soul, but also performs their functions. 2. eminently virtually, as the light of the stars is in the Sun, which is not only brighter than the rest, but is also the parent and origin of light. Finally, something is contained in another eminently formally in two ways: namely, perfectly, when it is contained inwardly in a superior from the first grade up to the last difference, as corporeal substance is contained in any individual of human nature, which involves all the grades and differences of corporeal substance formally, and in a nobler way than the rest of corporeal beings: or imperfectly, when it is contained in it only as to general notions, not however as to individual notions and atoms: thus any man comprises in himself the perfections of absolutely all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal.

Note 3. that something can be called infinitely perfect in two ways, namely either in every way, or only in a certain genus of being. In the former way it is called infinite simply, and absolutely, because it comprises in itself the whole amplitude and universality of being and perfection without any limit or any imperfection. In the latter way it is called infinite secundum quid, and in a determinate genus and special order of perfection: thus, v. g., if an infinite line were given, it would be infinite only according to the notion of quantity and length; so that it would comprise in itself and exceed absolutely all length.

First conclusion. — God contains absolutely all perfections.

This is the teaching of all the Holy Fathers. It is proved, first indeed by texts of Sacred Scripture: To the Romans 11.: From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things: and John 1.: All things were made through Him: therefore, since there is no perfection in an effect which was not first in the efficient cause, it follows that God contains in Himself all the perfections which He bestows on His creatures, as He Himself indicates in Isaias 66.: Shall I who make others bring forth, be Myself barren? And Psalm 93.: He who planted the ear, shall He not hear? or He who formed the eye, does He not see? Whence

Proverbs 8, He claims for Himself every perfection which shines forth more in men: Mine, He says, is prudence, mine is counsel, mine is strength, mine are riches, and glory, and substance, and justice: the Holy Fathers affirm the same: God, says St. Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 5., is all things, as the Author of all; and below: All beings are to be attributed to Him according to one eminent conjunction of all: and in the same place: He contains all things according to His more-than-simplicity: and in cap. 13. he supplies three grounds of the same infinite perfection: the first indeed, that He is perfect of Himself, and is defined from Himself alone in one uniform way, and is wholly most perfect through all things; that is, He is of Himself absolute and perfect, nor does He borrow His perfection from another; and accordingly He comprises absolutely every perfection, since there is nothing from which His divine perfection could be limited. The second, that He exceeds every perfection, and is grasped or comprehended by none: or as he speaks, That He surpasses perfection, as one who excels all things, and indeed determines every infinity, and is unfolded beyond every limit: nor is He grasped or comprehended by anyone, but pertains to all things, and beyond all things, by perpetual progressions and unending actions. The third finally, from the fact that He is the principle and cause of all things, and is always complete in His numbers; and that He cannot be diminished, as one who has all things anticipated in Himself, and overflows with one and the same perpetual and accumulated bestowal, which cannot be diminished, by which He perfects all perfect things and fills them with His perfection.

— This same truth was not hidden even from the pagan Philosophers: since Trismegistus called the true God the universality of all things, and likewise the Greeks named Him τὸ πᾶν, that is, the Universe, as Eugubinus testifies, lib. 3. Perennis Philosoph. cap. 8., to signify that all things are contained in Him in that most eminent and most perfect way. Whence in that Oracle, Great Pan is dead, which Plutarch mentions in the book De Oraculorum defectu, Christ is called Great Pan: who is the Lord of all things, and contains the universe in Himself. Indeed even Lucretius, who although an Epicurean in life, acknowledged this universality of goods and perfections in God, saying: Self-sufficient in His own resources, needing nothing of ours. Which he had perhaps borrowed from the Royal Bard: I have said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods.

The same truth is proved by reason: What is infinite in some genus contains absolutely all the perfections of that genus; v. g., if infinite light were given, it would comprise in itself absolutely all light, otherwise it would not be infinite light, since by the addition of another light it could be increased: but God is infinite in the genus of being, as has been proved: therefore He comprises in Himself absolutely all the perfections of being. — Then, what are divided in lower things are united in higher things in a more eminent way. Thus the vegetative and sentient soul are in man in a more excellent way than in brutes and plants; light shines more clearly in the Sun, the parent and origin of light, than in the Stars and the rest of the lucid bodies, which borrow their light from it: therefore, since God is the supreme of all beings, the perfections of the rest ought to be united in Him. — Finally, creatures are called beings by participation, because they are perfect only insofar as they receive perfection from God: but they could not receive perfection from God unless He Himself precontained it; for no one gives what he does not have: therefore God contains in Himself absolutely all the perfections of whatever beings.

Second conclusion. — God contains in Himself formally and eminently all simply simple perfections.

It is proved: Since God is that than which nothing greater or better can be thought, whatever is more perfect and better is to be attributed to Him: but a simply simple perfection is better with itself than without itself; therefore it is to be attributed to God formally. — Then, an infinitely perfect Being ought to contain in Himself in a nobler way all perfections which in their concept reek of no imperfection: but such are the simply simple perfections: therefore they are to be attributed to God formally. — Finally, those things belong to God formally which are formally predicated of Him: but simply simple perfections are formally predicated of God: therefore they belong to Him formally. — That He also contains them eminently is evident from this, that He comprises them in a nobler and more excellent way than they are found in creatures; since in the latter they are accidents, in God, however, they are substances; for God, as has been proved, admits of no accident; and since He really identifies with Himself whatever He contains in Himself, He cannot have those diverse and opposed notions of substance and accident. — Then those perfections are finite and limited in creatures; in God, however, they are infinite and free from limitation; for whatever is in God is formally infinite. — Whence, as Nicolaus Chusa notes, lib. 1. de docta ignorantia, God was rightly called by the Ancients a Sphere, whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference nowhere, to declare the infinity of the divine magnitude. For if an infinite Sphere were given, it would be infinite not only according to itself as a whole, but also according to each of its parts; for all lines drawn from the circumference to the center would be extended infinitely, all surfaces would tend infinitely, and finally the height and depth themselves would have no limit; and so according to all the dimensions of its magnitude it would be infinite on every side. Thus by parity of reasoning God is truly to be called infinite, because whatever is conceived in Him has infinite perfection; for infinite is His wisdom, unlimited goodness, uncircumscribed truth, eternal duration, immense presence, interminable power, incomprehensible Essence; all of which Saint Bernard, lib. 5. De Consid., cap. 13., lucidly explains: This eternity, he says, is so long that it has no end; Charity, which infinitely excels every affection; Knowledge, which includes, indeed surpasses, all wisdom; Essence, which anticipates every being. By which he denotes that there is no conceivable perfection in God which is not infinite; and accordingly which is found in God in a far more excellent way than in creatures.

Third conclusion. — Perfections secundum quid are not in God formally, but only eminently or virtually.

The first part is proved: God, since He is the most perfect being, removes every imperfection from Himself: but perfections secundum quid involve imperfection in their concept, as is clear from their definition: therefore God does not contain them formally. — Then: What are in God formally are also formally predicated of Him: but perfections secundum quid cannot be formally predicated of God, otherwise it would be true to say that God is as properly called a lion, or a stone, or a body, as He is called wise, just, etc.; and so He would be a wondrous monster composed of all creatures, and the center and receptacle of all imperfections. — Finally: An infinite being excludes every limitation from itself: but God is a being infinite on every side; and perfections secundum quid are limited and finite: therefore God removes them from Himself, nor does He comprise them formally.

The second part is proved: God is the cause of absolutely all beings, and consequently of all the perfections which are found in creatures: but every cause virtually precontains its effect; for the effect is a participation of the entity and perfection of the cause itself: therefore, etc.

That He also contains them eminently is evident from this, that eminent containment is said to be that by which either something of a more eminent nature can produce another, in the way every equivocal cause that is more principal, or total, contains its effect; or that by which something, by reason of its more perfect entity, accomplishes entirely without any imperfection what another performs only with imperfection. Thus the rational soul contains the soul of a brute, and the soul of a plant: and the intellect the phantasm; and this the internal senses: but in both these ways God contains all the perfections of creatures. For He is not only their author and origin, but also by reason of His infinite entity involves absolutely all being; not indeed formally, but eminently, and virtually, and that in a far more perfect and eminent way than animals and plants are contained in the power of the Sun and the rest of the stars. For the Sun and the rest of the stars do not concur, except by means of light and influx, to forming the dispositions of the body to be animated, but do not precisely bestow life itself of themselves; God, however, not only fashions the body, but also creates the soul, and bestows life. Hence St. Dionysius rightly warns, lib. De divinis nominibus, cap. 13., that all things are in a certain way affirmed of God, and denied, and that He is rightly called the position of all things, and the ablation of all things, because He eminently posits all things as containing them, and formally removes all things, because He excludes from Himself every created and imperfect formal notion.

You will ask. — Whether God is something greater or more perfect with creatures, than if He were alone.

The Subtle Doctor answers, in quaest. 5. Quodlibetica, n. 8., that God with creatures is not something greater and more perfect intensively, than He is alone. The truth of this answer is clear from all those texts of Sacred Scripture by which, when treating of the divine being, we proved that creatures compared with God are as it were nothing; For all nations, says Isaias, are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity. Which David had earlier taught, saying, Psalm 38: My substance is as nothing before Thee: but from the accession of nothing being does not grow, but rather decreases: therefore from the addition of creatures the divine perfection is not increased, nor does it grow. — Then, the infinite cannot be made greater by the addition of something finite: but God is simply infinite, while creatures are finite and limited: therefore they together with God do not make something greater and more perfect, than God Himself is. The minor is evident. The major is proved: that is infinite which contains in itself whatever perfection it can have from its formal notion; and accordingly it cannot receive a further perfection of the same notion. Thus, v. g., time added to eternity does not increase nor extend its duration, because all those inferior durations are contained in eternity in a most eminent way. — Finally, God is every good, as Moses himself says, Exod. 33: Come, I will show thee all good; therefore of Himself He so involves absolutely all goodness and perfection, that nothing can be added to Him which He does not precontain: whence just as if an Angel were posited twice, the union made of the same posited twice would not be something better, than it was alone: therefore St. Augustine rightly concludes, tract. 11. in Ioan.: If thou art without God, thou wilt be lesser; if thou art with God, God will not be greater: not from thee is He greater, but thou art lesser without Him,

I answer 2. God with creatures makes something more perfect extensively, than God alone is. It is proved: Where there are perfections really distinct, and not identified with one another, there one added to another makes something greater extensively, because good added to good not really identified with itself makes several goods: but the perfections of created things, as they are in God really, are distinguished from the same as they are in the creatures themselves: therefore God and creatures taken together are something more perfect extensively, than God Himself alone is. — It is confirmed: For this reason the three adorable Persons of the Trinity do not make some greater and more excellent good, than the Father alone is, as St. Augustine affirms, lib. 6. De Trinit., cap. 10., saying: In that supreme Trinity one is as much as the three together: nor are two anything more than one: because to be sure they are identified with one another in the divine Essence: therefore on the contrary, because the perfections of creatures, which are in God, whether formally or eminently, are not identified in every way with those which are in creatures, indeed are really distinguished from them, it follows that creatures together with God make something extensively more perfect, than God Himself alone is.

You will ask 2. — Whether Infinity is some special perfection of the Divinity.

I affirm: since that is a special perfection of God which removes from Him a special imperfection of creatures; but infinity removes from Him the notion of limitation and finiteness, by which they reek of imperfection; therefore it is some special perfection. — Then, the concept of infinity is one thing, the concept of the other modes of the divine Essence is another; for while God is conceived as infinitely perfect, His eternity or invisibility, etc., is not precisely attended to. Therefore since it has a distinct concept, it also imports a distinct perfection. — Finally, that is judged a special perfection which seems to be the source and origin of the rest; and which is the reason why the other perfections are shown to belong to God: but such is infinity, for God is judged eternal, v. g., immense, etc., precisely because He is infinite in duration and presence: therefore, etc.

Here it is customary for authors to discuss whether God alone is so infinite, that no creature can be infinite, either intensively or extensively; but since this has already been abundantly demonstrated in our Physica, that nothing besides God can have the notion of the infinite, I have judged that I should refrain from these resolutions here.