Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

It has already been said in the third note of the fourth Question on the divine Essence that, according to the Subtle Doctor, in 4. d. 3. q. 1. n. 32., a twofold infinity can be distinguished in God, namely fundamental and formal. We likewise said that the former is the formal constitutive and distinctive notion of the divine Essence, whereas the latter is a mode of the Essence itself, which is not limited either in itself or in all its perfections, nor confined to certain grades of perfection, but is in every way infinite and unbounded. Concerning the former, enough and more than enough has been said in treating of the divine Essence; concerning the latter, however, several points are to be discussed in this article.

Note 1. With our Bassoli in 1. d. 2. q. 2. a. 1., the infinite is said to be that which lacks a term: which happens in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. In the former way, that is called infinite which from itself does not have a term, but can have one. Thus prime matter is said by the Platonists to be infinite, because from itself it has no form by which it is terminated and actualized; but it is in potency to receiving absolutely any forms whatsoever by which it is informed and determined. In the latter way, that is called infinite which is neither finite from itself, nor finitizable through another; but which contains in itself formally, or eminently, every perfection that can at all be thought of. The former infinite is said to be most imperfect, because it is near to nothing, and is pure physical potency; the latter, however, is most perfect, because it is purest act, excluding all imperfection and potency. The former is called by Philolaus the Pythagorean malignity, darkness, etc.; the latter, however, is called by him benignity and the splendor of God. Orpheus, moreover, calls the former infinite confusion and chaos; the latter, however, distinction and ornament.

Note 2. The infinite taken negatively is again twofold: one, namely, in a certain respect, the other, however, simply and absolutely. The former is that which can be called infinite in a certain genus of beings. Thus, e.g., a continuum can be called infinite in quantity, because not so many parts of it can be assigned but that more remain to be numbered and assigned: so likewise, if the sun had infinite light, and fire infinite heat, the former would be called infinite in light, the latter, however, in heat: the latter, however, is that which is infinite in every genus of perfection, because it contains in itself the whole amplitude of being formally or eminently; so that no species, no perfection can be conceived in the universe of beings which does not shine forth in it.

Note 3. A twofold definition of the infinite is found in Aristotle, lib. 3. of the Physics cap. 6.: the first indeed handed down by the Ancients, who held that the infinite is that outside of which there is nothing, that is, which so comprehends all things in itself that there is no perfection, nor entity of things, which it does not contain in itself in a noble manner: the latter, however, is handed down by Aristotle himself, as it were opposed to the former, saying that the infinite is that of which something is always outside; which namely can never be exhausted by dividing. Both of these definitions fit the infinity of God. For He is so infinite that He cannot be comprehended, and consequently there always remains something of Him which is not yet grasped and known: so likewise He contains all things in Himself, so that He leaves nothing outside Himself; for, as Justin Martyr speaks, in the Question to the Orthodox, That is supremely perfect which can in nothing receive addition or increase. But whether this infinity can be shown to belong to God by efficacious reason and be urged by authority, is what must be resolved here.

First conclusion. — By natural reason it can be demonstrated that God is infinite.

The Doctor proves this conclusion together with his followers in 1. d. 2. q. 2. n. 2, by four reasons taken 1. from His effective power, 2. from His intellective power, 3. from His appetibility, 4. from His eminent dignity.

I form the first thus: That being which from itself could produce infinite distinct species if they were possible, has necessarily infinite power, and consequently an infinite essence: but God can produce infinite species, if they were possible: therefore He has infinite power, and thereby an infinite essence. The major is evident, first indeed as regards the inference of an infinite essence from the infinity of power; for since operative power is founded in the essence, and emanates from it, whence the common axiom: Operating follows being, it is evident that the greater the power is, the more perfect the essence is, and consequently that infinite power argues infinite perfection and essence. The same major is evident also as regards the inference of infinite power from infinite effects distinct in species, which it could produce, if such effects were possible; for since each producible species has a perfection distinct from another species, it is evident that if the producible species were infinite, the producible perfections would likewise be infinite; and consequently, since a cause is the more perfect the more perfections it can produce, it rightly follows that the cause which can produce infinite perfections is infinitely perfect. The minor is also evident, because since God is the first cause, and consequently having in Himself the causality of all inferior causes, and able to produce whatever is producible, it follows that if infinite species of things were possible, He could also produce them; for His power would not be more determined to one number than to another, and consequently could extend itself to infinity. For if it were limited, that would be either from itself or from another; not from another, otherwise it would not be first and supreme: not from itself either, because just as it would be entirely independent in being, so likewise its power would be entirely unlimited, and consequently infinite.

You will reply 1. The multiplication of species to infinity seems impossible, since in any genus there is given something so perfect that a more perfect than it cannot be assigned: therefore from those infinite impossible species infinite power in God is not rightly inferred. — I answer 1. that the antecedent can be denied, although the Doctor seems to affirm it probably; for no reason appears for limiting the species of creatures to some determined number and certain perfection, beyond which a greater and greater one could not be produced. For who will deny that many other and always more perfect species of flowers, plants, or other creatures could be newly produced? Who will deny that another heaven can be added above the Empyrean, just as the Empyrean was added above the Firmament, and so on in turn to infinity? I answer 2. by denying the consequence, because the object of divine Power is not only an effect possible absolutely, but also one possible under any condition whatsoever. Hence it becomes true to say that if a chimera were a true being, God could produce it; and so of other conditioned things, which cannot be produced, not indeed from defect of power in the productive cause, but from the repugnance and defect of possibility in the effect to be produced. And so whether species diverse to infinity are possible absolutely, or only hypothetically, it is always rightly inferred from their presupposed hypothetical or absolute possibility that the power which could produce them would truly be infinite.

You will reply 2. From infinite effects distinct only in number it is not lawful to infer the infinity of the cause: therefore neither from infinite species. The consequence is evident by parity of reason. The Doctor proves the antecedent ibidem n. 26: No greater power is required to produce two effects successively than to produce one in a single instant: but to produce one fire, e.g., in a single instant, infinite power is not required: therefore neither would such power be required to produce two fires successively. The consequence is evident, for the infernal fire, which will be conserved in eternity, would produce infinite heats successively in infinite bodies, if infinite successions were applied to it, and yet that fire will not be of infinite power; similarly the Sun and the heaven, if they endure in eternity, will cause infinite effects of illumination and influence, and yet it will not follow from this that they have infinite power. — I deny the consequence, and the reason for the disparity is that to produce effects diverse only in number, no other power and perfection is required in the agent, but only the application of the same power in those successive productions: it is otherwise, however, with the production of infinite species, because since each species has a perfection diverse from another, it also presupposes a diverse perfection in the cause from which it is produced; since the whole perfection of the effect depends on the perfection of the cause, because no one gives what he does not have, and consequently the cause could not give some power to the effect unless it first had it: therefore it rightly follows that if the producible effects have infinite perfections, the productive cause must also contain diverse and infinite perfections.

2. The Doctor's reason is taken from the infinite knowledge of God, which can be formed thus: He who necessarily understands infinite intelligibles at once, has infinite perfection and intellective power: but God understands them at once: therefore, etc. The major is certain, for the power of understanding and knowing is the more excellent the more things it can perceive and know at once, and consequently a power which can know infinite things at once must necessarily be infinite. The minor is proved: for those things are reckoned infinite where not so many can be known by creatures but that many more still remain to be known, nor can the created intellect ever arrive at the end of all by knowing one after another: but such are all possible creatures, which God Himself distinctly knows at once from eternity; nor can anyone deny that the thoughts and volitions of the Angels and of rational souls, e.g., will be more and more to infinity through eternity a parte post, and that no term and number can be assigned which they do not exceed: therefore God's intellect, which from eternity knows all of them at once, must be infinite. The same must be said of God's will and love, by which He distinctly wills and loves at once all and each of the good acts to be exercised without end, more and more through eternity, by the Angels and blessed men.

3. The Doctor's reason is taken from the notion of final cause and appetibility: Our appetite, or our will, has a natural inclination to love the infinite good, and aspires to it as to the ultimate end: therefore such a good exists; for if its existence were repugnant, the will would not incline by natural desire to attain it; for a natural appetite ought not to be in vain: therefore since such infinite good is not repugnant, it must necessarily exist; otherwise it would not be the infinite good, because it would not be more excellent than every good; for an existing good is more excellent than a non-existing good: but that notion of the highest good can be found in none but the first cause: therefore the first cause, or God, must be of infinite goodness and perfection. It is confirmed: the end is more excellent than those things which are for the end: but all things which are in the universe, both existing and possible, are ordered to God as to the ultimate end: therefore since all these ordainable things are infinite in number, the ultimate end itself must also be infinite.

4. The Doctor's reason is taken from the dignity and highest perfection of God: God is the being than which a more excellent cannot be thought or imagined: therefore He is infinite. The consequence is proved: Of anything finite a more perfect can be thought: therefore no finite thing can be that than which a better cannot be thought. Next, God is a being of highest and most excellent perfection: therefore He is infinite. The antecedent is proved: That being alone is of highest perfection which has every perfection not repugnant to being: but infinite perfection is not repugnant to being: therefore, etc. The minor is proved: both because if infinity were repugnant to being, that repugnance would appear from the terms; which is manifestly false, since no weighty reason can be brought which would persuade that repugnance: and because if infinity were repugnant to being; most of all either because finiteness intrinsically belonged to being as such, or because it would be its property convertible with it: for it does not appear by what other reason infinity would be repugnant to it: but neither of these can be said. Not the first, because we can conceive being as such without finiteness, which could not happen if finiteness were of its formal notion. Not the second either, because it cannot be concluded from the notion of being, nor from any other head, that finiteness is a property convertible with being. — It is confirmed: God is a being from itself, because He is the first of all beings and the most excellent: therefore He is unlimited and infinite. The consequence is proved: A being from itself is most perfect as much as it can be and be conceived: but the most perfect being, than which a more perfect cannot be or be conceived, must be simply infinite in perfection; for it is more perfect to be simply infinite in perfection than to be finite: therefore since God is the most excellent of all beings, and contains formally or eminently all the perfections of finite things, it follows that He is infinite. — Add that if He were limited and finitized, it would be most of all either from Himself or from another: not from another, since He has no cause; not from Himself either, because whatever is finitized from itself is finitized either by reason of the matter or of the form of which it consists: but since God has neither matter nor form, He cannot be limited and finitized even by Himself.

You will say. That is infinite which surpasses and transcends the maximum finite; for if it does not exceed it, it will remain within the multitude of those things which are finite: but it is impossible that a maximum finite be given: therefore it is also impossible that the infinite be given. The minor is proved: If a maximum finite were given, it would follow that it would become infinite by the addition of one grade or finite part, and consequently that the infinite would arise from two finites; thus, e.g., an infinite quantity would arise from a maximum finite quantity by the addition of only one palm or finger: but it is contradictory that the infinite can be made from two finites: therefore a maximum finite cannot be given. — I deny the major, and to its proof I say that for something to be infinite, nothing else is required than that it exceed in perfection absolutely every finite thing, however perfect it may be; nor is it required that a maximum finite be given which is exceeded and surpassed by the infinite. Thus, e.g., the Mathematicians with Euclid lib. 5. of the Elements say that the circle is more perfect than all rectilinear figures, although among them none is most perfect, for they can be multiplied to infinity: and man is said to be the most perfect of all animals, although in fact no brute is given so perfect that a more perfect cannot be given. The other objections customarily made against this conclusion we have already solved in proving the existence of God.

You will say 2. If God's infinity could be proved naturally, His omnipotence could also be proved: but according to the Doctor in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 27. and dist. 12. and Quodlib. 7., divine omnipotence cannot be demonstrated: therefore neither can His infinity. The major is certain: since omnipotence is nothing other than infinite power: the Doctor proves the minor at the assigned places, where he shows that God's omnipotence is believed by faith alone, and cannot be proved by any natural reason. — I answer 1. that the major can be denied. For although omnipotence signifies the same thing in reality as infinite power; they nevertheless differ as regards their precise and formal concept: since omnipotence is conceived by order to everything factible simply; but infinite power is conceived by order to that which is factible without imperfection: for since it could be doubted whether doing all things imports perfection, for some Philosophers with Aristotle judged that the efficiency of certain effects argues imperfection; hence it was rightly doubted by them that God is omnipotent and the maker of all things, lest He be infected with some imperfection: but since the concept of infinite power argues no imperfection, but rather imports the highest perfection, hence no one doubts that it must be attributed to God, the most perfect of beings. — I answer 2. by distinguishing the minor: Divine omnipotence cannot be demonstrated insofar as it is productive of all naturally producible effects, I deny; nor did any Philosopher ever doubt this: insofar as it is productive of things from nothing, and conferring of supernatural gifts, namely grace, charity, beatitude, etc. I concede. For nature supplies no means for proving these effects.

Second conclusion. — God's infinity is also confirmed by sacred authority.

For from the Scriptures God is called, Job 30. Higher than the heavens, deeper than the abysses, etc. Jeremiah 32. Incomprehensible in thought. Psalm 146. Great is the Lord, and great is His power, and of His greatness there is no end: And Ps. 95. Declare His glory among the Gentiles, His wonders among all peoples, for great is the Lord, and exceedingly praiseworthy; which words St. Augustine thus weighs:

And if it said all day long Great, Great, what Great would it say? for great is the Lord, and exceedingly praiseworthy: For what is a small tongue going to say in praising the Great? By saying exceedingly, it sent out a voice, and gave the thought something to savor, as if saying, what I cannot sound out, do you think; and when you have thought, it will be little. What no one's thought explains, someone's tongue explains. For great is the Lord, and exceedingly praiseworthy.

— Some add that passage of Baruch 3. He is great, and has no end, high, and immense. But that is not said of God, but of the place of God's possession, that is, of the world, whose greatness the Prophet exaggerates, so as to open to the Jews how much they owe to God, because above the other nations, among which they are fewer (as he notes ibidem), they were chosen to be His people and the sheep of His pasture. Nor only there, but also elsewhere the name of the Infinite is very often used metaphorically. Thus Numbers 32: a great abundance of riches and a multitude of cattle is said to be infinite. And 3. Kings cap. 3. An infinite people: And cap. 10. Exceedingly infinite gold.

You will reply. If these latter words are used metaphorically and amplificatorily, so that infinite is the same as very great, why not also the former? I answer that there is no parity, because Sacred Scripture everywhere most constantly preaches the infinity of God, nor does it subject anything from which the metaphor may be detected; nor does any reason appear persuading that one must depart from the genuine sense of Scripture. Add that the Lateran Council under Innocent 3. cap. Firmiter, established that it must be believed with certain faith that God is immense and incomprehensible; and consequently that He is infinite. The Holy Fathers confirm the same: Great is God, says St. Dionysius lib. De Divin. Nominib. cap. 9., and above all greatness, and leaping over all infinity. And St. Augustine, Serm. 1. de verbis Apostoli: Inestimable, ineffable, incomprehensible, beyond all things, outside all things, besides all things: And lib. De speculo, cap. 33.: Above whom nothing, outside whom nothing, without whom nothing, beyond whom nothing, beneath whom nothing. God under whom all, with whom all, in whom all. God from whom all things, through whom all things, in whom all things. And St. Gregory Nazian. Orat. 38. calls God an immense and unlimited sea of essence. The rest of the Holy Fathers affirm the same everywhere, who preach that God is infinite and is confined by no limits.

Note 1. The perfections which shine forth in creatures are of two kinds: for some are called simply simple; others, secundum quid. A simply simple perfection is said to be one which involves no imperfection, nor excludes another equal to it; of which sort are the pure or absolute perfections, as some speak: for instance, existence, spirituality, etc., which by St. Anselm, cap. 14. Monologii, is called a perfection which is better itself than not itself, in the whole breadth of being, as we have already noted in the first Question of the preceding Disputation. A perfection secundum quid is said to be one which in its concept has an imperfection so attached that it cannot be separated from it; whence absolutely it is not better for every being to have it than not to have it. Thus to be a body, although with respect to a stone, v. g., it is better than to lack a body, is nevertheless not better and more perfect with respect to all beings. Since it is better and more perfect to be incorporeal and a spiritual substance, as is clear in an Angel and the Soul, than to consist of a body like the rest of creatures.

Note 2. That some perfection can be contained in another in three ways: First indeed formally, as rationality in man; second eminently, as all corporeal creatures in man himself, who is called a little world, or an epitome of the world; third virtually, as heat in the Sun, and the plant in the seed. Moreover, something can be in another eminently in two ways: either formally, as the vegetative and the sentient are in the rational soul, which not only eminently contains the perfections of the vegetative and sentient soul, but also performs their functions. 2. eminently virtually, as the light of the stars is in the Sun, which is not only brighter than the rest, but is also the parent and origin of light. Finally, something is contained in another eminently formally in two ways: namely, perfectly, when it is contained inwardly in a superior from the first grade up to the last difference, as corporeal substance is contained in any individual of human nature, which involves all the grades and differences of corporeal substance formally, and in a nobler way than the rest of corporeal beings: or imperfectly, when it is contained in it only as to general notions, not however as to individual notions and atoms: thus any man comprises in himself the perfections of absolutely all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal.

Note 3. that something can be called infinitely perfect in two ways, namely either in every way, or only in a certain genus of being. In the former way it is called infinite simply, and absolutely, because it comprises in itself the whole amplitude and universality of being and perfection without any limit or any imperfection. In the latter way it is called infinite secundum quid, and in a determinate genus and special order of perfection: thus, v. g., if an infinite line were given, it would be infinite only according to the notion of quantity and length; so that it would comprise in itself and exceed absolutely all length.

First conclusion. — God contains absolutely all perfections.

This is the teaching of all the Holy Fathers. It is proved, first indeed by texts of Sacred Scripture: To the Romans 11.: From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things: and John 1.: All things were made through Him: therefore, since there is no perfection in an effect which was not first in the efficient cause, it follows that God contains in Himself all the perfections which He bestows on His creatures, as He Himself indicates in Isaias 66.: Shall I who make others bring forth, be Myself barren? And Psalm 93.: He who planted the ear, shall He not hear? or He who formed the eye, does He not see? Whence

Proverbs 8, He claims for Himself every perfection which shines forth more in men: Mine, He says, is prudence, mine is counsel, mine is strength, mine are riches, and glory, and substance, and justice: the Holy Fathers affirm the same: God, says St. Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 5., is all things, as the Author of all; and below: All beings are to be attributed to Him according to one eminent conjunction of all: and in the same place: He contains all things according to His more-than-simplicity: and in cap. 13. he supplies three grounds of the same infinite perfection: the first indeed, that He is perfect of Himself, and is defined from Himself alone in one uniform way, and is wholly most perfect through all things; that is, He is of Himself absolute and perfect, nor does He borrow His perfection from another; and accordingly He comprises absolutely every perfection, since there is nothing from which His divine perfection could be limited. The second, that He exceeds every perfection, and is grasped or comprehended by none: or as he speaks, That He surpasses perfection, as one who excels all things, and indeed determines every infinity, and is unfolded beyond every limit: nor is He grasped or comprehended by anyone, but pertains to all things, and beyond all things, by perpetual progressions and unending actions. The third finally, from the fact that He is the principle and cause of all things, and is always complete in His numbers; and that He cannot be diminished, as one who has all things anticipated in Himself, and overflows with one and the same perpetual and accumulated bestowal, which cannot be diminished, by which He perfects all perfect things and fills them with His perfection.

— This same truth was not hidden even from the pagan Philosophers: since Trismegistus called the true God the universality of all things, and likewise the Greeks named Him τὸ πᾶν, that is, the Universe, as Eugubinus testifies, lib. 3. Perennis Philosoph. cap. 8., to signify that all things are contained in Him in that most eminent and most perfect way. Whence in that Oracle, Great Pan is dead, which Plutarch mentions in the book De Oraculorum defectu, Christ is called Great Pan: who is the Lord of all things, and contains the universe in Himself. Indeed even Lucretius, who although an Epicurean in life, acknowledged this universality of goods and perfections in God, saying: Self-sufficient in His own resources, needing nothing of ours. Which he had perhaps borrowed from the Royal Bard: I have said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods.

The same truth is proved by reason: What is infinite in some genus contains absolutely all the perfections of that genus; v. g., if infinite light were given, it would comprise in itself absolutely all light, otherwise it would not be infinite light, since by the addition of another light it could be increased: but God is infinite in the genus of being, as has been proved: therefore He comprises in Himself absolutely all the perfections of being. — Then, what are divided in lower things are united in higher things in a more eminent way. Thus the vegetative and sentient soul are in man in a more excellent way than in brutes and plants; light shines more clearly in the Sun, the parent and origin of light, than in the Stars and the rest of the lucid bodies, which borrow their light from it: therefore, since God is the supreme of all beings, the perfections of the rest ought to be united in Him. — Finally, creatures are called beings by participation, because they are perfect only insofar as they receive perfection from God: but they could not receive perfection from God unless He Himself precontained it; for no one gives what he does not have: therefore God contains in Himself absolutely all the perfections of whatever beings.

Second conclusion. — God contains in Himself formally and eminently all simply simple perfections.

It is proved: Since God is that than which nothing greater or better can be thought, whatever is more perfect and better is to be attributed to Him: but a simply simple perfection is better with itself than without itself; therefore it is to be attributed to God formally. — Then, an infinitely perfect Being ought to contain in Himself in a nobler way all perfections which in their concept reek of no imperfection: but such are the simply simple perfections: therefore they are to be attributed to God formally. — Finally, those things belong to God formally which are formally predicated of Him: but simply simple perfections are formally predicated of God: therefore they belong to Him formally. — That He also contains them eminently is evident from this, that He comprises them in a nobler and more excellent way than they are found in creatures; since in the latter they are accidents, in God, however, they are substances; for God, as has been proved, admits of no accident; and since He really identifies with Himself whatever He contains in Himself, He cannot have those diverse and opposed notions of substance and accident. — Then those perfections are finite and limited in creatures; in God, however, they are infinite and free from limitation; for whatever is in God is formally infinite. — Whence, as Nicolaus Chusa notes, lib. 1. de docta ignorantia, God was rightly called by the Ancients a Sphere, whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference nowhere, to declare the infinity of the divine magnitude. For if an infinite Sphere were given, it would be infinite not only according to itself as a whole, but also according to each of its parts; for all lines drawn from the circumference to the center would be extended infinitely, all surfaces would tend infinitely, and finally the height and depth themselves would have no limit; and so according to all the dimensions of its magnitude it would be infinite on every side. Thus by parity of reasoning God is truly to be called infinite, because whatever is conceived in Him has infinite perfection; for infinite is His wisdom, unlimited goodness, uncircumscribed truth, eternal duration, immense presence, interminable power, incomprehensible Essence; all of which Saint Bernard, lib. 5. De Consid., cap. 13., lucidly explains: This eternity, he says, is so long that it has no end; Charity, which infinitely excels every affection; Knowledge, which includes, indeed surpasses, all wisdom; Essence, which anticipates every being. By which he denotes that there is no conceivable perfection in God which is not infinite; and accordingly which is found in God in a far more excellent way than in creatures.

Third conclusion. — Perfections secundum quid are not in God formally, but only eminently or virtually.

The first part is proved: God, since He is the most perfect being, removes every imperfection from Himself: but perfections secundum quid involve imperfection in their concept, as is clear from their definition: therefore God does not contain them formally. — Then: What are in God formally are also formally predicated of Him: but perfections secundum quid cannot be formally predicated of God, otherwise it would be true to say that God is as properly called a lion, or a stone, or a body, as He is called wise, just, etc.; and so He would be a wondrous monster composed of all creatures, and the center and receptacle of all imperfections. — Finally: An infinite being excludes every limitation from itself: but God is a being infinite on every side; and perfections secundum quid are limited and finite: therefore God removes them from Himself, nor does He comprise them formally.

The second part is proved: God is the cause of absolutely all beings, and consequently of all the perfections which are found in creatures: but every cause virtually precontains its effect; for the effect is a participation of the entity and perfection of the cause itself: therefore, etc.

That He also contains them eminently is evident from this, that eminent containment is said to be that by which either something of a more eminent nature can produce another, in the way every equivocal cause that is more principal, or total, contains its effect; or that by which something, by reason of its more perfect entity, accomplishes entirely without any imperfection what another performs only with imperfection. Thus the rational soul contains the soul of a brute, and the soul of a plant: and the intellect the phantasm; and this the internal senses: but in both these ways God contains all the perfections of creatures. For He is not only their author and origin, but also by reason of His infinite entity involves absolutely all being; not indeed formally, but eminently, and virtually, and that in a far more perfect and eminent way than animals and plants are contained in the power of the Sun and the rest of the stars. For the Sun and the rest of the stars do not concur, except by means of light and influx, to forming the dispositions of the body to be animated, but do not precisely bestow life itself of themselves; God, however, not only fashions the body, but also creates the soul, and bestows life. Hence St. Dionysius rightly warns, lib. De divinis nominibus, cap. 13., that all things are in a certain way affirmed of God, and denied, and that He is rightly called the position of all things, and the ablation of all things, because He eminently posits all things as containing them, and formally removes all things, because He excludes from Himself every created and imperfect formal notion.

You will ask. — Whether God is something greater or more perfect with creatures, than if He were alone.

The Subtle Doctor answers, in quaest. 5. Quodlibetica, n. 8., that God with creatures is not something greater and more perfect intensively, than He is alone. The truth of this answer is clear from all those texts of Sacred Scripture by which, when treating of the divine being, we proved that creatures compared with God are as it were nothing; For all nations, says Isaias, are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity. Which David had earlier taught, saying, Psalm 38: My substance is as nothing before Thee: but from the accession of nothing being does not grow, but rather decreases: therefore from the addition of creatures the divine perfection is not increased, nor does it grow. — Then, the infinite cannot be made greater by the addition of something finite: but God is simply infinite, while creatures are finite and limited: therefore they together with God do not make something greater and more perfect, than God Himself is. The minor is evident. The major is proved: that is infinite which contains in itself whatever perfection it can have from its formal notion; and accordingly it cannot receive a further perfection of the same notion. Thus, v. g., time added to eternity does not increase nor extend its duration, because all those inferior durations are contained in eternity in a most eminent way. — Finally, God is every good, as Moses himself says, Exod. 33: Come, I will show thee all good; therefore of Himself He so involves absolutely all goodness and perfection, that nothing can be added to Him which He does not precontain: whence just as if an Angel were posited twice, the union made of the same posited twice would not be something better, than it was alone: therefore St. Augustine rightly concludes, tract. 11. in Ioan.: If thou art without God, thou wilt be lesser; if thou art with God, God will not be greater: not from thee is He greater, but thou art lesser without Him,

I answer 2. God with creatures makes something more perfect extensively, than God alone is. It is proved: Where there are perfections really distinct, and not identified with one another, there one added to another makes something greater extensively, because good added to good not really identified with itself makes several goods: but the perfections of created things, as they are in God really, are distinguished from the same as they are in the creatures themselves: therefore God and creatures taken together are something more perfect extensively, than God Himself alone is. — It is confirmed: For this reason the three adorable Persons of the Trinity do not make some greater and more excellent good, than the Father alone is, as St. Augustine affirms, lib. 6. De Trinit., cap. 10., saying: In that supreme Trinity one is as much as the three together: nor are two anything more than one: because to be sure they are identified with one another in the divine Essence: therefore on the contrary, because the perfections of creatures, which are in God, whether formally or eminently, are not identified in every way with those which are in creatures, indeed are really distinguished from them, it follows that creatures together with God make something extensively more perfect, than God Himself alone is.

You will ask 2. — Whether Infinity is some special perfection of the Divinity.

I affirm: since that is a special perfection of God which removes from Him a special imperfection of creatures; but infinity removes from Him the notion of limitation and finiteness, by which they reek of imperfection; therefore it is some special perfection. — Then, the concept of infinity is one thing, the concept of the other modes of the divine Essence is another; for while God is conceived as infinitely perfect, His eternity or invisibility, etc., is not precisely attended to. Therefore since it has a distinct concept, it also imports a distinct perfection. — Finally, that is judged a special perfection which seems to be the source and origin of the rest; and which is the reason why the other perfections are shown to belong to God: but such is infinity, for God is judged eternal, v. g., immense, etc., precisely because He is infinite in duration and presence: therefore, etc.

Here it is customary for authors to discuss whether God alone is so infinite, that no creature can be infinite, either intensively or extensively; but since this has already been abundantly demonstrated in our Physica, that nothing besides God can have the notion of the infinite, I have judged that I should refrain from these resolutions here.