Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since this principal distinction is established between the attributes and the modes of the divine Essence, that the former are attributed to God and creatures alike, while the latter belong to the divine Essence alone, in order that an exact knowledge of the divine Simplicity may be had, and that it may clearly appear whether it is to be numbered among the modes, it is worthwhile to resolve here whether it belongs to God alone. That this may be done more clearly.

Note 1. In general, a twofold simplicity can be distinguished, one of being, the other of virtue. The former denies all composition; the latter excludes dissimulation. The former denotes imperfection in creatures; for when a created thing is simple and does not have the perfections of other things joined to it, it comes about that it is the less perfect the more simple it is: this latter, however, imports the highest perfection: whence Christ especially commends it in these words, Matthew 10. Be prudent as serpents, and simple as doves. For by this simplicity the spiritual man is perfected and made whole, who, in order to be perfect, ought to be simple indeed in mind, simple in heart, simple in speech, simple in work. In mind, through the knowledge and assertion of truth; in heart, through the fervor of charity; in speech, through the sincerity and candor of discourse; in work, through justice and holiness, so that the splendor of the Christian man may shine forth, Christ saying, Matt. 6. If your eye is simple, your whole body will be full of light, and like a lamp it will enlighten you.

Note 2. Composite things can be distinguished into three kinds: for some are composed out of these, some with these, others after these. Those are said to be composed out of these which consist of parts mutually united; thus a species is composed out of genus and difference, a physical body out of matter and form, and the human body out of head, arms, chest, etc. Those, however, are said to be composed with these which, although in themselves they do not appear composite, nor consist of parts, are nevertheless ordered of themselves to the composition of another: thus genus and difference are ordered to constituting a species, matter and form to composing a body, etc. Finally, those are said to be composed after these which are constituted out of a form supervening after the union of matter with form; thus after the union of soul with body, the universal form of man, namely humanity, arrives so as to constitute man as a whole. The first composition is called passive, because through it the thing is constituted. The second active, because it constitutes the thing. The third denominative, because it does not inform the thing, but denominates it.

Note 3. Besides the twofold general difference of composition, namely physical and metaphysical, each of which is done in four ways, as we noted above, a twofold genus of composition is again assigned by the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 2. n. 2. One indeed from actuality and possibility, by which it comes about that since no creature exists necessarily, there is also none which is not able not to exist, and consequently which does not imply potency to act: for whatever has been formed out of nothing can again pass away into nothing, so as to be produced anew, if God so wills. For since an existing creature is a mean between God, the highest being, and possible things, which are close to nothing, it also participates at once in the actuality of God and in the possibility of things capable of existence, that is, of possibles. The other genus of composition, however, is from positive entity and from the privation of some grade and perfection of being: for since a creature does not contain in itself all perfections of being whatsoever, the consequence is that it appears to be composed both of the perfections which it has and of the negation of the perfections which it does not embrace. These things having been premised, let there be

Only conclusion. — God alone is altogether simple.

This is the conclusion of all Theologians, and the Doctor proves it thus: Every creature is either a substance or an accident: if an accident, it necessarily requires to be received in a substance as in a subject, and so it can compose with the subject one composite per accidens. If it is a substance, it is either a substance constituted out of really distinct parts, e.g., matter and form, or it is not so constituted. If the first, it will be most properly composite; and consequently it will not be simple: if the second, it will be either substantially complete or incomplete. If incomplete, it can with its other co-part make one substance per se; thus prime matter with substantial form makes an organic body. If complete, it can receive in itself an accident, and so compose with the accident a composite per accidens formed out of that substance and the accident. That any created substance can receive some accident is evident, because if some one could not, it would be above all the most perfectly spiritual substance, namely the Angels: but the Angels can receive intellections and volitions, by which they understand and will: for those acts are not really identified with them; first, because otherwise they would be formally and necessarily blessed from their own nature; for their beatitude consists in intellection, or volition, or both: then, because they would necessarily understand every intelligible by one single intellection, and so their intellection, and consequently their Essence, would be infinite: finally, because they would not depend in understanding on any object, except on that on which they depend in being, namely on God, and consequently they would understand nothing in their proper genus except God; for whatever is understood in its proper genus is understood with dependence on that object which is thus understood. — Every creature likewise has two other modes of composition: since it has certain grades of being, but lacks very many others. For although man is a Microcosm and an epitome of the whole mundane composition, because he has being with stones, life with plants, sensation with animals, understanding with Angels, and on that account is called by Christ every creature, St. Gregory thus explaining these words, Preach the Gospel to every creature, that is, to man; nevertheless it is certain that man himself labors under innumerable defects, and lacks many perfections which we see shining in the other creatures. Whence the Royal Psalmist, not undeservedly disclosing his emptiness and vanity, says in Psalm 143.: Man is become like to vanity, and in Psalm 38.: Every living man is altogether vanity. — It equally stands that every creature involves act and potency at once; for there is none which holds its existence so tenaciously and immutably that it cannot pass into nothing at any moment of time. Whence it is rightly to be concluded with St. Job: Behold, they who serve him are not stable, and in his Angels he found wickedness: how much more they who dwell in houses of clay, who have an earthly foundation, are consumed as it were by a moth?

You will say. Things which are neither composed, nor divisible, nor able to be resolved into various parts, are simple: but many beings are such; for a point is indivisible, as also is one; matter and form are not composed: the supreme genera cannot be resolved into others: therefore besides God, many things are simple. — I distinguish the major: They are simple with some simplicity, I concede; with a simplicity of every kind, I deny. To the minor I say that the things adduced are indeed not composed out of these, but are composed or composable with these; for out of unities the number, out of points the line, out of genera and differences the species; and out of matter and form physical bodies are constituted. And consequently these cannot be called simple with a simplicity of every kind, since they are ordered of themselves to composition; but God rejects both these modes of composition.

You will insist. God too can be composed with these; therefore he is not simple in every way. The antecedent is proved: God can be united, and in fact the Word is united to the humanity so as to make with it the man-God: but this union is a true composition. Proof: the union of the Word with human nature is such as the union of the soul with the body; but this is a perfect composition: therefore so is that. The major is established from that saying of St. Athanasius in the Creed: As the rational soul and the flesh are one man: so God and man are one Christ. — I deny the major, and to the minor of its proof I say; the union of the Word with the humanity is rather the termination of dependence and of hypostatic communication than a composition: for every perfect composition is made either from parts which mutually perfect one another, or from those which are mutually united by way of act and potency. But the divine Word cannot have the notion of act and of part; for these savor of imperfection, which is far to be removed from God; and consequently his union with human nature cannot be a true composition. — To the authority of St. Athanasius I say that the parity assumed consists only in this, that just as the rational soul is neither polluted nor changed through its union with the flesh, so neither does the Word suffer any detriment through its union with the humanity; whence St. Athanasius had premised: One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person.