Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since in the preceding pages we have already noted that metaphysical composition takes place in four ways; and since it is already abundantly clear from what has been said about the formal distinction of the attributes that the divine perfections, whether attributive or modifying, produce no real composition in God, the only thing that remains to be resolved here is whether any composition can be detected in God from genus and difference, and from the Divine Essence and the divine supposits: and that these may appear more evidently

Note 1. The grades of genus and of difference can be conceived in two ways. First, insofar as they are really and formally distinguished from one another from the nature of the thing, as all the Scotists prove together with the Doctor, in 2. dist. 3. quest. 1. and elsewhere. In this sense the generic grade is so called, which, since it is common to different species and indifferent to them, is regarded as being, as it were, in potency determinable to them through some other grade, which is called difference, because through it the thing is constituted and distinguished from any other. Thus, for example, the principle and power of sensing is called the generic concept common to man and brute, and to be determined to each of the two through other concepts expressed by the names rational and irrational. Second, insofar as each of these two grades can be conceived as diverse only by reason, so that on the side of the thing there is in reality no distinction of such concepts, but only an occasion and foundation of distinction, on account of which our intellect from its native fecundity produces this distinction and perceives those grades as distinct, although in reality they are not distinguished on the side of the thing.

Note 2. Each of these two grades can be taken either categorically or transcendentally. In the former way, the generic grade is that which, in the predicamental line of substance or of accidents, prescinds from the species subject to it and is determined to them through true and perfect differences that divide and contract the genus and constitute and distinguish the species: in the latter way, however, that grade must be called generic which, prescinding from every predicamental being, is perceived after the manner of some common concept univocally belonging to God and creatures, and is determined to each of the two, whether through true essential differences or through intrinsic modes serving the place of differences. In the former way each of these two grades must be derived from some reality distinctly known through the operations or properties of the thing, e.g. the generic grade in man is derived from the power of sensing, which through sensations appears common to man and brute: the differential grade, however, is derived from the discursive power, which is proper to man alone among living beings: and each of these two grades must therefore be known distinctly, because it serves to form the distinction of the thing, which must explain the essence distinctly through genus and categorical difference. It is otherwise, however, with transcendental genus and difference, which disclose the nature of the thing not distinctly and through known realities, but confusedly and through transcendental concepts. Whether, however, the differential and generic grades belong to God in either of these ways, is what must be resolved here.

First conclusion. — God is truly not composed of the grades of genus and of categorical difference: it is not, however, improbable that He consists of transcendental genus and difference. This conclusion has two parts, the first of which the Doctor openly defends in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. n. 16. etc.

Proof 1. By the authorities of the Holy Fathers, who judge that God is in no way included in the predicaments. Thus, above all, Saint Anselm in the Monologion, cap. 26., where he says: The divine Substance is included in no common treatment of substances, from whose essential communion every nature is excluded. — The same is affirmed by Saint Bernard, or whoever is the author of the book De vita solitaria, where near the end, discoursing about God, he says: It is the supreme substance, not subject to the predicaments, but the subsisting causal principle of all things. Similarly Saint Augustine, in the book De Cognitione verae vitae, cap. 3. says: that every human condition is included in the predicaments, and that from all of these the property of the supreme Essence is utterly excluded by evident reason; whence Evagrius justly concludes, in Socrates, lib. 3. cap. 7.: That every proposition, or genus, contains what is predicated, either the species, or the difference, or the property, or the accident, or what is composed of these; but nothing of this kind can be received in the holy Trinity.

This same truth is proved by the reason of the Doctor in the cited place. The categorical generic grade is sought from a reality determinable and contractible, the differential grade, however, from a determinative and contractive reality: but these distinct realities cannot be found in God: therefore neither is the categorical generic and differential grade to be found in Him.

The major is evident from an inspection of the predicamental line itself, both of substance and of accidents, in which line it is certain that the generic grade is that reality which appears common to the different species, to which it is determined through grades proper and special to them; thus substance is determined and contracted to body through materiality, and to spirit through immateriality.

The minor is proved: every reality and formality in God that is to be distinguished is formally, or at least really, infinite; but an infinite formality or reality is not determinable and contractible through a formality or reality. Proof: whatever is contracted and determined through another is also actuated and perfected through it: but an infinite formality or reality cannot be actuated or perfected by anything: therefore it can neither be determined and contracted, nor consequently have the notion of genus. The major is evident: for matter, which is determined through form, is also actuated and perfected through it. The same must be said of genus, which is contracted through difference, and is perfected and ennobled. The minor is also established: for that is called infinite which has in itself and from itself all perfections compossible with itself: for if any perfection were wanting to it, it would no longer retain the notion of the infinite: but the generic concept of itself and in itself does not bring in the concept of the difference through which it is contracted, otherwise the difference, e.g. rational, would be superfluous for the constitution of man, since man would be rational also through the grade of animal; or it would follow that he is rational twice; once indeed through animal, which would also contain rational of itself, and again through the grade of the rational itself, which would be added to him after the manner of a difference: and consequently, since every reality or formality which is in God is infinite, no distinct generic concept that is truly categorical can be derived from it. And so God cannot be constituted from a generic and categorical differential grade, nor consequently be composed of predicamental genus and difference.

It is confirmed. It is impossible that an essence simply infinite in the genus of being should consist of categorical genus and difference: but the Divine Essence is simply infinite in the genus of being: therefore it cannot consist of categorical genus and difference. The minor is established. The major is proved: what is infinite in some order cannot consist of finite parts in the same order: but categorical genus and difference are something finite and limited in the notion of being: therefore the infinite Essence cannot consist of genus and difference. The major is evident, because from finite notions nothing but what is finite can be made. The minor is proved: genus and difference are metaphysical parts distinct from one another, and mutually excluding one another from their concept: for genus does not include difference in its concept, but excludes it: but it is repugnant that two parts, one of which does not include the other, should be infinite; for the infinite identifies whatever is compossible with itself; for infinite being identifies with itself every perfection of being; and an infinite line, if there were one, would identify with itself any length whatsoever: therefore in like manner infinite reality must identify every reality compossible with itself: therefore, since genus cannot identify with itself the difference compossible with it in the same species, nay rather excludes it from its concept, it follows that neither of the two can be infinite.

The other arguments proving this same truth I pass over, since we have weighed them in our Logica, in the Disputation on predicamental Substance, quaest. 1. concl. 2.

You will say. The Holy Fathers indicate that certain predicaments are found in God and truly affirmed of Him. Thus St. Augustine, 5. De Trinit., cap. 7. 8. 10. et 11., teaches that the predicament of Substance, of Relation, and of Action properly belongs to God; that of Quality, however, of Quantity, of Position, and of Habit only improperly. Similarly St. Damascene, in the Elementario, cap. 7. says: that the species of the highest and first genus of substance are, first, that which is free of body, and inanimate body: that is, the predicamental genus of substance is distributed into spiritual and corporeal substance: he adds, however: The Essence free of body comprises God, the Angel, the Soul, the Demon. Finally Boethius, lib. 1. De Trinit. says that only two predicaments, namely Substance and Relation, remain in divine things. Therefore these Fathers judge that categorical genus is truly found in God, both of Substance and of Relation.

I deny the consequence. For the Holy Fathers only intend that the confused concept of substance and relation can be accommodated and attributed to God more than the other predicamental concepts, which are altogether unbecoming to God; so that from the notion of uncreated and created substance and relation some concept, at least a confused one, can be prescinded, which is attributed to God generically not properly, but by metaphor. Thus the Subtle Doctor explains St. Damascene and Boethius, and he gathers this from the words of Damascene saying, c. 8. Elementarii: Substance, which contains supersubstantially the uncreated Deity, but knowably and contentively every creature, is the most general genus. That is, says the Doctor, predicamental substance contains under itself formally the Deity, just as it contains the creature, nor is it predicated generically of both in a similar way; but supersubstantially, that is, insofar as the concept of substance accommodated to God excludes every imperfection and limitation which is found in the predicamental generic concept.

The same is gathered from Boethius himself, l. 1. De Trinit., cap. 6., where, after he had enumerated the ten predicaments into which being is distributed in general, he adds:

But when anyone turns these into a divine predication, all things that can be predicated are changed: something, however, cannot be predicated at all. For substance in Him is not true substance, but beyond substance. Likewise quality, and the rest, in whatever way they can come to pass: and that the understanding of these may become fuller, examples must be subjoined. For when we say, God, we seem to signify substance indeed, but that which is beyond substance. When, however, we say just, quality indeed, but not an accident, but that which is of substance; but beyond substance.

Whence the Doctor concludes that all predicates common to God and creatures are transcendental predicates, prescinding from all categorical predicates, which are finite and limited.

The second part remains proved from our Metaphysica, q. 3. sect. 2., where we have shown that it is not improbable that the notion of Being, which the Subtle Doctor maintains to be univocal to God and creatures, likewise has the notion of transcendental genus; since indeed God agrees with the creature in being, but differs from it essentially through infinity.

You will say. The Holy Fathers judge that every notion of genus and of difference must be kept away from God: therefore He cannot admit even the notion of transcendental genus and difference. The antecedent is evident: for St. Clement of Alexandria, l. 8. Stromat. says that God is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor number, etc. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, lib. 55. Thesauri, cap. 5. says that God has a substantial difference, because He is most simple, and difference is found only in composites: therefore, etc.

I answer. The aforementioned Fathers, and any others suggesting the same, must be understood of predicamental genus and difference, which, since they import limitation and composition from realities, must be removed far from God: not, however, of transcendental genus and difference, which import no reality, but only a diversity of concepts, which Rusticus the Deacon lucidly observed in the Dialogue against the Acephali, where, to the heretic objecting that the Divinity and the Humanity have one highest genus; for substance is the most general genus of the divinity and of the humanity, which is subsisting through itself: he answers thus:

the Subsistent per se, when said of God, signifies that it needs nothing else in order to be; but when said of creatures, by no means; for they have taken their being from the Creator. … Therefore although substance is one name, it is not, however, one thing: substance is therefore not a common genus of the Deity and of flesh: but only a common name; this, however, is not genus.

You will insist. The notion of categorical genus cannot be found in God: therefore neither can the transcendental. The antecedent is evident from what has been said. The consequence is proved: The reason why categorical genus cannot be found in God is that, since whatever is in God is infinite, nothing in Him can have the notion of part: for every whole is greater than its part: but nothing is greater than the infinite: but any genus whatsoever, whether categorical or transcendental, necessarily has the notion of part; since it concurs with difference to constitute the essence. Therefore by the same reason by which categorical genus must be kept away from God, the transcendental must also be removed.

I deny the consequence. And to the major of that proof I say that it is not repugnant that the infinite should have the notion of part, not after the manner of reality, but after the manner of formality, which does not adequately state the whole essence of the thing formally; for it is certain that in God Himself the notion of infinite substance is formally distinguished from the notion of infinite spiritual substance. Add that although the divine attributes are infinite, they nevertheless seem to have the notion of part with respect to the Divine Essence itself: since from them and the divine essence the whole God is constituted and, as it were, integrated.

— To what is said, however, that nothing is greater than the infinite; I answer: nothing is greater than the infinite, really, let it pass; formally, I deny it. For it can happen that something is formally greater than one infinite, if indeed, since it is of itself already an infinitely perfect formality, it has another formality joined to itself and really identified with it, also infinitely perfect: thus the divine Essence, e.g. which of itself is infinitely perfect, prescinding from the attributes, can be said to be more perfect when it is conceived together with the attributes themselves, also infinitely perfect: therefore although nothing in God can have the notion of part after the manner of reality, from which the notion of categorical genus is derived, it is nevertheless not repugnant that something in Him have the notion of part after the manner of formality, from which the notion of transcendental genus is derived.

Second conclusion. — The divine personalities, although formally distinct from the Essence, nevertheless produce no true composition with it. This conclusion remains sufficiently and more than sufficiently proved from what we have said about the divine attributes, which, although they formally differ from the divine Essence, we have nevertheless shown to produce no composition with it. Nonetheless I prove it further:

First indeed from the supreme identity of God: Every true composition must be made from two realities: but the Personality and the divine Essence are not two realities: therefore they produce no composition. The major is evident from Note 2. The minor is proved from St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione ad Eugenium, cap. 8.: The properties of the Persons, he says, are nothing other than the Persons, and they themselves are nothing other than one God, one divine Substance, one divine Nature, one divine and supreme majesty, which the Catholic Faith confesses. Eulogius of Alexandria speaks the same, in Photius, pag. 457. Some assert, he says, that the Hypostasis is a combination of substance and of properties, which manifestly seems to introduce composition. And where is that simple Divinity in the Trinity, free of composition? namely, if the Personality were distinguished from the Essence, as reality from reality. St. Cyril of Alexandria, lib. 10. Thes. indicates this very supreme identity of the divine Essence with the Persons in explicit words:

Since the nature of the Deity is not composed but simple, he says, it would never be distinguished in thought into two Persons, the Father and the Son, unless some difference were found; not according to Essence, but according to Relation and, as it were, from without, that is, understood outside the Essence: through which the Person of each of the two is constituted in its own hypostasis, and is bound into the unity of the Deity because of natural identity, so that no confusion occurs, and, as it were, no mixture of the Father and of the Son

by which he openly indicates that no composition intervenes between the Divine Persons, nor of the same with the Divine Essence, namely because of their supreme essential identity.

The 2nd Conclusion is proved from the supreme Actuality of God: Every true composition must be made from two realities, or formalities, one of which has the notion of act, the other, however, the notion of determinable potency: God can have the notion of no potency: therefore He can admit no composition either. These things are sufficiently and more than sufficiently evident from what we have said, both in demonstrating the Existence of God, by a reason taken from necessary and actual being: and in proving the formal distinction of the attributes from the Divine Essence.

You will say. Where there is union, there is composition: but between the divine personalities and the essence there is union: therefore there is also composition. The Holy Fathers prove the minor, who affirm that both the divine nature is united with the Persons, and the Persons are mutually united with one another. Thus St. Athanasius, lib. Contra Sabellianos: The Trinity, he says, truly existing, is joined with nothing interrupting. And St. Gregory of Nazianzus, in Oration 23.: He says that the Unity is adored in the Trinity, and the Trinity in the unity, whose division and union are both admirable. Likewise St. Augustine in Sermon 189. de tempore asserts that the three Persons are divided by properties, but associated by nature.

I answer 1. The major can be denied, for union does not always entail composition; since complete beings, e.g. stones, are mutually united in a house by the unity of aggregation, yet are not on that account composed; for composition is the union of those things of which one has the notion of act and the other the notion of potency.

I answer 2. by denying the minor; and to the Holy Fathers I say that by these or similar ways of speaking they do not intend that some perfect union intervenes, whether among the Persons themselves or with the Divine Essence, but only a perfect essential unity; and that they suggest that the Divinity is communicated to the three Persons without any division and diversity of itself, lest they should seem to introduce a plurality of Gods; whence they frequently reproached the Arians that by the division of the Deity itself they introduced a plurality of Gods: If the nature in the holy Trinity varied, says St. Gregory of Nyssa, it would be a different thing, as those deceived by error suspect, and the consequence would be that the number would be spread out into a multitude of Gods; since the subjects themselves would be divided along with the diversity of substance. Which Cardinal Bessarion excellently pursues, lib. De Process. Spiritus sancti:

Substance and hypostasis, he says, are one thing in each divine Person: and so one, that they are mutually discerned only by reason. For if Person or hypostasis and substance really differed from one another, just as the Persons are three in reality, so there would also be three substances: that is, essences; but this is contrary to the faith.

You will insist. Where there is a determinable and a determinative, there is potency and act, and consequently composition: but the Essence is determinable, and the personality is determinative of it, so that with it it constitutes the Person; therefore between the Person and the Essence there is composition.

I distinguish the major. Where there is a determinable and a determinative after the manner either of matter and form, or of genus and difference, there is composition, I concede: where the determinable is not after the manner of a potency indifferent to this or that act, just as matter is indifferent to this or that form, and genus to this or that difference; but after the manner of a constituting act, concurring with another act to constitute a thing which is pure act, I deny. The divine Essence, however, is not determinable through the personality in the former way, but in the latter; for since this is pure act, it concurs to constitute the divine Person.

You will press. From the union of act with act, a being per se is not made, but per accidens: therefore either the divine Person, which is constituted through the Essence and the Personality, is not made from act and act, and so is truly composed; or it is not a being per se, but per accidens, which it would be impious to assert. — I distinguish the antecedent: From the union of act with act a being per se is not made, in created things, I concede; because unless created things united with one another coalesce after the manner of act and potency to constitute a third, they have nothing in themselves by which they can be mutually identified: it is otherwise, however, in divine things, because since the divine infinity really identifies all those things which are in God, except the Personal Relations, which on that account are not called infinite, hence it happens that through the union of act with act in God there is not made a being per accidens, but per se, because of the supreme identification of each of the two.