Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

AND IN WHAT ITS DIVINE SIMPLICITY FORMALLY CONSISTS.

Note 1. The difference between simplicity, unity, and identity is this: that Identity is opposed to distinction, Unity to multitude, and Simplicity to composition. For those things are said to be altogether the same which are not diverse either in reality or in reason; e.g., Man and rational Animal: for these diverse words express altogether the same thing; but those things are said to be One which, although they are diverse in themselves and distinct really or formally, are nevertheless so united to one another that they coalesce into one; thus the rational soul and the flesh are one man. But that is said to be Simple which rejects every composition entirely, and admits in itself nothing after the manner of act and potency, which are required for forming a true composition. And so Simplicity seems to be, as it were, midway between unity and identity; since it is stricter than Unity, which admits component parts, and broader than identity, which rejects every distinction. Therefore that is called simple which, although it includes distinct things, nevertheless excludes every composition from act and potency, as is manifest in the Mystery of the adorable Trinity, in which the real mutual distinction of the divine Persons does not dissolve divine simplicity; much less does the formal distinction of the Personal relations from the Divine Essence impede it.

Note 2. As many kinds of simplicity can be distinguished as there are kinds of composition inimical to it: whence, since universally there is a twofold genus of composition — for one is real composition, which is made in four ways, namely, either from matter and form; or from integral or quidditative parts; or from nature and subsistence, on the hypothesis that the latter adds something positive to the substantial nature; or from subject and accident. The other is formal composition ex natura rei, which others call virtual composition and of reason; and this is likewise made in four ways, namely, either from essence and existence, or from genus and difference, or from essence and properties, or finally from essence and its intrinsic modes. Hence it happens that likewise in general a twofold Simplicity is spoken of: one indeed real, which excludes every composition, whether from matter and form, or from integral or quidditative parts, or from nature and subsistence, or from subject and accident; the other is formal simplicity, or of reason, which excludes every mode of formal composition.

Note 3. Formal simplicity is again distinguished as twofold: one is called Simplicity secundum quid, or simple; whose objective concept is so one that it is nevertheless resolvable into various distinct concepts, thinkable separately; such is, e.g., the concept of man, which although metaphysically it is unique, can nevertheless be resolved into the concepts of animal and rational, by which man is constituted. The other is called absolute Simplicity, or simpliciter simplex, whose entity cannot be resolved into various concepts; such is the concept of Being, e.g., which since it presupposes nothing prior, but is the more general and prior of all concepts, is likewise resolved into none. Which, however, of these simplicities belongs to God is to be resolved here.

First conclusion. — God is entirely simple. Thus the Lateran Council defined, cap. Firmiter, in which it is decreed that the divine Substance is invisible, as being entirely simple. All the holy Fathers and theological Doctors prove the same, and that by various reasons, of which the First is deduced from the supreme perfection of God, and can be formed thus: God is the most perfect being: therefore He is simple. The antecedent is evident; since by the name of God is understood a being than which nothing better and more perfect can be thought or imagined. The consequence is proved: To the most perfect being must be attributed every perfection altogether that savors of no imperfection: whence St. Ambrose, lib. 1. De Fide, cap. 7.: Whatever can be felt more religiously, whatever is more excellent for adornment, whatever is more sublime for power, understand that this befits God: but a simple nature, says St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 7., is preferred to a manifold one: therefore, as he concludes there: God is not composed, He is pure simplicity. And that you may clearly know what I call simple, the same as one. God is as simple as He is one: He is one, and as it were nothing else: if it can be said, He is most one. The second proof is deduced from the notion of the first cause: The first cause can have no cause of itself: but every composite thing requires a cause which unites and joins its distinct parts; for things which are diverse among themselves cannot coalesce into one, except through some uniting cause: therefore since God is the first cause, He cannot have a unitive cause of parts; nor consequently can He be composed, and hence He is entirely simple. The major is certain. For, says the Author of the book De cognitione verae vitae, cap. 7., in Augustine, tom. 9., everything which is joined from parts, or resolved into parts, certainly undergoes conjunction or resolution from something. St. Cyril of Alexandria proves the minor in the book Thesaurus, cap. 13.: Since therefore, he says, nothing can be thought before the principle, it will in no way befall it to be composed; since composite things are made by a certain concourse of simples. The same is confirmed by Justin Martyr, or whoever is the Author of the Quaestionum, et Responsionum ad Orthodoxos, q. 129, where he says that every composite is made by another: For, he says, he who has no one who made and composed him, has neither been made nor composed. On that account in God we say especially that the essence is eternal, not however composition. Prudentius illustrated the same reason poetically, lib. 2. Contra Symmachum, where he brings in God speaking thus:

I am a simple substance, Nor can I be a part; division belongs only to things Composed, and made: no one created me, So that I could be cut apart, the one Creator of all things.

The third reason is inferred from the supreme Identity of God: In every composite there are parts which are not the composite itself: but in God there is nothing which is not God: therefore God is not composed. The major is evident: for none of the parts of a man is a man. St. Augustine proves the minor, lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 10, where he says that God is for that reason called simple, because what He has, that He is, except that each Person is said relatively to the other; for indeed the Father has the Son, and yet He is not Himself the Son: and the Son has the Father, and yet He is not Himself the Father. Therefore in that in which He is said with reference to Himself, not to another, He is what He has: as He is said to be Living with reference to Himself, having life, and that same life He Himself is; on this account that nature is called simple for which it is not the case that it has something which it could either lose, or that the one having and the thing had are different. — St. Bernard proves the same, sermon 80. in the Cantica:

Only the supreme and uncreated nature, he says, claims for itself this pure and singular Simplicity of its essence, so that it is not one thing and another, not elsewhere and elsewhere; but neither indeed now and then; namely, remaining in itself, it is what it has, and what it is is always and in one mode in it, and many things are reduced to one, and diverse things to one, so that it neither takes plurality from the number of things, nor feels alteration from variety.

— Therefore we must rightly conclude with our Cornelius Mussius, lib. De divina historia, that God is entirely simple, in whom all things are one; where there is no multitude of parts, no distinction of powers, no diversity of actions. What unity is in numbers, what the point is in lines, what the now is in time, what light is in the Sun, what seed is in substances, principle in elements, soul in body, mind in soul; imagine to yourself all the unities, imagine all the simplicities, still divine simplicity is far simpler, divine unity far more indivisible. Or, as St. Dionysius speaks, lib. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 13: More ancient than every one and multitude, every part and whole, every limit and privation of determination, every end and infinity, and hence since God surpasses every one and whole, He is simpler than all unities.

The fourth reason can be deduced from eternity: What is eternal is not composed: but God is eternal: therefore He cannot be composed, and hence is entirely simple. The minor is evident. The major is proved: Every composite presupposes the parts out of which it is constituted, at least with a priority of nature; for parts concur to the constitution of the whole, and are, as it were, its causes, and every cause precedes its effect at least by an instant of nature; and consequently the parts constituting a composite must be prior to the composite; and hence what is composed cannot be eternal; because in eternity there is nothing prior or posterior. — St. Ambrose brings forward this very cause of divine Simplicity, lib. De Symbolo, cap. 1.: God, he says, cannot be composed, since it is impious to think that anything anterior to Him pre-existed. Richard Victorinus infers the same, lib. 2. De Trinitate, cap. 17. in these words:

What is composed of several things is naturally divisible; and what is naturally divisible is naturally changeable; and where there is changeability, there cannot be eternity; and so neither true happiness: but in the good which is universally perfect, none of these things can be lacking.

And hence since God is eternal and immutable, it follows that He is likewise incomposite and entirely simple.

The fifth reason the Doctor deduces in 1. d. 8. q. 1. n. 5. from the supreme actuality of God and the necessity of being: If God were composed, He would be composed either of parts which were necessary beings, or which were not; but neither can be said; not indeed the second, because what is composed of non-necessary beings cannot be a necessary being. Not the first either, both because, by the very fact that those component parts would be necessary beings, they would have to be in their ultimate actuality; for a necessary being excludes all potentiality, and is in act all that it can be, and consequently one necessary part could not be actuated by another; nor consequently could those parts be mutually united so as to compose some third thing; for a part which is determined and actuated by another, so as with it to make a composite, is not of itself in its ultimate actuality, but is in potency to the other, and is ordered to it as its companion part; then because if those parts out of which God would be composed were necessary beings, it would follow that God is twice a necessarily existing being, namely by reason of each part composing Him; which is absurd; then finally because it would follow that God would be a necessary being by reason of one part, which nevertheless being removed, He would no less be a necessary being on account of the other part, which altogether implies a contradiction; and consequently since God is a necessarily existing being, He cannot be composed.

The sixth and final reason the Doctor infers from divine infinity: If God were composed, He would be composed especially either of parts of finite perfection, or of infinite; not of finite parts, because several things of finite perfection cannot make something infinitely perfect: not of several of infinite perfection either, for it is repugnant that several infinite things be mutually united to compose and constitute some whole: both because if those infinite parts made a composition, it would follow that the whole composed of them would be intensively more perfect; for a composite is more perfect than any of its parts taken separately, otherwise the composition would be made in vain, since one part without the fellowship of the other would be as perfect intensively as the whole itself; but it is absurd that one intensively infinite thing be more perfect than another also intensively infinite; otherwise the one would not be intensively infinite, since it would be exceeded by the other, nor would it involve every perfection altogether. Therefore it implies a contradiction that some whole be made of intensively infinite parts; and hence the Doctor subtly infers from the infinity of God that He is not composed; but entirely simple.

It must therefore be concluded with Boethius, book De Trinitate:

Simple being, simple power, Simple will, simple knowing, All things are simple.

You will say 1. That is to be attributed to God which is more excellent: but composition is more excellent than simplicity: therefore composition, not simplicity, is to be attributed to God. The major is evident; since God is the being than which nothing better and more perfect can be thought or imagined, it follows that we attribute to Him every perfection altogether which savors of no imperfection. The minor also is certain: for composite things excel simple ones, and mixed things excel elements, and the whole surpasses its parts; for good added to good makes better, and perfection joined to perfection makes a thing more perfect: therefore since in composition one perfect part is united to another perfect one, hence it happens that the more a whole is composed, the more perfect it should be judged, because it embraces more goods in itself and more perfections.

I distinguish the minor. Composition is more perfect than simplicity in created beings and those of limited perfection, I concede; it is more perfect than the simplicity which is really found in the divine essence altogether infinite, I deny. For since God on account of His infinity embraces all perfections altogether formally or virtually, and identifies them with Himself, hence it happens that the stricter His divine simplicity is, the more excellent His divine perfection is; for it is far better to embrace all perfections in a single simple, but infinite entity, than to involve some of them through composition mutually cohering. It is otherwise with creatures, whose entity and perfection, since it is finite and limited, shines forth the more excellent the more united perfections it embraces. Hence it happens that physical composites, since they involve more parts, and therefore more perfections, are also judged more perfect than prime matter, which is indeed simpler than all corporeal beings, yet more imperfect.

Add. That even in creatures greater perfection is not always found in more composed beings, indeed some are more perfect because they are simpler. For who would say that man, e.g., is nobler than an Angel because he is more composed, and consists of matter and form, body and soul, and integral corporeal parts, which the Angel lacks on account of his spirituality and his simple and indivisible entity? Which simple and indivisible Angelic entity nevertheless virtually embraces and contains unitedly all the perfections which in corporeal things may be observed separately: since therefore God contains in Himself the perfections of all beings whatsoever, but in a more eminent mode and grade, hence it happens that He is the more perfect the simpler He is.

You will say 2. If God could not be composed, this would be especially because Deity cannot have the notion of form: but this is not repugnant: therefore neither is it repugnant that God be composed.

The minor is proved. It would be repugnant for Deity to be a form, chiefly because a form carries with itself dependence on the subject which it informs, but Deity must be altogether independent: but it could happen that Deity be a form without any dependence: since there is no contradiction that the notion of dependence be separated from the notion of form: for a form would no less affect and actuate the subject, even if it in no way depended on it: therefore it is not repugnant that Deity be a form, nor consequently that God be composed. — The Doctor denies the minor in the cited place n. 8.; for the notion of limitation and dependence can in no way be separated from form, for although a form does not sometimes depend on the subject which it informs, it always depends on the efficient cause, which produces it, and unites it with the subject, as is clear by the example of the rational soul, which although it does not depend on the human body of which it is the form, nevertheless depends on God, by whom it is created, and through whom it is united to the body. Since therefore the notion of dependence can in no way be separated from form, it plainly follows that Deity cannot have the notion of form, and consequently that God is in no way composed. Add that every form has the notion of a part, and consequently of a limited being; but in God there is no part, and no limitation, as was proved above.

You will say 3. No perfection is to be asserted in God, except that which befits Him according to its most excellent grade: but simplicity cannot befit God according to its most excellent grade: therefore neither should it be asserted in God. The major is evident: since God is the most perfect being, He can admit in Himself nothing except what is most excellent. The minor is proved: The most excellent simplicity is that which is the strictest; and the strictest is that which suffers no plurality with itself, and excludes all multitude: but this cannot be attributed to God; for in God there is plurality of relations and attributes, and the Trinity of Persons: therefore the most excellent simplicity cannot be in Him. — Our Alexander of Hales denies the minor in 1. p. q. 5. memb. 2. ad 1:

For that simplicity is more perfect, he says, which remains undivided among many, and not multiplied; for the more something is one, the simpler it is; but greater and stricter unity is the unity of essence with plurality of Persons, because it is more perfect to be in many, and not to be multiplied in them, than to be only one in one, or multiple in many.

Since therefore supreme unity must be attributed to God, the unity and simplicity which stands with plurality is to be attributed to Him most of all; otherwise God would not be simple in the highest grade of simplicity.

You will insist. There is greater simplicity where there is identity without diversity, than where it is found with diversity: but in God there is identity with diversity of supposits and relations: therefore in Him there is not supreme simplicity. — The Seraphic Bonaventure responds in 1. d. 8. q. 5. ad 2. by distinguishing the Major: There is greater simplicity where there is identity without diversity, which comes from origin, he denies; which comes from the addition of form, he concedes. For diversity (he says) arises either from the addition of form and of absolute perfections, which are diverse in diverse things, as whiteness in Peter and Paul, and this dissolves simplicity, because it posits composition. The other is diversity coming from origin alone, by which it happens that a person emanating from another person differs and is distinguished from it. This diversity however is not repugnant to simplicity, because it posits no composition; but only an order and respect of one to another, and is more fittingly called distinction than diversity: this is attributed to God, not the former, and consequently divine simplicity is not dissolved by it.

You will insist. Simplicity is stricter where there is supreme unity without any plurality, because number says some composition in respect of which unity is simple: therefore since in God there is unity with plurality of Persons, there is not the strictest simplicity. — The same Seraphic Doctor responds that there is a twofold plurality, one indeed in which there is more in two than in one, as e.g. in two equally perfect men there is more wisdom and goodness than in either of them; and this plurality is repugnant to simplicity, because unity adds over unity: the other is plurality in which there is as much perfection in many as in one; and this is found in the divine, because there is as much perfection and virtue in one Person as in many; and so since this plurality does not dissolve unity, nor posit any composition, therefore it does not destroy simplicity either.

Second conclusion. — Simplicity thus divided is not a simple negation of composition, but formally is something positive connoting such a negation. This is the Doctor's teaching in 1. d. 8. q. 5. ad 5.

Proof. Simplicity is a perfection simpliciter simplex. Therefore it is not a pure negation. The consequence is evident, for no negation can be called simpliciter a perfection, since it precisely only denies imperfection, but does not establish any perfection. The antecedent is proved: First indeed by the authority of the holy Fathers, who affirm that divine Simplicity is a perfection far more excellent than multiplicity or composition is. Thus St. Augustine, lib. De quantitate animae, cap. 5.: Altogether to be preferred is that which altogether cannot be divided, and lacks all composition. St. Anselm, De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 6.: Every simple thing, he says, inasmuch as it is simple, is more perfect than a composite. And St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 7.: A simple nature is preferred to a manifold one. Therefore in the mind of the holy Fathers divine simplicity is a formal perfection of God, and hence is something positive, for a negation formally considered, since it does not signify some being, also imports no perfection. — Then, the same judgment is to be rendered of divine simplicity, inasmuch as it denies composition, just as of infinity, immensity, and the other perfections modifying the divine Essence, which deny limitation and determination: but these are not pure negations, as will appear below: therefore neither is this one. — Finally, every negation which imports repugnance is founded on something positive, which is the principle of this repugnance: but divine simplicity carries with itself the formal repugnance of composition and division: therefore it connotes some formal positive perfection in God, which is the principle of this repugnance.

You will say 1. Simplicity does not add some new entity to a simple thing: therefore it is not some positive perfection. The consequence is evident, for every positive perfection is an entity. The antecedent is proved: If simplicity added a new entity to a simple thing, it would make a composition with it: but this is repugnant, otherwise the thing would be simple and not simple: therefore it is not some perfection.

I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say that an intrinsic mode does not make a composition with the entity of which it is the mode; both because it is not adequately distinguished from it, as a part must be distinguished from a part, and a form from the subject which it composes; and because it does not affect it as act affects potency, which however are required for perfect composition, but only as a perfecting mode, or one connoting the perfection of such an entity: therefore although divine simplicity is some positive perfection, it does not thence follow that it makes a composition in God.

You will say 2. Composition does not add some entity or positive mode to a composite: therefore neither does simplicity to a simple thing.

I deny the antecedent. For composition is a mode of the entity which is said to be composed, for it connotes a thing which claims for itself act and potency, or parts mutually united: whence in a composite these are distinguished: the constituted entity, the constituting parts, and the order of the composed entity to the parts, and of the parts to the whole, which order indeed is an intrinsic mode, both in the whole and in the parts, following the nature or quiddity of such an entity and of its parts. And so composition formally taken says something besides the parts and the whole. The same judgment therefore is to be rendered of simplicity with respect to a simple thing.