Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

From the preceding Question it is clear that between the divine essence and its attributes and relations some distinction from the nature of the thing intervenes, and that it is not made only through a fiction and operation of the intellect. It remains in this Question to be examined and resolved whether that distinction is only virtual, as the Thomists contend, or rather formal and actual, as the followers of the Subtle Doctor affirm, so that this may be perceived more evidently

Note 1. A virtual distinction, as is gathered from Becanus, part 1. tract. 1. cap. 1. quest. 1. concl. 3. and from other modern Thomists, is said to be that by which some thing, although formally simple and in itself indivisible, is equivalent to many things, and so conducts itself with respect to our manner of conceiving as if it were multiple; whence it happens that it can not only be conceived in different ways, but also operate inadequately. Thus among creatures, the rational soul, which in the same simple entity is vegetating, sensing, and understanding, is said to be threefold virtually, because it discharges the functions and elicits the operations of the vegetating, sensing, and intellective soul. Whence when it understands, it is said to operate inadequately, because it operates only insofar as it is intellective and spiritual, and insofar as it is equivalent to the intellective power of the Angels, not however insofar as it is equivalent to the forms of brutes or plants. So likewise light, e.g., which is simple and indivisible in its entity, is nevertheless said to be threefold virtually, insofar as it is illuminative, desiccative, and calefactive. Similarly, therefore, they say, the divine entity, although simple and formally indivisible in itself, is nevertheless said to be multiple virtually, because through its infinity it is equivalent to and surpasses many things, and is said to operate in diverse ways inadequately, whether ad intra by generating the Son through the intellect, e.g., not through the will, that is, insofar as it has the power of understanding and is infinitely equivalent to and surpasses the created intellect, not however insofar as it has the faculty of willing, by which reason it breathes forth the Holy Spirit; or also ad extra when it produces creatures, e.g., through omnipotence.

Note 2. The formal distinction is gathered and understood through its opposite, namely through formal identity. Formal identity, moreover, is between those things of which one is the definition, or a part of the definition of the other, or which are expressed by different names and are not in themselves diverse. Whence the Doctor, in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. n. 41.: I call, he says, formal identity that where what is said to be thus the same includes that to which it is thus the same in its formal notion, and consequently per se in the first mode. That these may be more easily perceived, the Doctor warns beforehand in the same place that something can be said to be one with another in these six ways. First indeed, by the unity of aggregation, namely of those things which are heaped together without any order, like a heap of stones. Second, by the unity of order, which is greater than the former, and comes about when things really distinct and existing separately are united with one another in order, like an army of soldiers. Third, by the unity of adhesion, by which an accident affecting a subject makes one with it, as whiteness with a wall makes it white. Fourth, by the unity of constitution, by which two things are united with one another to constitute one per se; thus matter and form constitute a physical body. Fifth, by the unity of identification, which is stricter than the preceding ones, and is found in those metaphysical grades constituting one species. Thus animality and rationality are identified with one another in man. Sixth and finally, something is said to be one with the greatest unity of all, namely formal unity, by which two things have not only real but also formal identity. Those things, moreover, are said to have formal identity of which one is the essential predicate of the other, or which, although expressed by different names, the thing signified by the one name is entirely the same formally as that which is designated by the other name. From these things it is easily gathered that those things are distinguished formally which, although they are really identified with one another, one nevertheless is not the definition of the other, nor a predicate intimately fitting it, yet is conceivable separately from it and actually denominating. Whether, moreover, this distinction is found both between the Essence and the personal relations, and between the Essence and the Attributes, and finally between the Attributes themselves, is to be resolved in this Question.

First conclusion. — The personal relations, e.g. paternity and filiation, are distinguished formally from the divine essence, so that the divine essence is not actually and formally paternity, nor conversely is paternity formally the divine essence. This is the Doctor's teaching in 1. d. 2. q. 7. n. 41. and d. 8. q. 4. n. 17. against St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 28. a. 2. and elsewhere.

Proof 1. By the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 7. De Trinit., cap. 1., where he expressly proves that relation and essence are necessarily distinguished from one another, and that the two are not entirely the same, not only in creatures, but also in divine things. For when he had said:

A man, therefore, when he is called lord, the man himself is essence, but lord is said relatively; for man is said with reference to himself, lord with reference to a servant: But this of which we are treating, if the essence itself is said relatively, the essence itself is not essence: to this is added, because every essence which is said relatively is also something apart from the relative:

he concludes: Wherefore if the Father also is not something with reference to himself, there is altogether nothing that is said relatively to something. In which he distinguishes two things: first indeed, that the divine essence is not a relation, because essence is something absolute and with reference to itself, but relation is something respective and with reference to another. Second, that in the Father there is really something, namely the divine essence, by which he is with reference to himself; and something, namely the relation of Paternity, by which he is referred to the Son. And accordingly St. Augustine judges that the essence is really distinguished from Paternity from the nature of the thing. — Moreover, the same, in the same place, cap. 2.

Not, he says, because the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, or the one is unbegotten, the other however begotten, are they therefore not one essence, because by these names relatives are shown in common. Both, however, are at once one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise; not however are both at once the Word or the Son, because to be is not the same as to be the Word or to be the Son.

Therefore truly the notion of the Unbegotten and of Paternity, and the notion of the Begotten, of the Word, and of the Son, since it is relative, is distinguished from the divine essence, not indeed really, otherwise the Father would not be formally God, and the same is to be said of the Son. It remains, therefore, that they are distinguished formally, since St. Augustine speaks of the notion of essence and of relation as they truly are from the nature of the thing in God, not only insofar as they are conceived by us. — Finally, in the same place, cap. 6., weighing that of John 10. I and the Father are one, he says: And he said both one and we are. One according to essence, because they are the same God; we are according to the relative, because he is the Father, this one the Son. Therefore essence and relation are formally distinct. Which I thus evince: first indeed, before every operation of the intellect, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are truly one by the unity of essence, and several by the plurality of persons and relations. Therefore the relations are distinguished from the essence; otherwise truly, just as there is said to be one only essence, so too one only personal relation could be said, and conversely, just as there are three personal relations, so too three essences could be conceived and affirmed, if there were no distinction at all from the nature of the thing between the essence and the Personalities.

Second. The divine essence in the Father, with every act of the intellect entirely set aside, is an entity communicable from the nature of the thing, and in fact communicated to the Son; and Paternity is also an entity incommunicable from the nature of the thing, and not actually communicated to the Son, according to that of the Florentine in the decree of union, The Father communicated all things to the Son except being the Father. Likewise through Paternity, actually and formally, without any work of the intellect, the first Person of the Trinity is constituted in the being of Father, and is really distinguished from the Son; but through the divine essence it is not actually and formally constituted in the being of Father, nor really distinguished from the Son, according to that of the Second Council of Toledo: In the relation of the Persons a member is discerned, but in the substance of the Divinity it is comprehended what is numbered: and that of the Lateran Council, cap. Firmiter: This holy Trinity is undivided according to the common essence, and distinct according to the personal properties: therefore there is some actual distinction from the nature of the thing, before every operation of the intellect, between the divine Essence and Paternity. The consequence is proved: If there were absolutely no distinction, either formal or real, between them, with any operation of the intellect set aside, it would be impossible that whatever actually belongs to one from the nature of the thing should not also belong to the other: therefore since being communicated and identified with the Son is predicated of the essence, the same ought also to be predicated of paternity, and thus the Father would not be really distinguished from the Son, nor would he be a person other than him, which it is heretical to assert. —

It is confirmed: The divine Father, with every work of the intellect set aside, is really distinguished from the Son from the nature of the thing: therefore he must actually have something by which he is actually distinguished from him: but he would not have anything actual by which he would be so distinguished from him, unless he had something from the nature of the thing in some way actually distinct from the Son; but he would not have that, if Paternity were in no way distinguished from the essence, since through the divine essence he is not distinguished from the Son, indeed in it he agrees with him; for they are formally one God: therefore, in order that the Father be actually distinct from the Son, paternity must be actually distinct from the essence.

It is confirmed 2.: It is impossible that contradictory predicates actually belong to the same thing in the same respect: but if there were no actual distinction from the nature of the thing between paternity and essence, contradictory predicates would belong to the same thing in the same respect, namely to be actually communicated and not to be actually communicated; to constitute and not to constitute; to be really distinguished and not to be really distinguished: since the divine essence is actually communicated, but Paternity is not actually communicated to the Son; Paternity constitutes the Father, the essence does not constitute; Paternity really distinguishes the Father from the Son, but the essence does not so distinguish him, indeed it is the principle of agreement in which the Father essentially agrees with the Son, and is with him one God: therefore if Paternity and essence are in no way distinct from the nature of the thing, it follows that contradictory predicates belong to the same thing in the same respect; but the consequence is false; therefore so is the antecedent.

Some reply, according to Maironius, that among creatures contradictory predicates cannot belong to the same thing because of limitation and finitude, but otherwise in divine things, because of the infinite entity of God, which since it involves every entirely conceivable perfection and entity, can also admit any predicate whatsoever.

On the contrary: If contradictory predicates could be true in divine things, why likewise could they not be verified in creatures? Since contradiction does not formally conflict with the finite and the infinite, but with being and non-being, so that just as it denies or affirms finite being, so too it establishes or destroys infinite being; for it is just as repugnant for something to be infinite being and not infinite, and accordingly a contradiction could be verified of infinite being just as much as of finite. — Moreover, if contradictories could be verified of the very same entirely undivided thing in divine things, someone could affirm that God is at once wise and not wise; likewise that God is and is not; nor could anyone who affirms this so absurd thing be in any way convicted of falsity, if truly two contradictory predicates could subsist in divine things.

The Thomists reply that to save and resolve all these contradictions it suffices that a virtual distinction intervenes between the essence and the personal relations; for since, they say, the divine essence is infinite, and involves and exceeds every entity and perfection of creatures, it provides from itself a sufficient foundation to the intellect to distinguish in it something after the manner of essence, something else after the manner of relation, in comparison to created essences and relations. Not that essence and relation are really formalities actually distinct, but that the divine entity, because of its infinity, provides a sufficient motive to the intellect for devising and affirming this distinction.

On the contrary, first: That virtual distinction either brings it about that something is actually in the Father which is not identified with the Son, or it does not. If it does: therefore there is something actually in the Father which is actually distinguished from the essence, which is identified with the Son. If it does not: therefore it is false that the Father is really and actually distinct from the Son. — Second: When the distinguishing principle is only virtually distinct from that in which some things agree, those very things are also distinguished only virtually, not actually: therefore if Paternity and Filiation are only virtually distinct from the divine essence, in which the Father and the Son agree, the divine persons themselves will not be mutually distinguished actually, but only virtually. — Third: It is impossible that any distinction, whether real, virtual, or formal, bring it about that the same thing in the same respect is formally such and is not formally such: therefore it is impossible that that virtual distinction bring it about that being identified and not being identified, constitutive and not constitutive, distinctive and not distinctive belong to the same entity: therefore since these predicates belong to the essence and to paternity, Paternity and essence must be diverse formalities, by reason of which those predicates are verified in God. — Fourth: When the divine Father understands himself, he either understands the divine essence and Paternity as diverse formal objects actually distinct, or as the same object under one and another mode apprehensible by us. If the first, therefore between Paternity and essence there will be a formal and actual distinction. If the second, therefore there is no greater difference between Paternity and Deity than between God and Deity, and consequently he does not conceive Paternity to be more incommunicable than the essence, if indeed he detects no difference between the two. For how will Paternity be able to be known as more incommunicable than the divine essence, if truly no actual difference at all intervenes between the two from the nature of the thing, but only through the concept of our intellect? Will divine knowledge be accommodated to the weakness and fiction of our intellect, and need it, in order to perceive something actually distinct, and without which it would perceive everything as entirely undivided and indistinct? What if no created intellect had ever existed which detected this distinction of the divine essence from the relations, would God never have known it? I think no one who has actually touched the matter is so foolish as to admit these absurd consequences; rather he will gladly confess with the Subtle Doctor that nothing is more apt than the formal distinction for explaining the adorable mystery of the Trinity and for shaking off all the evasions and contradictions in which the adversaries and attackers of the formal distinction are daily entangled and pressed.

The Thomists object, first indeed: if the divine relations are not of the formal concept of the divine essence, it follows that they are extrinsic to it, and therefore accidental: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence of the major is evident, since between the essential and the accidental there is no middle. The minor is also evident, for nothing is in God which is not essence.

I distinguish the consequence of the major: They are accidental, insofar as accidental is taken for that which is not the definition, nor a part of the definition, nor a predicate in the first mode of saying per se of that thing to which it belongs, I concede; insofar as accidental is taken for that which comes extrinsically to a thing already intrinsically complete, I deny. And so the relations are indeed outside the formal concept of the essence itself insofar as it is precisely essence; but they are not outside its real entity, since they belong to it intrinsically and are really identified with it.

They object 2.: The divine Essence is necessarily the Father: but to be necessarily the Father does not belong to it as a property, nor as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the divine Essence, for the Trinity of Persons is not a property of the essence: therefore it belongs to it insofar as it is essence, formally and intrinsically.

I distinguish the major: It is necessarily Father by an identical necessity, I concede; by a formal one, I deny; for the divine Essence is not formally the Father, but only really and identically. To the minor I say that although being Triune does not belong to God as a property, nevertheless it is true that being Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit is not of the formal notion of the divine Essence, but outside its formal notion. I confess, therefore, that it belongs to God necessarily and intrinsically that he be Triune, since the Trinity of Persons arises from the supreme fecundity of the divine Essence; nevertheless it does not enter the formal notion of the essence, but is only really identified with it.

They insist: Whatever belongs essentially to the divine being also belongs essentially to the divine Essence; but to the infinite divine being it belongs essentially to be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: therefore also to the divine Essence. The minor is evident; otherwise infinite being would not be essentially and intrinsically infinite, since the Trinity of persons would not be intrinsically in it, which is the highest perfection.

I distinguish the major: If essential is taken for that which is intrinsic to the thing and really identified with it, I concede; if it is taken for that which is an essential predicate, and in the first mode of saying per se, I deny. To the minor I say that although the divine Essence does not formally involve the relations in its formal concept, it is nonetheless not less infinitely perfect, both because the personal relations of themselves formally express no perfection, and because the divine Essence through its formal and radical infinity is an infinite sea of being, from which all divine relations and attributes and modes sprout forth and emanate.

They object 3. the various authorities of the Councils, by which they strive to prove that no actual distinction is found between the divine Essence and the personal relations, but only a virtual one, and one which is conceived and apprehended through the intellect. They bring forward in the first place the Council of Florence, Session 18, where John the Theologian, according to the mind of the Latin Church, says that the divine substance and the person are indeed the same in reality, but seem to differ according to the mode of our intellection: and in Session 19. Andrew of Colossus, pleading the cause of the Latins against the Greeks, says: You ought by no means to think that they differ in reality (namely, essence and relation), but they are believed to differ by reason alone, or intelligence; and in Session 25.: Lest we seem to believe that the same substance itself differs from the hypostases and Persons in reality, and not by reason alone: therefore according to the mind of the Latin Fathers, whose parts the aforesaid John and Andrew played, it is established that essence and paternity actually differ by reason alone, and accordingly from the nature of the thing there is no formal distinction between them.

I deny the consequence: And I say to the aforesaid authorities: first indeed, that those words were uttered not by defining, but by disputing and explaining the things of faith: in disputations, moreover, and explanations, opinions more common than usual are employed, so that from them the investigation and manifestation of the truth may appear clearer and more evident. Second, by reason they perhaps understand the distinction of reasoned reason, which connotes extremes actually distinct, and which, the Doctor says in 1. dist. 2. quest. 7. n. 43, coincides with the formal distinction. For it can be called a difference of reason, as a certain Doctor says: Not that a difference formed by the intellect is understood: but reason is taken for the quiddity of the thing, according as the quiddity is the object of the intellect. Third, I say that by the distinction of reason those Theologians excluded the vulgar real distinction, which would dissolve the unity and identity of the essence with the Persons; not however the formal distinction, whose name had not yet become known to Theologians and Philosophers; and which mediates between the purely real distinction and the purely rational one; nor does it dissolve the real identity of the Essence and of the relations: which real identity those Theologians wanted only to assert, not however the formal identity, as is clear from the aforesaid words of John in the said Session 16., by which he himself seems to champion the formal distinction; for he adds: The substance itself, however, communicates with the persons; but the properties are by no means communicable: which indeed is believed to happen by the force of the relation: therefore so far is it from destroying our formal distinction, that it rather establishes it: for the distinction which is made by the force of the relation constitutive of the divine persons is not made through the mere actual consideration of the intellect, but is truly from the nature of the thing.

They object 4. the Council of Reims, in which (as Otto Frisingensis relates, lib. 1. De gestis Frederici Imperatoris, cap. 57.) against Gilbert Porretanus, who said: Theological reason divides between nature and person, it was defined that no reason divide between nature and person, nor that the divine essence be said only in the actual sense, but also in the nominal, that is, lest it be said only that the Father is God by Deity, but is Deity itself: therefore according to the mind of the Council, between the essence and the personal relations only a distinction of reason intervenes, and one which is made through the mind; not however a formal one, and one which is from the nature of the thing.

I answer: In that Council Gilbert was indeed deservedly condemned, because he asserted that the divine relations are really distinguished from the essence, as is established not only from our Alensis, 1. part. q. 68. memb. 5; St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 23. quest. 2; St. Thomas, 1. part. quest. 28. art. 3. and other older Theologians, who report and affirm that this was Gilbert's mind; but also from the Confession of Faith which St. Bernard published together with some Bishops of the Gallican Church, the Council of Reims having been dissolved; and which was reprobated by Eugenius the Supreme Pontiff, because it had been published without his knowledge and without the Cardinals being consulted. In this profession of Faith, moreover, which Otto Frisingensis relates in cap. 56., it is held that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not other things from God, which is a sign that Gilbert taught that the Persons and their constitutive relations are other things from God, and really distinct from the divine Essence. Moreover St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consideratione, cap. 7., disputing against the same Gilbert, says that he admitted a Quaternity in God, because he distinguished the divine Essence from the relations in number, and numerical distinction is real: therefore Gilbert judged that the relations are distinguished from the essence not only by a distinction of reason, but by a real one from the nature of the thing. Finally, the same St. Bernard, Sermon 80. in Cantica, disputing against the same Gilbert, says that the divine Essence is not in the Persons as a form in a subject from which it is distinguished, just as whiteness is distinguished from snow, and blackness from a raven; which things are certainly really distinguished: such a distinction also he thought to be between genus and differentia, between the soul and its faculties; although not accurately enough according to Philosophy and the truth of the matter. From which it is evident how wrongly Vasquez, Prima parte disp. 120. c. t. n. 18., and some more recent Thomists affirm from this that the definition published by Eugenius the Supreme Pontiff against Gilbert also militates against Scotus's formal distinction from the nature of the thing: which is certainly a supreme hallucination, since the opinion of the Subtle Doctor is far different from that of Gilbert Porretanus; for this one admitted a truly real, maximal distinction between the essence and the personal relations, which would dissolve their real identity; but the Subtle Doctor admits only a formal distinction, which does not dissolve such an identity. For if the Doctor had thought otherwise, without doubt the Church would not have tolerated so great an error uncondemned for so long: since it has not condemned this opinion at all, it is a sign that Scotus does not think the same as Gilbert, and accordingly that all those who ascribe this error to the Subtle Doctor are shamefully deluded.

Nor does it matter that, as the aforesaid Otto says, Gilbert asserted that reason divides between nature and person not by mathematical abstraction, but by theological consideration in some way; for by theological consideration he did not signify the diverse objective and formal concepts, such as the formal distinction imports, as Vasquez falsely interprets: but he designated a real distinction, as is gathered both from what has been said and from the very word to divide; for division signifies a negative abstraction, by which one thing is denied to be another, and accordingly is really distinguished from the other. Those things, however, which differ formally, one is not denied to be the other, but only to be abstracted formally from the other, by a precisive abstraction, not however a negative one.

Second conclusion. — The divine attributes are mutually distinguished formally and actually from the nature of the thing, and with the consideration of the intellect set aside.

This conclusion is the Doctor's in 1. dist. 8. quest. 4. n. 17. and elsewhere. And he proves it thus. First: With any consideration of the intellect set aside, God has formally every perfection simply simple; otherwise he would not be infinitely perfect, nor that than which nothing greater can be conceived, as we have already proved in the preceding article of quest. 2.: but the simply simple divine perfections cannot be formally in God without being formally and actually distinguished, both from one another and from the divine Essence; otherwise, if they were entirely the same formally with the Deity and with themselves, there would not be several simply simple perfections there, but only one: therefore if Wisdom, e.g., is formally and actually in God, it is also formally and actually distinguished from justice and the other attributes.

It is confirmed 1.: Where a thing is formally, there it is according to its quidditative concept: therefore also according to its entitative unity, because being and one are convertible: therefore if the perfections that are simply simple are in God formally, each one has its own unity in him, and consequently its own distinction from another, for unity is that by which a thing is undivided in itself and divided from anything else.

It is confirmed 2.: With every act of the intellect set aside, the Deity is an infinite sea of essence, according to St. John Damascene, lib. 1. cap. 12: but it cannot be a sea of perfections unless it is a multitude and plurality of perfections: therefore, with the operation of the intellect excluded, there is in God a plurality and diversity of perfections. Moreover, according to St. Augustine, lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 3., all divine perfections are mutually equal: but equality is among several things actually distinct: therefore the divine perfections are actually distinct from the nature of the thing. — Finally: If the attributes were distinguished by an operation of the intellect, this distinction would become actual either by the operation of the divine intellect or by the operation of the created intellect: but neither can be said: therefore it is not made by an operation of the intellect, but the attributes are distinct from the nature of the thing by themselves. The major is evident, for there is no intellect besides the created and the uncreated: the minor is proved as to its first part: the divine intellect is a divine attribute: therefore it cannot be actually distinguished by its own operation; for every operation presupposes an actual potency: therefore the operation of the divine intellect presupposes it as actual, and consequently cannot make it actual. It is evident also as to the second part: because the consideration of the created intellect causes nothing in God except only a relation of reason and an extrinsic denomination: therefore it cannot bring it about that the divine perfections be formally actually distinct in God: therefore they must be distinct from the nature of the thing by themselves.

The Doctor proves 2.: Wisdom in general and goodness in general are not the same formally and actually; but they are distinguished from each other formally and actually: therefore wisdom and goodness in God are also distinguished formally and actually. The consequence is proved: divine wisdom and divine goodness, insofar as they are divine, have nothing besides the notion of infinity: but infinity does not vary their formal notion, for it is a mode of the thing, and a mode does not vary the thing formally, as the Doctor says in 1. dist. 13. quaest. unica; for whiteness as four and infinite whiteness are not diverse essences, nor do they have a diverse formal notion: therefore infinity does not bring it about that wisdom and goodness in God are not actually distinct.

Proof 3. Intellect and will in the divine are distinguished formally: therefore likewise wisdom and goodness. The consequence is evident by parity of reason. The antecedent is proved: First indeed: the intellect is the principle of intellection, but not the will; and the will is the principle of volition, and not the intellect. Therefore the intellect and the will are actually distinguished. The consequence is evident, because if the intellect and the will are entirely formally the same from the nature of the thing, their acts also will be entirely the same; and so intellection will be volition, and volition will be intellection; since the distinction of acts is gathered from the distinction of potencies a priori, just as the distinction of potencies is inferred from the distinction of acts a posteriori. — Secondly: If the intellect and the will were not formally and actually diverse from the nature of the thing, it would follow that the production of the divine Word is not distinct from the procession of the Holy Spirit: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident both from the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and from the decrees of the Councils. For the Son, says St. Athanasius in the Creed, is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten: but the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. The major is proved: that diversity of emanations cannot be drawn from anywhere else than from the diversity of the intellect, through which the Son, and of the will, through which the Holy Spirit proceeds. — Hence the holy Fathers commonly teach that the Son arises by being born as the Word and concept of the mind; but the Holy Spirit by proceeding as a gift and as love, because love is as it were a certain procession into the beloved, as St. Anselm indicates, lib. de Processione Spiritus sancti c. 2.: The Son, he says, is therefore not the Holy Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son has being from the Father by being born; but the Holy Spirit not by being born, but by proceeding. And St. Augustine, lib. 10. De Trinitate, cap. 27, speaking of the beatific state, You will see, he says, how much the nativity of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God. And lib. 5. cap. 11., where he proposed why the Holy Spirit is not the Son, although he nevertheless goes out from the Father; he answers: For he went out not as born, but as given: therefore the Holy Fathers judge that there is a distinction from the nature of the thing between the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, since the emanation of the one is called nativity, but that of the other is named procession: but that distinction cannot be drawn from anywhere else than from the diversity of the intellect and of the will: therefore in truth the divine intellect and will are distinguished from the nature of the thing. — Maironius proves this minor in 1. dist. 8. q. 3: Where there are diverse emanations from the nature of the thing, there must be diverse principles: but the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit are diverse emanations from the nature of the thing, as was just proved: therefore their principles must be diverse from the nature of the thing: but those principles are none other than the intellect and the will: therefore the intellect and the will in God are diverse from the nature of the thing; for the same remaining the same is not born to do anything but the same, and consequently if they are not diverse principles, neither will the emanations be diverse, nor consequently the produced terms diverse.

Some reply that it is false that the diversity of potencies is gathered from the diversity of operations and effects; since active spiration and creation are entirely diverse operations, which nevertheless arise from the same divine will. Likewise the same heating power of the Sun hardens clay and melts wax, therefore, etc.

On the contrary: If formal diversity in the effect did not argue diversity in the operation of the cause, it would follow that absolutely all effects, however opposed, could be produced by the same cause: but the consequence is against common experience and reason, by which it is established that a cause must be proportioned to its effect, if not in entity, at least in operation and in the mode of operating; nor that a diverse effect follows from the same faculty operating in the same way about the same object. Since therefore the intellect and the will in God have the same divine essence for their object, it is evident that if the intellect and the will are not in reality diverse faculties, neither will their operations be diverse, and consequently their terms will not be distinct; for the same remaining the same is always born to do the same: nor do the adduced examples prove the contrary: for I confess with Aristotle, 2. Physic. cap. de Causis, that the same real principle affected in a diverse way and occupied about diverse objects can produce diverse effects. Hence it comes about that the divine will, insofar as it is engaged ⟦…⟧ the heating power of the Sun, which is disposed in one way to hardening clay and in another to melting wax. Add that (says Maironius) it is not yet established that the Sun produces these effects through one and the same indivisible power; for perhaps its hardening power is diverse, at least formally, from its melting power. Hence it appears that the adversaries' reply does not break the force of our argument: for we speak of faculties occupied about the same object. For if the intellect and the will are not diverse and actually formally distinct faculties from the nature of the thing, there is nothing from which the diversity of their operations can be drawn, since they are engaged about the same object, namely about the same divine essence. — This response is confirmed, and the preceding argument is further strengthened: It implies a contradiction that the same thing, entirely and formally indistinct, be the principle of knowledge and not be; be the principle of the emanation of the divine Word and not be: but the divine intellect is the principle of the knowledge and of the emanation of the divine Word, not so the will; likewise the divine will is the principle of love and of the spiration of the Holy Spirit, even with no created intellect thinking, not so the divine intellect; therefore it implies a contradiction that the divine intellect and the will be entirely the same formally.

The Thomists reply with Cajetan that, to save and solve these and similar contradictions, it suffices that between the divine intellect and will there intervene a virtual distinction from the nature of the thing; or that the same entirely simple Divine Essence, since it contains eminently and virtually every entity and perfection of creatures, also affords a foundation to the created intellect for conceiving those things to be actually and formally distinct in it which in creatures are in reality formally and actually distinct; for the virtual distinction in God (they say) is equivalent to the actual formal distinction in creatures; just as, for example, although the Sun is only virtually hot, it nevertheless performs all that fire does, which is formally hot.

On the contrary, first: Every actual contradiction presupposes actuality in the foundation in which it inheres and about which it is formed: but those contradictions are truly from eternity, the divine intellect is the principle of the knowledge of all things and of the procession of the Word; but the divine will is not so: therefore their foundations, namely the intellect and the will, must be in God distinct from eternity not only virtually, but also actually. — Secondly: Where there is a contradiction simply, there likewise must be simply the foundation of the contradiction, and not only be there secundum quid; but those contradictions in God are simply and absolutely truly actual: therefore their foundations must be in him simply and actually: but to be only virtually and in potency is not to be simply, but only to be secundum quid: for being in potency is only being secundum quid, but being in act is being simply: therefore since the aforesaid contradictions in God are truly simply, their foundations also must be in him simply, and consequently not in potency, but in act. — Thirdly: Either through that virtual distinction, in fact the intellect and the will, insofar as they are principles of the generation of the Son and of the spiration of the Holy Spirit, are actually distinct, or not: if they are, the truth of our conclusion stands: if they are not, the force of the argument remains unbroken, and the adduced contradictions are in no way solved. — Nor does the example of the heating power of the Sun press, since that power is actual in the Sun just as in fire; for fire does not heat only because it is formally hot, but also because through the heat which it contains it has the actual power of producing another heat.

Some answer that that distinction is indeed actual in God, if act is referred to the terms of the distinction, but not to the distinction itself: that is, the Son indeed proceeds through the intellect, and the Holy Spirit through the will, as distinct; but not as through a faculty distinct from eternity.

On the contrary: Either the Intellect and the Will are faculties actually distinct from eternity, or not: if so, I have what I seek; for actual distinction is nothing else than that the terms be actually distinct under that notion under which they are distinguished; that is, that the intellect be under the formal notion of intellect, and the will under the formal notion of will. If not: therefore from eternity they are actually the same, and entirely indistinct; and so the same force of the argument remains, and the same contradiction returns; nor will there be any order among the divine processions from eternity, nor any distinction in the divine Trinity, except according to the figment of our fallacious intellect; which to assert is impious and blasphemous.

They add in reply that this distinction to be thought out by our intellect is not merely fictitious, since the divine Essence itself affords the foundation for thinking it out.

On the contrary: Beings of reason which have a foundation in the thing are no less fictitious than those which are generated from the fecundity of an idle intellect, as we have demonstrated in the Logica: therefore although the divine Essence itself affords the foundation of this distinction, if it is not truly actual before every operation of our intellect about it, such a distinction will be no less fictitious; and so the whole distinction between the divine processions, so greatly championed by the holy Fathers, will be chimerical and empty. Broken by the weight of this argumentation, some recent Thomists have recourse to new evasions, to save and solve the aforesaid contradiction.

For they reply first that those propositions, the Divine Intellect understands and generates: the Divine Will does not understand nor generate but spirates; likewise, the Divine Essence is communicable, but the relation (e.g. Paternity) is incommunicable, are not properly contradictory, because they are not enunciated of the same thing considered under the same notion, but are used according to a diverse notion, and insofar as they are equivalent to many things: that is, the same divine entity, entirely simple and indistinct from the nature of the thing, insofar as it is equivalent to a created power of understanding, generates the Son; and insofar as it is equivalent to a faculty of willing, spirates the Holy Spirit. Likewise, insofar as it is equivalent to the absolute, it is communicable, and insofar as it is equivalent to a relation, it is incommunicable. Since therefore, they say, these predicates do not belong to the divine Essence whole and totally considered, but only insofar as it is conceived inadequately as equivalent to diverse things, therefore they are not properly contradictory, and consequently they do not infer in God any actual distinction.

On the contrary: This reply overturns the Mystery of the Trinity and the order of the divine processions more than the preceding one; since in truth it admits absolutely no distinction from the nature of the thing in God, not even a fundamental one, but only a diverse consideration of the same entirely simple divine entity: and consequently it judges that the intellect and the will, the essence and the relations are in reality entirely indistinct: and so in reality the Son does not emanate through the intellect more than through the will, nor in reality is Paternity less communicable than the essence, which is to overturn the whole order of the processions. — Secondly: That diverse equivalence and correspondence of the divine entity either imports in God some diversity from the nature of the thing, or only through our mode of conceiving: if the first, the truth of our conclusion stands: if the second, therefore the order of the divine processions is fictitious, and thought out by our intellect alone. — Thirdly: From eternity there was no created intellect to which the Divine Essence would actually be equivalent in the mode of understanding, nor any created will to which it would be equivalent in the mode of willing: therefore, given their reply, there was likewise in God no intellect through which the Word would emanate by being born, nor any will through which the Holy Spirit would emanate by proceeding; and if neither created intellect nor created will had been possible, the whole diversity of the divine processions, which the Holy Fathers championed with such zeal and such mental exertion, would be utterly destroyed. Therefore other Thomists seek another defense for their opinion.

They reply at last that not every contradiction infers a formal and actual distinction between the predicates and the extremes of which they are enunciated; and they prove this by diverse examples: for they say that between the definition and the definiendum objectively considered there is no actual distinction from the nature of the thing, and yet contradictories are verified of them; for the definition is predicated of the definiendum; not so the definiendum of the definition, at least by formal predication. Moreover, the definition is the means for demonstrating the property of the definiendum, as we said in the Logica; but the definiendum is not the means for demonstrating something of itself; likewise the difference dividing the genus and constituting the species is entirely indistinct; yet as it divides the genus, it does not constitute the species. Finally, the divine intellect, as cognizant of the essence, is not cognizant of creatures, and as it knows creatures by the knowledge of simple intelligence, insofar as they are only possible, it does not know them by the knowledge of vision, and insofar as they exist; all of which are contradictories; yet between the intellect knowing thus in diverse ways no actual distinction intervenes: therefore neither will it intervene between the essence, the relations, and the attributes, although a certain contradiction appears among them. — But these or similar examples do not solve, nor do they in any way weaken the force of our argument; since the adduced examples are only contradictions in appearance; and they proceed not from the thing itself, but from the imperfection of an intellect conceiving the thing itself inadequately and imperfectly; for an intellect which conceives things perfectly and intuitively does not attribute to the definition anything other than to the definiendum: nor does it conceive the one as a means for demonstrating the property more than the other. The same is to be said of the Difference; for its adequate office is not only to divide the genus, but also to constitute the species; and consequently he who distinguishes this office of the difference conceives it inadequately. These things are much more true of the divine Intellect, which, since it regards the Divine Essence as its adequate object, in which all other knowable things are represented and shine forth, has a single mode of knowing all things: and consequently he who should behold this divine intellect intuitively and adequately would not detect in it a varied notion of knowing possible or actual things. But it is otherwise with the Divine Essence and the divine relations and attributes; since even an intellect which conceives them intuitively and adequately notices that their formal notions are diverse; otherwise neither God nor the Blessed could distinguish one procession from another; nor know why Paternity is not formally communicated to the Son, just as the essence is formally communicated to him, with which Paternity is really identified; which to assert would be altogether absurd. All the objections which are wont to be brought against this conclusion the third Conclusion will dissolve.

Third conclusion. — The attributes are formally distinguished from the Divine Essence from the nature of the thing.

This is the Doctor's teaching in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 4. and quaestio 1. Quodlib., and its truth sufficiently appears from what has been said; nevertheless it is further proved.

First indeed by the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 3. contra Maximinum cap. 10., where, arguing against him that he denied the Trinity of Persons lest it should seem to offend the divine simplicity, and yet conceded that God is good, and just, and powerful, wise, etc., he presses him thus:

If therefore in the one Person of the Father you find those things which seem to be many, and you do not find parts; how much more the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and on account of the undivided Deity is one God, and on account of the property of each there are three Persons, and on account of the perfection of each they are not parts of one God.

From these things I argue thus. St. Augustine infers that the Trinity of Persons does not offend the simplicity of the Divine Essence, from the fact that there are in it several attributes, which nevertheless do not offend that same simplicity: but St. Augustine's argument would be null if the attributes were not in reality actually and from the nature of the thing formally distinct from one another and from the essence: therefore St. Augustine supposed them to be so distinguished; for his inference would be entirely ridiculous and absurd if he thought them distinct only virtually and by reason: for it would be the same as if he said: the plurality of attributes distinct from the essence only virtually and by reason does not offend its simplicity: therefore neither will the true and real plurality of Persons offend it. Which consequence would be altogether to be laughed at and exploded. Therefore in truth St. Augustine supposed the divine attributes to be several in God, and formally actually diverse from the essence.

Secondly: St. John Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide Orthodoxa, cap. 42 and 49, where he proves that the name proper to God is He who is, because being denotes a certain infinite sea of substance; he adds: If you say just, if good, if anything of the sort; you will not say the nature of God, but what is about the nature: therefore he judges that the attributes are distinguished from the divine nature; not indeed really: therefore formally.

Proof likewise by reason: God is from the nature of the thing God by Deity, but not by wisdom, goodness, or justice: nor likewise is he formally wise, good, and just by Deity: therefore Deity, or the Divine Essence, is formally distinguished from wisdom and the other attributes. The consequence is evident: for it is impossible that two contradictories be verified of the same thing under the same notion, and with respect to the same thing: but it is verified of God that he is God by Deity, and that he is not God by wisdom, etc. Therefore Wisdom and Deity, by reason of which those two contradictories are verified of God, are not entirely the same from the nature of the thing.

It is confirmed: The identity of essence with essence, and of wisdom with wisdom, is greater than that of wisdom with essence, and vice versa; for of the essence two diverse concepts cannot be formed, as in truth they are formed of essence and wisdom: but essence is formally the same as itself: therefore wisdom is not formally the same as the Divine Essence.

The Thomists object 1.: If there were a plurality of formalities in God from the nature of the thing, it would follow that God is not simple: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is proved: If before the operation of the intellect there are distinct formalities in God, it is necessary that in God there be something and something: but where there is something and something, there is no simplicity, for they either coalesce into one, or not: if not, there is not simplicity there, but multiplicity, since many distinct things are involved without union: if so, therefore there is composition, for many things cannot coalesce into one without union and composition, which are opposed to simplicity. Hence St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consid., cap. 6.:

God, he says, has nothing by which to divide to number, nothing by which to gather to one: for he is one, but not one. He does not consist of parts as a body, he does not differ by affections as a soul, he does not underlie forms as everything that has been made. And below: God is not composed, he is pure simple: and that you may clearly know what I call simple, it is the same as one. Now God is simple, since he is one: and he is one, and in a manner nothing else, if it can be said, he is most one.

Therefore he excludes every plurality whatsoever, whether real or formal. I deny the sequel of the major, and to its proof I say that the attributes are indeed something besides the Divine Essence, insofar as something is opposed to nothing and to a being of reason; but not insofar as it designates a thing completely finished in every respect. Nor does it follow from this that they form any composition in God: for composition is made from parts, or from those of which one has the notion of act and the other the notion of potency: but the attributes are neither parts nor potency; but they are acts, and most pure acts, which coalesce into one with the Divine Essence through identity. For if the divine relations and Persons, although really distinct from one another, coalesce into one not by composition but by identity, and are the one God, and their number and distinction in no way offends the divine simplicity, you will affirm this much more of the divine attributes, since they are distinguished not really but only formally, both among themselves and from the essence. With this same response satisfaction is given to the authority of St. Bernard, for if the real distinction which intervenes between the divine relations does not prevent God from being called most simple and most one, neither will the formal distinction of the attributes take anything away from the supreme simplicity of God. — St. Augustine excellently and lucidly weighs all these things, lib. 11. De Civitate Dei, cap. 10, where, treating of the simplicity of God, he has these words:

This Trinity is one God, and not therefore simple because it is a Trinity: for we do not call this nature of the good simple for this reason, that in it the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone: or indeed that this is only a Trinity of name, without the substance of the Persons, as the Sabellian heretics thought. The Father who begot is simple, and the Son who was begotten is likewise simple, and this is that of which he was begotten. But for this reason he is called simple, because what he has, this he is, except that each Person is said relatively to the other. For certainly the Father has the Son, and yet he himself is not the Son: and the Son has the Father, and yet he himself is not the Father. In that therefore in which he is said to himself, not to another, this he is that he has: just as he is said living to himself, having of course life, and he himself is that same life. For this reason therefore a nature is called simple, for which it is not the case to have something which it could either lose, or in which the one having is one thing and what is had another: as a vessel has some liquid, or a body color, or air light or heat, or a soul wisdom; for it is none of those things which it has, for neither is a vessel the liquid, etc.

The Thomists press: By the very fact that the Divine Essence is asserted as formally distinct from the attributes, by that very fact it is also asserted as actualizable and perfectible by them: therefore it is compared to them as potency to act, and as the perfectible to the perfective: and consequently if it is formally distinguished from them, it will form a true composition with them, just as the grade of the genus and of the difference, formally distinct from one another, make a true composition.

I distinguish the antecedent: The Divine Essence is actualizable and perfectible by the attributes after the manner of a potency to be determined, actuated, and distinguished, as matter by form, or the genus by the difference, I deny: as a most actual act to be perfected by another act really identified with it, I concede: for the Divine Essence is a most pure act excluding every notion of potency, determination, or constitution. And consequently, just as it is not said to be in potency with respect to the divine relations, which are identified with it, so neither with respect to the attributes, which are really the same as it, but formally distinct.

They subsume: But the attributes truly have the notion of a form with respect to the Divine Essence: therefore there is no solution. They prove the antecedent: Whatever denominates formally is a form: but the attributes denominate the Divine Essence formally; for God is formally just, wise, etc. Therefore justice, wisdom, and the other attributes, if they are actually distinguished from the Divine Essence, are forms of it.

I deny the subsumption, and I distinguish the major of that proof with the Doctor in 1. d. 8. q. 4. n. 22. Whatever denominates formally after the manner of that which informs is a form, I concede: whatever denominates after the manner of that which constitutes or perfects is a form properly so called, I deny. For a body, for example, is said to be animated denominatively, properly, and formally: because the soul is its form; but a man, says the Doctor, is said to be animated, not denominatively properly, but essentially, because the soul is of his physical essence; therefore not everything that denominates formally is properly a form; for the soul denominates the whole animated composite, and yet is not said to be the form informing the composite, but the matter. Whence the Doctor concludes, if some things are more identical with another than the soul, v. g. is the same as the whole animated thing, that identity suffices, so that that thing be denominated from the thing identified with it: but the attributes are intimately identified with the Divine Essence: therefore this Essence will be able to be denominated from them on account of that identification.

They insist: The divine Simplicity and Unity are perfections simply simple, and hence ought to be admitted in God according to the greatest grade of simplicity and unity conceivable: but that greatest grade is the one which excludes all composition, multiplicity, and diversity, not only real but also formal. For a thing which suffers no distinction in itself, even formal, is much simpler and more one than that which involves a plurality of formalities; for the highest simplicity excludes all composition; the highest unity all plurality; and the highest identity all distinction whatsoever: therefore the divine unity and simplicity, since it is the greatest, ought to exclude all distinction of formalities whatsoever.

I distinguish the major: They ought to be admitted according to the greatest grade of simplicity and unity compossible with the Divine Essence, I concede: otherwise, I deny; for the greatest grade of simplicity and unity to be excogitated by us is not compossible with the Divine Essence: since where there is a single Person, and a single constitutive principle of it, there is greater simplicity and unity than where there are three Persons and three constitutive principles of them; yet this unity and simplicity is not compossible with the Deity; for in it there are three Persons and three constitutive principles, or relations, of them. The same must be said of simplicity excluding every formality; for this is not compossible with the Divine Essence, on account of the evident contradictions that would follow from it, as we said above. Then I argue ad hominem: simplicity which excludes every distinction, both fundamental and of reason, is greater than that which suffers such a distinction with itself: but the Thomists, with divine simplicity, admit in God a fundamental distinction and a distinction of reason: therefore they do not attribute to God every simplicity whatsoever to be excogitated by us, and hence, attacking us, they fight against themselves.

They object 2: Things which are distinguished in lower things are united in higher things, and become one and the same simple thing, as is clear by the example of the desiccative and liquefactive virtue, which, although they are formally distinguished in sublunary things, because one is not the other, nevertheless do not so differ in the Sun; since the Sun by one altogether simple virtue hardens mud and liquefies wax: therefore by parity all perfections, which are distinguished in creatures either really or formally, are formally united in God. The consequence is proved: the virtues of the lower qualities are not more united in the light of the Sun than the perfections in God: but those are formally united: therefore these too ought to be united in that way.

I deny the consequence, and likewise the parity: for the attributes belong to God otherwise than the indurative and liquefactive virtue to the Sun; for those belong to God formally, whereas these belong to the Sun only eminently and virtually; because the Sun is not formally liquid, nor dry, but emits rays which cause dryness and liquefaction. But God is formally wise; and the first divine supposit is formally Father, the second formally Son, the third formally the Holy Spirit, through the Personal relations, which formally constitute them in the being of such a Person. Whence the attributes and the relations ought not to be united in God in the same way in which the liquefactive and desiccative virtues are united in the Sun.

The reason, moreover, why the virtues of lower things are more united in higher things than their formalities, is that the greater a virtue is, the more it is united; because it can accomplish more things by it: for the same divine Omnipotence, since it is infinite, produces various essences; and hence it is no wonder if a virtue limited and divided in lower things is united in higher things, because it is greater and more perfect in higher than in lower things. But it is otherwise with formality, or formal perfection; for since this perfects only in a certain determinate notion, v. g. Wisdom in the notion of certain knowledge; it does not follow that it can perform more and various things in higher than in lower things; for Wisdom cannot attribute to God the perfection of justice, because wisdom and justice are diverse formalities, affecting and perfecting in diverse ways. Whence it follows that it is indeed more perfect in God, but not more united.

They object 1. The argument which St. Bernard used against Gilbert, Serm. 8. in Cant.: If Wisdom, v. g., were distinguished from the Divine Essence ex natura rei, and before every operation of the mind, it would be either something superior to it, or equal, or inferior. Not the first, because nothing can be, or be conceived as, superior to the Divine Essence: Not the second either; because there would be given something a parte rei which would not be God, and yet would be of so great perfection as the Divine Essence: Nor the third, because what is inferior to the Divine Essence is created, and so God would be wise through something created, which is false: therefore wisdom is in no way distinguished from the Divine Essence.

I distinguish the consequent: That would follow, if divine wisdom were distinguished from the essence as a thing from a thing, I concede; as a formality from an entity, I deny: but St. Bernard thought that Gilbert distinguished the divine attributes just as he distinguished the divine relations from the Divine Essence, as a thing from a thing; so that there was no identity between them: whence his argument indeed availed, and pressed Gilbert; but in no way does it militate against us, since we assert the highest identity between the essence and the attributes, and admit only a distinction of formalities.

They object 5: If the Divine Essence were distinguished a parte rei from its attributes, and they likewise differed among themselves, neither of them would be infinite; nay, nor would God adequately taken be infinite. Indeed the Essence would not be infinite, because in its concept it would not include every perfection simply; for it would not include that perfection from which it would be said to be distinguished a parte rei. Nor likewise would the attributes be infinite, because one would not include the perfection of that from which it would formally differ. Nor would God adequately taken be infinite, because from several things not infinite but limited, one infinite thing is not made: therefore either the attributes are not formally distinguished, or God is not infinite.

I deny the consequence; for each of them is infinite in its own genus. Indeed the Essence in the notion of essence, according to which it formally includes every essential perfection; likewise wisdom is infinite in the notion of wisdom, and so of the rest: but all taken together constitute a thing most simple really, which is infinite simply. For although infinite Being cannot coalesce from several finite perfections, it can nevertheless from several formally infinite ones according to a diverse notion. The reason of which is, (as our Smisingus subtly observes, tract. 2. dist. 1. n. 66) that a finite perfection always excludes some better perfection from the thing of which it is the perfection, as the difference of body excludes the perfection of spirit; the difference of the inanimate excludes the soul: but an infinite perfection excludes nothing from the thing of which it is the perfection, but by identity postulates in it every perfection which, being better than another, is incompossible with it. Whence it happens that that perfection, from its own nature, concurs to constitute one being simply infinite, which really, and through the highest identity, involves in itself every perfection simply, and by reason of which highest identity any divine perfection really embraces another.

You will insist. The Divine Essence as it is formally distinguished from wisdom, v. g., does not formally include it: therefore it is not infinitely perfect. The consequence is proved: That is not formally infinitely perfect which does not formally include every perfection simply simple: but the Divine Essence, as prescinding from wisdom, would not formally include every perfection simply simple, since it would not involve wisdom: therefore it would not be infinitely perfect.

I answer with the Doctor,

Quaest. 1. prologi, that since the Divine Essence can be said to be infinitely perfect formally in two ways: first indeed through radical infinity, by which all divine perfections as it were emanate and flow out from it, and which is their root and ocean; second through formal infinity, which is a mode surrounding the Divine Essence and formally affecting it, just as also all its other perfections: whence it happens that, prescinded from its attributes, it always remains infinitely perfect; namely through radical infinity, which identifies with itself every perfection whatsoever; and also through formal infinity, because while the essence prescinds from the attributes, it is not on that account judged to prescind from its modes; and hence while it prescinds from wisdom, it can nevertheless still be conceived with formal infinity. He answers secondly; that from the formal distinction it does not follow that something is not such, but only that it is not conceivable as such. Whence it is indeed true that while the Divine Essence prescinds from wisdom, it is not indeed conceived as wise, but it does not follow that it is not wise; for from the conceivability of a thing without its perfection, it does not follow that it is without its perfection identified with it.

You will press. While the Divine Essence prescinds from the attribute of wisdom, God is either conceived as wise, or as foolish, or as not wise. Not the first, otherwise there would be two wisdoms in God; namely one essential, another attributal, which is absurd; for by a like reason there could be infinite ones. Not the second either; because it is blasphemous to say that God is foolish. Not finally the third, because wisdom would be denied of God, which would equally be blasphemous: therefore it is necessary that the Divine Essence cannot be conceived without wisdom; nor hence formally distinguished from it.

I answer. That while the Divine Essence is conceived as prescinding from wisdom, God is conceived neither as wise, nor as foolish, nor as not wise; but only as divine essence: just as by parity, a man considered according to his essence is conceived neither as risible, nor as not risible, but only as he is a rational animal. Whence that well-worn saying of the Philosophers: There is no falsehood in abstraction, because namely in those things which abstract from others, one is neither denied nor affirmed of another, but only conceived without another: but to be conceived without another is not the same as to be without another; because not to be the same as another denies real identity with it; but to be conceivable without another denies only formal identity with it.

They object 6: Every distinction either is a relation, or imports some relation between the things which are distinguished, because distinct terms are in some way opposed: but opposition is a relation, and consequently between terms distinct a parte rei there is a relation a parte rei: but no theologian has acknowledged any relation in God besides the Personal relations; therefore neither any distinction. Moreover the holy Fathers, distinguishing in divine things the Essential from the Notional, say that the former are absolute and toward themselves; but the latter relative and toward another. Therefore in the essential things they acknowledge nothing relative.

I answer 1. That the major can be denied: both because every real relation requires extremes really distinct from each other; but the formal distinction is not between extremes really distinct, and hence is not a relation: and because every relation of distinction presupposes the extremes distinct; really indeed, if the distinction is real, formally however if the distinction is formal: therefore formally speaking distinction does not express a relation, but is presupposed to a relation; and finally, because every distinction expresses more the negation of identity than a relation; for the negation of identity follows the distinct extremes themselves from their own nature, even if no relation followed upon their distinction, and sufficiently, with such a negation of identity, the extremes are conceived as distinct; and hence no necessity appears of admitting a distinctive relation.

I answer 2. By distinguishing the minor: no theologian has acknowledged any relation besides the Personal ones, real, I concede: formal, I deny: for granted that every distinction is a relation, as the Doctor also seems to teach in 1. dist. 31. q. unica, and q. 6. Quodlib., it is evident that those who acknowledge in God a distinction whether of reason, or virtual, or formal, also affirm in Him another relation besides the Personal ones. To the holy Fathers I say that they are to be understood either of the essential things taken entitatively and fundamentally, that is insofar as they found those notions of distinction; or of the absolute, as it is opposed to relation, not indeed formal, such as is between the essence and the attributes, but real, such as is between the divine Persons.

They object 7: Things which are formally distinguished are not predicated of each other in the abstract; for this predication would not be legitimate: rationality is animality; although these are distinguished in man only formally: but the attributes are predicated of each other in the abstract: for this predication is true: the justice of God is His wisdom: therefore they are not formally distinguished.

I distinguish the major with the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. q. 4. n. 25. Formally distinct things are not predicated of each other in the abstract, in created things, I concede; in God, I deny. The reason of the disparity between the two is that created abstracts are finite, just as those from which they abstract: but divine abstracts, v. g. justice, are infinite, just as the divine essence too, from which they prescind and are formally distinguished; but when abstracts are finite and are conceived as finite, the intellect does not acknowledge in them any bond of union, by reason of which one could be predicated of another formally distinct from it. But it is otherwise with divine abstracts, because since they are formally infinite, infinity itself, with which they are conceived, is the bond uniting and identifying them, because infinity from its own notion postulates identifying with itself any perfection compossible with it: whence when the intellect conceives divine abstracts as infinite, it has a sufficient reason for conceiving them as identified, and hence as predicable of each other.

Or more clearly and briefly, I distinguish the minor: The divine attributes in the abstract are predicated of each other formally, I deny; for it is not true that wisdom, v. g., is formally justice, since they formally differ from each other; identically, I concede; because they are identified with each other by reason of the divine essence and of their infinity.

You will press. The divine attributes are predicated of each other in the abstract more strictly and more intimately than rationality and animality: but these are predicated of each other identically; since in man they are the same as each other: therefore those ought to be predicated formally, and hence be formally the same.

I distinguish the major: They are predicated more strictly, that is, they have a stricter bond by which they are identified and predicated of each other, I concede: that is, they are enunciated of each other in another way than identically, namely formally, I deny. I confess indeed that the divine attributes are united to each other by a stricter bond than rationality and animality; for these are only identified with each other by reason of a third, namely the man whom they constitute; but those are not only identified with each other by reason of the divine essence, which they perfect, and with which they are really the same, but also by reason of their formal infinity, which would identify them with each other even if, per impossibile, they were not identified with each other in the divine essence. But it is otherwise with rationality and animality; for if they were not identified in man, they would have nothing in themselves by which they would become the same. Whence the predication of these can be called a broader identical predication; but the predication of those is a most strict identical predication.

Finally they object the authority of St. Augustine saying, 5. De Trinit., cap. 2.: He is not the Father by that by which He is God; nor is the Word by that by which He is wisdom, and yet He is great by that by which He is wise. From which they argue thus: St. Augustine concedes that identity between the essence and magnitude, and the other attributes, which he denies between the Personal relations and the divine essence: but between these he denies only formal identity; for what other identity would he deny? Therefore between those he affirms that there is formal identity; and hence he judges that the attributes are not formally distinguished from the essence.

I answer. That although these words do not coalesce together into one sentence in Augustine, but are gathered from his divided words, nevertheless, granted that the aforesaid mind and opinion is his, I say with the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 4. n. 23., that Augustine only means that He is not the Father by that by which He is God, insofar as Father cannot be predicated of everyone of whom it is said that He is God; and yet He is great, wise, just, etc. by that by which He is God, because of whomever the divine essence is predicated, of him also the divine attributes are predicated. For it is said, v. g., that the Son is God, and wise, and just, not however that He is the Father: and the reason of this diversity does not arise from the fact that the attributes are more identified with the essence than the relations; but because, since the Personal relations are mutually opposed and really distinct, any one of them cannot be communicated to the three Persons, as the attributes and the essence are communicated to them.

I say 2. with the same Doctor in the same place, that these things are perhaps affirmed by Augustine for this reason, not to signify that there is another distinction between the Deity and Paternity or Filiation than between the Deity and Wisdom; for in both there is real identity and formal distinction; but that there is a greater reason of identity between the Deity and the attributes, than between the relations compared with the Deity and the attributes. Because since the Essence and the attributes are formally infinite, and infinity from its formal notion postulates identifying with itself whatever is possible with it; it follows that the attributes have a twofold reason of identification: one indeed in the essence, in which they are altogether really the same as the relations; for since God is a most simple being, His essence really identifies with itself everything that is in Him; the other, from their own infinity, which postulates identifying with itself any perfection compossible with it: wisdom, v. g., insofar as it is an infinite perfection, requires that the perfection of goodness, justice, and of the other attributes compossible with it be identified with it: but the divine relations, since they do not express any perfection of themselves, (as will be proved in the Treatise on the Trinity) and much less an infinite perfection, do not have this second reason of identification, which is drawn from infinity, but only the first, which must be drawn from the simplicity and highest identity of God; and hence there is a greater reason of identification of the attributes, both with each other and with the divine essence, than of the relations.

Corollary. — From all these things it is evident how far from the mark some recent Thomists stray, who contend that the divine attributes are of the essence of God, and formally include each other; to defend which opinion they are forced to explode their own distinction, both fundamental and virtual. For they cannot explain how one is of the formal notion and essence of another from which it is distinguished fundamentally and virtually; for from their opinion it would follow that the essences of things are distinguished from the things themselves fundamentally and virtually; and so that the essences without the things themselves, and conversely the things themselves without their essences, could rightly be conceived, which it is altogether unbecoming for an expert Philosopher and Theologian to admit. Moreover, if the attributes were of the formal concept of the essence, then also the relations would formally belong to the divine essence; but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is evident from the parity of reason. The minor is proved: To be the Father is not of the essence and formal concept of God: therefore neither is Paternity of the formal concept of the essence. The consequence is evident: for whatever is of the formal concept of God is of the formal concept of the essence, and vice versa. The antecedent is proved: If it were of the formal concept of God that He be the Father, it would follow that the Son is the Father, for whatever is of the intrinsic notion of some common thing is also of the essence of every supposit and singular thing contained under that common thing: Thus, v. g., because living is said of animal, and animal of man, as of a subject and inferior, likewise living will be said of man: therefore a simili, if to be the Father is of the formal and essential notion of the Deity, likewise it will be of the essential notion of the Son contained under it. Therefore if the Father is predicated quidditatively and essentially of God, likewise He will be predicated of the Son, of whom God is essentially predicated. Finally, if Paternity essentially belongs to the Deity, and the Deity is formally included in the concept of Filiation, then Paternity too will be included in the formal concept of Filiation. The consequence is evident, because the Deity is included in the concept of Filiation: therefore also whatever is formally the Deity is included in it. But Paternity, as they will, is formally the Deity, and hence is also formally Filiation; and since these consequences are false, that also is false and absurd from which they are elicited and inferred.