Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Concerning the resolution of the present Question, the opinion of certain theologians was varied and completely opposed. For some held that between the essence and the attributes there intervenes a real, adequate distinction; as Niphus reports concerning a certain Walter, in book 12 of Metaphys., Disputation 13, chap. 3, and James of Vitry: which opinion is likewise attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers. The Nominalists, however, went into a completely opposite opinion, who, with their Prince Ockham, in 1. dist. 2. quaest. 2., admit no distinction at all a parte rei in God: but they will that the attributes are only a diversity and variety of names, arising from a diverse connotation and respect of the divine essence toward creatures; so that the same altogether most simple divine essence, by connoting, e.g., a misery to be relieved, is called mercy; by connoting truths to be clearly and certainly known, is called wisdom, etc. But in order that, between these opinions and reefs, we may hold a safer course, and that we may evidently lay open what is to be thought more truly

Note 1. These three words, division, distinction, and non-identity, differ from one another according to more and less, and as the superior and the inferior: for every division is a distinction and non-identity, yet not conversely: because since division follows matter and quantity, it can be found only in extended corporeal things; but distinction, since it is a property of being, is found in all beings, both spiritual and corporeal: whence it happens that in the Angels there is indeed distinction, but not division. Likewise distinction and non-identity differ according to the superior and the inferior; for every distinction is non-identity, yet not conversely; because since distinction is a property of being, it is found only between beings and positive extremes: whence between being and non-being, between a form and its privation, there is not distinction but non-identity. But if sometimes the Doctors and the Philosophers say that form and privation, being and non-being are distinguished from one another, this distinction is to be taken negatively, that is, that they are not the same; for all things which are distinguished are not the same, yet not all things which are not the same ought to be called properly distinct.

Note 2. With our Mayronius, in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 1., the genus of the distinction of things is fourfold, a parte rei and independently of the operation of the intellect. The first distinction, he says, is essential, by which one existing essence is distinguished from another existing essence, e.g., God from a creature. The second is real, by which a thing is distinguished from another thing, either from that by which it is produced, as the Son from the Father, or from that from which it can be separated, as whiteness from a wall, or without which it can exist, as a foundation without a relation. The third is formal, by which the quidditative concept of the one, e.g., of wisdom, is not the quidditative concept of the other, e.g., of omnipotence. The fourth is modal, which is between a quiddity and its mode or grade, e.g., between wisdom and its finitude or infinity.

Note 3. Of all these distinctions the greatest is the essential: for things that differ essentially from one another diverge more than those which are separated by other distinctions. The real follows it, as that which is between really existing entities, of which the one is either productive of the other, or is separable from it, or can exist without it. The formal holds the third place, as the mean between the real and the modal, and it is between two formalities or objective concepts that are conceivable separately. The modal is the least of all: for a mode does not vary the formal notion of the thing, but augments or diminishes it within the same formal notion; for intense whiteness, as two, is not distinguished from itself formally, nor is it essentially diverse, inasmuch as it has eight grades; although it is not the same modally. Whence the modal distinction follows the lot of the formal distinction; so that accordingly, if the attributes are distinguished a parte rei formally from one another and from the divine essence, even the modal perfections are distinguished modally in act.

First conclusion. — Between the essence and the attributes there intervenes no essential distinction, nor a real one. This seems to be of the Faith: since in the Lateran Council, chap. Firmiter, it is defined that the divine substance is indivisible, as altogether simple: but it would not be altogether simple if it consisted of attributes really and essentially distinct from it: therefore the attributes do not thus differ from the divine essence. — Moreover, in the same Council it is determined that by faith it is to be believed that in God there is only a Trinity, not indeed a quaternity; because each of the three Persons is that thing, namely, the substance, essence, or divine nature: but if the attributes were really distinguished from the essence, there would be no less a quaternity in God than if the divine Persons really differed from it; for wherever there is a real distinction, there likewise is a multiplicity of things: whence since the attributes are many, if they were really distinguished from the divine essence, not only a quaternity would have to be admitted in God, but even a centenity, if there were as many attributes, as St. Bernard rightly gathers, book 5. De Consideratione, chap. 7.: Many things, he says, are said to be in God, and indeed soundly and catholically: but the many are one; otherwise, if we think them diverse, you will have not a quaternity, but a centenity. Thirdly we say great, just, and innumerable such things: but unless you consider all things as one in God, you will have a multiple God. Moreover, in the Councils of Toledo, the eleventh, and of Florence, it is defined that in divine things all is one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way: but between the essence and the attributes no opposition of relation intervenes: therefore between them also there is no real distinction. Finally St. Bernard, in Sermon 8 on the Cantica, asserts that in the Council of Rheims that exposition of Gilbert of Poitiers was condemned, by which he interpreted the books of Boethius De sancta Trinitate in this way: The Father is truth, that is, true; the Son is truth, that is, true, etc. Whence Bernard exclaims: O obscure and perverse explanation! How much more truly and more soundly, by the contrary, he would have said it thus: the Father is true, that is, truth; the Son is true, that is, truth! etc. And in the same place: Let it be written, he says, with an iron pen on an adamantine nail, or carved into flint: that the Divine Essence, Form, Nature, Deity, Goodness, Wisdom, Virtue, Power, Greatness truly is God. But this definition could not stand if goodness, greatness, etc., were really distinguished from the divine Essence; for just as, e.g., a wall is not called whiteness but white, because whiteness is not identified with it, so neither can the Father and the Son be called truth, nor is God rightly called goodness, greatness, etc., if there is a real distinction between them: therefore, according to the mind both of St. Bernard and of the Council of Rheims, the divine attributes are not really distinguished from the essence.

Our Bassolius proves the same thing by a threefold argument in 1. dist. 22. q. 2. ad 4. articulum. First indeed thus: every infinite thing identifies with itself all those things which are compossible with it: but the divine Essence is infinite, for, says St. John Damascene, it is a certain infinite ocean of substance: therefore it identifies with itself all those things which are compossible with it; but the perfections, both attributal and modal, are compossible with the divine Essence, since they affect and perfect it: therefore they are identified with it. The minor is evident: for if the infinite did not identify with itself those things which are compossible with it, they would have to be united with it by composition from parts: but the infinite can neither be perfected nor constituted from parts; because every part, in the notion of a part, is limited and finite, for it does not involve that which the other part, its companion, embraces, otherwise they would not be diverse: but the infinite cannot be composed from a finite part, for such is the whole per se as are the parts composing it; therefore if the parts are infinite, even the whole per se consisting of those parts will be infinite: therefore since the divine Essence is infinite, it is necessary that it really identify all its perfections with itself, and consequently between the essence and the attributes no real distinction can intervene. — Secondly: Those things are really the same of which the one is predicated of the other in the abstract: but the divine attributes are predicated of one another and of the divine Essence in the abstract; for, as St. Augustine says, 15. De Trinitate, chap. 5., God does not receive wisdom by which He is wise, but He Himself is wisdom. And St. Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 2. De pace, n. 24., says: that the Trinity is true, and truth; and the Spirit of truth, holy, and holiness itself. Finally St. Anselm, in the Proslogion, c. 18., addressing God, says: Surely it is Life, it is Wisdom, it is Truth, it is Blessedness, it is Eternity, and every true and good thing; these are many; my narrow intellect cannot see the whole with one single glance at once, so that it may delight in all. — Thirdly: If the essence and the attributes were not really the same, it would follow that the essence together with the attributes is something more perfect according to entity than the essence alone: but this is false; otherwise the essence would not be infinite being, since it would not involve all entity whatsoever: therefore they are not really distinct from one another.

You will say 1. The same thing really is not contained in itself; otherwise the same would be and not be the same: but the attributes are contained really in the divine essence: therefore they are really distinguished from it. — Bassolius distinguishes the major: The same according to the same notion is not contained in itself, he concedes; for it cannot be containing and contained according to the same altogether same notion: it is not contained in itself in respect of one notion and another, he denies; whence just as a man, inasmuch as he is an animal, can be said to be contained in himself inasmuch as he is a man, because the animal is contained in the man as a part in the whole: so although the attributes are really the same as the essence, yet because they formally differ from it, they can be said to be really contained in it, just as properties are contained in the essence. — Or, more clearly and more briefly, I distinguish the major: The same is not contained in itself through true containment, which imports a real distinction between containing and contained, I concede; through the real identification of one formality with the entity of another, I deny. I likewise distinguish the minor: The attributes are contained in the divine Essence through true containment, I deny: through real identification with the entity of the divine Essence, I concede. Whence they are said more rightly and more truly to be, than to be contained in, the divine Essence.

You will say 2. When certain things are really the same, one being multiplied, the other is also multiplied: therefore if the attributes and the essence are really the same, just as the attributes are many, so also the essence will be multiple. I distinguish the antecedent: One being multiplied according to real entity, the other must also be multiplied according to entity, I concede: being multiplied according to formality, the other must be multiplied according to entity, I deny; but the attributes are various only according to formality, not indeed according to real entity: therefore, on their multiplication, the divine entity and essence must not be multiplied.

You will say 3. The perfectible and the perfective are really distinguished: but the divine attributes are perfections of the divine Essence: therefore they must be really distinguished from it. The major is evident, for nothing is perfective of itself; therefore it must be perfective of another. — I distinguish the minor: If the perfective is related after the manner of a form informing a subject, or of a part composing some whole, as whiteness, e.g., informs and makes the wall white, and the soul with the body constitutes a living thing, I concede: if it is only a formality affecting the subject which is perfected, after the manner of a property and an intrinsic perfection, I deny: but the attributes do not perfect the divine Essence after the manner of an informing form, or of a composing part, but only after the manner of a formality and perfection intrinsically determining and perfecting the divine Essence in this or that mode, e.g., wisdom in the notion of the wise, etc.: therefore they must not be really distinguished from it.

You will say 4. Things which regard diverse categories, and are placed under diverse predicaments, are really distinguished: but the divine Essence and the attributes are placed under diverse predicaments, the former indeed under the predicament of substance, the latter under the predicament of quality. This can be proved by various opinions of the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine, 15. De Trinit. chap. 5., where he says: If we say eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable, living, wise, powerful, comely, just, good, blessed, spirit, of all these the last that I have set down seems to signify substance; but the rest, qualities of this substance. Therefore he judges that the divine essence belongs to the predicament of substance, but the attributes to quality. — I deny the minor: For from what is to be said concerning divine simplicity, it will openly be clear that God is in no way comprehended under any of the categories. Nor was that the mind of Augustine either, for in the aforesaid words he speaks indeed of the concept which we can form concerning predicates fitting creatures, not indeed concerning the predicates which regard God; for he adds: But it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature; for whatever seems to be said there according to qualities is to be understood according to substance or essence: far be it that the Spirit be called God according to substance, and good according to quality, but both according to substance: therefore so far is it from the case that that most gross error darkened the genius of Augustine, that he thought the divine essence to be indeed substantial, but the divine perfections to be reckoned among the accidents, that on the contrary he openly confesses that nothing is found in God except substance.

You will say 5. Those things of which contradictory predicates can be verified are really distinguished: but contradictory predicates are verified of the divine essence and the attributes, and especially of the divine relations. For the essence is the root and source of the attributes and relations, but the attributes and relations are not for one another the sources of their own spring, nor does the essence emanate from them in turn, just as these flow from it. Moreover, the essence is communicated to the three Persons, but not so the personal relations, etc. Therefore a real distinction must be admitted among them. — I deny the minor: since, to preserve and resolve all these contradictions, it suffices that a formal distinction obtains between the essence and the attributes and relations, as we shall clearly show in the following Question. The other things which either Gilbert himself proposed in defense of his opinion, or which others are wont to object in his favor, since they are chiefly drawn from the Tractatu de Trinitate, we have therefore judged that their discussion should be referred to that treatise itself, so that all things may cohere with one another in a fitting order.

You will ask, however, here in passing, whether Gilbertus Porretanus truly held that a real distinction obtains between the Essence and the Attributes?

I answer that there is no doubt that he so judged concerning the Essence and the constitutive relations of the divine persons, as is clear from his commentaries on the book of Boethius De Trinitate, which we shall deliberately prove in the following Question in the solution of the objections. That he did not, however, assert a like distinction between the essence and the attributes, may be gathered from the various texts of the aforementioned commentary, by which he seems to establish the real identity of the divine essence with its attributes; for in book 1. § Sed haec, he writes thus: When it is said: man is just, he is not said to be just with all that he is; but divisively, by justness alone, he is said to be just, nor does this expression leave out anything at all by which he is, for God is the very same thing that is just, that is, by that by which he is God he is just. He does not, therefore, judge that justice is really distinct from the Deity; for how could it come about that God were just by that by which God is, if the divine justice were really distinct from the Deity? For a wall, e.g., is not said to be white by that by which it is a wall, but by that by which it has whiteness, for it could be a wall and not be white, because since whiteness is really distinct from it, it can also be separated from it. You will find several similar locutions in the same commentary, and, that it may be clear that this was his genuine mind, he speaks in the same way in the commentary on the book of the same Boethius De Hebdomad., rule 7.: We do not think, he says, that from the essence, by which we predicate him to be, his power or wisdom is diverse in that notion. Therefore he admits that power and wisdom (the same must be said of the other attributes) are not really distinct from the divine essence, indeed, as he seems to feel, not even distinct by reason. — Nor does it stand in the way that, as St. Bernard reports, he denied that God is truth, as though he really distinguished truth from the Deity. For by the name of God he understood the person having the Deity. Whence, since he contended that the personalities are really distinguished from the essence, he also affirmed that they are really distinct from the attributes. Hence he said: The Father is true, and not truth, as we noted above from St. Bernard. For that man, otherwise most learned, fell into this most serious error for this reason, that, being too much devoted to the precepts of philosophy, he weighed the mysteries of our faith on the balance of natural reason, and could not conceive how the divine relations are the same really with the divine essence, and yet are really distinguished from one another, against that dialectical principle: Things which are the same as one and the same third are the same among themselves, which principle indeed we shall weigh in the Tractatu de Trinitate.

Second conclusion. — The divine attributes are not distinguished from one another, and from the divine essence, by a mere variety of names. This is the opinion of all the theologians against the Nominalists, namely Ochamum in 1. q. 2; Gregorium Ariminensem in the same place d. 8. q. 2. a. 1; Mayronem q. 1; Gabrielem d. 2. q. 1., who contend that the divine attributes are not distinguished even by the intellect, either among themselves or from the essence, but are only diverse names signifying the same thing, and under the same altogether intrinsic notion, and differ among themselves only through the connotation of diverse effects, or of the perfections or imperfections of creatures, with which God is compared by our intellect, and is signified in diverse ways by a comparative, or connotative, name, so that the same altogether formally simple divine essence is even said to be mercy by order to the effect of sparing and pitying; justice by order to the effect of punishing; wisdom, goodness, and omnipotence, by comparison to the created perfections, e.g., of wisdom, of moral goodness, and of the manifold power of creatures, over which God infinitely towers. Likewise he is said to be immortal, immutable, and by the negation of the mutability and defectibility which is found in creatures. But, as Suarez justly notes, lib. 7. De Trinitate, cap. 1. n. 1., this opinion, if in the thing itself it disagrees with the common opinion, is more than false; if, however, only in the manner of speaking, it is impertinent, and without foundation, and scarcely permits us to use apt words for explaining the mystery of the Trinity. And so the conclusion is proved: first indeed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, which often speaks of the essence and the divine attributes as of many things: therefore it indicates that they are distinguished from one another and from the essence, for things which are many are distinct, and where there is multitude there is also distinction. The consequence is clear: for in the same way Scripture must be said to use words in the plural to signify many things, as it uses words in the singular to express one thing; but while it uses words in the singular, it expresses only one thing, as St. Paul notes in Galatians 3. in these words: To Abraham were the promises spoken, and to his seed. He did not say: And to seeds, as of many: but as of one, and to your seed, which is Christ: therefore, while it uses words in the plural, it designates many. The antecedent is proved by these and similar places of Scripture: Romans 1.: The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity, by which the Apostle designates three things, namely the attributes, the operations, and the divine essence: therefore he judges that these are in some way distinguished from one another. And in the same place, cap. 11. he exclaims: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways! Likewise John 16. Christ himself speaks of the divine attributes and the essence communicated to himself as Son by the Father as of many things: All things, he says, whatsoever the Father has are mine. Which words the Council of Florence in the last session thus explains: All things which are the Father's, the Father himself gave to his only-begotten Son by begetting, except to be the Father. The Council therefore judges that besides paternity there are many things in the Father: but these are nothing other than the essence and its perfections, whether attributive or modal, as St. Hilary also explains, lib. 5. De Trinitate, where, weighing the aforementioned words of John, he says: God shows in these that what are his own are to be understood in virtue, in eternity, in providence, in power.

Secondly: the Councils not only speak of the attributes and the essence as of many things; but they also affirm that some distinction obtains among them. Thus the 6th Synod, in action 8., says: that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have nothing in common in the Incarnation except most benign mercy and will, as if it said that there is in the Son something common with the Father and the Holy Spirit, according to which he is not immediately united to the humanity, and something proper, according to which he is personally united immediately to the humanity itself: and hence that there is some distinction between the divine essence common to the three Persons, which is not immediately incarnated, and the person of the Son, which immediately assumed human nature: for it is impossible that one and the same thing, indistinct in reality and in reason, be incarnated and not incarnated at the same time; otherwise two truly contradictory things would be affirmed of the same thing under the same aspect, such as to be incarnated and not to be incarnated: it is equally impossible that if the divine essence and the relation of filiation differ only as to names, anything could be truly affirmed of the personality of the Son which would not be truly affirmed of the divine essence; just as, e.g., on the hypothesis that gladius and ensis differ only in name, whatever is truly affirmed of the ensis is also truly predicated of the gladius: and hence, just as the Son is truly said to have immediately assumed human nature, so likewise it will be true to say that the divine essence immediately assumed human nature, and is united to it: which is foreign at once to truth and to faith, as the 6th and 11th Councils of Toledo testify, affirming that the Son assumed the humanity in that which is proper to the Son, not in that which is common to the Trinity. All the holy Fathers to be praised in the following Question go in the same opinion, for the same reasons and opinions which will establish the formal distinction between the essence and the attributes will utterly destroy and vanquish the opinion of the Nominalists. Nevertheless the conclusion is also proved by reason: those things of which contradictories can be verified are distinguished from one another; for contradictories cannot be true of the same thing under the same aspect: but two contradictories are verified of the divine attributes and of the essence and the personal relations; for the Son is begotten through the intellect, not through the will; but the Holy Spirit is produced through the will, not through the intellect; and just as the intellect generates, the will does not generate; the will spirates, the intellect does not spirate; the divine essence neither generates nor is generated, neither spirates nor is spirated. Likewise the essence is communicated to the three Persons, but the personal relations are not communicated: the hypostasis of the Word is immediately united to the humanity, not so the essence: therefore it is necessary that some distinction obtains among those things, otherwise two contradictories would be verified of the same thing under the same aspect; which is impossible. — Moreover, if paternity, e.g., and the essence are altogether the same, and in no way distinct, it will be just as true to say: filiation is really paternity, as: filiation is really the essence; for the same thing altogether would be conceived and affirmed in both propositions: likewise it would be just as true to say that the essence generates and is generated, produces and is produced, as that the Father generates and the Son is generated: likewise the Son could truly be said to be produced through the will, just as much as the Holy Spirit, if the will and the intellect differ only in name; for things which differ only in name, as ensis and gladius, or Deus and Θεός, whatever is affirmed of the one can likewise be affirmed of the other. But all these consequences militate against the faith.

The Nominalists object: the various authorities of the holy Fathers, by which God is said not so much to have as to be all his perfection. Thus St. Anselm in the Monologio, cap. 25.: The supreme nature, he says, is not properly said to be just because it has justice: but because it exists as justice. Similarly St. Augustine, 6. De Trinitate, cap. 7.: God, he says, is indeed said in many ways to be great, good, wise, blessed, true; and whatever else is seen to be said of him not unworthily; but his greatness is the same as his wisdom, and his goodness the same as his wisdom and greatness. Therefore neither the essence from the attributes, nor the attributes from one another, differ in any way. — I distinguish the consequent: that they in no way differ really, I concede; for they are not thing and thing existing with really distinct existences; that they do not differ formally, and as diverse formalities and objective concepts conceivably in diverse ways, I deny. And so, while the holy Fathers affirm that God is all of whatever he is, and that one divine perfection is another, they speak of the real identity, by which, through infinity, all things which are in God are altogether the same and really indistinct; they do not, however, speak of the identity or distinction formal; otherwise they would contradict themselves, as will be clear from the opinions of theirs to be set forth in the following Question.

The Nominalists insist: the holy Fathers sometimes affirm that the divine perfections in no way differ from one another, and deny that one adds anything to another. Thus St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 5.: Goodness, he says, and justice, do they perhaps differ from one another in the nature of God as in his works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God, one goodness, another justice? Not at all; but what justice is, that itself is goodness, and what goodness is, that itself is blessedness. Likewise cap. 6.: Nor, as we perceive wisdom from him, does God perceive it from someone; but he himself is his own wisdom, because his wisdom is not one thing and his essence another, for which to be is to be wise. Similarly St. Gregory Nyssenus, in the book to Ablavius, about the end: The divine nature, simple and ignorant of variation, rejects every diversity concerning the essence. Likewise St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consider. cap. 6.: For him to be is to be all these things, and if you add a hundred such, you have not departed from being; which is a manifest indication that no distinction really obtains between the essence and the attributes. — I deny the consequence: for the aforementioned Fathers only want to drive away from God the real distinction between the essence and the attributes, and to remove every composition from God, lest they detract from his divine simplicity and infinity: for since simplicity and infinity really identify all things whatsoever which are in God, essential and attributive, it is true to say that one perfection is really another, and adds nothing really distinct to the other; they do not, however, deny that these are various formalities, really identified with one another and with the essence, but formally distinct.

The Nominalists press: the holy Fathers also affirm that the plurality of names by which we signify the divine perfections arises only from our imperfect concepts, by which we apprehend God in the manner of creatures, or compare him variously to creatures; in God, however, there is nothing varied and manifold, but only a diverse appellation of names. Thus St. Bernard, lib. 5. De Consider. cap. 13., when he had said that God is length, breadth, sublimity, and depth, subjoins: I seem to have uttered many things, but it is one; one God is signified according to our grasp, not according to his state. Our grasp here is divided, not that God; the voices are diverse, the paths many; but one is signified through them, one is sought. Likewise St. Cyril, lib. 11. Thesauri, says: The substance of God is perfect of itself, but nevertheless we are sometimes compelled to conceive in the manner of accidents, understanding that before the creation of the world God was the creator, but not in act; with the world, however, created, he is also creator in act. Therefore the attributes are only various names, nor do they import any distinction a parte rei in God. — I deny the consequence: for either the holy Fathers speak only of the extrinsic denominations and relations, namely of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, Author, etc., which, inasmuch as they import and signify an act, do not indeed infer in God a new intrinsic perfection which he would not have had from eternity; but they are only a new denomination coming from without; but the holy Fathers do not speak of the divine perfections, which in reality, setting aside any concept of the intellect, affect and perfect the divine essence; or the holy Fathers mean that the diversity of names does not designate in God a variation of things, but that the divine essence, with its perfections and attributes, is indeed one thing altogether really simple, but formally diverse, and signified by several names.

They object 2. The Nominalists urge that solemn argument of theirs: where there is not one and another, one cannot be conceived without the other: but in a simple thing, such as God is, there is not one and another: therefore one is not conceivable without the other, and hence nothing in him is distinct. — I deny the minor: since the essence is distinguished from the attributes, and the attributes from one another, formally, as will be clear in the following Question. Moreover, the argument could be turned back, and pressed against them: where there is not one and another, one cannot produce or be produced, generate or be generated, spirate or be spirated, be communicated or be united without the other: but in the divine essence there is not one and another, and likewise in the divine Person, which is a most simple being, there is not one and another, as the Nominalists hold: therefore the divine essence cannot be communicated to the Son, the Paternity not being communicated, nor could the Son rather be said to be generated through the intellect than through the will, nor the will more to spirate than the intellect; which and similar consequences are absurd, and heretical: therefore, etc.