Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. The entitative mode taken generally signifies the state and grade of perfection of any thing whatsoever; for which reason such extension in quantity, or intension in quality, are called modes of quality or of quantity. This entitative mode is properly said by the Scotists to be that which, added to or removed from a thing, does not vary its formal notion; yet without which that thing cannot be perfectly conceived. For, as the Doctor says in primum dist. 8. q. 3. n. 27., the eighth grade of whiteness does not effect an essential distinction of the same whiteness from itself, while it consists of only four grades. If, however, it were conceived only as it is whiteness, not attending to those eight grades of which the thing consists, it would indeed be conceived by an essential concept, but not by a concept adequate to its perfection, because whiteness as two is as essentially whiteness as whiteness as four, but is not as perfect.

Note 2. Attribute is used in three ways: first, more loosely, insofar as it imports any predicate attributed by someone to another; in which way all things that are attributed to God — whether they belong to Him intrinsically, as goodness, justice, the divine relations, etc., or extrinsically, as the relations of Creator, Sanctifier, etc., or by metaphor, as anger, sorrow, repentance, etc. — can be called attributes. Second, more strictly, for every perfection belonging to God intrinsically and objectively, whether meanwhile it belongs to Him alone or also univocally to a creature; in which way all the modes of the divine Essence can be called attributes. Third, finally, the divine attribute is used most strictly for a perfection simply simple, which, observing it in creatures, we attribute to God, judging that it befits Him by way of a quality, as it were perfecting the divine Essence already adequately constituted in the notion of divine Essence.

Note 3. Perfection in general is distinguished as twofold; for one is called simply simple, but the other secundum quid. Each has a twofold acceptation, as is gathered from the Doctor in primum dist. 2. quaest. 2. and distinctione 8. quaest. 1. For first, that perfection is called simply simple whose concept is not resolvable into several objective concepts; such is the concept of being, and of its properties, and of the intrinsic modes, and of the ultimate differences. But that is called simple only secundum quid which, although apprehended by a single formal concept, can nevertheless be resolved into several objective concepts; such as, for example, the concept of man, which can be resolved into the concept of animal, of rational, of risible, etc. In the second way, that perfection is called simply simple which, following St. Anselm in Monologio, cap. 15.¹, is better in each thing than its non-self, or, as St. Anselm speaks, when in each thing it is better to be than not to be. On the contrary, however, that perfection is called secundum quid which in each thing is not better than its non-self. These definitions, however, that they may become plain —

Note 4. From the Doctor in primum dist. 8, quaest. 1. n. 7., these words of the aforementioned definition (better than its non-self) are not to be taken contradictorily, as if it were better to have this perfection than not to have it: for thus every perfection would have to be called a simple perfection, because any perfection, even secundum quid, is better than its own negation; since negation does not express perfection, but the lack of being and of perfection. And so those words are to be taken contrarily, so that that perfection is called simple which is better than another perfection that would be incompossible with it in the same subject; thus, for example, rational could be called a simple perfection, because it is better to have rationality than irrationality. Yet, as the Doctor further observes, this is not to be taken as if that perfection were to be called simple in which it is better in any particular thing; otherwise irrationality would have to be called a simple perfection in a brute, because it is better for a brute to be irrational than rational, for if it were rational, it would cease to be a brute: but the sense is that, if the thing is considered precisely according to its generic notion, as it is an existing being, prescinding from its particular nature, it would be better for it to have the simple perfection than the one opposed to it. Thus, for a brute considered not as it is a brute, but as a species of being, it would be better to have rationality than irrationality, because a rational and intellective being is more perfect than an irrational and non-intellective being. And so a simple perfection can be accurately described as one which is better than another perfection opposed to it and repugnant to it in a subject considered according to the general notion of being.

First conclusion. — The mode or perfection modifying the divine Essence is a predicate belonging intimately and to the Essence alone, by which all the imperfections of creatures are removed from it: and without which the divine Essence cannot be conceived by an adequate quidditative concept.

The truth of this definition is evident from the declaration of its parts. First it is said to be a predicate, because it is affirmed and predicated of God; for while, v. g., God is said to be infinite, infinity is enunciated of God. Second, intimately, by which all the predicates are excluded which are attributed to God only by metaphor or extrinsically. Third, to the

divine Essence alone, in which the modes differ from the attributes; for attributes are certain perfections belonging to God and to creatures. Fourth, by which the imperfections of creatures are removed from God; for every mode imports the negation of some imperfection: thus infinity negates limitation, immensity negates circumscription and determination, eternity negates succession, duration, etc. Fifth, finally, without the modifying perfection the divine Essence cannot be conceived adequately and quidditatively: for the adequate and quidditative concept imports not only the knowledge of the thing according to itself, but also according to all the modes intrinsically belonging to it.

From which a threefold difference of the mode from the attributes appears. First, indeed, the mode belongs to the divine Essence alone: but the attribute belongs not only to God, but also to creatures. Second, by the mode the imperfections of creatures are removed from God, which does not belong to the attributes, at least formally; for the attributes do not import formally and explicitly the negation of any imperfection, but only consequently and implicitly, and inasmuch as the attributal perfections are attributed to God in a more eminent way than they belong to creatures. Hence although Wisdom, v. g., is an accident in creatures, it is nevertheless not attributed to God under the notion of accident, of which God is incapable; but only under the notion of certain and evident knowledge of any highest truths whatsoever; whence it only consequently removes from God the notion of accident, which it obtains in creatures. Third, the divine Essence can be conceived adequately and quidditatively without the attributes, which are formally distinguished from it, as will appear below: but not so with the modes, which differ from it only modally, and belong to it so intimately that it cannot be conceived adequately without them, not otherwise than this whiteness, v. g., cannot be perfectly conceived except under this or another grade of its intension.

Second conclusion. — The divine attribute is a perfection simply simple, which, participated by creatures either univocally or analogically and shining forth in them, we attribute to God; and we judge that it belongs to Him formally and intrinsically by way of a property affecting the divine Essence already adequately constituted in the notion of Essence.

This definition is gathered from the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. et 4. Its truth is evident from the explanation of each of its parts. For first it is called a simply simple perfection, by which all the divine Personal relations are excluded from the notion of attribute, as also the extrinsic respects that supervene, namely those of Creator, Redeemer, and those which are not simply simple perfections. Second, participated by creatures univocally or analogically, etc.; for those things which are in God, if they are not found in creatures, cannot be reckoned attributes; and by this the attributes differ from the intrinsic modes: for thus they belong to God alone. Third, formally and intrinsically, so that they are separated from all those things which belong to God only by metaphor. The rest are added so that the attributes are distinguished from the essential predicates, which belong to God in actu primo and per se, and constitute His essence.