Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Divine perfection here I understand to be whatever affects and perfects the divine Essence, already constituted and determined by its essential predicates. This divine perfection, moreover, is customarily distinguished as twofold: namely, modal and attributive. What the definition of each is, and their difference, must be resolved in the following question.

Note 1. The entitative mode taken generally signifies the state and grade of perfection of any thing whatsoever; for which reason such extension in quantity, or intension in quality, are called modes of quality or of quantity. This entitative mode is properly said by the Scotists to be that which, added to or removed from a thing, does not vary its formal notion; yet without which that thing cannot be perfectly conceived. For, as the Doctor says in primum dist. 8. q. 3. n. 27., the eighth grade of whiteness does not effect an essential distinction of the same whiteness from itself, while it consists of only four grades. If, however, it were conceived only as it is whiteness, not attending to those eight grades of which the thing consists, it would indeed be conceived by an essential concept, but not by a concept adequate to its perfection, because whiteness as two is as essentially whiteness as whiteness as four, but is not as perfect.

Note 2. Attribute is used in three ways: first, more loosely, insofar as it imports any predicate attributed by someone to another; in which way all things that are attributed to God — whether they belong to Him intrinsically, as goodness, justice, the divine relations, etc., or extrinsically, as the relations of Creator, Sanctifier, etc., or by metaphor, as anger, sorrow, repentance, etc. — can be called attributes. Second, more strictly, for every perfection belonging to God intrinsically and objectively, whether meanwhile it belongs to Him alone or also univocally to a creature; in which way all the modes of the divine Essence can be called attributes. Third, finally, the divine attribute is used most strictly for a perfection simply simple, which, observing it in creatures, we attribute to God, judging that it befits Him by way of a quality, as it were perfecting the divine Essence already adequately constituted in the notion of divine Essence.

Note 3. Perfection in general is distinguished as twofold; for one is called simply simple, but the other secundum quid. Each has a twofold acceptation, as is gathered from the Doctor in primum dist. 2. quaest. 2. and distinctione 8. quaest. 1. For first, that perfection is called simply simple whose concept is not resolvable into several objective concepts; such is the concept of being, and of its properties, and of the intrinsic modes, and of the ultimate differences. But that is called simple only secundum quid which, although apprehended by a single formal concept, can nevertheless be resolved into several objective concepts; such as, for example, the concept of man, which can be resolved into the concept of animal, of rational, of risible, etc. In the second way, that perfection is called simply simple which, following St. Anselm in Monologio, cap. 15.¹, is better in each thing than its non-self, or, as St. Anselm speaks, when in each thing it is better to be than not to be. On the contrary, however, that perfection is called secundum quid which in each thing is not better than its non-self. These definitions, however, that they may become plain —

Note 4. From the Doctor in primum dist. 8, quaest. 1. n. 7., these words of the aforementioned definition (better than its non-self) are not to be taken contradictorily, as if it were better to have this perfection than not to have it: for thus every perfection would have to be called a simple perfection, because any perfection, even secundum quid, is better than its own negation; since negation does not express perfection, but the lack of being and of perfection. And so those words are to be taken contrarily, so that that perfection is called simple which is better than another perfection that would be incompossible with it in the same subject; thus, for example, rational could be called a simple perfection, because it is better to have rationality than irrationality. Yet, as the Doctor further observes, this is not to be taken as if that perfection were to be called simple in which it is better in any particular thing; otherwise irrationality would have to be called a simple perfection in a brute, because it is better for a brute to be irrational than rational, for if it were rational, it would cease to be a brute: but the sense is that, if the thing is considered precisely according to its generic notion, as it is an existing being, prescinding from its particular nature, it would be better for it to have the simple perfection than the one opposed to it. Thus, for a brute considered not as it is a brute, but as a species of being, it would be better to have rationality than irrationality, because a rational and intellective being is more perfect than an irrational and non-intellective being. And so a simple perfection can be accurately described as one which is better than another perfection opposed to it and repugnant to it in a subject considered according to the general notion of being.

First conclusion. — The mode or perfection modifying the divine Essence is a predicate belonging intimately and to the Essence alone, by which all the imperfections of creatures are removed from it: and without which the divine Essence cannot be conceived by an adequate quidditative concept.

The truth of this definition is evident from the declaration of its parts. First it is said to be a predicate, because it is affirmed and predicated of God; for while, v. g., God is said to be infinite, infinity is enunciated of God. Second, intimately, by which all the predicates are excluded which are attributed to God only by metaphor or extrinsically. Third, to the

divine Essence alone, in which the modes differ from the attributes; for attributes are certain perfections belonging to God and to creatures. Fourth, by which the imperfections of creatures are removed from God; for every mode imports the negation of some imperfection: thus infinity negates limitation, immensity negates circumscription and determination, eternity negates succession, duration, etc. Fifth, finally, without the modifying perfection the divine Essence cannot be conceived adequately and quidditatively: for the adequate and quidditative concept imports not only the knowledge of the thing according to itself, but also according to all the modes intrinsically belonging to it.

From which a threefold difference of the mode from the attributes appears. First, indeed, the mode belongs to the divine Essence alone: but the attribute belongs not only to God, but also to creatures. Second, by the mode the imperfections of creatures are removed from God, which does not belong to the attributes, at least formally; for the attributes do not import formally and explicitly the negation of any imperfection, but only consequently and implicitly, and inasmuch as the attributal perfections are attributed to God in a more eminent way than they belong to creatures. Hence although Wisdom, v. g., is an accident in creatures, it is nevertheless not attributed to God under the notion of accident, of which God is incapable; but only under the notion of certain and evident knowledge of any highest truths whatsoever; whence it only consequently removes from God the notion of accident, which it obtains in creatures. Third, the divine Essence can be conceived adequately and quidditatively without the attributes, which are formally distinguished from it, as will appear below: but not so with the modes, which differ from it only modally, and belong to it so intimately that it cannot be conceived adequately without them, not otherwise than this whiteness, v. g., cannot be perfectly conceived except under this or another grade of its intension.

Second conclusion. — The divine attribute is a perfection simply simple, which, participated by creatures either univocally or analogically and shining forth in them, we attribute to God; and we judge that it belongs to Him formally and intrinsically by way of a property affecting the divine Essence already adequately constituted in the notion of Essence.

This definition is gathered from the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. et 4. Its truth is evident from the explanation of each of its parts. For first it is called a simply simple perfection, by which all the divine Personal relations are excluded from the notion of attribute, as also the extrinsic respects that supervene, namely those of Creator, Redeemer, and those which are not simply simple perfections. Second, participated by creatures univocally or analogically, etc.; for those things which are in God, if they are not found in creatures, cannot be reckoned attributes; and by this the attributes differ from the intrinsic modes: for thus they belong to God alone. Third, formally and intrinsically, so that they are separated from all those things which belong to God only by metaphor. The rest are added so that the attributes are distinguished from the essential predicates, which belong to God in actu primo and per se, and constitute His essence.

Three things are to be resolved in the present Question. First indeed, whether the divine perfections, both attributal and modifying, are infinite in number. Second, whether they belong to God really and formally, or only virtually and eminently. Third and finally, whether they are of equal perfection with one another: which, that they may be more easily perceived

Note 1. Something can be said to be infinite in two ways; namely, either intensively, and in respect of quality, or of the grade of perfection: or extensively, and in respect of number. In the former way, that is called infinite which has infinite grades of perfection: so that not so many can be conceived that still more grades of perfection in it do not remain to be conceived. In the latter way, on the other hand, that is called infinite whose parts, or quasi-parts, are so indeterminate that, however many are designated and numbered, many more remain to be numbered. It is asked, however, whether the divine perfections are infinite in the one or the other, or in both, of these modes of infinity.

Note 2. Formality takes its origin from form; and form is said in various ways. First indeed, for the other part of a natural composite, which together with matter concurs in forming a natural body; and thus it is called a partial form, or a part. Second, for the form of the whole, which is the whole nature of a thing considered in the abstract; thus humanity is called the form of the whole man, not indeed by information, but because it designates the human supposit and expresses it abstractively. Third, it is taken for any immaterial substance, and in this way the Intelligences are sometimes called forms by the Philosophers. Fourth, form is said of any accident coming to a subject and informing it, whether it be quantity, or quality, or relation. Fifth and finally, form is said of every notion under which something can be conceived from the nature of the thing, and which is in it by way of a determining or perfecting grade: thus the properties of things can be called their forms, because they affect and perfect their essences.

Note 3. A perfection can be contained in another in three ways: namely, either formally and actually, as rationality in a man; or eminently, in the way in which the imperfections of lower things are said to be contained in higher ones; thus, e.g., the excellences of things devoid of life are said to be contained eminently in living things, those of animals in man, those of men in the Angels, and the perfections of the Angels and of all beings are said to be contained eminently in God. Third and finally, virtually, as, e.g., heat is said to be contained in the sun, because the sun can produce heat. It is doubtful, however, in which of these ways the attributes are contained in the divine Essence.

Note 4. The divine attributes can be considered in two ways: either according to themselves and objectively, or according to our mode of conceiving and formally. And this again in two ways, namely, either absolutely, when we conceive them only as they are divine perfections, having no regard to the perfections of creatures, with which they have some analogy: or comparatively, and in respect of the relation and order which they bear to the perfections of creatures, with which they are compared, or to the effects which they produce in creatures. The difficulty, however, is whether the divine perfections, both according to themselves and according to our absolute and comparative mode of conceiving, are infinite.

First conclusion. — The modifying and attributal divine perfections are infinite intensively, but not extensively.

This is common among the Theologians with respect to both parts: and indeed the first part is clear, since in an infinite and unlimited being nothing finite or limited can be found; it is necessary, therefore, that everything which is in God be infinite; and consequently that those divine excellences be infinite in every way. These things will be proved more fully and more effectively in the following Disputation, where there will be a treatment of divine infinity.

The second part, however, has some difficulty because of the Nominalists, who with their leader Ockham seem to hold that the divine perfections are infinite in number. Ockham indeed, in the fourth book, q. 3. a. 1., said that God alone knows all the predicates suitable to himself, doubtless on account of his infinity; for why would the Blessed, seeing God clearly and intuitively, not be able to discern all the divine Attributes unless they were infinite? And so this second part of the conclusion is proved: That is not to be attributed to God which neither Sacred Scripture, nor the holy Fathers, nor does any fitting and convincing reason persuade that they belong to him: but the extensive infinity of the divine perfections can be gathered from neither of those heads: therefore it is not to be asserted. The major is established; for whatever is affirmed must be confirmed either by authority or by reason. The minor is proved: For no open text of Sacred Scripture, nor any evident opinion of the holy Fathers, establishes this infinitude of the divine perfections, nor are any other divine perfections related, both by the canonical Writers and by the sacred Doctors of the Church, than those which the Theologians are accustomed to relate, and which will be named below; for why would God have hidden other divine excellences from us rather than those which are revealed and disclosed? The same minor is also evident by reason itself: For if any convincing reason should persuade that infinitude, it would be chiefly because God, since he is an infinite being, ought also to shine and excel with excellences infinite in number: but this reason does not establish the point; for just as, if something is called an infinite being, there is no need for it to comprise entities infinite in number, but it suffices that in its indivisible and most simple divine entity it contain formally or eminently absolutely all actual or possible entities; so by parity, in order that it be called an infinitely perfect being, it suffices that it virtually or formally comprise absolutely all possible or actual perfections which can belong to a being, nor is there need for it to involve them as infinite in number. — Secondly: The attributes are divine perfections, as it were diverse in species: but these are only finite in number: therefore etc. The major is clear, for not every perfection in God has the nature of an attribute, but only that which explains the divine Nature to us in a special way; since the attributes are like rays of the Divinity, opening up and pointing out to us the immense Sun of the Godhead. The minor is proved: A divine perfection is either attributed to God by analogy with the perfections of creatures, or removes from him the imperfections of creatures: but in neither of these ways is it infinite in number. This is clear as regards the former part, because since every attributal perfection has a likeness and proportion with the perfections of creatures, which are finite in number, those attributal perfections too must be finite in number. The minor is also clear as regards the second part: for only nine principal defects of creatures are numbered, which are removed from God by as many divine perfections, namely, dependence on a principle, which is removed through Aseity; limitation in entity, through Infinity; composition from parts and accidents, through Simplicity; confinement in place, through Immensity; variation in operations, through Immutability; succession and alternation in duration, through Eternity; constitution from a corporeal or limited entity, apprehensible by the senses or comprehensible by the intellect, which are removed through Invisibility and Ineffability: therefore since the defects of creatures are not infinite, neither should perfections infinite in number be assigned in God, which remove and keep away our defects from him. Nor does it matter that several other defects of creatures beyond those named can be thought up, which must likewise be kept away from God; for not any negation and removal of imperfection constitutes a special attribute or mode in God; but only that which designates and imports some special perfection in God. Since, however, all defects that can be thought of are sufficiently removed from God, explicitly or implicitly, by the assigned perfections, no other excellences expressed by negative names seem to be assigned, which would remove from God the other defects of creatures that are to be thought up and assigned.

Second conclusion. — The divine perfections, both modifying and attributal, are in God formally, and not only eminently or virtually.

So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 4. And from him Bassolius, dist. 2. quaest. 2. ad 3. and from both the conclusion is thus proved:

First: If the divine perfections, e.g., infinity, goodness, etc., were in God only virtually and eminently, it would follow that God is not otherwise infinite, good, wise, etc., than he is white, hot, etc.: but the consequent is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence of the major is clear; for since God is every being, and contains every created being either eminently, on account of his supreme and infinite perfection, which involves every thinkable entity and perfection: or virtually, because he has the power of producing any other being from himself; it follows that he contains whiteness, heat, etc., eminently and virtually: therefore if in this way alone he contained wisdom, infinity, and the other perfections assigned to him, he could with equal right be called white, as well as wise; since he comprises wisdom and whiteness in a similar way; than which surely nothing is more absurd.

Secondly: Every perfection simply simple is formally in the most perfect being, because a perfection simply simple cannot belong to anything more nobly than formally: but God is the most perfect being, and the attributes and modes of the divine Essence are perfections simply simple: therefore they must belong to God formally. The major is clear: both because, says the Doctor, otherwise he would not be the most perfect being; because he would not be that than which a greater could not be thought; for another more perfect than he would be thought, namely that to which infinity, wisdom, etc., would belong formally; and because if those simply simple perfections are not in God formally, it follows that they can be found formally in nothing: they cannot be found in creatures, since as all the perfections of creatures are finite and limited, they are not simply simple, because they are not better than their own absence, for an infinite perfection is more excellent and better than they are: and finally because it would follow that a perfection simply simple is formally in something by participation and is not: it would indeed be, as is supposed; but it would not be, because it cannot be participated formally, unless it is also formally in him from whom it would be participated: therefore if that perfection were not in God formally, it could not be formally in a creature even by participation.

Thirdly: If a perfection simply simple is not in God formally, but only virtually or eminently, it follows that God is not formally perfect absolutely and simply, but only virtually or eminently: but this implies a contradiction; for although God contains the perfections of creatures virtually or eminently, no one nevertheless would say that he contains his own divine perfections in the same way; otherwise he could be said to be perfected by the perfections of creatures in the same way as by his own, if he contained both only virtually and eminently.

Fourthly: If the attributal and modifying perfections were contained in God only virtually or eminently, it would likewise follow that the notion of being and the personal relations are also contained in him only virtually and eminently: but this implies a contradiction, otherwise God would not be a being formally, and consequently would be formally a non-being, and nothing: likewise the first Person would not be formally the Father, nor the second formally the Son, but only eminently; which is certainly false.

You will say. God must contain his perfections in the most noble way, and by a more excellent containment: but eminential and virtual containment is more excellent than formal: therefore God must contain his perfections virtually or eminently. The minor is clear; for the sun, e.g., which contains heat virtually, is more perfect than fire, which is formally hot: likewise the rational soul, which is only sentient eminently and virtually, is more excellent than the soul of brutes, which is formally sentient. Finally, it is certain that beings are contained in God eminently in a more perfect and more noble way than in themselves formally, and consequently eminential containment is more excellent than formal.

I distinguish the minor. When the contained perfection is not simply simple, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is established that the attributes and modes are perfections simply simple, and consequently it is more noble to contain them formally than only eminently. I confess indeed that perfections secundum quid are contained more nobly eminently than formally, for this reason, that while they are contained formally, they are contained as they are in themselves, and consequently insofar as they have an imperfection annexed, which is removed in eminential containment. It is otherwise, however, with a perfection simply simple, which has no imperfection mixed in.

Third conclusion. — The divine attributes considered according to themselves and absolutely are wholly of equal perfection: but unequal if they are considered comparatively and respectively.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which

The first part is proved. By the authority and reasoning of St. Augustine, lib. 8. De Trinit., cap. 1., where, speaking of the equality of the divine Persons, he has this:

We say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not something greater than one of them, which carnal custom does not grasp, for no other reason than because it perceives the true things that are created as it can: but the truth itself by which they were created it cannot behold. For if it could, in no way would that corporeal light be more manifest than this which we have said: for in the substance of truth, since it alone truly is, nothing is greater except what is more true. But whatever is intelligible and immutable is not one thing more true than another, because it is equally immutably eternal. Nor is what is there called great great from anything else than from that by which it truly is. Wherefore where magnitude itself is truth, whatever has more of magnitude must needs have more of truth. Whatever, therefore, does not have more of truth, does not have more of magnitude either.

By these words saint Augustine indicates three things: First indeed, that it is clearer than the noonday light that that alone is perfect which is true; and that that is true which is immutable. Second, that all things which are in God are equally immutable, and consequently equally true. Third, that they consequently are equally perfect; and so nothing in God is more or less perfect; but all things are of wholly equal perfection.

It is proved 2. By theological Reason: One infinite thing is not formally more perfect than another infinite thing: but the modes and attributes of the divine essence are infinite formally: therefore one of them is not more perfect than another. The major is established, both from Aristotle saying that the infinite is that in which there is no more or less to be taken: and by reason, since the infinite is that which comprises in itself absolutely every thinkable perfection: but what is so perfect cannot have something more perfect than itself; otherwise it would not comprise every thinkable perfection in its kind. The minor will be clear from what will be said below, when treating of infinity.

It is proved 3. The things which are most highly identified with God, one cannot be more perfect than another: but the modes and attributes are most highly identified with God really: therefore one of them cannot be more perfect than another: The major is evident. Otherwise, if the things which God comprises were of unequal perfection, God too could be said to be perfect unequally, and more or less: but the consequent is absurd: therefore so too is that from which it follows.

You will say. Two infinite things can be of unequal perfection: therefore although the divine attributes are infinite, they can nonetheless for that reason be of unequal perfection. The antecedent is proved: If there were an infinite light, e.g., and an infinite line, the light would be far more excellent than the line, as is clear: therefore one infinite could be more perfect than another, and consequently from the infinity of the attributes and modes their equality is not rightly inferred.

I distinguish the antecedent. In created things, in which diverse and wholly unequal perfection appears, I concede; in divine things, I deny: for divine things, since with the highest identification they are one, and are mutually united not only by their formal infinity, but also by the radical infinity proper to the divine essence, nor can God be said to be less perfect through one and more through another; hence it comes about that although from the infinity of created things one could not rightly infer their equality, yet from it the wholly equal perfection of the attributes and modes is rightly inferred.

The second part is sufficiently proved, both by authority and by reason. By reason indeed: for since the perfections of creatures, which are attributed to God by analogy, are some more excellent than others, it follows that the divine excellences, taken comparatively with respect to those created perfections, can be said to be some more perfect than others. By authority likewise the same is established: since Sacred Scripture, speaking of the divine excellences comparatively with respect to the effects which they work in creatures, calls them greater or lesser. Thus Ps. 137. David says: Thou hast magnified thy holy name above every name, namely because the sanctification of creatures is more excellent than all the works of God, and toward it, as toward a head, all things which he has wrought either in the order of nature or in the order of grace converge and are referred. So likewise James 2: But mercy exalteth itself above judgment: and Ps. 144¹: His tender mercies are over all his works; because namely God out of mercy bestows his graces upon us, and supplies divine helps, by which we can work out our salvation and sanctification.