Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Scotus Academicus, seu universae Doctoris Subtilis theologica dogmata. Tomus primus. De Deo in se subsistente.
Dedicatio I: Reverendissimo Patri Aloysio Lauer ... (dedicatio editoris)
Praefatio I: Editor ad lectorem (praefatio editoris editionis 1900)
Praefatio II: Lectori studioso (Frassenii praefatio)
Index I: Index haereticorum, qui veritates catholicas et theologicas saeculo quovis impugnarunt
Approbatio I: Approbationes (Facultatis Parisiensis et Ordinis Fratrum Minorum)
Praefatio III: Divinae Sapientiae ... dignitas et natura in prooemiali tractatu delineata (praefatio)
Introductio I: Disputatio prooemialis. De Theologia in communi
Articulus I: De necessitate et existentia theologicae doctrinae
Quaestio I: An admittenda sit aliqua theologica et supernaturalis doctrina
Quaestio II: An theologia positiva sit utilis et necessaria
Quaestio III: An, et qualiter theologia scholastica Ecclesiae Dei prosit
Articulus II: De essentia theologiae
Quaestio I: An theologia Dei et Beatorum sit proprie dicenda scientia
Quaestio II: An theologia Viatorum perfectae scientiae characteres habeat
Quaestio III: An theologia nostra perfectae sapientiae titulo glorietur
Quaestio IV: An theologia nostra subalternetur scientiae Dei, et Beatorum
Quaestio V: Quodnam sit obiectum theologiae nostrae
Articulus III: De proprietatibus, et praecipuis characteribus nostrae theologiae
Quaestio I: An theologia nostra sit speculativa, vel practica
Quaestio II: An theologia nostra sit habitus supernaturalis
Quaestio III: An theologia nostra certior sit, et dignior scientiis naturalibus
Quaestio IV: An theologia nostra sit argumentativa, et adhaesiva
Quaestio V: Quinam sint loci ex quibus theologia argumenta sua depromit
Introductio II: Primi libri Sententiarum methodica explanatio
Tractatus I: De Deo in se subsistente
Disputatio I: De existentia et essentia Dei
Articulus I: De existentia Dei
Quaestio I: An, et quomodo nobis constet Deum existere
Quaestio II: An Deum existere sit per se notum
Quaestio III: An et quomodo demonstrari possit Deum existere
Quaestio IV: Quibus rationibus demonstrari possit Deum existere
Quaestio V: An et quomodo probari possit unicum esse Deum
Articulus II: De essentia, seu de praedicatis quidditativis Dei
Quaestio I: An et quomodo Deus possit definiri
Quaestio II: An rationes Entis, et Existentiae essentialiter Deo competant
Quaestio III: An Deus sit substantia completa, spiritualis, vivens
Articulus III: De ratione formali constitutiva, et ultimo distinctiva essentiae divinae
Quaestio I: An essentia divina ultimo constituatur, et distinguatur per Aseitatem, et Intellectionem, alterutro ex tribus modis statim assignatis
Quaestio II: Quaenam sit ratio formalis ultimo constitutiva, et distinctiva Dei
Note 1. According to the Subtle Doctor, in 1. distinct. 13. q. 1. n. 32, a twofold infinity must be distinguished in God, namely fundamental and formal. The former is constitutive of the divine Essence, or of the divine being, which, comprehending in itself all being, says St. Damascene, has being as it were a certain infinite and unbounded sea of substance; that is, it embraces absolutely all being in itself, whether eminently, virtually, or formally. The latter is a mode of the divine Essence itself, which is not limited either in itself or in its perfections, but is wholly and formally infinite. For just as two white things, e.g., are said to be fundamentally similar through whiteness, and formally through similarity, because whiteness is the foundation of the relation of similarity, which is as it were the form denominating white things as mutually similar; so the divine essence, since it is the root and foundation of all the divine perfections, is deservedly said from itself to be infinite fundamentally, and infinite formally through the notion and perfection of formal infinity.
Note 2. From the same Doctor in the same place it is gathered that both infinities, namely fundamental and formal, belong to the divine essence: the first indeed by way of a quidditative predicate agreeing with the divine essence, precisely as the divine essence is; the second only insofar as the essence is under such a mode, or insofar as formal infinity is a mode and perfection of the essence itself. The Doctor says, however, that only formal infinity belongs to the perfections, that is, to the divine modes and attributes, which, he says, have their formal perfection from the infinity of the essence as from a root and foundation: but neither infinity, whether formal or fundamental, belongs to the divine personal relations, such as paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, which are neither finite nor infinite, neither perfect nor imperfect; as we shall openly demonstrate in the treatise On the Trinity, if God grants it.
Note 3. That just as in creatures there are some predicates by which they agree with others, and others by which they differ from them — so man, e.g., agrees with all things in the notion of being; with self-subsisting things, in the concept of substance; with corporeal things, in the concept of body; with plants, in the concept of the vegetative; and with brutes, in the concept of animal; and differs from them through the rational, which is the predicate ultimately constitutive and distinctive of man: so likewise in God many formal notions are conceived by which He agrees with creatures, such as the notion of being, of substance, of spiritual, of intelligent, etc.; but there are some notions by which He differs greatly from creatures, e.g., infinity, eternity, etc. Which, however, is more essentially distinctive of Him is to be resolved here; wherefore let there be
Only conclusion. — Being infinite radically, or radical infinity, is the formal constitutive and ultimately distinctive notion of the divine Essence.
This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Doctor, as is gathered from his words in 1. distinctione 8. q. 3. n. 18., where he teaches that being is divided first by finite and infinite rather than by substance and accident: but substance is of the essence of God by way of genus: therefore infinity is also essential to God by way of difference; since through it He agrees with no other being, and through it He essentially differs from every other being. Moreover, in the same place num. 29. he teaches that being is understood to be infinite before it is understood to be this being: but this being, or singularity, is the essence of God: therefore so also is radical infinity. That these things may appear more evidently, I bring forward the words of the Doctor. For he says:
But being, as it agrees with God, namely being through essence, is itself infinite being, and not something to which being itself merely belongs: and therefore it is this from itself, and infinite from itself, so that as it were by priority it is understood, in some way, that infinity is a mode of entity through essence, rather than that it itself is understood to be this; and therefore there is no need to ask how this being is infinite, as if singularity belonged to it before infinity; and so it is universally in those things which can be beings through essence, not through participation. Such a being is first determined from itself to be such through essence, so as to be thus infinite such, and so as to be thus this from itself;
In which words the Doctor indicates three things: First, that infinity belongs to God before singularity; Second, that both are essential to God; Third, that God is being through essence and essentially singular, because He is infinite being; from which it clearly appears that he posits infinity as a grade constitutively and distinctively essential to God. Nor does it matter that in the same place he calls infinity a mode of entity; for he does not mean it to be only a mode of the divine essence, in the way in which immensity, eternity, etc. are called modes of the Deity; but only that it does not have the notion of a perfect and complete difference, nor is it a concept adequately distinct from the being that determines and contracts God; namely, in the way in which the rational, e.g., is adequately conceived to be distinguished from the animal which it contracts to man, of which it is the constitutive and distinctive difference; otherwise God would be constituted from genus and difference, which the Doctor attacks in the same place.
The same thing is established from the vote of nearly all the holy Fathers, who affirm that the notion of infinite being is essential to God. Thus St. Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide orthodoxa, cap. 12., defines God as an immense and infinite sea of essence: thus the other Fathers affirm that God is distinguished from creatures by the notion of being; not indeed of being absolutely; for in that notion He agrees univocally with creatures, as has been proved in the Metaphysica; but by the notion of infinite and unlimited being.
The same truth is proved by reason. That is the formal constitutive and distinctive notion of God which first and per se constitutes the divine being and distinguishes it from every other: but such is the notion of infinity: since it determines and contracts being to God, and distinguishes Him from any created being; for there is no created being which agrees with God in the notion of infinite being. — Second, infinity is the root and fundamental notion of all the attributes and of all the modes emanating from the divine essence; since for this reason God is omnipotent, immense, eternal, etc., because He is infinite being. — Third, that is the formal constitutive notion of God by which God in no way agrees with creatures: but by the notion of infinite being God in no way agrees with creatures: therefore infinity is His formal constitutive notion. — Fourth, if the divine essence were not constituted through radical infinity, it would follow that it could be conceived as not infinite: but the consequent is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear, since the essence can be conceived without everything that does not have the notion of a predicate and principle essentially constitutive of it. The minor is also evident, for if the divine essence were conceived as not infinite, it would involve nothing in its formal concept by which it would be understood to be essentially distinguished from creatures; since through the grade of substantial being, living with an intellectual life, which are essential to God, it agrees univocally with creatures by way of genus; and therefore it is necessary that radical infinity essentially belong to it, as its constitutive and distinctive differential concept.
You will say 1. Fundamental infinity is the divine Essence itself, insofar as it is the foundation and root of formal infinity and of all the modes and attributes: but it would be incongruous to say that the divine Essence is constituted by itself: therefore it is also incongruously said to be constituted through fundamental infinity.
I distinguish the minor. It is the divine Essence in an identical sense, that is, it is the same as the divine essence which it constitutes, just as reason is the same as the essence of man, I concede: in a formal sense, as if the whole formal and precise notion of the divine Essence consisted in that radical infinity, I deny; since the divine Essence says two things: namely, the notion of being and of the infinite. The notion of being is as it were generic, as agreeing objectively with God and with creatures: but infinity is as it were the difference distinguishing God from every other being.
You will say 2. That which can be demonstrated a priori in God does not constitute the divine essence: but according to the Doctor, in many places, infinity can be demonstrated a priori by one who has the quidditative concept of God: therefore, etc.
I distinguish the minor. Fundamental and radical infinity can be demonstrated a priori, I deny; for it is itself the formal constitutive notion of the divine Essence: formal infinity, I concede: because since this is a mode, it presupposes the essence of which it is a mode, and consequently can be demonstrated through it. Whence, when the Doctor in 1. distinct. 3. q. 1. et dist. 8. q. 3. n. 26. and elsewhere asserts that the infinite is an intrinsic mode of the Deity, but not its essential predicate, he speaks of formal Infinity, which is numbered among the modes of the divine essence; not of radical Infinity, which is the notion primarily determinative and contractive of being to God, and essentially distinctive of Him from every other being. Whence formal infinity can indeed be demonstrated a priori, as can the other modes of the Deity; but not radical infinity.
You will say 3. If the root and foundation of infinity is said to be God's constitutive, the same can be said of the other modes and attributes; for since immensity, e.g., is equally a mode of the divine Essence and flows from it as from a root, just as formal infinity itself does, radical immensity will with equal propriety be said to be essentially constitutive of God, as will infinity: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent.
I deny the major. For although the other modes and attributes agree with formal infinity in this, that they emanate from the divine Essence; nevertheless they do not point it out equally distinctly: since through infinity it is more easily conceived that God is essentially distinguished from creatures and has all these perfections, than through immensity; for if one asks why God is Wise, Omnipotent, Immense, Eternal, it will rightly be answered, because He is unlimited and infinitely perfect. Whence the other modes and attributes can be gathered, and as it were demonstrated, through infinity; but this can be gathered through no other modal or attributive perfection. — The reason, however, why the divine essence is more inferred and known through infinity than through either of the other modes, is that since formal or modal infinity is a more intimate property and perfection of God, and is diffused through the other modes and attributes, as was observed in the third Note, it points out the divine essence all the more evidently. Not otherwise than the discursive power in man, which indicates his essential difference expressed by the name rational all the more, because it has a greater affinity with the rational itself, and as it were runs through and is poured out through man's other properties; for man is admirative, e.g., because he is discursive; whence the essence of man is more easily and evidently indicated and recognized through the discursive than through the admirative or the risible.
You will say 4. The formal constitutive notion of the Deity ought to be the root of all those things which agree with God: but infinity is not the root of all things which are attributed to God and which are contained in the divine being. — Proof: Infinity is the root only of those things to which it belongs and which are called infinite: but infinity does not belong to all things which are in God: for it is not attributed to the divine personalities; since the personal relations are not infinite: therefore, etc.
I distinguish the minor. Formal infinity, which belongs to the attributes and other modes alone, is not the root of all things that are in God, nor the formal constitutive notion of the Deity, I concede: radical and fundamental infinity, which is proper to the divine essence alone, is not the principle of emanation of all things that are in God, I deny. I likewise distinguish the proof: Infinity is the root of those things to which it belongs either formally or really, I concede; formally only, I deny. But that fundamental infinity belongs formally to the divine Essence alone, since it is its formal constitutive principle; but to the other things that are in God it belongs really and identically, because namely it identifies all things that are in God. Whence even the personal relations can be called infinite really and identically, because they are really identified with the essence, properties, and divine modes, which are infinite; the essence indeed is infinite fundamentally and formally; the modes and attributes only formally; but the personal relations only identically; as was observed in the third Note.
You will say 5. With many Scotists: The formal constitutive notion of the divine essence, according to the Subtle Doctor, is the purest intellectuality, or that purest intellective thing which is conceived and called by us radical intellection: therefore radical infinity is not the formal constitutive principle of the same essence. They prove the antecedent with various texts drawn from the Doctor. First indeed, on the first book of the Sentences, dist. 26. q. unica, num. 50.: This essence, as this essence (he says), preceding as it were every quality, is an intellectual and volitive essence: so that just as rationality is an attribute of man, so intellectuality belongs to this essence. Then in Quolibeto 1. num. 6. the Doctor relates, saying:
But intellectuality, or the intellective or intellectual life, is the same essentially as the divine Essence, understanding this in such a way that it is not only really the same as the essence itself, but is the same to it in this way, that if the divine Essence itself were defined, the intellectual itself, or intellectuality, would not be outside its definition, just as wise and good are not outside it.
And in the same Quolibeto 1. sub num. 11. he says:
Intellectuality indeed does not have the notion of an attribute, as it were a second thing adventitious to it; but the notion of a perfection altogether intimate; just as life also in God is an act, not an attribute or something adventitious, but altogether intimate and the same as the essence: so also the perfect life, which belongs to God alone, of which sort is the intellectual life, is the same essentially as the first essence itself.
Therefore intellectuality, or the intellective, is the formal constitutive notion of the divine essence.
I distinguish the consequent. It is of the formal constitutive concept of the divine essence by way of a difference ultimately constitutive and distinctive, I deny; by way of a generic concept, as it were determinable through the notion of radical infinity, and distinguishing it from any other intellective and spiritual being, I concede. For since the Doctor confesses that the concept of being and of spiritual substance is common and univocal to God and to the creature, as has been proved in the Metaphysicis, it is equally necessary to admit that the concept of spiritual substance living with an intellectual life is not ultimately distinctive of the divine Essence; since in that concept He agrees with creatures as it were generically: therefore that concept is to be called ultimately constitutive of the divine Essence which separates it in every way from the creature, and in which He in no way agrees with it; but this is the concept of radical infinity, and consequently it is to be judged formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine Essence.