Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. There is a twofold constitution of things: one is made through composition, whether real or formal or of reason with a foundation in the thing; the other, which is most pure and excludes every composition, is made through some formal grade in the constituted thing that is to be distinguished essentially, and this simple and most pure constitution is wont to be called by theologians such. The former is clear from the example of man, who is really composed of soul and body, formally however of animal and rational. The latter is clear from the example of the divine Persons, who are constituted through relations in a most pure manner, devoid of every composition whether physical or metaphysical: and it is about this mode of constitution that we are here treating.

Note 2. Three things are required for the formal constitutive of a thing: first indeed, that, as far as possible, it be taken from the ultimate and most perfect notion of the thing: from the ultimate, because it ought to distinguish the thing from every other; from the most perfect, because it ought to be the root of all the operations and properties which belong to the thing. Second, that it belong to the thing per se primo, and insofar as it is precisely such a thing, distinct from any other; otherwise it would either be an accident, or it would be common to it with the rest, and consequently it would be neither its constitutive nor its essentially distinctive principle. Third and finally, that it really and formally contain all that the essence claims for itself as such, for this reason, that the essence is never conceived as perfectly constituted until it is understood to involve formally those things which constitute it in the notion of essence.

Note 3. In the first act of understanding taken generally, three things are found most especially: the first is a physically productive power of actual intellection, such as is not in God, since the essential intellection of God is unproduced. The second is a receptive power of intellection, and here likewise a concept that must be removed from God as far as possible, as being incapable of every accident. The third and final, and the principal thing in the radical principle of understanding, is a certain perceptive power of the intelligible objects represented by actual intellection. Since therefore this power belongs to God no less than to the soul or to an Angel — since God perceives all intelligibles, and that in an infinite manner — hence almost all theologians confess that in Him there is the principle of understanding by way of first act, and of an intellective power and faculty, or by way of a root; from which actual intellection emanates, distinct from that root and power, either formally, as the Scotists affirm, or by reasoned reason, as most Thomists teach. But whether this power of understanding, or actual intellection itself, is ultimately constitutive and distinctive of God, will appear in the following Conclusion: but first let there be

First conclusion. — The divine essence is not formally constituted, nor ultimately distinguished, by aseity, that is, by the notion of being from itself and of existing essentially.

It is proved first: Aseity is taken insofar as it denies every notion of being from another, whether as from a cause or as from a principle; but in neither way can it be formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive of the divine essence. Not the first, because not being from another as from a cause belongs not only to the divine essence, but even to the divine attributes and relations: therefore this notion of aseity, insofar as it denies existence from another as from a cause, cannot be the formally constitutive principle of the divine essence under the precise and formal notion of essence. The second likewise cannot be said; otherwise the divine essence would not properly belong to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, for they do not have the notion of being from themselves through the negation of a principle, since the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, as from principles from which they emanate and are produced.

Second: The constitutive grade of an essence ought not to be some mode of having and obtaining entity; for two things are not distinguished specifically or quasi-specifically, nor are they constituted in such a species of being, from the mere diversity of having their entity; for who would say that Abel is essentially distinguished from Adam because he receives his entity and nature from him? But aseity says only a mode of having entity from oneself and not from another: therefore it is not a constitutive and distinctive principle of the essence.

Third: What belongs to the divine essence as considered by way of being, and as it were generically, cannot be its differential grade that is constitutive and formally distinctive: but aseity belongs to the divine essence precisely as it is being, and says only, beyond the notion of being, the negation of being from another: therefore it cannot be formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine essence. The major is clear from the example of all the differential grades constituting and distinguishing essences; for no one would say that man, e.g., is essentially constituted and ultimately distinguished by the grade of animal or of sentient living being, which belong to him generically. The minor likewise is evident; for aseity formally imports nothing other than the negation of existing dependently on another, and thus belongs to God precisely under the notion of being existing independently; and consequently it belongs to Him by way of a generic grade, which cannot be formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive of the essence.

It is confirmed. Just as man, e.g., can be considered in two ways — namely, generically, insofar as he is a created being, and under this notion common to all creatures he is constituted through the formal notion of being from another; or specifically, insofar as he is man, that is, a rational animal, and considered in this way he is distinguished by rationality from every other created being: so by a like reasoning, the divine essence can be considered either insofar as it is an uncreated being distinct from creatures, and thus considered it is indeed constituted through the notion of aseity: or insofar as it is formally this divine essence and the root of all the divine attributes and perfections which belong to God: but in this way it cannot be constituted by aseity; since aseity is not the formal reason why God is spiritual, living, wise, etc., because these predicates could belong to Him even if per impossibile He were not from Himself, just as in fact they belong to creatures, although these are dependent beings and from another, namely produced by God.

You will say 1. That is the formal constitutive of the divine essence which God used to declare and express His nature and essence to men: but God, declaring His nature to Moses, Exodi 3, expressed it in no other way than through this, that He is being by essence and existing from Himself; for He says: I am who am; He who is has sent me to you. Whence St. Athanasius, in Oration against the Gentiles, column 3, says: God, who is the very essence, is not joined together from any parts, wherefore also His notion is being itself. Therefore the notion of existing essentially and from oneself is formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine essence.

I distinguish the major. Insofar as the divine essence is expressed by a looser term, and has the notion of a transcendental and of an uncreated being distinct from creatures, I concede: insofar as it is considered more strictly, and insofar as the essence is distinguished and prescinds both from intrinsic modes, and from attributes, and from the divine relations, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, the consequence must be denied. I confess therefore that the very notion of being from oneself and existing independently suffices to show the essential distinction of God from creatures; for this reason God used it, as being easier to grasp, both to express His divinity and to signify men's subjection, dependence, and the obedience and reverence owed to Him: but it does not suffice to make known the distinction of the divine essence itself from the divine perfections, which emanate from it, as we are here treating of the divine essence.

You will say 2. That notion is formally constitutive of something, before which the thing is not understood to be essentially distinguished, and after which nothing is conceived in it through which it essentially differs from everything that is not itself; for the constitutive principle of a thing is the same as its distinctive principle: but before the grade of aseity is conceived, the Deity is not understood to be distinguished from anything else that is not itself; and after the grade of aseity is conceived, there is none through which God can be so distinguished, because after being there is no further essential contraction, since being is the ultimate actuality of the essence. Therefore the grade of aseity is formally distinctive of the divine nature and Essence. The minor is clear as to the latter part; it is likewise clear as to the former, since God is distinguished from accidents by substance, from parts by the complete, from the inanimate by the living, from the corporeal by the spiritual, from the common by the singular, and by being from Himself He is distinguished from every created and dependent being: therefore aseity is the first formal distinctive notion.

I answer. The major being conceded, and the first part of the minor — namely, that before aseity is conceived no grade appears in God through which He is distinguished essentially from creatures first of all; denying the other part of the same minor, namely, that after the grade of aseity there is no further grade through which God essentially differs from creatures: for radical infinity is a grade posterior to aseity, through which God is essentially distinguished not only from creatures, but also from the attributes and modes. To the probative argument of the minor, I distinguish: Being is the ultimate actuality of the essence considered generically and as it is being, I concede: considered specifically and as it is formally an essence distinct from the perfections which emanate from it, I deny.

Second conclusion. — Neither the intellective power nor actual intellection are formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive principles of the divine essence.

The first part is proved. The divine essence is not formally constituted nor distinguished by that which presupposes it as constituted and distinguished: but the intellective power presupposes the divine essence as already constituted: therefore it neither constitutes nor distinguishes it. The major is clear; the minor likewise: for every power supposes the thing of which it is, as appears generally by induction: thus the formal discursive power in man supposes his essence, the intellective power in an Angel presupposes the Angel as already essentially constituted. I said formal, for I am not unaware that just as the radical intellective power in an Angel is formally the same as its immateriality and spirituality, and consequently taken in this way it is drawn from its essential concept; so too the intellective power in God, radically taken, is the same as His essence; but it is otherwise if it is taken formally, insofar as it is ordered to intellection; for in that way it is distinguished from the essence, and presupposes it.

Second: That which is formally distinguished from the divine Essence is not its formal constitutive and distinctive principle: but the divine intellect, that is, the intellective power, is formally distinguished from the divine Essence, as the Doctor affirms in many places, especially in the first quodlibetal question, and in the commentary on the fourth book, distinction 13, question 1, n. 31, where he has these words: God is simply blessed in the operations of His intellect and will: He is not, however, simply blessed in His Essence: therefore the essence is distinguished from the intellect and the will. Moreover, ibidem n. 32, he said that the will does not include all the perfections fundamentally; but the essence alone (he says) thus includes them all. The same judgment is to be made of the intellect: the Doctor therefore judges that the intellect and will of God are formally distinguished from the essence; and consequently he judges that neither of them is the formal constitutive and distinctive principle of the essence.

Third: The divine Essence is a most actual being and consequently excludes every notion of potentiality from its formal concept: but the intellective power imports the notion of a potency ordered to the act of intellection: therefore it does not enter into the formal concept of the divine Essence:

The second part is also proved and the first is confirmed. That which can be demonstrated a priori is not the formal constitutive of the divine Essence: but both the intellective power and actual intellection in God can be demonstrated a priori: therefore, etc. The major is evident by itself: for the essence is the first thing conceivable in a thing. The minor is proved by St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 11. art. 1., thus: Immateriality is the reason why something is intellective and cognitive: but God is supremely immaterial: therefore He is also supremely cognitive, and consequently intelligent; for intellection is the supreme among all cognitions. He proves the minor both from the Philosopher, 2. De Anima, where he teaches that plants do not know for this reason, because they are purely material; but sense is cognitive because it is receptive of species without matter and consequently in some way immaterial; the human intellect likewise is more cognitive because it is more immaterial and less mixed with matter, as the Philosopher teaches in 3. De Anima; similarly, because an Angel surpasses the rational soul through its immateriality, since it is not ordered, as the soul is, to inform a body, it also knows more perfectly: therefore, since immateriality is in God most perfectly, God also knows all things most perfectly: and consequently both the intellective power and intellection itself are demonstrated a priori, and so neither can be a constitutive principle of the divine Essence.

Second: Actual intellection and cognition supposes an object: but the object of the actual intellection and cognition of God is the divine Essence: therefore actual intellection supposes the divine Essence, and consequently does not constitute it.

It is confirmed. If intellection did not suppose the divine Essence as distinct from itself, it would follow that it has itself for its object: and so divine cognition would not be a direct act, but a reflex one, which certainly seems absurd. Moreover, every cognition supposes a cognoscible object: therefore divine cognition supposes its essence at least prior by nature to what it attains. Finally, cognition is an operation: therefore it supposes both a potency and an essence; since to operate follows upon being, and consequently it does not constitute that essence.

Third: The divine Essence is the root of all the attributes and modes emanating from it: but intellection is not the root nor the a priori reason of all the divine attributes; for example, of omnipotence, eternity, immensity; for God is not immense, present everywhere, nor is He eternal and omnipotent for this reason, because He is intelligent, since He could be formally intelligent even if per impossibile He were not immense, nor eternal, nor omnipotent: therefore, etc.

Fourth and finally: If the divine Essence were formally constituted through actual intellection, it would follow that whatever divine intellection comprises would also affect the divine Essence: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear, for because the rational, e.g., is the constitutive principle of man, whatever the rational comprises — for example, the discursive and risible power — that also belongs to man. The minor is proved: Divine cognition comprises all creatures and their defects, indeed even sins: therefore if these constituted the divine essence, it would also follow that sins would affect and infect the nature of God, which certainly it is blasphemous to assert.

You will say 1. The divine Essence is a most pure and most excellent act: therefore it ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of all, one which expresses greater actuality: but the intellective grade is the most perfect of all, and to understand is that which expresses greater actuality; indeed it is the ultimate actuality of a spiritual substance, just as existence is the ultimate act of entity: therefore to understand constitutes the divine essence.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. It ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade which says greater actuality in the notion of being, I concede: in the notion of operation, I deny. To the minor I say that actual understanding, that is, actual intellection, does indeed say greater actuality in the notion of operation than any other grade conceivable in the divine Essence; but it does not connote greater actuality in the notion of being and of constitutive principle. For that which identifies absolutely every perfection, essential and modal as well as attributal, imports greater actuality in the notion of being than that which does not have such a force of identifying: but fundamental infinity has this force of identifying, not however intellection: and consequently that infinity has more of the nature of a constitutive principle than this intellection.

You will say 2. The divine Essence is formally constituted by that which the divine Word receives by virtue of His procession: but the divine Word by virtue of His procession receives actual intellection: therefore this is constitutive of the divine Nature. The major is clear, because the second Person by virtue of His procession is called son; but He cannot be called or constituted son except through the communication of the divine Nature, as the theologians teach in the Tractate on the Trinity. The minor is proved: the second Person proceeds as Word: but to be the Word is nothing other than to be the term of intellection: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. For the divine Word, as He is the son, does indeed receive the divine Nature, not through intellection, but through utterance, which is distinguished from actual intellection, although both are acts of the intellect, as will appear in the Tractate on the Trinity, in which we shall likewise prove that the second Person is not for this reason called son because He proceeds through intellection, but because He proceeds from a principle operating by way of nature.

You will say 3. God is the most perfect living being: therefore He ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of life: but this grade is the intellective one: therefore He ought to be constituted by the intellective grade.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. He ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of life, as by a principle holding itself on the side of the concept as it were generic, I concede: as by a principle holding itself on the side of the concept as it were differential, I deny. I confess indeed that God is essentially living and intellective, since the grade of a substantial being living with a most perfect intellectual life belongs to Him essentially, but by way of a concept as it were generic, not however by way of a grade and principle that is distinctive and precisely constitutive.

You will say 4. All the requisites for the constitutive of God belong to actual intellection: therefore God is constituted by the grade of intellective life. The antecedent is clear: for first, it is a special perfection, not transcendental, nor common to other attributes or creatures. Second, it is the most perfect grade of all that are in God. Third, it is the root and prior concept of the attributes, for divine intellection moves toward divine volition and omnipotence: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent. For, as has already been proved, intellection is indeed the most perfect of all the grades that are in God in the notion of operation, but not in the notion of being; nor is it the root of all the attributes, modes, and relations which are in God, as we have already said, and consequently it cannot be the formally constitutive and distinctive principle of God.