Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Just as in created things four things are customarily distinguished: some after the manner of a predicate constitutive of the essence; others as it were intrinsic modes identified with the essence itself and intrinsically perfecting it; others after the manner of a property and perfection accruing to the essence already constituted; and others finally after the manner of operation and action; so in God certain things can be distinguished after the manner of an essential predicate, such as to be, to live, and to understand: some as intrinsic modes, e.g., to be perfect, to be immutable, etc.; others as attributes, e.g., goodness, justice; and finally operations, namely providence, knowledge, predestination, etc. There is a dispute, however, among theologians as to which of these four is precisely the formal constitutive and ultimate distinguishing notion of the divine Essence.

Concerning this resolution, there is chiefly a threefold opinion among the authors. For some hold that the nature and quiddity of God consist in this, that He is a being from itself and essentially existing; others contend that the essence of God is constituted and distinguished by the intellective grade. These again disagree among themselves, for there are those who hold that the divine nature is constituted by the root or potency of understanding; others, however, by the most actual understanding itself, or by actual intellection. Others, finally, judge that the divine nature is constituted by infinity, or by the accumulation of all the perfections which are in God. But what seems truer to us, the following Questions will disclose.

Note 1. There is a twofold constitution of things: one is made through composition, whether real or formal or of reason with a foundation in the thing; the other, which is most pure and excludes every composition, is made through some formal grade in the constituted thing that is to be distinguished essentially, and this simple and most pure constitution is wont to be called by theologians such. The former is clear from the example of man, who is really composed of soul and body, formally however of animal and rational. The latter is clear from the example of the divine Persons, who are constituted through relations in a most pure manner, devoid of every composition whether physical or metaphysical: and it is about this mode of constitution that we are here treating.

Note 2. Three things are required for the formal constitutive of a thing: first indeed, that, as far as possible, it be taken from the ultimate and most perfect notion of the thing: from the ultimate, because it ought to distinguish the thing from every other; from the most perfect, because it ought to be the root of all the operations and properties which belong to the thing. Second, that it belong to the thing per se primo, and insofar as it is precisely such a thing, distinct from any other; otherwise it would either be an accident, or it would be common to it with the rest, and consequently it would be neither its constitutive nor its essentially distinctive principle. Third and finally, that it really and formally contain all that the essence claims for itself as such, for this reason, that the essence is never conceived as perfectly constituted until it is understood to involve formally those things which constitute it in the notion of essence.

Note 3. In the first act of understanding taken generally, three things are found most especially: the first is a physically productive power of actual intellection, such as is not in God, since the essential intellection of God is unproduced. The second is a receptive power of intellection, and here likewise a concept that must be removed from God as far as possible, as being incapable of every accident. The third and final, and the principal thing in the radical principle of understanding, is a certain perceptive power of the intelligible objects represented by actual intellection. Since therefore this power belongs to God no less than to the soul or to an Angel — since God perceives all intelligibles, and that in an infinite manner — hence almost all theologians confess that in Him there is the principle of understanding by way of first act, and of an intellective power and faculty, or by way of a root; from which actual intellection emanates, distinct from that root and power, either formally, as the Scotists affirm, or by reasoned reason, as most Thomists teach. But whether this power of understanding, or actual intellection itself, is ultimately constitutive and distinctive of God, will appear in the following Conclusion: but first let there be

First conclusion. — The divine essence is not formally constituted, nor ultimately distinguished, by aseity, that is, by the notion of being from itself and of existing essentially.

It is proved first: Aseity is taken insofar as it denies every notion of being from another, whether as from a cause or as from a principle; but in neither way can it be formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive of the divine essence. Not the first, because not being from another as from a cause belongs not only to the divine essence, but even to the divine attributes and relations: therefore this notion of aseity, insofar as it denies existence from another as from a cause, cannot be the formally constitutive principle of the divine essence under the precise and formal notion of essence. The second likewise cannot be said; otherwise the divine essence would not properly belong to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, for they do not have the notion of being from themselves through the negation of a principle, since the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, as from principles from which they emanate and are produced.

Second: The constitutive grade of an essence ought not to be some mode of having and obtaining entity; for two things are not distinguished specifically or quasi-specifically, nor are they constituted in such a species of being, from the mere diversity of having their entity; for who would say that Abel is essentially distinguished from Adam because he receives his entity and nature from him? But aseity says only a mode of having entity from oneself and not from another: therefore it is not a constitutive and distinctive principle of the essence.

Third: What belongs to the divine essence as considered by way of being, and as it were generically, cannot be its differential grade that is constitutive and formally distinctive: but aseity belongs to the divine essence precisely as it is being, and says only, beyond the notion of being, the negation of being from another: therefore it cannot be formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine essence. The major is clear from the example of all the differential grades constituting and distinguishing essences; for no one would say that man, e.g., is essentially constituted and ultimately distinguished by the grade of animal or of sentient living being, which belong to him generically. The minor likewise is evident; for aseity formally imports nothing other than the negation of existing dependently on another, and thus belongs to God precisely under the notion of being existing independently; and consequently it belongs to Him by way of a generic grade, which cannot be formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive of the essence.

It is confirmed. Just as man, e.g., can be considered in two ways — namely, generically, insofar as he is a created being, and under this notion common to all creatures he is constituted through the formal notion of being from another; or specifically, insofar as he is man, that is, a rational animal, and considered in this way he is distinguished by rationality from every other created being: so by a like reasoning, the divine essence can be considered either insofar as it is an uncreated being distinct from creatures, and thus considered it is indeed constituted through the notion of aseity: or insofar as it is formally this divine essence and the root of all the divine attributes and perfections which belong to God: but in this way it cannot be constituted by aseity; since aseity is not the formal reason why God is spiritual, living, wise, etc., because these predicates could belong to Him even if per impossibile He were not from Himself, just as in fact they belong to creatures, although these are dependent beings and from another, namely produced by God.

You will say 1. That is the formal constitutive of the divine essence which God used to declare and express His nature and essence to men: but God, declaring His nature to Moses, Exodi 3, expressed it in no other way than through this, that He is being by essence and existing from Himself; for He says: I am who am; He who is has sent me to you. Whence St. Athanasius, in Oration against the Gentiles, column 3, says: God, who is the very essence, is not joined together from any parts, wherefore also His notion is being itself. Therefore the notion of existing essentially and from oneself is formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine essence.

I distinguish the major. Insofar as the divine essence is expressed by a looser term, and has the notion of a transcendental and of an uncreated being distinct from creatures, I concede: insofar as it is considered more strictly, and insofar as the essence is distinguished and prescinds both from intrinsic modes, and from attributes, and from the divine relations, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, the consequence must be denied. I confess therefore that the very notion of being from oneself and existing independently suffices to show the essential distinction of God from creatures; for this reason God used it, as being easier to grasp, both to express His divinity and to signify men's subjection, dependence, and the obedience and reverence owed to Him: but it does not suffice to make known the distinction of the divine essence itself from the divine perfections, which emanate from it, as we are here treating of the divine essence.

You will say 2. That notion is formally constitutive of something, before which the thing is not understood to be essentially distinguished, and after which nothing is conceived in it through which it essentially differs from everything that is not itself; for the constitutive principle of a thing is the same as its distinctive principle: but before the grade of aseity is conceived, the Deity is not understood to be distinguished from anything else that is not itself; and after the grade of aseity is conceived, there is none through which God can be so distinguished, because after being there is no further essential contraction, since being is the ultimate actuality of the essence. Therefore the grade of aseity is formally distinctive of the divine nature and Essence. The minor is clear as to the latter part; it is likewise clear as to the former, since God is distinguished from accidents by substance, from parts by the complete, from the inanimate by the living, from the corporeal by the spiritual, from the common by the singular, and by being from Himself He is distinguished from every created and dependent being: therefore aseity is the first formal distinctive notion.

I answer. The major being conceded, and the first part of the minor — namely, that before aseity is conceived no grade appears in God through which He is distinguished essentially from creatures first of all; denying the other part of the same minor, namely, that after the grade of aseity there is no further grade through which God essentially differs from creatures: for radical infinity is a grade posterior to aseity, through which God is essentially distinguished not only from creatures, but also from the attributes and modes. To the probative argument of the minor, I distinguish: Being is the ultimate actuality of the essence considered generically and as it is being, I concede: considered specifically and as it is formally an essence distinct from the perfections which emanate from it, I deny.

Second conclusion. — Neither the intellective power nor actual intellection are formally constitutive and ultimately distinctive principles of the divine essence.

The first part is proved. The divine essence is not formally constituted nor distinguished by that which presupposes it as constituted and distinguished: but the intellective power presupposes the divine essence as already constituted: therefore it neither constitutes nor distinguishes it. The major is clear; the minor likewise: for every power supposes the thing of which it is, as appears generally by induction: thus the formal discursive power in man supposes his essence, the intellective power in an Angel presupposes the Angel as already essentially constituted. I said formal, for I am not unaware that just as the radical intellective power in an Angel is formally the same as its immateriality and spirituality, and consequently taken in this way it is drawn from its essential concept; so too the intellective power in God, radically taken, is the same as His essence; but it is otherwise if it is taken formally, insofar as it is ordered to intellection; for in that way it is distinguished from the essence, and presupposes it.

Second: That which is formally distinguished from the divine Essence is not its formal constitutive and distinctive principle: but the divine intellect, that is, the intellective power, is formally distinguished from the divine Essence, as the Doctor affirms in many places, especially in the first quodlibetal question, and in the commentary on the fourth book, distinction 13, question 1, n. 31, where he has these words: God is simply blessed in the operations of His intellect and will: He is not, however, simply blessed in His Essence: therefore the essence is distinguished from the intellect and the will. Moreover, ibidem n. 32, he said that the will does not include all the perfections fundamentally; but the essence alone (he says) thus includes them all. The same judgment is to be made of the intellect: the Doctor therefore judges that the intellect and will of God are formally distinguished from the essence; and consequently he judges that neither of them is the formal constitutive and distinctive principle of the essence.

Third: The divine Essence is a most actual being and consequently excludes every notion of potentiality from its formal concept: but the intellective power imports the notion of a potency ordered to the act of intellection: therefore it does not enter into the formal concept of the divine Essence:

The second part is also proved and the first is confirmed. That which can be demonstrated a priori is not the formal constitutive of the divine Essence: but both the intellective power and actual intellection in God can be demonstrated a priori: therefore, etc. The major is evident by itself: for the essence is the first thing conceivable in a thing. The minor is proved by St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 11. art. 1., thus: Immateriality is the reason why something is intellective and cognitive: but God is supremely immaterial: therefore He is also supremely cognitive, and consequently intelligent; for intellection is the supreme among all cognitions. He proves the minor both from the Philosopher, 2. De Anima, where he teaches that plants do not know for this reason, because they are purely material; but sense is cognitive because it is receptive of species without matter and consequently in some way immaterial; the human intellect likewise is more cognitive because it is more immaterial and less mixed with matter, as the Philosopher teaches in 3. De Anima; similarly, because an Angel surpasses the rational soul through its immateriality, since it is not ordered, as the soul is, to inform a body, it also knows more perfectly: therefore, since immateriality is in God most perfectly, God also knows all things most perfectly: and consequently both the intellective power and intellection itself are demonstrated a priori, and so neither can be a constitutive principle of the divine Essence.

Second: Actual intellection and cognition supposes an object: but the object of the actual intellection and cognition of God is the divine Essence: therefore actual intellection supposes the divine Essence, and consequently does not constitute it.

It is confirmed. If intellection did not suppose the divine Essence as distinct from itself, it would follow that it has itself for its object: and so divine cognition would not be a direct act, but a reflex one, which certainly seems absurd. Moreover, every cognition supposes a cognoscible object: therefore divine cognition supposes its essence at least prior by nature to what it attains. Finally, cognition is an operation: therefore it supposes both a potency and an essence; since to operate follows upon being, and consequently it does not constitute that essence.

Third: The divine Essence is the root of all the attributes and modes emanating from it: but intellection is not the root nor the a priori reason of all the divine attributes; for example, of omnipotence, eternity, immensity; for God is not immense, present everywhere, nor is He eternal and omnipotent for this reason, because He is intelligent, since He could be formally intelligent even if per impossibile He were not immense, nor eternal, nor omnipotent: therefore, etc.

Fourth and finally: If the divine Essence were formally constituted through actual intellection, it would follow that whatever divine intellection comprises would also affect the divine Essence: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear, for because the rational, e.g., is the constitutive principle of man, whatever the rational comprises — for example, the discursive and risible power — that also belongs to man. The minor is proved: Divine cognition comprises all creatures and their defects, indeed even sins: therefore if these constituted the divine essence, it would also follow that sins would affect and infect the nature of God, which certainly it is blasphemous to assert.

You will say 1. The divine Essence is a most pure and most excellent act: therefore it ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of all, one which expresses greater actuality: but the intellective grade is the most perfect of all, and to understand is that which expresses greater actuality; indeed it is the ultimate actuality of a spiritual substance, just as existence is the ultimate act of entity: therefore to understand constitutes the divine essence.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. It ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade which says greater actuality in the notion of being, I concede: in the notion of operation, I deny. To the minor I say that actual understanding, that is, actual intellection, does indeed say greater actuality in the notion of operation than any other grade conceivable in the divine Essence; but it does not connote greater actuality in the notion of being and of constitutive principle. For that which identifies absolutely every perfection, essential and modal as well as attributal, imports greater actuality in the notion of being than that which does not have such a force of identifying: but fundamental infinity has this force of identifying, not however intellection: and consequently that infinity has more of the nature of a constitutive principle than this intellection.

You will say 2. The divine Essence is formally constituted by that which the divine Word receives by virtue of His procession: but the divine Word by virtue of His procession receives actual intellection: therefore this is constitutive of the divine Nature. The major is clear, because the second Person by virtue of His procession is called son; but He cannot be called or constituted son except through the communication of the divine Nature, as the theologians teach in the Tractate on the Trinity. The minor is proved: the second Person proceeds as Word: but to be the Word is nothing other than to be the term of intellection: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. For the divine Word, as He is the son, does indeed receive the divine Nature, not through intellection, but through utterance, which is distinguished from actual intellection, although both are acts of the intellect, as will appear in the Tractate on the Trinity, in which we shall likewise prove that the second Person is not for this reason called son because He proceeds through intellection, but because He proceeds from a principle operating by way of nature.

You will say 3. God is the most perfect living being: therefore He ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of life: but this grade is the intellective one: therefore He ought to be constituted by the intellective grade.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. He ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade of life, as by a principle holding itself on the side of the concept as it were generic, I concede: as by a principle holding itself on the side of the concept as it were differential, I deny. I confess indeed that God is essentially living and intellective, since the grade of a substantial being living with a most perfect intellectual life belongs to Him essentially, but by way of a concept as it were generic, not however by way of a grade and principle that is distinctive and precisely constitutive.

You will say 4. All the requisites for the constitutive of God belong to actual intellection: therefore God is constituted by the grade of intellective life. The antecedent is clear: for first, it is a special perfection, not transcendental, nor common to other attributes or creatures. Second, it is the most perfect grade of all that are in God. Third, it is the root and prior concept of the attributes, for divine intellection moves toward divine volition and omnipotence: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent. For, as has already been proved, intellection is indeed the most perfect of all the grades that are in God in the notion of operation, but not in the notion of being; nor is it the root of all the attributes, modes, and relations which are in God, as we have already said, and consequently it cannot be the formally constitutive and distinctive principle of God.

Note 1. According to the Subtle Doctor, in 1. distinct. 13. q. 1. n. 32, a twofold infinity must be distinguished in God, namely fundamental and formal. The former is constitutive of the divine Essence, or of the divine being, which, comprehending in itself all being, says St. Damascene, has being as it were a certain infinite and unbounded sea of substance; that is, it embraces absolutely all being in itself, whether eminently, virtually, or formally. The latter is a mode of the divine Essence itself, which is not limited either in itself or in its perfections, but is wholly and formally infinite. For just as two white things, e.g., are said to be fundamentally similar through whiteness, and formally through similarity, because whiteness is the foundation of the relation of similarity, which is as it were the form denominating white things as mutually similar; so the divine essence, since it is the root and foundation of all the divine perfections, is deservedly said from itself to be infinite fundamentally, and infinite formally through the notion and perfection of formal infinity.

Note 2. From the same Doctor in the same place it is gathered that both infinities, namely fundamental and formal, belong to the divine essence: the first indeed by way of a quidditative predicate agreeing with the divine essence, precisely as the divine essence is; the second only insofar as the essence is under such a mode, or insofar as formal infinity is a mode and perfection of the essence itself. The Doctor says, however, that only formal infinity belongs to the perfections, that is, to the divine modes and attributes, which, he says, have their formal perfection from the infinity of the essence as from a root and foundation: but neither infinity, whether formal or fundamental, belongs to the divine personal relations, such as paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, which are neither finite nor infinite, neither perfect nor imperfect; as we shall openly demonstrate in the treatise On the Trinity, if God grants it.

Note 3. That just as in creatures there are some predicates by which they agree with others, and others by which they differ from them — so man, e.g., agrees with all things in the notion of being; with self-subsisting things, in the concept of substance; with corporeal things, in the concept of body; with plants, in the concept of the vegetative; and with brutes, in the concept of animal; and differs from them through the rational, which is the predicate ultimately constitutive and distinctive of man: so likewise in God many formal notions are conceived by which He agrees with creatures, such as the notion of being, of substance, of spiritual, of intelligent, etc.; but there are some notions by which He differs greatly from creatures, e.g., infinity, eternity, etc. Which, however, is more essentially distinctive of Him is to be resolved here; wherefore let there be

Only conclusion. — Being infinite radically, or radical infinity, is the formal constitutive and ultimately distinctive notion of the divine Essence.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Doctor, as is gathered from his words in 1. distinctione 8. q. 3. n. 18., where he teaches that being is divided first by finite and infinite rather than by substance and accident: but substance is of the essence of God by way of genus: therefore infinity is also essential to God by way of difference; since through it He agrees with no other being, and through it He essentially differs from every other being. Moreover, in the same place num. 29. he teaches that being is understood to be infinite before it is understood to be this being: but this being, or singularity, is the essence of God: therefore so also is radical infinity. That these things may appear more evidently, I bring forward the words of the Doctor. For he says:

But being, as it agrees with God, namely being through essence, is itself infinite being, and not something to which being itself merely belongs: and therefore it is this from itself, and infinite from itself, so that as it were by priority it is understood, in some way, that infinity is a mode of entity through essence, rather than that it itself is understood to be this; and therefore there is no need to ask how this being is infinite, as if singularity belonged to it before infinity; and so it is universally in those things which can be beings through essence, not through participation. Such a being is first determined from itself to be such through essence, so as to be thus infinite such, and so as to be thus this from itself;

In which words the Doctor indicates three things: First, that infinity belongs to God before singularity; Second, that both are essential to God; Third, that God is being through essence and essentially singular, because He is infinite being; from which it clearly appears that he posits infinity as a grade constitutively and distinctively essential to God. Nor does it matter that in the same place he calls infinity a mode of entity; for he does not mean it to be only a mode of the divine essence, in the way in which immensity, eternity, etc. are called modes of the Deity; but only that it does not have the notion of a perfect and complete difference, nor is it a concept adequately distinct from the being that determines and contracts God; namely, in the way in which the rational, e.g., is adequately conceived to be distinguished from the animal which it contracts to man, of which it is the constitutive and distinctive difference; otherwise God would be constituted from genus and difference, which the Doctor attacks in the same place.

The same thing is established from the vote of nearly all the holy Fathers, who affirm that the notion of infinite being is essential to God. Thus St. Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide orthodoxa, cap. 12., defines God as an immense and infinite sea of essence: thus the other Fathers affirm that God is distinguished from creatures by the notion of being; not indeed of being absolutely; for in that notion He agrees univocally with creatures, as has been proved in the Metaphysica; but by the notion of infinite and unlimited being.

The same truth is proved by reason. That is the formal constitutive and distinctive notion of God which first and per se constitutes the divine being and distinguishes it from every other: but such is the notion of infinity: since it determines and contracts being to God, and distinguishes Him from any created being; for there is no created being which agrees with God in the notion of infinite being. — Second, infinity is the root and fundamental notion of all the attributes and of all the modes emanating from the divine essence; since for this reason God is omnipotent, immense, eternal, etc., because He is infinite being. — Third, that is the formal constitutive notion of God by which God in no way agrees with creatures: but by the notion of infinite being God in no way agrees with creatures: therefore infinity is His formal constitutive notion. — Fourth, if the divine essence were not constituted through radical infinity, it would follow that it could be conceived as not infinite: but the consequent is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear, since the essence can be conceived without everything that does not have the notion of a predicate and principle essentially constitutive of it. The minor is also evident, for if the divine essence were conceived as not infinite, it would involve nothing in its formal concept by which it would be understood to be essentially distinguished from creatures; since through the grade of substantial being, living with an intellectual life, which are essential to God, it agrees univocally with creatures by way of genus; and therefore it is necessary that radical infinity essentially belong to it, as its constitutive and distinctive differential concept.

You will say 1. Fundamental infinity is the divine Essence itself, insofar as it is the foundation and root of formal infinity and of all the modes and attributes: but it would be incongruous to say that the divine Essence is constituted by itself: therefore it is also incongruously said to be constituted through fundamental infinity.

I distinguish the minor. It is the divine Essence in an identical sense, that is, it is the same as the divine essence which it constitutes, just as reason is the same as the essence of man, I concede: in a formal sense, as if the whole formal and precise notion of the divine Essence consisted in that radical infinity, I deny; since the divine Essence says two things: namely, the notion of being and of the infinite. The notion of being is as it were generic, as agreeing objectively with God and with creatures: but infinity is as it were the difference distinguishing God from every other being.

You will say 2. That which can be demonstrated a priori in God does not constitute the divine essence: but according to the Doctor, in many places, infinity can be demonstrated a priori by one who has the quidditative concept of God: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the minor. Fundamental and radical infinity can be demonstrated a priori, I deny; for it is itself the formal constitutive notion of the divine Essence: formal infinity, I concede: because since this is a mode, it presupposes the essence of which it is a mode, and consequently can be demonstrated through it. Whence, when the Doctor in 1. distinct. 3. q. 1. et dist. 8. q. 3. n. 26. and elsewhere asserts that the infinite is an intrinsic mode of the Deity, but not its essential predicate, he speaks of formal Infinity, which is numbered among the modes of the divine essence; not of radical Infinity, which is the notion primarily determinative and contractive of being to God, and essentially distinctive of Him from every other being. Whence formal infinity can indeed be demonstrated a priori, as can the other modes of the Deity; but not radical infinity.

You will say 3. If the root and foundation of infinity is said to be God's constitutive, the same can be said of the other modes and attributes; for since immensity, e.g., is equally a mode of the divine Essence and flows from it as from a root, just as formal infinity itself does, radical immensity will with equal propriety be said to be essentially constitutive of God, as will infinity: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent.

I deny the major. For although the other modes and attributes agree with formal infinity in this, that they emanate from the divine Essence; nevertheless they do not point it out equally distinctly: since through infinity it is more easily conceived that God is essentially distinguished from creatures and has all these perfections, than through immensity; for if one asks why God is Wise, Omnipotent, Immense, Eternal, it will rightly be answered, because He is unlimited and infinitely perfect. Whence the other modes and attributes can be gathered, and as it were demonstrated, through infinity; but this can be gathered through no other modal or attributive perfection. — The reason, however, why the divine essence is more inferred and known through infinity than through either of the other modes, is that since formal or modal infinity is a more intimate property and perfection of God, and is diffused through the other modes and attributes, as was observed in the third Note, it points out the divine essence all the more evidently. Not otherwise than the discursive power in man, which indicates his essential difference expressed by the name rational all the more, because it has a greater affinity with the rational itself, and as it were runs through and is poured out through man's other properties; for man is admirative, e.g., because he is discursive; whence the essence of man is more easily and evidently indicated and recognized through the discursive than through the admirative or the risible.

You will say 4. The formal constitutive notion of the Deity ought to be the root of all those things which agree with God: but infinity is not the root of all things which are attributed to God and which are contained in the divine being. — Proof: Infinity is the root only of those things to which it belongs and which are called infinite: but infinity does not belong to all things which are in God: for it is not attributed to the divine personalities; since the personal relations are not infinite: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the minor. Formal infinity, which belongs to the attributes and other modes alone, is not the root of all things that are in God, nor the formal constitutive notion of the Deity, I concede: radical and fundamental infinity, which is proper to the divine essence alone, is not the principle of emanation of all things that are in God, I deny. I likewise distinguish the proof: Infinity is the root of those things to which it belongs either formally or really, I concede; formally only, I deny. But that fundamental infinity belongs formally to the divine Essence alone, since it is its formal constitutive principle; but to the other things that are in God it belongs really and identically, because namely it identifies all things that are in God. Whence even the personal relations can be called infinite really and identically, because they are really identified with the essence, properties, and divine modes, which are infinite; the essence indeed is infinite fundamentally and formally; the modes and attributes only formally; but the personal relations only identically; as was observed in the third Note.

You will say 5. With many Scotists: The formal constitutive notion of the divine essence, according to the Subtle Doctor, is the purest intellectuality, or that purest intellective thing which is conceived and called by us radical intellection: therefore radical infinity is not the formal constitutive principle of the same essence. They prove the antecedent with various texts drawn from the Doctor. First indeed, on the first book of the Sentences, dist. 26. q. unica, num. 50.: This essence, as this essence (he says), preceding as it were every quality, is an intellectual and volitive essence: so that just as rationality is an attribute of man, so intellectuality belongs to this essence. Then in Quolibeto 1. num. 6. the Doctor relates, saying:

But intellectuality, or the intellective or intellectual life, is the same essentially as the divine Essence, understanding this in such a way that it is not only really the same as the essence itself, but is the same to it in this way, that if the divine Essence itself were defined, the intellectual itself, or intellectuality, would not be outside its definition, just as wise and good are not outside it.

And in the same Quolibeto 1. sub num. 11. he says:

Intellectuality indeed does not have the notion of an attribute, as it were a second thing adventitious to it; but the notion of a perfection altogether intimate; just as life also in God is an act, not an attribute or something adventitious, but altogether intimate and the same as the essence: so also the perfect life, which belongs to God alone, of which sort is the intellectual life, is the same essentially as the first essence itself.

Therefore intellectuality, or the intellective, is the formal constitutive notion of the divine essence.

I distinguish the consequent. It is of the formal constitutive concept of the divine essence by way of a difference ultimately constitutive and distinctive, I deny; by way of a generic concept, as it were determinable through the notion of radical infinity, and distinguishing it from any other intellective and spiritual being, I concede. For since the Doctor confesses that the concept of being and of spiritual substance is common and univocal to God and to the creature, as has been proved in the Metaphysicis, it is equally necessary to admit that the concept of spiritual substance living with an intellectual life is not ultimately distinctive of the divine Essence; since in that concept He agrees with creatures as it were generically: therefore that concept is to be called ultimately constitutive of the divine Essence which separates it in every way from the creature, and in which He in no way agrees with it; but this is the concept of radical infinity, and consequently it is to be judged formally constitutive and distinctive of the divine Essence.