Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since it plainly appears, enough and more than enough, that God is the greatest and most excellent of all beings, and it easily comes to anyone's mind that He likewise holds the first place and seat among the principal and nobler species of being, and consequently that He is a complete, spiritual, and living substance, there would be no occasion for doubting and disputing, unless the error of those philosophizing badly provoked us to it.

Note 1. The name of substance is used in various ways: 1. Indeed, for the resources, or riches, by which human life is sustained; in which manner the name of substance is for the most part used in Sacred Scripture. Thus Proverb. 3 says: Honor the Lord with your substance, and give to Him of the first-fruits of all your produce, etc. Thus Luc. 15: the prodigal son is said to have received from his father the portion of substance due to him, and to have squandered it by living luxuriously. — 2. It is taken for the nature and essence of any thing whatsoever, whether substantial or accidental, in which sense we sometimes say that an accident can be considered according to its substance, that is, according to its entity and nature. — 3. It is taken for that being which is opposed to accident, and which so subsists per se that it can in no way be in a subject of inherence. The name of substance used in this way, however, arises from the verbs substo, or subsisto; the first designates its function, which is to stand under, that is, to stand beneath accidents; the second indicates its formal notion, which consists in existence per se, that is, in a mode of existing independently of any accident.

Note 2. The name of spirit is almost the greatest of all equivocal terms: 1. For it is taken for a most tenuous thing, whether that be an accident or a substance; in which manner the purer part of the blood is called the vital spirit, and intentional species are called spiritual images of things. The name of spirit taken in this way, however, is opposed not to the corporeal, but to the coarse, and especially to the solid. — 2. It is taken for wind, air, exhalation; and hence to breathe and to respire is the same as to draw in air: and a wind rushing with excessive force is called the spirit of storms. — 3. For the soul, whether rational or sensitive. Thus Eccle. 3: Who knows whether the spirit of the children of Adam ascends upward, and whether the spirit of the beasts descends downward? — 4. For an incorporeal substance, in which manner it is opposed to body. Thus Christ the Lord in Luc. 24, opening the truth of His resurrection to His disciples, who, seeing that He had entered the midst of the Cenacle through closed doors, thought that it was a phantom, and believed that they were seeing a spirit, says: Handle and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see me having.

Note 3. From St. Thomas, 1. part, q. 18. a. 1.: That those things are properly living which move themselves according to some species of motion, whether motion is taken properly, as motion is said to be the act of the imperfect, that is, of that which exists in potency, or motion is taken commonly, insofar as it is said to be the act of the perfect, insofar as sensing and understanding are said to be moved, as one is said to be moved to some motion or some operation. But those things in whose nature it is not to move themselves to some motion or operation cannot be called living except through some likeness. Whence, answering the third objection, he says: That waters are called living which have a continuous flow, but standing waters are called dead, like the waters of cisterns and pools, but this is by way of likeness. Here, however, this vital motion, in order to be properly so called, must be made by a thing standing in its own and natural place. Whence heavy things indeed and rivers are moved while they are outside their native situation, but in it they rest. Plants, however, and other living things are moved with vital motion when they are in their own disposition and natural situation, as the same author says there in response to the second.

Hence in the same place, art. 3., he gathers a threefold genus of life. The first is of those things which move themselves to increase and perfect the form implanted in them by nature, like plants. Some, to obtain an external form perfective of themselves, such as are the animals which are moved to a form not implanted by nature, but received through the senses. Some, finally, move themselves to an apprehended end with the due order of means, such as is the rational creature.

But since the created intellect is moved from the knowledge of principles to the knowing of the conclusion, and is moved and attracted by external objects to operation, hence it happens that although it moves itself, nevertheless because it is also moved by another, it does not have the perfect grade of life. Whence he concludes: that thing therefore whose very nature is to understand, and to which that which it naturally has is not determined by another; this is what obtains the highest grade of life: such, however, is God, whence in God there is life in the highest degree. With these things premised for the sake of clarity, let it be

First conclusion. — God is a substance, and a complete one. This conclusion comprises two parts, of which the first is proved: God is the most excellent being: therefore He holds the first and principal place among the species of being: but substances are the nobler species of being: therefore among them God holds the first place. The major is evident from what has been said; the minor likewise from the common judgment of the philosophers, who admit that accident is a being of being, that is, a less perfect being.

Secondly: An accident depends on a subject, and is by nature posterior to it: but God is a being independent in every genus: therefore He is not an accident, and consequently He is a substance.

Thirdly: That which produces a substance cannot be an accident, because a cause is more excellent than its effect, and whatever dignity and perfection the effect has, all of it it borrows from its cause; and consequently, since an accident is more imperfect than a substance, it cannot produce it: but God is the Author and Maker of all substances: therefore He is not an accident, but a substance. These things will be established more fully below when we treat of divine simplicity, where we shall demonstrate that every accident is to be removed from God.

You will say 1. From St. Augustine, book 7. De Trinitate, cap. 5.: It is manifest that God is called substance improperly. Likewise Boethius also, in the book De Trinitate, around the middle, says that God is not truly a substance; and hence there is no conclusion.

I deny the consequence. But the authority of St. Augustine I distinguish: that God is not a substance, insofar as substance signifies that which stands under and is subjected to accidents, I concede; insofar as the name of substance expresses that which subsists per se, I deny. That this, however, is the mind of St. Augustine is clear; for when at the end of the fourth chapter he had said: just as from that which is to be, essence is named, so from that which is subsisting, we call it substance... For every thing subsists with respect to itself, how much more God? If, however, it is worthy that God be said to subsist. He adds in cap. 5.: But God, if He subsists so that He can be properly called a substance, something is in Him as in a subject, and He is not simple, to whom to be is that which it is for Him, and whatever else is said of Him about Him, like great, omnipotent, good, and if anything of this sort is not incongruously said of God. It is true, however, to say that God subsists and stands under His own goodness, and that that goodness is not a substance but rather an essence, nor is God Himself His own goodness, but it is in Him as in a subject. Whence it is manifest that God is called substance improperly, so that by the more customary name essence is understood, which is said truly and properly, so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence. From these things His mind clearly stands. — As to Boethius, however, I say that he is to be understood in this way, that he wills God not to be a finite and limited substance, in the manner in which the substances of creatures are said to be: but an infinite substance, and in every way independent and subsisting per se, for he says: Substance in Him is not truly substance, but beyond substance. And (a few things interposed): for when we say, God, it seems indeed to signify substance: but that which is beyond substance. In which manner also St. Dionysius, in the book De divinis nominibus, judges that God is not to be called substance, but supersubstance.

You will say 2. The sacred Scriptures for the most part express God by a name proper to accidents. Thus, for example, it is said in the first epistle of John: God is light, and there are no darknesses in Him; in the same place, in the fourth chapter: God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God. But light and charity are accidents: therefore God is an accident.

I distinguish the major. According to some analogy and proportion, namely by reason of operation and effects, I concede; according to the truth and entity of the thing, I deny. And so God is called light, because surely, just as light drives away darkness, He drives away and eliminates far from Himself all the darknesses of sin and the defects of all creatures; then also because with the light of His graces He penetrates and illuminates every man coming into this world. By the same reason He is called charity, because namely He burns with the greatest love toward men and pursues us with the most ardent affection.

Proof of the second part. Because if He were an incomplete substance, He would be either matter or form: neither can be said. Not the first, because matter does not live, but God lives; matter is passive potency, and hence something imperfect, but God is the most perfect being; matter is not active, but God is the first efficient cause of things. Not the second either, both because every form has an essential order to matter, which essential order argues dependence: and also because if He were a form, it would be either animate or inanimate; not the latter, because to be an animate form is more perfect than to be an inanimate form. Nor the former, because an animate form must be united to some matter in order to make some animate whole; not from itself, therefore from another: therefore if God were an animate form, something would be prior to God.

Second conclusion. — God is a spiritual substance.

This is of faith, as is evident both from Sacred Scripture: John 4: God is spirit; 2 Corinthians 3: But the Lord is spirit; Wisdom 1: The spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world; in the twenty-eighth Psalm: Where shall I go from your spirit? If I ascend into Heaven, you are there; for although the word, Spirit, is sometimes taken in the Scriptures for a corporeal substance, as was said in the 2. Note, nevertheless in the aforementioned places it is used properly, as we shall prove when we treat of the simplicity of God, where we shall demonstrate that He is neither a body nor corporeal.

Third conclusion. — God is a living substance. This is likewise of faith, as is evident from Sacred Scripture, in which God Himself affirmed that He lives not only by the most efficacious arguments, but also by an oath. Thus in Deuteronomii 33, where He had reproached the powerlessness of the vain gods, and had convicted the madness of the idolaters who trust in them with these words: Where are the gods in whom they had trust? Let them rise and help you, and protect you in necessity; He concludes: See that I am alone, and there is no other besides me: I will kill and I will make to live, I will strike and I will heal. He confirms all these things with this solemn oath: I will lift my hand to Heaven, and I will say: I live forever: or, as the Seventy Interpreters render: Because I will lift my hand to Heaven, and I will swear by my right hand, I will say: I live. The Angels also affirm the same oath; for we read in Apocalyps. 10: The angel, says John the Evangelist, whom I saw standing upon the sea and upon the earth, lifted his hand to Heaven, and swore by Him who lives forever and ever. Hence you will find these words so often divinely uttered: I live, says the Lord. — The same thing Christ the Savior indicates with these words, Ioannis 5.¹: As the Father has life in Himself, so He gave to the Son also to have life in Himself; for God is not only living, but also the fountain and origin of life, since all things living through Him and in Him receive their life. Hence David, Psalm. 41: My soul has thirsted for the strong living God; and Psal. 35: With you is the fountain of life. Because, says St. Dionysius elegantly, in the book De Divinis nominibus, cap. 6.:

Every life and vital motion proceeds from that life which surpasses every life, and is the principle of all life. For from it souls have immortality, from it animals live, from it plants live through the last vestige of life. If the gift of that life should perhaps be taken away, every life fails; and it gives to life itself and to universal life that it be life, and again to each life that each one be properly what by nature it ought to have been.

Hence rightly does saint Paul say, Acts, cap. 17: In Him we live, and move, and are. We are moved, says St. Ambrose, in the book De Bono Mortis, final chapter, in God as it were on the way; we are as it were in truth; we live as it were in eternal life. Or, as St. Cyprian interprets, in the book De Baptismo Christi, we are in the Father, we live in the Son, we are moved in the Holy Spirit; in the Son, I say, we live, because, says John in the first chapter, what was made, in Him was life.

The same truth is proved by reason: To live is to move oneself to operation: but God operates in the highest degree not from another mover, but from Himself, independently of anything else, for He is the first mover and agent: therefore life belongs to Him in the most perfect grade. Secondly: The divine being comprises every perfection of being: but to live is the highest perfection of being: therefore God comprises life. Thirdly: No one gives what he does not have: but God bestows life on all, both on plants, and on animals, and on men and Angels: therefore it is necessary that He likewise have it.

You will say. From Aristotle, book 2. De Anima, text 36: The soul is the cause and principle of the living body: but God has neither a soul, nor a body, nor a principle: therefore neither life.

I distinguish. In corporeal and created things, about which alone Aristotle treats, I concede; in spiritual and uncreated things, such as God is, I deny: for God, since He is altogether spiritual and without a body, lives a spiritual and intellectual life, not indeed distinct from Himself, but altogether identified with Himself, because, says saint Augustine, book 8. De Civitate Dei, cap. 6.:

To Him it is not one thing to be, another to live, as though He could be without living; nor is it one thing to Him to live, another to understand, as though He could live without understanding; nor is it one thing to Him to understand, another to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed: but that which it is for Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, that it is for Him to be.