Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Two things are to be resolved in the present Question: first, whether the concept and notion of being belongs to God in some special way such that it cannot belong to creatures by a similar notion; second, whether existence, that is, the actuality of being, belongs to God essentially, or only after the manner of a property or of an intrinsic mode, as some Scotists contend; which, that they may appear more evidently

Note 1. That although the word being, according to its grammatical signification, is the participle of the substantive verb sum, es, est, in which sense it denotes a thing actually existing, just as living signifies a thing actually living: nevertheless it is used by the philosophers for a substantive noun signifying that which is or can be. Taken in this way it can be understood in a threefold manner, as the Doctor notes in q. 3, quodlibetica, n. 20, namely: most broadly, broadly, and strictly. In the first way it involves beings both real and of reason, both actual and possible; and so taken it is contradictorily opposed to non-being, that is, to nothing. In the second way it embraces only real beings, whether accidental or substantial; and so it is contradictorily opposed to being of reason, which is not real being. In the third way it comprehends beings subsisting per se, such as substances both corporeal and spiritual; and so it is opposed to accidents, which, since they depend on substance in becoming and in being preserved, can be called not so much beings as something of a being. It is asked, however, whether being belongs to God in any of these ways, or whether it is to be attributed to Him in a special and altogether supereminent way most proper to Himself, and fitting to no creature in such a way.

Note 2. That existence, taken generally, is that by which a thing is in act; whence it comes about that existing things are distinguished by this their actuality from possible, future, and past things. This actuality of things, however, is twofold: one contained and dependent on an extrinsic and pre-existing cause; the other necessary, from itself, and altogether independent. The first belongs to all creatures, which borrow their whole being from God. The second, however, is proper to God alone. Each is really indistinct from the essence which it affects, as the Doctor proves in 2. d. 3. q. 4. But whether the existence proper to God is essential to Him, or only a mode of that essence, is no light controversy even among the Scotists themselves; what, however, seems to us truer in settling this dispute will appear below.

First conclusion. — The notion of being belongs to God most properly and essentially. This Conclusion has two parts, of which

The first part is proved. That belongs most properly to God which most expresses and manifests God: but the notion of being most manifests and makes known God: therefore, etc. The major is evident; for any thing is made known and distinguished from another by that which is proper and peculiar to it.

The minor is proved by the twofold definition which God Himself delivered of Himself, Exodi 3; for when Moses was sent by Him as a messenger to the children of Israel, and he asked the Lord in these words: If they say to me: what is His name? He answered: I am who am: He who is sent me to you. Which passage St. Bernard, lib. 5, De Consider., c. 6, so lucidly expounds:

If you say good, if great, if blessed, if wise, or whatever such thing of God, it is restored in this word which is EST. Surely, to ESSE is for Him to be all these things. If you have said them, you have added nothing; if you have not said them, you have diminished nothing. If you have seen this so singular, so supreme ESSE, do you not judge that, in comparison with this, whatever is not this is rather not-being than being? What likewise is God, than whom nothing is? Just as nothing can be without Him, so neither can He Himself be without Himself. He Himself is to Himself, He Himself is to all. And by this, in a certain way, He alone is who is His own being and the being of all.

Trismegistus had already taught the same thing earlier in Pymandro, cap. 5: As often as I say EXISTENCE, I say the Treasure of God; for existence embraces God Himself: outside Him there is nothing: outside nothing He Himself. Whence in the Temple of Delphic Apollo this inscription was once read in golden letters (Εἶ) you are, or you may be, as Eusebius reports, lib. 2. De Praeparatione Evangelica, which Plutarch, in the book published on this inscription, interprets thus: You are, and You alone truly are God. Plato likewise greatly commended this same name in his writings, as Augustine reports, lib. 8. De Civit. Dei, c. 11. And perhaps he had borrowed it from the books of Moses. Whence the author of the Catena notes that the name Tetragrammaton, which is said by the Hebrews to be so sacred and august that only the high Priest was allowed to utter it, signified the same as He who is. With these things Elias agrees, commenting on and explaining the oration 24. of Nazianzen.

God, he says, as St. Dionysius says, is indeed the cause of those things that are, that they may be; He Himself, however, is not, as one who is none of those things that are, but is above all things. For although God is called ENS, according to that text: I AM WHO AM; yet He is not a being as those things that are: for in what way would the maker be, as the works are? Neither is He a being in a definite way, but simply and in a peculiar way, or as it were excellently and surpassingly, as He alone knows.

Second, he alone is said truly to be, and being belongs most properly to him, if the rest besides him are more fittingly said not to be than to be: but the rest besides God can better and more rightly be said not to be than to be. Proof: those things can more rightly be said not to be than to be, of which far more can be denied than affirmed: but of man, e.g., the monarch of all visible creatures, far more can be denied than affirmed; for few grades of being are affirmed of him, namely that he is a rational animal, a body, etc., but the other creatures are almost infinite which are denied of him; for man is not an Angel, not a Star, not an Element, etc.

Then, a threefold state of created being can be conceived by us: the first, before its production; the second, in its existence; the third, after its consumption; that is, when it was not, when it actually exists, and after it has ceased to be. It is certain, however, that man before his origin and after his death is almost nothing: since before his origin he had only possible being, which the Doctor calls diminished being, or being little distinguished from nothing: after his death he no longer remains except according to part and as to his soul alone; for his body is dissolved into ashes and cinders.

It is likewise certain that while he lives he is little distant from nothing, not only because continual death threatens him, and as Seneca says, for the old it is at the gates, for the young in ambush; so that with David any man ought justly to say: I and death are divided by one step only; but because being belongs to any creature only accidentally, beggarly and precariously.

Second; because the being of creatures is most closely bordering on nothing; for, as St. Dionysius teaches, the last thing in the elements is earth, in bodies prime matter, in intellectual things our soul, in all things being. And so, just as the being of a creature appears first in creation after nothing, so it is last by resolution and near nothing: and so created being is between two nothings; whence, since middle things always participate something from the extremes, so created being has something of the nothing from which it came forth, and of the nothing toward which it tends.

Some refer here to the fact that Christ the Lord, at the approach of the Passion, laid low all the Jews with this word: I am: as if He had wished to signify the infinite majesty of His essence and nature, and, diametrically opposed, the nothingness of the creature. Hence in the Scriptures, Iob. cap. 23., it is said: For He alone is: and cap. 21: Are You not He who alone is? Of creatures, on the contrary, it is said Psal. 38: My substance is as nothing before You. Isaia, 40: All nations are so before God as if they were not, and are reputed as nothing and empty.

These things St. Jerome lucidly expounds, Epist. 25 ad Damascenum:

One, he says, is the sole nature of God, which truly EST; for that which subsists does not have it from elsewhere, but it is its own. The rest, which are created, even ifthey seem to be, are not, because at one time they were not, and what was can again not be. God alone, who is eternal, that is, who has no beginning, truly holds the name ESSE.

St. Isidore adds the reason, lib. 7, Etymol., cap. 1.: Because, in comparison with Him who truly IS and incomparably IS, those things which are mutable are as if they were not. He concludes: therefore God alone truly IS, in comparison with whose essence our being is not. Supply, according to equivalence and proportion, as holy Bonaventure observes, in 1. dist. 8. dub. 6. For it is true, he says, that there is no proportionable reason according to the condition of truth and mobility of the divine being; and therefore our being is as it were nothing, not altogether nothing in itself, but in proportion; for there is no proportion of created being to uncreated.

The second part is proved. God is called being by essence: therefore being belongs to Him essentially. The antecedent is evident by authority, not only of the holy Fathers, but also of the weightier philosophers, who called God being by essence. Our Smisingus proves the consequence, quaest. 1. De Essentia Dei, n. 17; for while God is called being by essence, these words do not signify that God is only being taken nominally, so that God has an essence which includes that which is signified by the name of being; otherwise creatures also would be called beings by essence, because their essences include that which is expressed by the name of being. Nor do they signify being insofar as it is a participle, and denotes and imports a thing actually existing, as if existence were only of the Essence of God by identity; since thus it would also be identified with the essence of a creature: for existence is not really distinguished from essence, and consequently is identified with it: therefore, while God is called being by essence, it must be so understood that being is of the very essence of God. These things will open more evidently

Second conclusion. — Existence is of the essence of God. So the Subtle Doctor in the places to be cited below, and St. Thomas, prima parte, q. 3. art. 4, and their more faithful interpreters and followers. But the truth and proof of this conclusion is evident from the preceding one; since, as being, which has been demonstrated to belong to God essentially and properly, is not possible being and actual being, it follows that existence, by which the Being belonging to God is made actual, also belongs to God essentially. Nevertheless, for a more evident intimation of this truth

First proof. That which from its formal notion is a necessary being and pure act includes existence in its essential concept: but God is formally a necessary being and pure act: therefore He includes existence in His essential concept. The major is certain, because the highest necessity of being and pure actuality exclude all potentiality and contingency whatsoever, and consequently presuppose a being existing by essence. For an essence which does not include existence in its formal concept can be conceived as non-existing, and consequently as possible; but an essence which is conceived as possible is not pure act, nor a necessary being. The minor is also evident, and will appear below, where we will show that the necessity of being and the highest actuality are intrinsic modes of the divine essence; and consequently that they are of the modal formal concept of the Deity itself.

Second, that is of the essence of a thing which is the first thing conceivable in it, and belongs to it in the first mode of saying per se: but such is existence in God: therefore, etc. The major is evident from Philosophy. The minor is proved: if anything prior to existence were conceivable in God, it would be especially His essence insofar as it prescinds from actual being and is conceived as non-existing: but the divine essence cannot be so conceived. Proof: if the divine essence can be conceived as non-existing, it must likewise be conceived as to be determined to existence, either by itself or by another: but neither can be said. Not the first, because since that essence would not be in act, it could not be the principle of actual existence; just as a possible Sun cannot be the principle of light actually emanating. Not the second either, otherwise God would not be the first cause, since He would suppose another from whom He would borrow existence and on whom He would depend in order to be; and consequently He would not be God.

It is confirmed. Nothing can flow or emanate from another, except from that which already exists; therefore, in order that existence might flow from essence, it would be necessary for the divine essence to be actually existing, so that divine existence might flow from it; and so it would exist before it existed, which is altogether contradictory.

You will say 1. From St. Jerome in cap. 3. ad Ephesios: God is the origin of Himself, and the cause of His own substance: but He cannot be one origin of Himself, unless His existence flows from His essence: therefore, etc. Moreover St. Augustine, lib. 83, Quaestionum, c. 16: God, he says, is the cause of all things that are; but what is the cause of all things is also the cause of its own wisdom: therefore God can be the cause of something of Himself, and so it will not be repugnant that the essence be the cause and origin of its existence.

I deny the consequence. For the sense of Hieronymus is that God never began, nor was produced by another, but exists essentially per se; so that He is said to be the cause of Himself not positively, as if He had produced Himself, but negatively, because He is from Himself, and acknowledges no cause of Himself. The same answer to St. Augustine.

You will say 2. Those things which are univocally common are of altogether the same notion: whence the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 4. concludes that if divine Goodness were of the formal notion of divine Wisdom, it would likewise be of the formal notion of created wisdom: but existence is common to God and to creatures univocally, just as the notion of being itself is, as the Doctor himself acknowledges: therefore existence in God and in creatures must be of the same notion. But in creatures existence is only an intrinsic mode: therefore it will also be such in God.

I distinguish the major. If they are univocally common in the first grade of univocation, I concede: if only in the fourth grade of univocation, I deny. For a fourfold grade of univocation is distinguished by our authors: the first is that whose univocal notion is in its inferiors with equal perfection, the same essential order, and the same mode of being: thus the infima species, for example, man, is in Peter and in John, etc. The second is that whose notion is indeed in the inferiors with the same essential order and the same mode of being, but not with equal perfection: thus the genus, for example, animal, is in man and in brute, more nobly indeed in man by reason of the more perfect difference which contracts it to man. The third is that whose notion belongs to the inferiors equally essentially, but not equally immediately: thus number is univocal to two and to three, because each is essentially number, but it belongs to two before three. The fourth, finally, is that whose univocal notion alone belongs to the inferiors, setting aside the same mode of being and the same essential order: and in this way existence belongs to God and to creatures: to God indeed essentially formally, to creatures however only essentially really, that is, as an intrinsic mode really indistinct from the essence.

You will insist. This answer being admitted, it would follow that the divine essence is not first-diverse from the created essence, nor simpliciter simple; but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The sequel is proved: that essence is not first-diverse, nor simpliciter simple, which has one common concept in which it agrees with another, and a peculiar concept by which it is distinguished from another: but the divine essence would be such, since it would agree with the created essence through the concept of existence, and would be distinguished from it through the concept of essence; and so it would be resolvable into a particular and a common notion: therefore it would be neither simple, nor first-diverse.

I deny the minor. For nothing absurd follows from this; for although the divine essence should be diverse from the creature and simple, yet it is not necessary that it be first-diverse and simpliciter simple; nor does this argue any imperfection in God, rather it imports perfection; because a concept simpliciter simple, that is, irresolvable into other concepts, both virtually and formally, seems to be less perfect, since it includes perfection and entity as it were determinate and limited.

You will say 3. What, coming to a thing, does not vary its formal notion, is only an intrinsic mode: but such is existence, since a possible man and a man actually existing is the same man essentially; nor are his essential predicates varied by actual existence: therefore, by the like argument, divine existence will be only a mode of the divine essence.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that created existence does not enter into the formal notion of the created essence, but follows it and reduces it from the possible state to actuality: but it is otherwise in divine things; for since the divine essence is necessarily pure act, it excludes all possibility whatsoever and includes existence in its essential concept.

You will say 4. If existence were of the formal concept of the essence, it would also be of the formal concept of the attributes and of the personal relations: but the consequence is false, otherwise there would be several existences in God just as there are several attributes and several personal relations in Him; for, the thing being multiplied, that also which is of its essential concept is multiplied. The antecedent is proved: for existence would be of the formal concept of the essence for this reason, because, as we have said, the divine essence is a necessary being and pure act: but the attributes are likewise such, and such are the relations: therefore if existence, for this reason, is of the formal concept of the divine essence, it must also be of the formal concept of the attributes and of the relations.

The antecedent could be denied. For the notion of the essence and of the attributes and relations is not the same, since the attributes and relations, as they presuppose the divine essence from which they emanate, can be understood to borrow their existence from it; but the divine essence can receive existence from no one, and consequently it is necessary that it involve it in its formal concept. But this being freely granted, I deny the minor: for it is not inconvenient to admit in God as many existences as there are adequately distinct properties and relations; for since existence is a transcendent predicate fitting every actual being, it is necessary that there be as many existences as there are actual beings formally or really adequately distinct; because just as an intrinsic mode does not have a reality or formality adequately distinct from the essence, but is involved in its perfect and modified concept, so also it does not have an existence distinct from the essence. But it is otherwise with the positive attributes and personal relations, which, since they are actual entities formally and adequately distinct from the divine essence, must also have their existence distinct from it; which is most certain concerning the existence of the essence and of the relations; for the former is communicable, the latter, however, altogether incommunicable.

Whence it is to be inferred that whatever has a reality formally distinct from the essence must also have an existence formally distinct from the existence of the essence. Thus the Doctor in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 1. teaches that the common nature has its own real being outside the soul, formally distinct from the being of the singular nature, just as it has its own reality and quiddity.

You will say 5. What exists essentially cannot be conceived as non-existing: but God can be conceived as non-existing: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for a thing cannot be conceived without its essence, nor under the opposite of its essence: for man, e.g., cannot be conceived except as he is sentient and rational, nor can he be apprehended as an ass. The minor is likewise established from the opinion of the Atheists, who call the existence of God into doubt.

I answer. With St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 8. parte 1. quaest. 2., that something can be thought and conceived not to be in two ways: namely, without assent and with assent of the one conceiving. In the former way something can be conceived under the opposite of its essence; e.g., man-ass: for this concept imports nothing other than the understanding of those things which are said and uttered in the proposition. In the latter way, when something can be conceived not to be, this proceeds either from the defect of the one understanding, or from the defect of the intelligible object: but the defect of the one understanding is either blindness or ignorance, by which it happens that he who is ignorant of the thing thinks it not to be: this ignorance, however, regards either the existence or the essence of the thing. I confess, however, that the human intellect can conceive God not to be as to what He is, that is, not to know His essence; not, however, as to whether He is, that is, truly to doubt of His existence.

For (says Hugo, lib. 1. De Sacram., parte 3. cap. 1.): God from the beginning so tempered the knowledge of Himself in man that, just as what He was could never be comprehended by man, so it could never be ignored that He was.

Because therefore (says St. Bonaventure) our intellect never fails in the knowledge of God, whether He is, therefore it cannot be ignorant that He is, nor think that He is not; but because it fails in the knowledge of what He is, therefore it frequently thinks God to be what He is not, e.g., to be the Sun, an Idol, etc.; and it also thinks not to be what He is, e.g., God not just; and therefore by reason of the defect of the intellect, God can be thought not to be that which He is; although He cannot be thought what He is. But if this proceeds from the part of the intelligible object, since this defect is either a defect of presence or a defect of evidence, namely because either the thing is not always, and so it can be thought not to be at some time; or it is not everywhere, and so it can be thought not to be here; or because it does not have evident proofs, and so it can be thought not to have certain existence. But in neither of these ways can God be thought not to be, because He is always, everywhere, and evidently demonstrable through creatures.

And so He cannot be thought not to be with assent, except because of the ignorance of the one thinking, who does not perceive what is understood by the name of God, and in fact assent to this proposition: God is not: but they only utter it with the mouth.