Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since a definition is a discourse explaining the nature of a thing, we who desire to know the divine Essence rightly begin our discussion with the inquiry into its definition. It is certain, however, that an accurate definition of the Deity cannot be assigned by us, who are still mortals: inasmuch as the proper characteristics of the divine Essence lie hidden from us in this life: we can nevertheless describe it in some way through certain predicates common to it and to creatures, and through others by which it is distinguished from creatures. Now, in order that this may be done more evidently

Note 1. We can attain the knowledge of the divine Essence by a threefold way; namely, by the way of negation, of affirmation, and of excellence. The first imitates sculptors, the second painters, the third orators. The first, I say, adumbrates the sculptor's art; for just as (says Saint Dionysius, bk. De Theologia Mystica, ch. 2.) a sculptor forms the image of a man out of wood by removing, hollowing out, and cutting away what is superfluous, so we in some way fashion the notion and image of the divine Essence in our mind, while we remove from that supreme and greatest Being of all whatever is imperfect and limited in creatures. In this way proceeded St. Augustine, bk. 10. Confessionum, c. 6: But what do I love when I love you, Lord? Not the beauty of the body, nor the grace of time, not the brightness of light, friendly to those eyes, not the sweet melodies of songs of every kind, not the fragrant sweetness of flowers and ointments and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable to the embraces of the flesh.

— The second imitates the painter's industry; for just as a painter adds various colors to various things, so as to complete the outlined image; so, once the imperfections which naturally inhere in a created being are removed, we attribute to God whatever perfection is in it, cleansed of every earthly and limited stain. E.g., when we say that He is good without dissimulation, just without cruelty, wise without any ignorance, etc. Augustine discloses this way of defining God in the same place, where after the foregoing he adds: Yet I love a certain light, and a certain voice, and a certain food, and a certain embrace when I love my God: but the light, voice, odor, food, embrace of my inner man: where something shines for my soul that no place contains, and where something sounds that time does not snatch away, and where something smells that no breeze disperses, and where something tastes that greed does not diminish; and where something clings that satiety does not tear away. This is what I love when I love my God. — The third, finally, imitates the orators, who whatever perfection they find in the thing they praise, they extol in a wonderful way, and utter by a comparative or superlative degree. St. Bernard used this method:

You marvel, he says, at the splendor in the sun, the ardor in fire, the purity in air, the fecundity in water, the firmness in earth, the savor in bread, the sweetness in honey, the most sweet fragrance in the flower, the gleam in gold; but behold all these things in God, yet in the most eminent heap of all perfections: for He is more splendid than the sun, purer than air, more fecund than water, firmer than earth, sweeter than honey, more savory than bread, more pleasant than the flower, more precious than gold.

In this way Saint Dionysius, bk. De Divinis nominibus, after he had defined God through several superlative degrees, finally concludes: Infinity is a certain infinity of all infinity, and the term of every term.

Note 2. A varied definition of God has been assigned by various authors, both pagan and sacred: for Plato, according to Alcinous c. 10., God is called a living being, immortal, sufficient through itself for beatitude, an everlasting essence, etc. By Thales of Miletus, a Being which lacks beginning and end. By Aristotle, the Maker of the world, the supreme Ruler, unmoved, moving all things: whose strength if you regard, most mighty; if his beauty, most comely; if his life, immortal; if his virtue, most excellent. By Cicero, a certain mind free and unbound, withdrawn from every mortal concretion, etc. By Seneca, wholly reason, than which nothing greater can be conceived, the mind of the universe, the soul of the world, etc. With him Ovid agrees, saying: A spirit within nourishes, and infused through all its limbs, a mind moves the mass and mingles with the great body. So too He is everywhere described by the holy Fathers, according to His various divine excellences, which St. Bernard delineated best of all, bk. 5. De Consideratione.

What is God? he says: length, breadth, height, depth: length on account of eternity, breadth on account of charity, height on account of majesty, depth on account of wisdom. God who loves as charity, knows as truth, sits as equity, rules as majesty, governs as principle, protects as salvation, works as virtue, etc.

But these or similar descriptions, whether rhetorical or philosophical, disclose indeed the excellences and operations of God, but not His nature and essence.

Note 3. In disclosing the essence of God, no slight controversy is stirred between the Subtle Doctor and the Angelic Doctor and their followers: for St. Thomas, bk. 2. Contra gentes, ch. 14., judges that God cannot be known and defined by us wayfarers affirmatively, but only negatively; namely, by removing from Him whatever imperfection we detect in creatures; but the Subtle Doctor, in 1. d. 3. q. 2. n. 2., contends that God can be known not only negatively, but also affirmatively; and n. 17. he teaches that the concept of infinite Being is the most perfect of all.

Three things, therefore, are to be resolved in this question: First, that God can be known by us wayfarers not only negatively, but also affirmatively; Second, that He can be defined not only through attributes, but also through quidditative predicates, at least confusedly and argumentatively; Third, what is the genuine definition of God which can be formed and explained by us wayfarers in this mortal life.

First conclusion. — God can be conceived by us not only negatively but also affirmatively.

This conclusion belongs to the Doctor at the cited place, and he proves it 1. indeed by experience, by which it is established that we love God as we conceive Him: but we do not love only negations, because a negation, formally, since it is a non-being, cannot have the character of an appetible object; for nothing is appetible except the good; and nothing is good except being, for the reason that goodness is a property of being alone, which consequently cannot belong to non-being and negation. Therefore we do not conceive only negations in God. — Next, it is also evident by experience that we do not attribute to God the negations of some positive being, unless we likewise attribute to Him another positive thing incompatible with that positive thing which we deny of God. For example, we say that God is immaterial, because we attribute to Him spirituality, which is incompatible with matter, which we remove from God by the word 'immaterial'; we say that He is not composed, because we attribute to Him simplicity, which is incompatible with the composition which we exclude from God, and so with the rest. — Finally, it is likewise established by the same experience that our intellect does not rest in knowing a negation alone; above all in a being supremely perfect such as God is: but it further investigates why such a negation belongs to Him; because the intellect does not remove from God by a negation something imperfect, or less perfect, except because it detects in Him and attributes to Him something which is more perfect. Therefore it is evident by experience that God cannot be conceived negatively, unless He be likewise conceived affirmatively.

Proof 2. When God is conceived by a negative concept, either in it is conceived a simple and bare negation; or there is conceived a negation belonging to some positive thing. If the first, that concept is not proper to God; if the second, we have what we sought, namely, that a perfect negative concept cannot be formed of God without an affirmative one; for a simple negation, e.g. 'not a stone', befits nothing and the other beings (says the Doctor) just as much as God; since it is said just as truly that nothing is not a stone, or that a plant is not a stone, as it is said that God is not a stone: and consequently that purely negative concept would not be proper to God; nor would it therefore express God perfectly and distinctly, but only imperfectly and confusedly, since it could be attributed to others as much as to God. — The same can be said of immateriality and the other negative attributes: for if immateriality, e.g., signified in God only the negation of matter, it would befit the Angel and the rational soul and the other spiritual beings just as much as it would befit God: because it is said just as truly that the soul, that the Angel, intellection, volition, grace, etc. lack matter, as it is said of God that He lacks matter or that He is immaterial. Therefore, in order that that negation be proper to God alone, it is necessary that we admit in Him something positive, by reason of which positive thing this negation of matter befits God in a special way in which it does not befit other spiritual beings; and consequently either that concept will not be simply negative, or it will not be proper to God. And so God cannot be known only negatively, but also affirmatively.

You will say 1. From St. Dionysius, book De Divinis nominibus, ch. 7., when he had asked how we have knowledge of God, since He is neither discerned by the mind, nor falls under the senses, nor is He anything at all of the things that exist; he answers: Not from His own nature, for it is unknown and surpasses every reason and mind, but from the description of things we ascend, by way and order, to the best of our power, to that which surpasses all things, by the removal and pre-eminence of all things, and as the cause of all things. And in the book De Theologia Mystica, ch. 1., exhorting Timothy to the knowledge of God by withdrawing from the senses and from all creatures, he says: For by a free and unbound and clean departure from yourself and from all things, you will press on to the ray of the divine darkness, which is superior to every essence, when you have both removed all things and been loosed and freed from all things. By these words he clearly indicates that God can be known only negatively, and by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures. With him agree Saint Damascene, bk. 1. De fide, ch. 4.: Whatever things, he says, are predicated of God do not signify what He is, but what He is not. And other holy Fathers affirming everywhere that we say better of God what He is not, than what He is. Therefore God cannot be known properly and distinctly by an affirmative concept. — I distinguish the consequence. God cannot be known by an affirmative concept properly and distinctly, so that His essence is evidently expressed and laid open through this concept; I concede: so that in this concept His essence does not appear at least obscurely and, as it were, argumentatively; I deny. The mind of the holy Fathers, therefore, is that we indeed have a more distinct and easier negative concept of God than an affirmative one; for it is more easily known what God is not than what He is; yet they do not on that account contend that He cannot also be known affirmatively. Indeed, St. Dionysius himself proves both ways of knowing God, namely affirmatively and negatively, in many places, as is clear both from what has been said and from ch. 3. of his Mystical Theology, where he discloses which are the affirmative notions about God and which the negative.

You will say 2. No perfection having the character of a most simple pure act can be known by us mortals by a positive concept: but every perfection of God, whether essential or attributive, has the character of a most simple pure act: therefore it cannot be conceived by us by an affirmative concept. The minor is evident: the major is proved: First, because our intellect cannot form such a concept of a created spiritual being and substance: therefore much less of an uncreated substance or perfection, which is a most simple pure act. Second, if a proper concept of God were had, God would appear in this concept under a created or uncreated notion: not under a created notion, for so He would not be conceived as God, but as a creature: nor under an uncreated notion either, because either He would be conceived so by a negative concept, and we have what was sought; or by a positive one, and then He would be conceived as He is in Himself; and accordingly He would be discerned intuitively by us wayfarers by natural light alone; which is repugnant. Third, finally, because all the perfections of God, both intrinsic and extrinsic, or those which express an order to creatures, are not conceived except by a negative concept. For God is not conceived as a necessary being, spiritual, etc. except through the negation of contingency, matter, etc. Similarly He is not conceived under the notion of first Cause, of supreme Ruler, and of ultimate end, except through an order to negations; for these concepts, as perceived by us, involve the negation of a prior or superior; for the first Cause is said to be that which has nothing prior; the supreme Ruler, that which has nothing superior; and the ultimate end, that which has nothing further. Therefore no proper affirmative concept of God can be formed by us. — I deny the major, and to the first proof of that major, I say that although we cannot have an affirmative concept of a created spiritual being through its own species, we can nevertheless have it through foreign species, conceiving namely the spiritual being by affirmation and negation together; denying namely that the spirit is matter or body; and affirming that it is something besides matter and body: so that the species of a corporeal being contribute to forming this concept: 'spirit is not matter nor body; but it is a substance devoid of matter and corporeity.' So, by way of likeness, it can be said that the species of creatures can contribute to the knowledge of God, inasmuch as, at the sight of them, we deny that He is this or that created being, and we affirm that He is a being devoid of all finiteness and of every created and limited character.

If you say. That God is not conceived or known in this way through proper species; and accordingly that that concept is not proper to God. I shall deny the consequence. For just as when we conceive a substance through its order to the accidents which it receives from its nature, or through its order to the operations for eliciting which it is naturally ordered; for example, when we conceive fire as a substance which requires light and heat in such a degree, and which can produce another similar fire, we have a proper concept of the substance of fire, although this concept is not formed except dependently on foreign species, namely on the species of accidents; so, by parity, the concept formed of God will be no less proper, although it is not formed except dependently on the species of creatures, which are denied of Him, and by whose benefit it is understood that there is something beyond and above creatures. — To the second proof I say, that God is represented by this concept as an uncreated being; nor is that affirmative concept on that account intuitive, because it is not made nor caused by an object present and moving through its immediate presence, which motion is required for an intuitive concept. — To the third proof of the aforesaid major I say, that although the divine perfections, both intrinsic and extrinsic, cannot be conceived by us without some order to negations, nevertheless it does not therefore follow that they are conceived by us as pure negations, as the Thomists will have it, but only this may be inferred from it, that those positive perfections connote certain negations, for the sake of greater clarity and more evident knowledge. And so the truth of the conclusion remains safe and intact, that God can be known and defined by us not only by a negative concept, but also by an affirmative one.

Second conclusion. — There can naturally be had by us wayfarers a proper concept of God, not only attributive, or through His attributes, but also quidditative and essential.

This is the Doctor's teaching at the cited place n. 5., against Henry of Ghent and St. Thomas 1. part. q. 2. art. 1.

The first part is proved. We conceive God as the supreme good, infinitely wise, omnipotent, etc.: but these concepts are properly attributive, as all admit: therefore an attributive concept proper to God can be formed by us wayfarers.

You will say. Those concepts are not proper to God which also belong to creatures, and which are not attributed to God except because they are seen to be perfections in creatures, which ought not to be denied to God, the Author and Origin of all perfections: but all attributive concepts are such: therefore they are not proper to God. — I distinguish the major. If those attributive perfections belong to God and to creatures in the same way, and with the same degree of perfection, their concept will not be proper to God, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is true that all those perfections which are attributed to God are attributed to Him otherwise than to creatures; for power, e.g., is attributed to creatures as limited to certain effects; but to God as extending itself to any possible effects; and so with the rest: and accordingly the concept formed of those divine attributes is so proper to God that it belongs to no other.

The Doctor proves the second part in the same place thus: When God is conceived as infinitely wise, He is conceived as a being having infinite wisdom and requiring it from its nature: but that concept is quidditative, proper and essential to God: therefore, etc. It is indeed proper, since besides God there is no other being which requires and has infinite wisdom: it is also quidditative, since it does not suppose another prior concept; otherwise there would be an infinite regress: therefore a concept of God that is proper and quidditative can be formed by us.

It is confirmed. Almost all theologians admit that the divine attributes are distinguished from the essence, either formally, as the Scotists, or virtually, as the Thomists, or by reason, as the rest: therefore it is necessary that they have a concept of the divine Essence other than the concept of the Attributes: for how would essence and attributes appear distinct, unless they could be expressed by different concepts? Therefore a quidditative concept of God can be formed by us.

You will say. A quidditative concept expresses the essence: but there is no concept which expresses the divine essence to us: therefore none exists. The major is certain; the minor likewise; for if any concept expressed the divine essence to us, we could know it distinctly: but it lies hidden from us, for now we know God only through a mirror and in an enigma: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. A quidditative concept expresses the essence, either distinctly, or at least confusedly, I concede: always distinctly, I deny. Therefore a twofold quidditative concept can be distinguished: one, indeed, evident, which expresses the essence distinctly, that is, through genus and difference; the other confused, or argumentative, which points out the essence through the properties which it requires: thus, e.g., I conceive distinctly the essence of man by saying: man is a rational animal; and only confusedly, when I affirm that he is a risible animal, because risibility is a property which indeed points out and presupposes the essence, but does not constitute or express it.

To the minor I say with the Subtle Doctor, ibidem n. 16, that a distinct quidditative concept of God cannot indeed be formed by us naturally; because God is a voluntary object with respect to the created intellect; and accordingly He cannot be distinctly perceived by it, unless He Himself exhibits and manifests Himself to be perceived: yet a proper concept can be formed, which expresses at least confusedly His essence, and discloses it as distinct from every essence of creatures. But which concepts can be formed by us, by which the divine essence is more distinctly disclosed and manifested, will indicate

Third conclusion. — God is rightly defined by us as a being infinite in every way. So the Doctor in 1. dist. 3. q. 2. n. 17.

Proof. That definition is legitimate by which the nature of the thing defined is disclosed in the more perfect way in which it can be conceived by us, and which is the reason why the other predicates of the thing defined are shown to belong to it: but the aforesaid definition is such.

For first, it demonstrates the nature of God: since by the notion of Being it agrees with all creatures as it were generically and univocally, as has been fully proved in our Metaphysics: and by the notion of the infinite it differs from them essentially; for there is no creature which is infinite in every way; indeed all are finite and limited, both in entity and in their excellences and perfections.

Next, that infinite entity is the formal reason why all the predicates which are attributed to God belong to Him; for if someone asks why God is eternal, e.g., it will be rightly answered: because He is infinite in every way; and accordingly He must be infinite in duration, and so lack beginning and end, and consequently be eternal; the same is to be said of the other divine attributes.

It is confirmed. By the reasons of the Doctor proving this Conclusion thus: That definition is to be judged legitimate which is made through a concept that is simple and more perfect: but the aforesaid definition is such. For first, that concept is simpler, because entitative infinity is not conceived as a certain property distinct from being, in the way in which unity, truth, goodness, which are the properties of being, are distinguished from it and have their objective concepts so distinct from the concept of being that they can be conceived separately from being: whence when being is conceived as good, e.g., that concept is not simple, but as it were united from two concepts, namely from the concept of being and of goodness. But it is otherwise with infinite being, because the concept of infinite being is not the concept of being as affected by a property emanating from it, but is the concept of being as expressing a mode and grade intrinsic to itself. Whence, just as the concept of intense whiteness as eight is not the concept of whiteness as affected by some property emanating from it, e.g. visibility; but is formally the very concept of whiteness under such a grade, which is not its property, but only the determination of that entitative intensity to the eighth grade: so the concept of infinite being (says the Doctor) is the simple concept of being itself in a certain grade of perfection, namely infinity. Whence infinite being is not properly said to be 'being such', that is, affected by a property: but more rightly it is said to be 'being in such a way', that is, determined in such a mode and grade of being: which concept is prior to the concept of all the attributes which belong to God as properties, and consequently is the simplest of all.

Second: it is also more perfect, both because (says the Doctor) the concept of infinite being virtually includes many, indeed all, the divine perfections; for just as being virtually contains truth, unity, and its other attributes, so infinite being virtually contains the supreme good and the supreme true and whatever other attributes we conceive of God; and because those things are more perfect which are last demonstrated a posteriori of God; for the things which are thus last demonstrated of God are more remote from creatures; and accordingly more exceed the perfections of creatures, and therefore are more perfect: but that God is an infinite being is last demonstrated a posteriori, because in infinity He agrees with no creature; nor is infinity known to belong to God except by removing from Him all the things which are finite and imperfect in creatures, and consequently the concept of infinite being is the most perfect of all.

You will say 1. 'Supreme being' equally signifies an intrinsic mode, as does 'infinite being': it equally and likewise virtually includes all the divine attributes: therefore the concept of infinite being is not simpler, nor more perfect than all those which can be formed of God; nor does it therefore serve more to define and disclose His essence. The Doctor answers in the same place that 'supreme' can be understood either comparatively or absolutely; namely, either through an order to the others which it exceeds, or for that which cannot be exceeded: but in whatever way it be taken, it is certain that the concept of infinite being is more perfect than it: both because the concept of the infinite can be understood without comparison to creatures; and accordingly is more absolute, and consequently more perfect: and because even if the concept of supreme being be taken absolutely, it is nevertheless less perfect than the concept of the infinite; for from the fact that some being is supreme, it does not follow that it is infinite; nevertheless among them there could be given one which would be supreme, and yet not infinite: therefore although really and in fact the concepts of supreme being and of infinite being are the same in God and signify the same, yet if they were conceived separately and formally, it is certain that the concept of infinite being is more excellent than the other.

You will say 2. The concept of a spiritual substance living an intellectual life is more perfect than the concept of infinity; because while I conceive God as an infinite being, there still remains the difficulty whether He is a substance or an accident, living or not living, spiritual or corporeal: therefore the concept of infinite being is not more excellent.

I deny the antecedent. For by the very fact that I conceive God as an infinite being, I necessarily conceive Him as the more perfect being that can be thought; and accordingly as having whatever perfection is in being; otherwise He would not be an infinite being, because some entity or perfection would be lacking to Him: therefore by the very fact that I conceive Him as an infinite being, I also conceive Him as existing necessarily and unfailingly, as subsisting through Himself, as incorporeal, as intelligent, finally as having the other grades of being which carry with them perfection without any imperfection. The rest which could be objected will be more easily and more suitably proposed and solved in the following Questions, in which the discourse will be about the divine Infinity.