Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

We undertake in this chapter to lay open and explain a matter not only difficult, but one that wholly exceeds the grasp of the human mind: whence not undeservedly Simonides the Philosopher (says Minutius Felix in the Octavius), when he was asked by the tyrant Hiero what and of what sort he judged God to be, first asked a day for deliberation; on the next day he prolonged it to two days; soon, being admonished, he added as much again; and at last, when the tyrant inquired the causes of so great a delay, he answered that the more slowly his inquiry proceeded, the more obscure the truth became to him. With him agrees St. Ambrose, book 1. De fide contra Arianos: God, he says, is this: that when it is spoken, it cannot be spoken; when it is estimated, it cannot be estimated; when it is defined, it grows by the definition; whom all things do not know, and know by fearing.

Whence Tertullian in the Apologetico, cap. 17:

He is invisible, although He is seen; incomprehensible, although He is represented by grace; inestimable, although He is estimated by human senses: so true and so great is He. Moreover, what can be seen commonly, what can be comprehended, what can be estimated, is less than the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is contaminated, and the senses by which it is discovered. But what is immense is known to itself alone: the fact that He is makes God be esteemed, while He does not admit of being esteemed.

Nor is it a wonder, since St. Cyprian says, in the book De vanitate Idolorum: God cannot be seen, being clearer than sight; nor comprehended, being purer than touch; nor estimated, being greater than sense: and therefore we thus esteem Him worthily, when we call Him inestimable. This manner of speaking he had perhaps borrowed from St. Dionysius the Areopagite, in the book De Divinis nominibus, cap. 13., where he says: Nothing of the things that are, or of the things that are known to any of the things that exist, explains that hidden mystery, surpassing every reason and intellect, of the super-deity superessentially superexisting above all things. By which he indicates that the essence of the Deity is wholly hidden from us; wherefore he affirms in several places that of God we say more truly what He is not, than what He is.

— But if it is not permitted to steer the ship with Peter into the deep sea of the divine Essence, at least it will be granted to graze its shores in the light skiff of our intellect, and to lay open in the three following questions whatever the holy Fathers and the Princes of Theology have set forth in their writings concerning the quidditative predicates of God.

Since a definition is a discourse explaining the nature of a thing, we who desire to know the divine Essence rightly begin our discussion with the inquiry into its definition. It is certain, however, that an accurate definition of the Deity cannot be assigned by us, who are still mortals: inasmuch as the proper characteristics of the divine Essence lie hidden from us in this life: we can nevertheless describe it in some way through certain predicates common to it and to creatures, and through others by which it is distinguished from creatures. Now, in order that this may be done more evidently

Note 1. We can attain the knowledge of the divine Essence by a threefold way; namely, by the way of negation, of affirmation, and of excellence. The first imitates sculptors, the second painters, the third orators. The first, I say, adumbrates the sculptor's art; for just as (says Saint Dionysius, bk. De Theologia Mystica, ch. 2.) a sculptor forms the image of a man out of wood by removing, hollowing out, and cutting away what is superfluous, so we in some way fashion the notion and image of the divine Essence in our mind, while we remove from that supreme and greatest Being of all whatever is imperfect and limited in creatures. In this way proceeded St. Augustine, bk. 10. Confessionum, c. 6: But what do I love when I love you, Lord? Not the beauty of the body, nor the grace of time, not the brightness of light, friendly to those eyes, not the sweet melodies of songs of every kind, not the fragrant sweetness of flowers and ointments and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable to the embraces of the flesh.

— The second imitates the painter's industry; for just as a painter adds various colors to various things, so as to complete the outlined image; so, once the imperfections which naturally inhere in a created being are removed, we attribute to God whatever perfection is in it, cleansed of every earthly and limited stain. E.g., when we say that He is good without dissimulation, just without cruelty, wise without any ignorance, etc. Augustine discloses this way of defining God in the same place, where after the foregoing he adds: Yet I love a certain light, and a certain voice, and a certain food, and a certain embrace when I love my God: but the light, voice, odor, food, embrace of my inner man: where something shines for my soul that no place contains, and where something sounds that time does not snatch away, and where something smells that no breeze disperses, and where something tastes that greed does not diminish; and where something clings that satiety does not tear away. This is what I love when I love my God. — The third, finally, imitates the orators, who whatever perfection they find in the thing they praise, they extol in a wonderful way, and utter by a comparative or superlative degree. St. Bernard used this method:

You marvel, he says, at the splendor in the sun, the ardor in fire, the purity in air, the fecundity in water, the firmness in earth, the savor in bread, the sweetness in honey, the most sweet fragrance in the flower, the gleam in gold; but behold all these things in God, yet in the most eminent heap of all perfections: for He is more splendid than the sun, purer than air, more fecund than water, firmer than earth, sweeter than honey, more savory than bread, more pleasant than the flower, more precious than gold.

In this way Saint Dionysius, bk. De Divinis nominibus, after he had defined God through several superlative degrees, finally concludes: Infinity is a certain infinity of all infinity, and the term of every term.

Note 2. A varied definition of God has been assigned by various authors, both pagan and sacred: for Plato, according to Alcinous c. 10., God is called a living being, immortal, sufficient through itself for beatitude, an everlasting essence, etc. By Thales of Miletus, a Being which lacks beginning and end. By Aristotle, the Maker of the world, the supreme Ruler, unmoved, moving all things: whose strength if you regard, most mighty; if his beauty, most comely; if his life, immortal; if his virtue, most excellent. By Cicero, a certain mind free and unbound, withdrawn from every mortal concretion, etc. By Seneca, wholly reason, than which nothing greater can be conceived, the mind of the universe, the soul of the world, etc. With him Ovid agrees, saying: A spirit within nourishes, and infused through all its limbs, a mind moves the mass and mingles with the great body. So too He is everywhere described by the holy Fathers, according to His various divine excellences, which St. Bernard delineated best of all, bk. 5. De Consideratione.

What is God? he says: length, breadth, height, depth: length on account of eternity, breadth on account of charity, height on account of majesty, depth on account of wisdom. God who loves as charity, knows as truth, sits as equity, rules as majesty, governs as principle, protects as salvation, works as virtue, etc.

But these or similar descriptions, whether rhetorical or philosophical, disclose indeed the excellences and operations of God, but not His nature and essence.

Note 3. In disclosing the essence of God, no slight controversy is stirred between the Subtle Doctor and the Angelic Doctor and their followers: for St. Thomas, bk. 2. Contra gentes, ch. 14., judges that God cannot be known and defined by us wayfarers affirmatively, but only negatively; namely, by removing from Him whatever imperfection we detect in creatures; but the Subtle Doctor, in 1. d. 3. q. 2. n. 2., contends that God can be known not only negatively, but also affirmatively; and n. 17. he teaches that the concept of infinite Being is the most perfect of all.

Three things, therefore, are to be resolved in this question: First, that God can be known by us wayfarers not only negatively, but also affirmatively; Second, that He can be defined not only through attributes, but also through quidditative predicates, at least confusedly and argumentatively; Third, what is the genuine definition of God which can be formed and explained by us wayfarers in this mortal life.

First conclusion. — God can be conceived by us not only negatively but also affirmatively.

This conclusion belongs to the Doctor at the cited place, and he proves it 1. indeed by experience, by which it is established that we love God as we conceive Him: but we do not love only negations, because a negation, formally, since it is a non-being, cannot have the character of an appetible object; for nothing is appetible except the good; and nothing is good except being, for the reason that goodness is a property of being alone, which consequently cannot belong to non-being and negation. Therefore we do not conceive only negations in God. — Next, it is also evident by experience that we do not attribute to God the negations of some positive being, unless we likewise attribute to Him another positive thing incompatible with that positive thing which we deny of God. For example, we say that God is immaterial, because we attribute to Him spirituality, which is incompatible with matter, which we remove from God by the word 'immaterial'; we say that He is not composed, because we attribute to Him simplicity, which is incompatible with the composition which we exclude from God, and so with the rest. — Finally, it is likewise established by the same experience that our intellect does not rest in knowing a negation alone; above all in a being supremely perfect such as God is: but it further investigates why such a negation belongs to Him; because the intellect does not remove from God by a negation something imperfect, or less perfect, except because it detects in Him and attributes to Him something which is more perfect. Therefore it is evident by experience that God cannot be conceived negatively, unless He be likewise conceived affirmatively.

Proof 2. When God is conceived by a negative concept, either in it is conceived a simple and bare negation; or there is conceived a negation belonging to some positive thing. If the first, that concept is not proper to God; if the second, we have what we sought, namely, that a perfect negative concept cannot be formed of God without an affirmative one; for a simple negation, e.g. 'not a stone', befits nothing and the other beings (says the Doctor) just as much as God; since it is said just as truly that nothing is not a stone, or that a plant is not a stone, as it is said that God is not a stone: and consequently that purely negative concept would not be proper to God; nor would it therefore express God perfectly and distinctly, but only imperfectly and confusedly, since it could be attributed to others as much as to God. — The same can be said of immateriality and the other negative attributes: for if immateriality, e.g., signified in God only the negation of matter, it would befit the Angel and the rational soul and the other spiritual beings just as much as it would befit God: because it is said just as truly that the soul, that the Angel, intellection, volition, grace, etc. lack matter, as it is said of God that He lacks matter or that He is immaterial. Therefore, in order that that negation be proper to God alone, it is necessary that we admit in Him something positive, by reason of which positive thing this negation of matter befits God in a special way in which it does not befit other spiritual beings; and consequently either that concept will not be simply negative, or it will not be proper to God. And so God cannot be known only negatively, but also affirmatively.

You will say 1. From St. Dionysius, book De Divinis nominibus, ch. 7., when he had asked how we have knowledge of God, since He is neither discerned by the mind, nor falls under the senses, nor is He anything at all of the things that exist; he answers: Not from His own nature, for it is unknown and surpasses every reason and mind, but from the description of things we ascend, by way and order, to the best of our power, to that which surpasses all things, by the removal and pre-eminence of all things, and as the cause of all things. And in the book De Theologia Mystica, ch. 1., exhorting Timothy to the knowledge of God by withdrawing from the senses and from all creatures, he says: For by a free and unbound and clean departure from yourself and from all things, you will press on to the ray of the divine darkness, which is superior to every essence, when you have both removed all things and been loosed and freed from all things. By these words he clearly indicates that God can be known only negatively, and by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures. With him agree Saint Damascene, bk. 1. De fide, ch. 4.: Whatever things, he says, are predicated of God do not signify what He is, but what He is not. And other holy Fathers affirming everywhere that we say better of God what He is not, than what He is. Therefore God cannot be known properly and distinctly by an affirmative concept. — I distinguish the consequence. God cannot be known by an affirmative concept properly and distinctly, so that His essence is evidently expressed and laid open through this concept; I concede: so that in this concept His essence does not appear at least obscurely and, as it were, argumentatively; I deny. The mind of the holy Fathers, therefore, is that we indeed have a more distinct and easier negative concept of God than an affirmative one; for it is more easily known what God is not than what He is; yet they do not on that account contend that He cannot also be known affirmatively. Indeed, St. Dionysius himself proves both ways of knowing God, namely affirmatively and negatively, in many places, as is clear both from what has been said and from ch. 3. of his Mystical Theology, where he discloses which are the affirmative notions about God and which the negative.

You will say 2. No perfection having the character of a most simple pure act can be known by us mortals by a positive concept: but every perfection of God, whether essential or attributive, has the character of a most simple pure act: therefore it cannot be conceived by us by an affirmative concept. The minor is evident: the major is proved: First, because our intellect cannot form such a concept of a created spiritual being and substance: therefore much less of an uncreated substance or perfection, which is a most simple pure act. Second, if a proper concept of God were had, God would appear in this concept under a created or uncreated notion: not under a created notion, for so He would not be conceived as God, but as a creature: nor under an uncreated notion either, because either He would be conceived so by a negative concept, and we have what was sought; or by a positive one, and then He would be conceived as He is in Himself; and accordingly He would be discerned intuitively by us wayfarers by natural light alone; which is repugnant. Third, finally, because all the perfections of God, both intrinsic and extrinsic, or those which express an order to creatures, are not conceived except by a negative concept. For God is not conceived as a necessary being, spiritual, etc. except through the negation of contingency, matter, etc. Similarly He is not conceived under the notion of first Cause, of supreme Ruler, and of ultimate end, except through an order to negations; for these concepts, as perceived by us, involve the negation of a prior or superior; for the first Cause is said to be that which has nothing prior; the supreme Ruler, that which has nothing superior; and the ultimate end, that which has nothing further. Therefore no proper affirmative concept of God can be formed by us. — I deny the major, and to the first proof of that major, I say that although we cannot have an affirmative concept of a created spiritual being through its own species, we can nevertheless have it through foreign species, conceiving namely the spiritual being by affirmation and negation together; denying namely that the spirit is matter or body; and affirming that it is something besides matter and body: so that the species of a corporeal being contribute to forming this concept: 'spirit is not matter nor body; but it is a substance devoid of matter and corporeity.' So, by way of likeness, it can be said that the species of creatures can contribute to the knowledge of God, inasmuch as, at the sight of them, we deny that He is this or that created being, and we affirm that He is a being devoid of all finiteness and of every created and limited character.

If you say. That God is not conceived or known in this way through proper species; and accordingly that that concept is not proper to God. I shall deny the consequence. For just as when we conceive a substance through its order to the accidents which it receives from its nature, or through its order to the operations for eliciting which it is naturally ordered; for example, when we conceive fire as a substance which requires light and heat in such a degree, and which can produce another similar fire, we have a proper concept of the substance of fire, although this concept is not formed except dependently on foreign species, namely on the species of accidents; so, by parity, the concept formed of God will be no less proper, although it is not formed except dependently on the species of creatures, which are denied of Him, and by whose benefit it is understood that there is something beyond and above creatures. — To the second proof I say, that God is represented by this concept as an uncreated being; nor is that affirmative concept on that account intuitive, because it is not made nor caused by an object present and moving through its immediate presence, which motion is required for an intuitive concept. — To the third proof of the aforesaid major I say, that although the divine perfections, both intrinsic and extrinsic, cannot be conceived by us without some order to negations, nevertheless it does not therefore follow that they are conceived by us as pure negations, as the Thomists will have it, but only this may be inferred from it, that those positive perfections connote certain negations, for the sake of greater clarity and more evident knowledge. And so the truth of the conclusion remains safe and intact, that God can be known and defined by us not only by a negative concept, but also by an affirmative one.

Second conclusion. — There can naturally be had by us wayfarers a proper concept of God, not only attributive, or through His attributes, but also quidditative and essential.

This is the Doctor's teaching at the cited place n. 5., against Henry of Ghent and St. Thomas 1. part. q. 2. art. 1.

The first part is proved. We conceive God as the supreme good, infinitely wise, omnipotent, etc.: but these concepts are properly attributive, as all admit: therefore an attributive concept proper to God can be formed by us wayfarers.

You will say. Those concepts are not proper to God which also belong to creatures, and which are not attributed to God except because they are seen to be perfections in creatures, which ought not to be denied to God, the Author and Origin of all perfections: but all attributive concepts are such: therefore they are not proper to God. — I distinguish the major. If those attributive perfections belong to God and to creatures in the same way, and with the same degree of perfection, their concept will not be proper to God, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is true that all those perfections which are attributed to God are attributed to Him otherwise than to creatures; for power, e.g., is attributed to creatures as limited to certain effects; but to God as extending itself to any possible effects; and so with the rest: and accordingly the concept formed of those divine attributes is so proper to God that it belongs to no other.

The Doctor proves the second part in the same place thus: When God is conceived as infinitely wise, He is conceived as a being having infinite wisdom and requiring it from its nature: but that concept is quidditative, proper and essential to God: therefore, etc. It is indeed proper, since besides God there is no other being which requires and has infinite wisdom: it is also quidditative, since it does not suppose another prior concept; otherwise there would be an infinite regress: therefore a concept of God that is proper and quidditative can be formed by us.

It is confirmed. Almost all theologians admit that the divine attributes are distinguished from the essence, either formally, as the Scotists, or virtually, as the Thomists, or by reason, as the rest: therefore it is necessary that they have a concept of the divine Essence other than the concept of the Attributes: for how would essence and attributes appear distinct, unless they could be expressed by different concepts? Therefore a quidditative concept of God can be formed by us.

You will say. A quidditative concept expresses the essence: but there is no concept which expresses the divine essence to us: therefore none exists. The major is certain; the minor likewise; for if any concept expressed the divine essence to us, we could know it distinctly: but it lies hidden from us, for now we know God only through a mirror and in an enigma: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. A quidditative concept expresses the essence, either distinctly, or at least confusedly, I concede: always distinctly, I deny. Therefore a twofold quidditative concept can be distinguished: one, indeed, evident, which expresses the essence distinctly, that is, through genus and difference; the other confused, or argumentative, which points out the essence through the properties which it requires: thus, e.g., I conceive distinctly the essence of man by saying: man is a rational animal; and only confusedly, when I affirm that he is a risible animal, because risibility is a property which indeed points out and presupposes the essence, but does not constitute or express it.

To the minor I say with the Subtle Doctor, ibidem n. 16, that a distinct quidditative concept of God cannot indeed be formed by us naturally; because God is a voluntary object with respect to the created intellect; and accordingly He cannot be distinctly perceived by it, unless He Himself exhibits and manifests Himself to be perceived: yet a proper concept can be formed, which expresses at least confusedly His essence, and discloses it as distinct from every essence of creatures. But which concepts can be formed by us, by which the divine essence is more distinctly disclosed and manifested, will indicate

Third conclusion. — God is rightly defined by us as a being infinite in every way. So the Doctor in 1. dist. 3. q. 2. n. 17.

Proof. That definition is legitimate by which the nature of the thing defined is disclosed in the more perfect way in which it can be conceived by us, and which is the reason why the other predicates of the thing defined are shown to belong to it: but the aforesaid definition is such.

For first, it demonstrates the nature of God: since by the notion of Being it agrees with all creatures as it were generically and univocally, as has been fully proved in our Metaphysics: and by the notion of the infinite it differs from them essentially; for there is no creature which is infinite in every way; indeed all are finite and limited, both in entity and in their excellences and perfections.

Next, that infinite entity is the formal reason why all the predicates which are attributed to God belong to Him; for if someone asks why God is eternal, e.g., it will be rightly answered: because He is infinite in every way; and accordingly He must be infinite in duration, and so lack beginning and end, and consequently be eternal; the same is to be said of the other divine attributes.

It is confirmed. By the reasons of the Doctor proving this Conclusion thus: That definition is to be judged legitimate which is made through a concept that is simple and more perfect: but the aforesaid definition is such. For first, that concept is simpler, because entitative infinity is not conceived as a certain property distinct from being, in the way in which unity, truth, goodness, which are the properties of being, are distinguished from it and have their objective concepts so distinct from the concept of being that they can be conceived separately from being: whence when being is conceived as good, e.g., that concept is not simple, but as it were united from two concepts, namely from the concept of being and of goodness. But it is otherwise with infinite being, because the concept of infinite being is not the concept of being as affected by a property emanating from it, but is the concept of being as expressing a mode and grade intrinsic to itself. Whence, just as the concept of intense whiteness as eight is not the concept of whiteness as affected by some property emanating from it, e.g. visibility; but is formally the very concept of whiteness under such a grade, which is not its property, but only the determination of that entitative intensity to the eighth grade: so the concept of infinite being (says the Doctor) is the simple concept of being itself in a certain grade of perfection, namely infinity. Whence infinite being is not properly said to be 'being such', that is, affected by a property: but more rightly it is said to be 'being in such a way', that is, determined in such a mode and grade of being: which concept is prior to the concept of all the attributes which belong to God as properties, and consequently is the simplest of all.

Second: it is also more perfect, both because (says the Doctor) the concept of infinite being virtually includes many, indeed all, the divine perfections; for just as being virtually contains truth, unity, and its other attributes, so infinite being virtually contains the supreme good and the supreme true and whatever other attributes we conceive of God; and because those things are more perfect which are last demonstrated a posteriori of God; for the things which are thus last demonstrated of God are more remote from creatures; and accordingly more exceed the perfections of creatures, and therefore are more perfect: but that God is an infinite being is last demonstrated a posteriori, because in infinity He agrees with no creature; nor is infinity known to belong to God except by removing from Him all the things which are finite and imperfect in creatures, and consequently the concept of infinite being is the most perfect of all.

You will say 1. 'Supreme being' equally signifies an intrinsic mode, as does 'infinite being': it equally and likewise virtually includes all the divine attributes: therefore the concept of infinite being is not simpler, nor more perfect than all those which can be formed of God; nor does it therefore serve more to define and disclose His essence. The Doctor answers in the same place that 'supreme' can be understood either comparatively or absolutely; namely, either through an order to the others which it exceeds, or for that which cannot be exceeded: but in whatever way it be taken, it is certain that the concept of infinite being is more perfect than it: both because the concept of the infinite can be understood without comparison to creatures; and accordingly is more absolute, and consequently more perfect: and because even if the concept of supreme being be taken absolutely, it is nevertheless less perfect than the concept of the infinite; for from the fact that some being is supreme, it does not follow that it is infinite; nevertheless among them there could be given one which would be supreme, and yet not infinite: therefore although really and in fact the concepts of supreme being and of infinite being are the same in God and signify the same, yet if they were conceived separately and formally, it is certain that the concept of infinite being is more excellent than the other.

You will say 2. The concept of a spiritual substance living an intellectual life is more perfect than the concept of infinity; because while I conceive God as an infinite being, there still remains the difficulty whether He is a substance or an accident, living or not living, spiritual or corporeal: therefore the concept of infinite being is not more excellent.

I deny the antecedent. For by the very fact that I conceive God as an infinite being, I necessarily conceive Him as the more perfect being that can be thought; and accordingly as having whatever perfection is in being; otherwise He would not be an infinite being, because some entity or perfection would be lacking to Him: therefore by the very fact that I conceive Him as an infinite being, I also conceive Him as existing necessarily and unfailingly, as subsisting through Himself, as incorporeal, as intelligent, finally as having the other grades of being which carry with them perfection without any imperfection. The rest which could be objected will be more easily and more suitably proposed and solved in the following Questions, in which the discourse will be about the divine Infinity.

Two things are to be resolved in the present Question: first, whether the concept and notion of being belongs to God in some special way such that it cannot belong to creatures by a similar notion; second, whether existence, that is, the actuality of being, belongs to God essentially, or only after the manner of a property or of an intrinsic mode, as some Scotists contend; which, that they may appear more evidently

Note 1. That although the word being, according to its grammatical signification, is the participle of the substantive verb sum, es, est, in which sense it denotes a thing actually existing, just as living signifies a thing actually living: nevertheless it is used by the philosophers for a substantive noun signifying that which is or can be. Taken in this way it can be understood in a threefold manner, as the Doctor notes in q. 3, quodlibetica, n. 20, namely: most broadly, broadly, and strictly. In the first way it involves beings both real and of reason, both actual and possible; and so taken it is contradictorily opposed to non-being, that is, to nothing. In the second way it embraces only real beings, whether accidental or substantial; and so it is contradictorily opposed to being of reason, which is not real being. In the third way it comprehends beings subsisting per se, such as substances both corporeal and spiritual; and so it is opposed to accidents, which, since they depend on substance in becoming and in being preserved, can be called not so much beings as something of a being. It is asked, however, whether being belongs to God in any of these ways, or whether it is to be attributed to Him in a special and altogether supereminent way most proper to Himself, and fitting to no creature in such a way.

Note 2. That existence, taken generally, is that by which a thing is in act; whence it comes about that existing things are distinguished by this their actuality from possible, future, and past things. This actuality of things, however, is twofold: one contained and dependent on an extrinsic and pre-existing cause; the other necessary, from itself, and altogether independent. The first belongs to all creatures, which borrow their whole being from God. The second, however, is proper to God alone. Each is really indistinct from the essence which it affects, as the Doctor proves in 2. d. 3. q. 4. But whether the existence proper to God is essential to Him, or only a mode of that essence, is no light controversy even among the Scotists themselves; what, however, seems to us truer in settling this dispute will appear below.

First conclusion. — The notion of being belongs to God most properly and essentially. This Conclusion has two parts, of which

The first part is proved. That belongs most properly to God which most expresses and manifests God: but the notion of being most manifests and makes known God: therefore, etc. The major is evident; for any thing is made known and distinguished from another by that which is proper and peculiar to it.

The minor is proved by the twofold definition which God Himself delivered of Himself, Exodi 3; for when Moses was sent by Him as a messenger to the children of Israel, and he asked the Lord in these words: If they say to me: what is His name? He answered: I am who am: He who is sent me to you. Which passage St. Bernard, lib. 5, De Consider., c. 6, so lucidly expounds:

If you say good, if great, if blessed, if wise, or whatever such thing of God, it is restored in this word which is EST. Surely, to ESSE is for Him to be all these things. If you have said them, you have added nothing; if you have not said them, you have diminished nothing. If you have seen this so singular, so supreme ESSE, do you not judge that, in comparison with this, whatever is not this is rather not-being than being? What likewise is God, than whom nothing is? Just as nothing can be without Him, so neither can He Himself be without Himself. He Himself is to Himself, He Himself is to all. And by this, in a certain way, He alone is who is His own being and the being of all.

Trismegistus had already taught the same thing earlier in Pymandro, cap. 5: As often as I say EXISTENCE, I say the Treasure of God; for existence embraces God Himself: outside Him there is nothing: outside nothing He Himself. Whence in the Temple of Delphic Apollo this inscription was once read in golden letters (Εἶ) you are, or you may be, as Eusebius reports, lib. 2. De Praeparatione Evangelica, which Plutarch, in the book published on this inscription, interprets thus: You are, and You alone truly are God. Plato likewise greatly commended this same name in his writings, as Augustine reports, lib. 8. De Civit. Dei, c. 11. And perhaps he had borrowed it from the books of Moses. Whence the author of the Catena notes that the name Tetragrammaton, which is said by the Hebrews to be so sacred and august that only the high Priest was allowed to utter it, signified the same as He who is. With these things Elias agrees, commenting on and explaining the oration 24. of Nazianzen.

God, he says, as St. Dionysius says, is indeed the cause of those things that are, that they may be; He Himself, however, is not, as one who is none of those things that are, but is above all things. For although God is called ENS, according to that text: I AM WHO AM; yet He is not a being as those things that are: for in what way would the maker be, as the works are? Neither is He a being in a definite way, but simply and in a peculiar way, or as it were excellently and surpassingly, as He alone knows.

Second, he alone is said truly to be, and being belongs most properly to him, if the rest besides him are more fittingly said not to be than to be: but the rest besides God can better and more rightly be said not to be than to be. Proof: those things can more rightly be said not to be than to be, of which far more can be denied than affirmed: but of man, e.g., the monarch of all visible creatures, far more can be denied than affirmed; for few grades of being are affirmed of him, namely that he is a rational animal, a body, etc., but the other creatures are almost infinite which are denied of him; for man is not an Angel, not a Star, not an Element, etc.

Then, a threefold state of created being can be conceived by us: the first, before its production; the second, in its existence; the third, after its consumption; that is, when it was not, when it actually exists, and after it has ceased to be. It is certain, however, that man before his origin and after his death is almost nothing: since before his origin he had only possible being, which the Doctor calls diminished being, or being little distinguished from nothing: after his death he no longer remains except according to part and as to his soul alone; for his body is dissolved into ashes and cinders.

It is likewise certain that while he lives he is little distant from nothing, not only because continual death threatens him, and as Seneca says, for the old it is at the gates, for the young in ambush; so that with David any man ought justly to say: I and death are divided by one step only; but because being belongs to any creature only accidentally, beggarly and precariously.

Second; because the being of creatures is most closely bordering on nothing; for, as St. Dionysius teaches, the last thing in the elements is earth, in bodies prime matter, in intellectual things our soul, in all things being. And so, just as the being of a creature appears first in creation after nothing, so it is last by resolution and near nothing: and so created being is between two nothings; whence, since middle things always participate something from the extremes, so created being has something of the nothing from which it came forth, and of the nothing toward which it tends.

Some refer here to the fact that Christ the Lord, at the approach of the Passion, laid low all the Jews with this word: I am: as if He had wished to signify the infinite majesty of His essence and nature, and, diametrically opposed, the nothingness of the creature. Hence in the Scriptures, Iob. cap. 23., it is said: For He alone is: and cap. 21: Are You not He who alone is? Of creatures, on the contrary, it is said Psal. 38: My substance is as nothing before You. Isaia, 40: All nations are so before God as if they were not, and are reputed as nothing and empty.

These things St. Jerome lucidly expounds, Epist. 25 ad Damascenum:

One, he says, is the sole nature of God, which truly EST; for that which subsists does not have it from elsewhere, but it is its own. The rest, which are created, even ifthey seem to be, are not, because at one time they were not, and what was can again not be. God alone, who is eternal, that is, who has no beginning, truly holds the name ESSE.

St. Isidore adds the reason, lib. 7, Etymol., cap. 1.: Because, in comparison with Him who truly IS and incomparably IS, those things which are mutable are as if they were not. He concludes: therefore God alone truly IS, in comparison with whose essence our being is not. Supply, according to equivalence and proportion, as holy Bonaventure observes, in 1. dist. 8. dub. 6. For it is true, he says, that there is no proportionable reason according to the condition of truth and mobility of the divine being; and therefore our being is as it were nothing, not altogether nothing in itself, but in proportion; for there is no proportion of created being to uncreated.

The second part is proved. God is called being by essence: therefore being belongs to Him essentially. The antecedent is evident by authority, not only of the holy Fathers, but also of the weightier philosophers, who called God being by essence. Our Smisingus proves the consequence, quaest. 1. De Essentia Dei, n. 17; for while God is called being by essence, these words do not signify that God is only being taken nominally, so that God has an essence which includes that which is signified by the name of being; otherwise creatures also would be called beings by essence, because their essences include that which is expressed by the name of being. Nor do they signify being insofar as it is a participle, and denotes and imports a thing actually existing, as if existence were only of the Essence of God by identity; since thus it would also be identified with the essence of a creature: for existence is not really distinguished from essence, and consequently is identified with it: therefore, while God is called being by essence, it must be so understood that being is of the very essence of God. These things will open more evidently

Second conclusion. — Existence is of the essence of God. So the Subtle Doctor in the places to be cited below, and St. Thomas, prima parte, q. 3. art. 4, and their more faithful interpreters and followers. But the truth and proof of this conclusion is evident from the preceding one; since, as being, which has been demonstrated to belong to God essentially and properly, is not possible being and actual being, it follows that existence, by which the Being belonging to God is made actual, also belongs to God essentially. Nevertheless, for a more evident intimation of this truth

First proof. That which from its formal notion is a necessary being and pure act includes existence in its essential concept: but God is formally a necessary being and pure act: therefore He includes existence in His essential concept. The major is certain, because the highest necessity of being and pure actuality exclude all potentiality and contingency whatsoever, and consequently presuppose a being existing by essence. For an essence which does not include existence in its formal concept can be conceived as non-existing, and consequently as possible; but an essence which is conceived as possible is not pure act, nor a necessary being. The minor is also evident, and will appear below, where we will show that the necessity of being and the highest actuality are intrinsic modes of the divine essence; and consequently that they are of the modal formal concept of the Deity itself.

Second, that is of the essence of a thing which is the first thing conceivable in it, and belongs to it in the first mode of saying per se: but such is existence in God: therefore, etc. The major is evident from Philosophy. The minor is proved: if anything prior to existence were conceivable in God, it would be especially His essence insofar as it prescinds from actual being and is conceived as non-existing: but the divine essence cannot be so conceived. Proof: if the divine essence can be conceived as non-existing, it must likewise be conceived as to be determined to existence, either by itself or by another: but neither can be said. Not the first, because since that essence would not be in act, it could not be the principle of actual existence; just as a possible Sun cannot be the principle of light actually emanating. Not the second either, otherwise God would not be the first cause, since He would suppose another from whom He would borrow existence and on whom He would depend in order to be; and consequently He would not be God.

It is confirmed. Nothing can flow or emanate from another, except from that which already exists; therefore, in order that existence might flow from essence, it would be necessary for the divine essence to be actually existing, so that divine existence might flow from it; and so it would exist before it existed, which is altogether contradictory.

You will say 1. From St. Jerome in cap. 3. ad Ephesios: God is the origin of Himself, and the cause of His own substance: but He cannot be one origin of Himself, unless His existence flows from His essence: therefore, etc. Moreover St. Augustine, lib. 83, Quaestionum, c. 16: God, he says, is the cause of all things that are; but what is the cause of all things is also the cause of its own wisdom: therefore God can be the cause of something of Himself, and so it will not be repugnant that the essence be the cause and origin of its existence.

I deny the consequence. For the sense of Hieronymus is that God never began, nor was produced by another, but exists essentially per se; so that He is said to be the cause of Himself not positively, as if He had produced Himself, but negatively, because He is from Himself, and acknowledges no cause of Himself. The same answer to St. Augustine.

You will say 2. Those things which are univocally common are of altogether the same notion: whence the Doctor in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 4. concludes that if divine Goodness were of the formal notion of divine Wisdom, it would likewise be of the formal notion of created wisdom: but existence is common to God and to creatures univocally, just as the notion of being itself is, as the Doctor himself acknowledges: therefore existence in God and in creatures must be of the same notion. But in creatures existence is only an intrinsic mode: therefore it will also be such in God.

I distinguish the major. If they are univocally common in the first grade of univocation, I concede: if only in the fourth grade of univocation, I deny. For a fourfold grade of univocation is distinguished by our authors: the first is that whose univocal notion is in its inferiors with equal perfection, the same essential order, and the same mode of being: thus the infima species, for example, man, is in Peter and in John, etc. The second is that whose notion is indeed in the inferiors with the same essential order and the same mode of being, but not with equal perfection: thus the genus, for example, animal, is in man and in brute, more nobly indeed in man by reason of the more perfect difference which contracts it to man. The third is that whose notion belongs to the inferiors equally essentially, but not equally immediately: thus number is univocal to two and to three, because each is essentially number, but it belongs to two before three. The fourth, finally, is that whose univocal notion alone belongs to the inferiors, setting aside the same mode of being and the same essential order: and in this way existence belongs to God and to creatures: to God indeed essentially formally, to creatures however only essentially really, that is, as an intrinsic mode really indistinct from the essence.

You will insist. This answer being admitted, it would follow that the divine essence is not first-diverse from the created essence, nor simpliciter simple; but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The sequel is proved: that essence is not first-diverse, nor simpliciter simple, which has one common concept in which it agrees with another, and a peculiar concept by which it is distinguished from another: but the divine essence would be such, since it would agree with the created essence through the concept of existence, and would be distinguished from it through the concept of essence; and so it would be resolvable into a particular and a common notion: therefore it would be neither simple, nor first-diverse.

I deny the minor. For nothing absurd follows from this; for although the divine essence should be diverse from the creature and simple, yet it is not necessary that it be first-diverse and simpliciter simple; nor does this argue any imperfection in God, rather it imports perfection; because a concept simpliciter simple, that is, irresolvable into other concepts, both virtually and formally, seems to be less perfect, since it includes perfection and entity as it were determinate and limited.

You will say 3. What, coming to a thing, does not vary its formal notion, is only an intrinsic mode: but such is existence, since a possible man and a man actually existing is the same man essentially; nor are his essential predicates varied by actual existence: therefore, by the like argument, divine existence will be only a mode of the divine essence.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that created existence does not enter into the formal notion of the created essence, but follows it and reduces it from the possible state to actuality: but it is otherwise in divine things; for since the divine essence is necessarily pure act, it excludes all possibility whatsoever and includes existence in its essential concept.

You will say 4. If existence were of the formal concept of the essence, it would also be of the formal concept of the attributes and of the personal relations: but the consequence is false, otherwise there would be several existences in God just as there are several attributes and several personal relations in Him; for, the thing being multiplied, that also which is of its essential concept is multiplied. The antecedent is proved: for existence would be of the formal concept of the essence for this reason, because, as we have said, the divine essence is a necessary being and pure act: but the attributes are likewise such, and such are the relations: therefore if existence, for this reason, is of the formal concept of the divine essence, it must also be of the formal concept of the attributes and of the relations.

The antecedent could be denied. For the notion of the essence and of the attributes and relations is not the same, since the attributes and relations, as they presuppose the divine essence from which they emanate, can be understood to borrow their existence from it; but the divine essence can receive existence from no one, and consequently it is necessary that it involve it in its formal concept. But this being freely granted, I deny the minor: for it is not inconvenient to admit in God as many existences as there are adequately distinct properties and relations; for since existence is a transcendent predicate fitting every actual being, it is necessary that there be as many existences as there are actual beings formally or really adequately distinct; because just as an intrinsic mode does not have a reality or formality adequately distinct from the essence, but is involved in its perfect and modified concept, so also it does not have an existence distinct from the essence. But it is otherwise with the positive attributes and personal relations, which, since they are actual entities formally and adequately distinct from the divine essence, must also have their existence distinct from it; which is most certain concerning the existence of the essence and of the relations; for the former is communicable, the latter, however, altogether incommunicable.

Whence it is to be inferred that whatever has a reality formally distinct from the essence must also have an existence formally distinct from the existence of the essence. Thus the Doctor in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 1. teaches that the common nature has its own real being outside the soul, formally distinct from the being of the singular nature, just as it has its own reality and quiddity.

You will say 5. What exists essentially cannot be conceived as non-existing: but God can be conceived as non-existing: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for a thing cannot be conceived without its essence, nor under the opposite of its essence: for man, e.g., cannot be conceived except as he is sentient and rational, nor can he be apprehended as an ass. The minor is likewise established from the opinion of the Atheists, who call the existence of God into doubt.

I answer. With St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 8. parte 1. quaest. 2., that something can be thought and conceived not to be in two ways: namely, without assent and with assent of the one conceiving. In the former way something can be conceived under the opposite of its essence; e.g., man-ass: for this concept imports nothing other than the understanding of those things which are said and uttered in the proposition. In the latter way, when something can be conceived not to be, this proceeds either from the defect of the one understanding, or from the defect of the intelligible object: but the defect of the one understanding is either blindness or ignorance, by which it happens that he who is ignorant of the thing thinks it not to be: this ignorance, however, regards either the existence or the essence of the thing. I confess, however, that the human intellect can conceive God not to be as to what He is, that is, not to know His essence; not, however, as to whether He is, that is, truly to doubt of His existence.

For (says Hugo, lib. 1. De Sacram., parte 3. cap. 1.): God from the beginning so tempered the knowledge of Himself in man that, just as what He was could never be comprehended by man, so it could never be ignored that He was.

Because therefore (says St. Bonaventure) our intellect never fails in the knowledge of God, whether He is, therefore it cannot be ignorant that He is, nor think that He is not; but because it fails in the knowledge of what He is, therefore it frequently thinks God to be what He is not, e.g., to be the Sun, an Idol, etc.; and it also thinks not to be what He is, e.g., God not just; and therefore by reason of the defect of the intellect, God can be thought not to be that which He is; although He cannot be thought what He is. But if this proceeds from the part of the intelligible object, since this defect is either a defect of presence or a defect of evidence, namely because either the thing is not always, and so it can be thought not to be at some time; or it is not everywhere, and so it can be thought not to be here; or because it does not have evident proofs, and so it can be thought not to have certain existence. But in neither of these ways can God be thought not to be, because He is always, everywhere, and evidently demonstrable through creatures.

And so He cannot be thought not to be with assent, except because of the ignorance of the one thinking, who does not perceive what is understood by the name of God, and in fact assent to this proposition: God is not: but they only utter it with the mouth.

Since it plainly appears, enough and more than enough, that God is the greatest and most excellent of all beings, and it easily comes to anyone's mind that He likewise holds the first place and seat among the principal and nobler species of being, and consequently that He is a complete, spiritual, and living substance, there would be no occasion for doubting and disputing, unless the error of those philosophizing badly provoked us to it.

Note 1. The name of substance is used in various ways: 1. Indeed, for the resources, or riches, by which human life is sustained; in which manner the name of substance is for the most part used in Sacred Scripture. Thus Proverb. 3 says: Honor the Lord with your substance, and give to Him of the first-fruits of all your produce, etc. Thus Luc. 15: the prodigal son is said to have received from his father the portion of substance due to him, and to have squandered it by living luxuriously. — 2. It is taken for the nature and essence of any thing whatsoever, whether substantial or accidental, in which sense we sometimes say that an accident can be considered according to its substance, that is, according to its entity and nature. — 3. It is taken for that being which is opposed to accident, and which so subsists per se that it can in no way be in a subject of inherence. The name of substance used in this way, however, arises from the verbs substo, or subsisto; the first designates its function, which is to stand under, that is, to stand beneath accidents; the second indicates its formal notion, which consists in existence per se, that is, in a mode of existing independently of any accident.

Note 2. The name of spirit is almost the greatest of all equivocal terms: 1. For it is taken for a most tenuous thing, whether that be an accident or a substance; in which manner the purer part of the blood is called the vital spirit, and intentional species are called spiritual images of things. The name of spirit taken in this way, however, is opposed not to the corporeal, but to the coarse, and especially to the solid. — 2. It is taken for wind, air, exhalation; and hence to breathe and to respire is the same as to draw in air: and a wind rushing with excessive force is called the spirit of storms. — 3. For the soul, whether rational or sensitive. Thus Eccle. 3: Who knows whether the spirit of the children of Adam ascends upward, and whether the spirit of the beasts descends downward? — 4. For an incorporeal substance, in which manner it is opposed to body. Thus Christ the Lord in Luc. 24, opening the truth of His resurrection to His disciples, who, seeing that He had entered the midst of the Cenacle through closed doors, thought that it was a phantom, and believed that they were seeing a spirit, says: Handle and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see me having.

Note 3. From St. Thomas, 1. part, q. 18. a. 1.: That those things are properly living which move themselves according to some species of motion, whether motion is taken properly, as motion is said to be the act of the imperfect, that is, of that which exists in potency, or motion is taken commonly, insofar as it is said to be the act of the perfect, insofar as sensing and understanding are said to be moved, as one is said to be moved to some motion or some operation. But those things in whose nature it is not to move themselves to some motion or operation cannot be called living except through some likeness. Whence, answering the third objection, he says: That waters are called living which have a continuous flow, but standing waters are called dead, like the waters of cisterns and pools, but this is by way of likeness. Here, however, this vital motion, in order to be properly so called, must be made by a thing standing in its own and natural place. Whence heavy things indeed and rivers are moved while they are outside their native situation, but in it they rest. Plants, however, and other living things are moved with vital motion when they are in their own disposition and natural situation, as the same author says there in response to the second.

Hence in the same place, art. 3., he gathers a threefold genus of life. The first is of those things which move themselves to increase and perfect the form implanted in them by nature, like plants. Some, to obtain an external form perfective of themselves, such as are the animals which are moved to a form not implanted by nature, but received through the senses. Some, finally, move themselves to an apprehended end with the due order of means, such as is the rational creature.

But since the created intellect is moved from the knowledge of principles to the knowing of the conclusion, and is moved and attracted by external objects to operation, hence it happens that although it moves itself, nevertheless because it is also moved by another, it does not have the perfect grade of life. Whence he concludes: that thing therefore whose very nature is to understand, and to which that which it naturally has is not determined by another; this is what obtains the highest grade of life: such, however, is God, whence in God there is life in the highest degree. With these things premised for the sake of clarity, let it be

First conclusion. — God is a substance, and a complete one. This conclusion comprises two parts, of which the first is proved: God is the most excellent being: therefore He holds the first and principal place among the species of being: but substances are the nobler species of being: therefore among them God holds the first place. The major is evident from what has been said; the minor likewise from the common judgment of the philosophers, who admit that accident is a being of being, that is, a less perfect being.

Secondly: An accident depends on a subject, and is by nature posterior to it: but God is a being independent in every genus: therefore He is not an accident, and consequently He is a substance.

Thirdly: That which produces a substance cannot be an accident, because a cause is more excellent than its effect, and whatever dignity and perfection the effect has, all of it it borrows from its cause; and consequently, since an accident is more imperfect than a substance, it cannot produce it: but God is the Author and Maker of all substances: therefore He is not an accident, but a substance. These things will be established more fully below when we treat of divine simplicity, where we shall demonstrate that every accident is to be removed from God.

You will say 1. From St. Augustine, book 7. De Trinitate, cap. 5.: It is manifest that God is called substance improperly. Likewise Boethius also, in the book De Trinitate, around the middle, says that God is not truly a substance; and hence there is no conclusion.

I deny the consequence. But the authority of St. Augustine I distinguish: that God is not a substance, insofar as substance signifies that which stands under and is subjected to accidents, I concede; insofar as the name of substance expresses that which subsists per se, I deny. That this, however, is the mind of St. Augustine is clear; for when at the end of the fourth chapter he had said: just as from that which is to be, essence is named, so from that which is subsisting, we call it substance... For every thing subsists with respect to itself, how much more God? If, however, it is worthy that God be said to subsist. He adds in cap. 5.: But God, if He subsists so that He can be properly called a substance, something is in Him as in a subject, and He is not simple, to whom to be is that which it is for Him, and whatever else is said of Him about Him, like great, omnipotent, good, and if anything of this sort is not incongruously said of God. It is true, however, to say that God subsists and stands under His own goodness, and that that goodness is not a substance but rather an essence, nor is God Himself His own goodness, but it is in Him as in a subject. Whence it is manifest that God is called substance improperly, so that by the more customary name essence is understood, which is said truly and properly, so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence. From these things His mind clearly stands. — As to Boethius, however, I say that he is to be understood in this way, that he wills God not to be a finite and limited substance, in the manner in which the substances of creatures are said to be: but an infinite substance, and in every way independent and subsisting per se, for he says: Substance in Him is not truly substance, but beyond substance. And (a few things interposed): for when we say, God, it seems indeed to signify substance: but that which is beyond substance. In which manner also St. Dionysius, in the book De divinis nominibus, judges that God is not to be called substance, but supersubstance.

You will say 2. The sacred Scriptures for the most part express God by a name proper to accidents. Thus, for example, it is said in the first epistle of John: God is light, and there are no darknesses in Him; in the same place, in the fourth chapter: God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God. But light and charity are accidents: therefore God is an accident.

I distinguish the major. According to some analogy and proportion, namely by reason of operation and effects, I concede; according to the truth and entity of the thing, I deny. And so God is called light, because surely, just as light drives away darkness, He drives away and eliminates far from Himself all the darknesses of sin and the defects of all creatures; then also because with the light of His graces He penetrates and illuminates every man coming into this world. By the same reason He is called charity, because namely He burns with the greatest love toward men and pursues us with the most ardent affection.

Proof of the second part. Because if He were an incomplete substance, He would be either matter or form: neither can be said. Not the first, because matter does not live, but God lives; matter is passive potency, and hence something imperfect, but God is the most perfect being; matter is not active, but God is the first efficient cause of things. Not the second either, both because every form has an essential order to matter, which essential order argues dependence: and also because if He were a form, it would be either animate or inanimate; not the latter, because to be an animate form is more perfect than to be an inanimate form. Nor the former, because an animate form must be united to some matter in order to make some animate whole; not from itself, therefore from another: therefore if God were an animate form, something would be prior to God.

Second conclusion. — God is a spiritual substance.

This is of faith, as is evident both from Sacred Scripture: John 4: God is spirit; 2 Corinthians 3: But the Lord is spirit; Wisdom 1: The spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world; in the twenty-eighth Psalm: Where shall I go from your spirit? If I ascend into Heaven, you are there; for although the word, Spirit, is sometimes taken in the Scriptures for a corporeal substance, as was said in the 2. Note, nevertheless in the aforementioned places it is used properly, as we shall prove when we treat of the simplicity of God, where we shall demonstrate that He is neither a body nor corporeal.

Third conclusion. — God is a living substance. This is likewise of faith, as is evident from Sacred Scripture, in which God Himself affirmed that He lives not only by the most efficacious arguments, but also by an oath. Thus in Deuteronomii 33, where He had reproached the powerlessness of the vain gods, and had convicted the madness of the idolaters who trust in them with these words: Where are the gods in whom they had trust? Let them rise and help you, and protect you in necessity; He concludes: See that I am alone, and there is no other besides me: I will kill and I will make to live, I will strike and I will heal. He confirms all these things with this solemn oath: I will lift my hand to Heaven, and I will say: I live forever: or, as the Seventy Interpreters render: Because I will lift my hand to Heaven, and I will swear by my right hand, I will say: I live. The Angels also affirm the same oath; for we read in Apocalyps. 10: The angel, says John the Evangelist, whom I saw standing upon the sea and upon the earth, lifted his hand to Heaven, and swore by Him who lives forever and ever. Hence you will find these words so often divinely uttered: I live, says the Lord. — The same thing Christ the Savior indicates with these words, Ioannis 5.¹: As the Father has life in Himself, so He gave to the Son also to have life in Himself; for God is not only living, but also the fountain and origin of life, since all things living through Him and in Him receive their life. Hence David, Psalm. 41: My soul has thirsted for the strong living God; and Psal. 35: With you is the fountain of life. Because, says St. Dionysius elegantly, in the book De Divinis nominibus, cap. 6.:

Every life and vital motion proceeds from that life which surpasses every life, and is the principle of all life. For from it souls have immortality, from it animals live, from it plants live through the last vestige of life. If the gift of that life should perhaps be taken away, every life fails; and it gives to life itself and to universal life that it be life, and again to each life that each one be properly what by nature it ought to have been.

Hence rightly does saint Paul say, Acts, cap. 17: In Him we live, and move, and are. We are moved, says St. Ambrose, in the book De Bono Mortis, final chapter, in God as it were on the way; we are as it were in truth; we live as it were in eternal life. Or, as St. Cyprian interprets, in the book De Baptismo Christi, we are in the Father, we live in the Son, we are moved in the Holy Spirit; in the Son, I say, we live, because, says John in the first chapter, what was made, in Him was life.

The same truth is proved by reason: To live is to move oneself to operation: but God operates in the highest degree not from another mover, but from Himself, independently of anything else, for He is the first mover and agent: therefore life belongs to Him in the most perfect grade. Secondly: The divine being comprises every perfection of being: but to live is the highest perfection of being: therefore God comprises life. Thirdly: No one gives what he does not have: but God bestows life on all, both on plants, and on animals, and on men and Angels: therefore it is necessary that He likewise have it.

You will say. From Aristotle, book 2. De Anima, text 36: The soul is the cause and principle of the living body: but God has neither a soul, nor a body, nor a principle: therefore neither life.

I distinguish. In corporeal and created things, about which alone Aristotle treats, I concede; in spiritual and uncreated things, such as God is, I deny: for God, since He is altogether spiritual and without a body, lives a spiritual and intellectual life, not indeed distinct from Himself, but altogether identified with Himself, because, says saint Augustine, book 8. De Civitate Dei, cap. 6.:

To Him it is not one thing to be, another to live, as though He could be without living; nor is it one thing to Him to live, another to understand, as though He could live without understanding; nor is it one thing to Him to understand, another to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed: but that which it is for Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, that it is for Him to be.