Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Such is the affinity and connection of Polytheism with Atheism, that the affirmation of many gods is the complete negation of the one true God. Indeed, to Tertullian it seems far less a crime to deny God altogether than to multiply him; for God, he says, in book 1. contra Marcionem, if he is not one, he is not, because we believe not to be, whatever has not been such as it ought to be. Hence he begins his book De Idololatria with these words: The principal crime of the human race, the highest guilt of the age, the whole cause of judgment, is Idolatry. Therefore, after Atheism has been vanquished, it is worthwhile also to expugn Idolatry, and to demonstrate by natural reason that the plurality of gods is altogether impossible.

Note 1. The Demon is the parent and artificer of all Idolatry, inasmuch as he tried to introduce it into the heavenly and earthly Paradise, and from there into the whole circle of the earth. For scarcely had that emulator of the Divinity been formed, when he wished to become like the Most High, to ascend into the heaven of the Godhead, and to exalt above the stars the throne of his pseudo-divine majesty. Scarcely had the first parents of men greeted the day, when that artificer of malice and cunning solicited them to Idolatry, saying: You will be like gods. Scarcely, finally, had the men who survived the strangling waters of the flood begun again to cultivate the earth, and to raise up the human race, almost extinct, when the Demon urged upon them the worship of many gods, in order to turn man away from the thought and knowledge of the true Divinity, and that he himself, under the false name of Idols, uttering certain empty Oracles, might hunt for divine honors. Whence Tertullian aptly, in cap. 22. of the Apologeticum: They emulate divinity, while they steal divination.

Note 2. So great was the blindness and folly of the Gentiles, that they adored an almost innumerable multitude of gods. For as Eusebius reports, book 9. of Praeparationis Evangelicae, cap. 15., Hesiod reckoned that there are thirty thousand gods on earth. Hence St. Augustine, book 4. of De Civitate Dei, cap. 8: When (he says) could all the names of the Gods or Goddesses be commemorated in one place of this book, which they could scarcely contain in huge volumes, distributing to single things the proper offices of the Divinities? And after a few words interposed, relating the twelve gods whom they had appointed for the preserving and fostering of a single ear of grain, he says:

They therefore set Proserpina over the sprouting grains; over the joints and knots of the stalks, the god Nodutus; over the coverings of the husks, the goddess Volutina; when the husks open so that the ear may come forth, the goddess Patelina; when the crops are equaled by new ears, because the ancients said hostire for to equal, the goddess Hostilina; when the grains are in flower, the goddess Flora; when they are milky, the god Lacturnus; when they ripen, the goddess Matura; when they are weeded, that is, taken away from the earth, the goddess Runcina. Nor do I mention all things, because it disgusts me that they are not ashamed.

But how much men endowed with reason ought to have blushed, to worship, and as it were to adore, invoke, and fear as gods, others not only mortal men, and in all things similar to themselves, but even fever, pestilence, pallor, and other infirmities and disasters, which (says the same St. Augustine, ibidem cap. 23.) were not the divinities of the worshippers, but the crimes of the worshippers. Nay more, to venerate, and to hold as gods all the stupid and harmful animals, even small plants, such as leek and onion, which the Egyptians also held as gods, and venerated in such a way that they dared neither to break nor to eat them. Concerning which Juvenal writes wittily, Satire 15.

Who does not know, Volusius of Bithynia, what monsters mad Egypt worships? It adores the crocodile… Leek and onion it is a crime to violate and to break with a bite. O holy peoples! for whom these deities spring up in the gardens.

Note 3. That although, with the Gospel light irradiating, all this error of idolatry was driven away, according to that prophecy of Isaiah, cap. 2., The Lord alone shall be lifted up in that day, and the idols shall be utterly crushed; for at the rising of that most splendid Sun of justice, the dense darkness of superstition began to diminish, and from then on the Demon himself, returning to his ancient seats of darkness and foretelling that a perpetual silence was to be in the Delphic Oracle and the rest, departing from it, says:

Me a Hebrew boy, God himself ruling the gods, Bids yield the seat, and sad return beneath Orcus,

nevertheless certain infamous heretics broke forth from among the Christians, who introduced a plurality of gods, since the Manichaeans, Cerdonians, Gnostics, and Marcionites established two gods, one Good, the other Evil. Whence Tertullian, speaking of Marcion, in book 1. which he wrote against him, cap. 2.: The Pontic man, he says, brings forward two gods, like the Symplegades of his shipwreck: one whom he could not deny, that is, the Creator and ours, and the other whom he could not prove, that is, his own. And in cap. 5., speaking of Valentinus the heresiarch, he says: More honest and more liberal is Valentinus, who dared at once to conceive two, Bythus and Sige, when he poured out the godhead of divinity up to the thirty offspring of Aeons, like an Aeonic sow. Therefore, not only against the idolaters, but also against the heretics, the unity of the Godhead is to be demonstrated by reasons, both natural and moral.

First conclusion. — God is so necessarily unique, that it is altogether impossible for there to be many gods. The Subtle Doctor proves this conclusion in 1. dist. 2. q. 3. by seven natural reasons, of which the First is drawn from the infinite intellect, the second from the infinite will, the Third from infinite goodness, the Fourth from infinite power, the Fifth from the very notion of infinity, the Sixth from necessary existence, the Seventh from omnipotence; all of which, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I have judged to be reducible to three heads, namely, to the divine entity, operation, and dignity, from which, as from a threefold source of light, the unity of the Divinity is established, and, as far as can be done, demonstrated.

First indeed thus: What is essentially singular is unique: but God is essentially singular: therefore he is unique. The major is clear, for singularity formally carries with itself the negation of communicability and multiplicability into several numerically distinct things: whence all Philosophers admit, that if human nature, for example, were singular from its essential principles, it could be found in one individual only. The minor is proved: What is essentially existing is essentially singular: but God is essentially existing: therefore he is singular. The minor is clear; since the name of God sounds nothing other than a being by essence, and so necessarily existing from itself, that it is impossible for it not to exist. The major also is evident; since existence belongs only to a singular thing, for it is the last grade of the thing and its last complement: whence Aristotle rightly teaches, that common natures, whether generic or specific, have no existence except in the singulars to which they belong and of which they are predicated: therefore it is necessary, that if God be essentially existing, he be also essentially singular, and consequently altogether incapable of multiplication into many gods; and consequently God is necessarily unique.

It is confirmed: If the Godhead could be multiplied, there would be infinite gods: but there are not infinite gods: therefore the Godhead cannot be multiplied. The minor is clear, for no Polytheist has so far asserted an infinite throng of gods. Because since God is to be worshipped by us, and we cannot worship infinite ones through our limited and finite operations, if they were infinite, it would follow that innumerable gods would be left altogether destitute of all worship and veneration, and entirely banished among us from the fellowship of the gods. — Whence Octavius, in Minucius Felix, wittily attacking the procreation and generation of the gods, says:

Why, if gods were born, are they not born even today? Unless perhaps Jupiter has grown old, and childbirth has failed in Juno, and Minerva grew gray before she gave birth. And therefore did that generation cease, because no assent was given to fables of this kind? But if gods could be created and could not perish, we would have more gods than all men, so that already neither could heaven contain them, nor the air hold them, nor the earth sustain them.

— The cited Doctor proves the major in n. 5: Every essence that is multiplicable and capable of being pluralized in individuals is not determined of itself to a certain number of individuals: but by whatever reason it can be in two, by the same it can be in four, in a hundred, in a thousand, and so on to infinity, as is clear of human nature, which could be in infinite men, if they were given: therefore if the divine nature can be in several individuals, it will be able to be in infinite ones. For why would its communication stop rather at one number, for example at a hundred, than at a thousand, and so on for the rest? Moreover, why could any created nature be capable of multiplication and pluralization to infinity, and the divine one not? Therefore if there could be many gods, there could be infinite ones. But if there could be infinite ones, they would in fact and actually exist, because since God is the being supremely necessary-to-be, whatever can be, in fact is: but there are not infinite gods existing: therefore they cannot be: therefore there cannot be many: therefore there is only one. Maironius judges this reason to be maximally convincing, in his commentary on the first book, dist. 2. quaest. 4. Yet against it

The Polytheists reply that, in order to break the force of this reason, those consequences are invalid, just as by way of analogy these inferences are invalid: 1. Human nature is not in fact determined to a certain number of men: therefore in fact there can be infinite men actually existing; 2. A blacksmith is not in fact determined to make one knife: therefore he will be able to make infinite ones; 3. I am not determined to carry a weight of three or four pounds: therefore I can carry infinite pounds of weight; 4. The Father in the Divinity is not determined to produce a single divine supposit: therefore he will be able to produce infinite divine supposits in number. But it is certain that these four consequences are false: therefore the sequel of our proof will also be false, by which we inferred, that if the divine nature is not necessarily determined to a single individual, but is multiplicable into several, it will be able to be multiplied into infinite ones, and thus there could be infinite gods. — Our Maironius answers: to the first, that although indeed human nature and any other is not of itself determined to a certain number of individuals, otherwise God could not perpetuate the world as long and as much as he would wish, since beyond the determined number of men he could not produce others, nevertheless it is determined from without, namely, by the divine will, which has decreed to produce so many men and not more. But if the divine nature could of itself be multiplied, its multiplication could be limited by nothing extrinsic, and consequently there would be as many of its individuals as could be, because since God is a being necessary-to-be, in him to be and to be able are the same. To the second, he says that the smith is determined by the matter and the brevity of life, so that if he lived forever and had infinite iron, he could make infinite knives. To the third, he says that that repugnance with respect to carrying an infinite weight is to be traced back not to the side of infinity, but to the side of simultaneity, for successively I could carry infinite pounds of weight, if indeed I lived infinite days and carried one pound on each single day: but I could not carry those infinite ones at the same time, unless God infused infinite strength into me. To the fourth, he distinguishes the antecedent: that the Father in the Divinity is not determined to produce a single supposit of the same notion and by the same faculty and operation, he denies; that it is to be produced by diverse faculties and operations, he concedes; for he is determined to produce the supposit of the Son by the utterance of the intellect, and to produce the supposit of the Holy Spirit by the spiration of the will. Whence it does not follow that he could produce infinite divine supposits: that indeed would follow if he were undetermined to produce two supposits of the same notion by the same faculty and operation, for example, two divine Sons or two Holy Spirits, because by whatever reason God could produce two, he could also produce infinite ones. Just as it legitimately follows, that if the divine nature were communicable to two divine individuals, it would also be communicable to a thousand and to infinite ones; because the same is the reason concerning communication to infinite ones as to two; since this communication could be limited and determined by nothing extrinsic to a certain number rather than to another: and therefore the firmness and strength of the aforesaid reason stands.

The second reason is sought from the infinite power of operating: since in God a threefold operation is supposed, namely, that of Omnipotence, by which he produces all things, of Intelligence, by which he knows himself and other things, and of Will, by which he loves himself and all other goods, from this threefold manner of operating the Doctor proves that the plurality of gods is repugnant.

First indeed from Omnipotence: It is repugnant for there to be several omnipotent beings: therefore also several gods. The consequence is clear, since by the name of God we signify the first cause altogether independent and unlimited, both in its entity and in its operations. For although the omnipotence of God cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, as the Doctor observes in n. 6., nevertheless, as the name of God is commonly received, it designates an omnipotent cause. The antecedent is proved: If there were two Omnipotent beings and one of them wished to produce some creature, either the other could impede the production of that creature or destroy it once produced, or he could not; if he could not, certainly he would not be to be called Omnipotent, since he could not carry out whatever he wished; if he could, it would follow that the other is not Omnipotent, since he could not complete his work or preserve it once done. Whence St. Athanasius rightly concludes: To say that several gods are equally powerful is to say that several are equally powerless.

You will reply that perhaps they are of equal virtue and power, but that there is so great and so close a bond of prudence and love among them, that one cannot dissent from the will of another. — On the contrary. Each of them would be altogether free, and consequently could sometimes dissent from the other: but supposing that they do not think alike about some work which one of them intends to undertake, either he will be able to carry out the intended work, or not: if he can, with the others opposing, who would not see that they are weak and powerless? since they could not prevent a work repugnant to them from being done. If he cannot, certainly he will not be omnipotent, nor consequently is he to be called God. Thus, on the part of the operation of Omnipotence, it is altogether repugnant for there to be several gods.

Secondly, the same is repugnant on the part of the operation of the divine Intellect, which the Doctor proves thus, and with him Bassolius in 1. dist. 2. q. 3: God must have an intellect of infinite perfection: but if there were several gods, neither of them would have an intellect of infinite perfection: therefore neither would be God. The major is established; for since God is an infinitely perfect being, above all he must have an intellect of infinite power and perfection in knowing, for knowledge is the greatest perfection of a spiritual being. The minor is proved: An intellect of infinite perfection must know all intelligible things in the most perfect manner in which they are knowable of themselves: but if there were several gods, for example two, of whom one, for the sake of greater clarity, may be called God the Father, and the other God the Son, neither of them could know any intelligible thing in the most perfect manner in which it is intelligible of itself, for indeed God the Father, for example, could not so know God the Son. The Doctor proves: In order that God the Father might know God the Son most perfectly, he would have to know him through the essence of God the Son himself: but he cannot know him so: therefore he would not know him most perfectly. The major is clear, for nothing is known most perfectly which is not known through its own essence, or through something else in which its essence is contained in a more perfect and nobler manner than in itself, namely, in the manner in which Theologians teach that creatures are and are known more perfectly in God than in themselves: but that God the Son, if he were given, would be knowable through his own essence, since he himself would so know himself, nor would there be anything in which his essence was contained in a more perfect manner than in itself, since it is supposed to be of infinite perfection, and consequently there is nothing which is more perfect than it: therefore he could not be known most perfectly by God the Father unless he were known through his essence. The minor also is evident, namely, that God the Father could not know God the Son through his essence: both because it would follow (says the Doctor) that the knowledge of God the Father would be posterior in nature to the essence of God the Son really distinct from him, for every knowledge really distinct from its object presupposes the object with at least a priority of nature, as the effect does the cause; for from the object and the potency every knowledge is begotten: and because (says Bassolius) God the Father would depend on God the Son in acquiring his knowledge, as on something extrinsic, and consequently would not be independent in the operation most proper to himself, such as knowledge is, and consequently would not be God.

You will reply that perhaps one God would know the other through his own essence, that is, through the essence of the knowing God himself, which would be altogether similar to the essence of the known God: or he would know him through some species representing the essence of the known God, by which consequently he would represent it most perfectly. — On the contrary: In this hypothesis (says the Doctor) the knowledge of the knowing God would not be most perfect, since a thing is not known as perfectly in something similar and representative as in itself, for intuitive knowledge is more perfect than abstractive knowledge: therefore if God the Father knew God the Son only by abstractive knowledge, namely, through his own essence or through a representative species of the essence of God the Son, his knowledge would not be most perfect, nor consequently would he be God.

Thirdly, finally, plurality is repugnant from the operation of the divine Will, which the Doctor thus proves in n. 3: The divine Will, since it is of infinite perfection, must be ordered and regulated, and therefore must love whatever is lovable as much as it is lovable: but if there were several gods, one could not love the other as much as he is lovable. It is proved: Either one would love the other infinitely, or not: if not, therefore his will would not be regulated, because since the other God is supposed infinitely perfect, he is infinitely lovable: if so, therefore he would love the other equally with himself, and consequently his love would not be ordered. For just as anyone by a natural weight inclines more toward his own preservation than toward that of another, so also he is bound to love himself more than another: but if one God loved another infinitely, he could not love himself more than the other, for in the infinite there is no more nor less: therefore if there were several gods, their will would be disordered, and consequently would not be divine: therefore they would not be gods. — Then, if there were several gods, either one would enjoy himself and the others at the same time, or he would use the others and enjoy himself; but neither can be said. Not the first, because then he would enjoy two adequately beatifying objects, for each of them, since it would be infinite good, would beatify adequately, and thus one would contribute to the beatitude of the other, and would not contribute: he would contribute indeed, because he would enjoy him; but he would not contribute, because with either of them removed, he would be no less blessed. Nor the second, because since one God is not ordered of himself to another as to an end, if one of them enjoyed the other, he would misuse him; and thus his will would not be ordered, nor consequently would he be God.

Finally, the third reason is sought from the dignity of the Godhead, which is chiefly threefold, according to the threefold respect which all creatures have toward God as toward their principle, moderator, and end, from whom they arise, by whom they are ruled, and to whom they are ordered.

For first it is established from the Physicists that for one and the same effect several total and adequate causes cannot be assigned, otherwise the cause would be total, as is supposed, and would not be, because for the production of the effect it would admit the consortium and activity of another cause: therefore neither can several first principles of all things be admitted. For either each of them would be the total principle, or not: not the first, because it implies that the same thing have several total causes: nor the second, otherwise it would not be God, since it would not have infinite power, but would admit the aid of another. Whence Lactantius rightly, in the book De vera sapientia, cap. 3.: If nature (he says) does not suffer that one man have several fathers, for from one they are procreated: therefore also to worship many gods is against nature, and against piety.

Secondly. It is clear from moral philosophy that several total and adequate ends cannot be admitted; for that end is called total to which all desirable things are referred. Therefore, where a man proposes to himself one God as his ultimate total end, it is necessary that he order and refer all other things to Him, and consequently he cannot propose another God to himself as a total end; otherwise the first God would be the total end, and would not be; He would be, indeed, by supposition; but He would not be, because the other gods would not be referred to Him. Thus from the dignity and notion of the total end only one God is necessarily to be admitted.

Thirdly. Finally, it is clear from politics that the monarchical government is the best of all: and hence it is to be attributed to God, the supreme moderator of all things:

Therefore God alone is the Lord of all, says St. Cyprian, in the book De vanitate Idolorum; for that sublimity cannot have a partner, since it alone holds all power and the divine dominion. Let us also borrow an example from earthly things. When ever did a partnership of rule either begin with good faith or end without bloodshed? Thus the brotherhood of the Thebans was broken, and the discord persisting upon the divided pyres even in death, and one kingdom does not hold the Roman twins, whom the single lodging of one womb received. Pompey and Caesar had been kinsmen, and yet the bond of their relationship did not hold against rival power. Nor should you wonder at this in man alone, since in this all nature agrees. There is one king among the bees, and one leader in the flocks, and one ruler in the herds. Much more is there one Ruler of the world, who commands whatever things exist by His word, disposes them by His reason, and brings them to completion by His power.

You will say 1. From the Apostle, primae ad Corinth. 8: There are many lords, and many gods: therefore there is not only one God. — I distinguish. That there are many true gods, I deny; fictitious ones, I concede. For all the gods of the Gentiles are demons, says the Royal Psalmist.

You will insist. Those are true gods who have the true characteristics of divinity: but the gods of the Gentiles have the true characteristics of divinity. Proof: There are chiefly three characteristics that make divinity known to us, namely, the working of miracles, according to that of Psal. 71.: who alone dost wonderful things; the sudden cure of infirmities, as is related in primo Regum cap. 2: The Lord killeth and maketh alive, He bringeth down to hell and bringeth back; and the foretelling of future things, according to that of Isaiae 41: Declare the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. But the gods of the Gentiles have wrought these three things, as is established by countless histories: therefore they are to be called true gods. — I deny the minor, and to the proofs I say that all those things which are narrated as done at the invocation of the false divinities were wrought by the native aid and power of the demons; of such a kind were those astonishing works brought forth by the two Vestals in sign and confirmation of their undefiled virginity, of whom one, by the name of Tuscia, held and carried water in a sieve, and the other, by the name of Claudia, could by her girdle move and bring to port a ship in the middle of the waters of the Tiber, in which a great stone sacred to the great Mother of the Gods was carried, a ship so stuck fast that it could be moved by no human strength. For these and similar things were brought forth by the demons under the name of the gods (says Tertullian) that stones might be believed to be divinities and the true God not sought after. In Apologetico c. 22.

— To the second proof I say that these cures of diseases by the false divinities were rather the demons' disturbing of one's rest than the driving away of illness; for first, says Tertullian in the same place, they harm, then they prescribe remedies that are new to the point of a miracle, or contrary ones, after which they cease to harm and are believed to have cured. Or as Octavius speaks in Minucius Felix: they feign diseases, terrify minds, torment limbs, that they may force men to worship them, and that, being fattened by the splendor of the altars or by the victims of flocks, once they have relaxed what they had bound, they may seem to have cured. — To the third proof I say that all those declarations of absent things, or notifications and predictions of future ones, were likewise made by the industry of the demons, who by their wonderful swiftness survey the world in a moment and can report what is done in the most remote regions. They can likewise, by the admirable subtlety of their genius, conjecture future events from the influence of the stars, the interpretation of the Scriptures, and the oracles of the Prophets.

Tertullian elegantly uncovers and lays open all these things in the same place:

Every spirit, he says, is winged; this is so of Angels and demons. Therefore in a moment they are everywhere. The whole world is one place to them; what is done everywhere they know as easily as they declare it. Their swiftness is believed to be divinity, because their substance is not known. They also cull even the dispositions of God, now gathering them while the presiding officers are composing them, and now snatching them while the readings resound; and so, taking from this source certain lots of the times, they emulate Divinity while they steal divination.

But with what skill they temper ambiguities in oracles toward the events, the Croesuses know, the Pyrrhuses know. For when Croesus had consulted the Oracle of Apollo, to which he was devoted, whether he should move war against the Persians, the Oracle answered, as Eusebius relates, lib. 3. De praeparatione Evangelica: If Croesus crosses the river Halys undaunted, He will destroy a great empire and a proud kingdom. Deceived by that ambiguity of the word 'destroy', Croesus declared war on the Persians, judging that the kingdom of the Persians was to be destroyed and laid waste by his own arms; but he himself lost his own kingdom of Lydia by the unhappy outcome of the war. Something similar happened to Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, who, when he had consulted the same Oracle whether, fighting against the Romans, he would escape, heard this ambiguous Oracle: I declare that you, son of Aeacus, can conquer the Romans. Whence it came about that Pyrrhus, animated by the hope of victory, fought against the Romans; but, conquered and prostrated by them, he learned the sense of the ambiguous Oracle by his own loss.

You will say 2. Whatever is better must be admitted, especially in divinity: but it is better that there be several gods than one only: therefore several gods must be admitted. The minor is proved. It is better that there be several goods than one only: but several gods are several goods: therefore it is better that there be several gods than one only. — I distinguish the major. If that which is thought to be better is possible and admissible, I concede. If it is impossible, I deny. But that there be several gods has been shown to be impossible more than enough. I likewise distinguish the proof of the minor: that several goods are better than one only, if that one does not contain in itself whatever perfection is found in the others, I concede; if it contains it, I deny. For although ten pounds of silver, v. gr., are several goods compared with one gold coin, yet they do not exceed it in price, because the gold coin contains in itself the value and price of those ten pounds: so, by parity, although several gods, if they were given, would be several goods, yet since the one God is infinitely perfect, and consequently contains in Himself whatever perfection would be found in the others, hence it comes about that it would not be better that there be several gods than one only.

You will say 3. with Marcion and the Manichaeans: There are to be admitted as many gods as there are first producers of things, supreme moderators, and ultimate ends: but those are at least two: therefore there are also two gods. The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proved: There are as many producers, moderators, and ends of things as there are wholly opposite effects, contrary laws, and perpetually different terms: but those are at least of two kinds and orders. The major is clear; for from opposite effects, laws, and perpetual terms, the diversity and distinction of the cause, ruler, and end is known. The minor is likewise established by experience itself and by Scripture; for bodies and spirits are opposite effects, whence there is a perpetual struggle between body and soul, according to that of St. Paul, Romanorum 7: For I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man: but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Likewise the divine laws are wholly opposite: for the Old and Mosaic law threatened nothing but severity, terror, and punishments; but the New and Evangelical law presents nothing but love, pardon, and mercy. Likewise two perpetual terms of rational creatures, namely beatitude and damnation, Heaven and Hell, happiness and gehenna. Therefore there must necessarily be admitted two producers of things, one of whom produced the evil corporeal and visible things, the other the good spiritual and invisible ones; likewise two rulers of the world, one of whom savors of vengeance and evils from his nature corrupted by malice, while the other is prone to love and mercy from his innate goodness; finally two ultimate ends, one of whom delights in tormenting and perpetually torturing human bodies, while the other is occupied in freeing, saving, and soothing with eternal delights the animals made to his own likeness. — I deny the minor, and to its first proof I say that the diversity of effects does indeed sometimes indicate the diversity of finite causes, whose virtue, since it is limited, is also determined to produce certain effects in such a way that it could not produce others: thus fire produces fire and not water; but it is otherwise with the divine power, which, since it is of infinite virtue and fecundity, can produce whatever effects, whether similar, disparate, or contrary; whence in the Creed God is rightly called the Creator of Heaven and Earth, of visible and invisible things. Add that if two first producers were to be assigned, one of whom should produce the corporeal and visible things, the other the spiritual things, and they could not be produced at once by a single one on account of their opposition, then also numberless producers of corporeal things would have to be assigned, since these are found not only disparate, but even properly opposed and contrary to one another, for example heat and cold, white and black, light and darkness; nay, different first craftsmen of the same human body will have to be assigned, for, says Tertullian, lib. 1. In Marcionem, cap. 16:

Diversity tempered man himself, as much in body as in sense: some members strong, others weak, some honorable, others dishonorable, some double, others single, some alike, others unlike. So too in sense, now joy, now anxiety, now love, now hatred, now anger, now gentleness, which is so ordered that this whole rival universe of condition is modulated among itself. Therefore now also visible things are owed to visible things, not to be assigned to another Author.

— To the second proof Tertullian himself also responds, lib. 2. cap. 4.

The law which you accuse, he says, which you twist in controversies, goodness dispensed, providing for man to which God he should adhere: lest he should seem not so much free as abject, to be placed on a level with his servants the other animals, released from God and free from the height: but that man alone might glory, because he alone had been worthy to receive the law from God.

But in order to show that the two laws, both the Old and the New, did not have different founders, he shows that whatever had been sketched in the one was fulfilled in the other, and the things which Marcion objected against the God, the Author of the Old Law, the same Tertullian at the end of this second book turns back against the artificer of the new law, so greatly celebrated by Marcion.

— To the third proof he likewise himself replies that justice and goodness, vengeance and indulgence, beatitude and damnation do not imply a diversity of gods, but rather prove unity; for, he says, lib. 2. cap. 12:

From the beginning the Creator proceeded equally as good and as just. His goodness wrought the world, His justice modulated it... The separations of His justice which were pronounced between light and darkness, between day and night, between Heaven and Earth, between the upper and lower water, between the sea and the mass of the dry land, between the greater and lesser lights, the diurnal and the nocturnal, between male and female, between the tree of the knowledge of death and of life, between the world and Paradise, between all the water-born and earth-born animals — as goodness conceived, so justice distinguished.

And in cap. 18., showing that in God, who is supremely good, severity is necessary, he says:

With so many allurements of evil assaulting the good, who would seek after that which he could despise with impunity? Who would guard what he could lose without danger? The way of slight evil is broad and far more frequented. Would not all slip into it if nothing in it were feared? We shudder at the terrible threats of the Creator and are scarcely torn away from evil; what if He threatened nothing? Will you call that justice evil, which does not favor evil? Will you deny that this is good, which looks out for the good? What kind of God would you wish Him to be; what kind would suit the wicked, under whom offenses would rejoice, whom the Devil would mock? Would you judge God to be good, who could make man worse by the security of sinning?

From this he concludes:

The justice of God is the fullness of divinity, showing God perfect both as Father and as Lord; as Father by clemency, as Lord by discipline; as Father by gentle power, as Lord by severe power; as Father to be loved piously, as Lord to be feared necessarily. To be loved, because He prefers mercy to sacrifice; and to be feared, because He wills not sin: to be loved, because He prefers the repentance of the sinner to death; and to be feared, because He wills sinners no longer repentant.

You will say 4. God can do more than the human intellect can think: but the human intellect, as is clear from the idolaters and the pagans, can think of several gods: therefore God can make several gods: but in divine things to be and to be able are the same: therefore in fact there are several gods. — The Seraphic Doctor answers in 1. dist. 2. art. 1. quaest. 1. that the pagans did not understand God according to His divine nobility; therefore it is no wonder that they thought of, or rather fancied, many gods; for the plurality of gods was a fiction of the human intellect. Whence to the argument I say that the intellect is twofold: namely, rational and phantastic. Of the first the objection is true, but not of the second; that is, if we think those things which are according to reason, then it is true that God can do more than we can think; for God does more things than we can think of, for God does many things which we cannot understand by natural reason, as is clear from the mysteries of our faith. If, however, we wish to think those things which occur to our phantasy and imagination, without doubt we can think more things than God can do, because we can think many absurd and unfitting things, which are said to be fancied rather than understood; but for God the least unfitting thing is impossible.

You will say 5. Great is the power which can do a great thing, greater that which can do a greater, greatest that which can do the greatest, and supreme that which can do the supreme; but the power of God is supreme: therefore it can produce the supreme: but this is God: therefore God can produce another. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that something can produce another in three ways: either from itself, or from something created, or from nothing. From Himself God can produce, and truly does produce, the supreme simply; for the divine Father generates the Son from His own substance: but He cannot produce another God on account of the simplicity of the divine nature. From another, or from nothing, God cannot produce the supreme simply, but in a genus: not on account of a defect of His power, but on account of a defect of the creature, which must of necessity be limited: and so He cannot produce another God.