Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since various reasons are at hand by which the divine existence can be urged — nay, even convincingly shown — some of which are customarily drawn from Metaphysical principles, several from Physical ones, others from Moral ones, it is worthwhile to set forth and unfold in this Question which among them appear the more efficacious. In order that this may be done more efficaciously

Note 1. Causes are of a twofold order: for some are called subordinating, that is, containing certain causes under themselves; others, however, depend on these or on higher causes and are for that reason called subordinated. Again, a cause is said to be subordinated to another in two ways: namely, either per se, or per accidens. A cause subordinated per se is said to be that which, as the Doctor says in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 11, has the following three conditions: 1. That it so depend on the subordinating cause that without it it can neither exist nor operate; thus a creature is said to be subordinated to the Creator; 2. That it have a causality of a different notion from the subordinating cause; because no cause essentially and necessarily requires another cause which is of the same notion with itself, and hence if it necessarily requires the concurrence of another cause, this concurrence must be of a different notion; 3. That all essentially subordinating causes must necessarily concur to the effect together with the cause to which it is subordinated, and hence must exist together with it.

Note 2. According to the Doctor in the same place, there is a threefold distinction between a cause subordinated per se and one subordinated per accidens. For first, a cause subordinated per accidens does not require the concurrence of the subordinating cause in order to act; for fire produced by another fire can heat independently of it. Second, it does not require a causality of a different notion; for fire producing and fire produced can concur at the same time through a causality of the same notion to the same effect. Third and finally, a cause per accidens does not require the presence of the subordinating cause; for fire produced can act even when the fire which produced it has been destroyed. It is otherwise with a cause subordinated per se; for this so depends on the subordinating cause that without its concurrence it can in no way act, and the causality of the subordinating cause is essentially distinct from the causality of the subordinated cause; e.g. the action of the Sun is distinguished from the action of a man generating. Finally, the subordinating cause must necessarily concur together with the subordinated cause in producing the effect, so that, for want of the concurrence of the subordinating cause, the second subordinated cause can in no way act.

First conclusion. — There are several metaphysical reasons by which the divine existence can be demonstrated. Chiefly, however, three.

The first — and the most powerful — is supplied by the Subtle Doctor in 1. d. 2. q. 2. n. 11. and the following, where he demonstrates four things: 1. That there is given some being simply first according to the notion of efficient cause, and of final cause, and of supereminent being; 2. That that being which is first by this threefold primacy is also first according to all other primacies, namely first in duration, dignity, dominion, wisdom, power, etc.; 3. That this threefold primacy can belong to one being alone; 4. That this being, to which those three primacies belong, is that very being which we call God. But that a first efficient Cause is given, from the admission of which the other proofs of the Existence of God can easily be gathered, is now to be demonstrated.

First demonstration. On the existence of God, from the fact that He is the first efficient cause. — An effectible, or producible, being is given: therefore an effective, or productive, being is given, and hence a first cause is given. The antecedent is evident from experience itself, by which it is established that very many things are produced and perish from day to day, such as especially living things; For the form of being born is the cause of dying, and the end depends on the origin, says Tertullian. Or, as he says in the book De anima, cap. 10: We declare by the public judgment of the whole human race that death is a debt of nature; this is what the voice of God stipulated, this is what everything that is born has promised. Whence Lactantius, lib. 2. cap. 11., says: All things must necessarily consist of three times, past, present, and future; of the past is the origin, of the present the substance, of the future the dissolution; as we find confirmed in each of the animals, plants, and whatever bodily living things. Thus it is established that several effectible and producible beings are given; and consequently that some first effective and productive being is given.

This consequence is proved: Everything that comes to be and is produced is produced either by a thing or by another; it is not produced by itself, because, as Saint Augustine says, lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 1.: There is absolutely no thing which generates itself so that it may exist; otherwise it would be before it was. For since nothing comes to be except through production, and since production presupposes a producing thing, because what is not cannot operate; hence it comes about that if something were produced by itself, it would be before it was; it would indeed be, because it would produce; but it would not be, because it would be produced; for what is does not come to be, but has been made: therefore it implies a contradiction that something could produce itself; and hence it is necessary that whatever is produced be produced by another: but it cannot be produced by one and another to infinity: therefore one must come to rest in some first productive being, which produces all the other things, while it itself is produced by no other, but subsists from itself.

— The minor, in which the whole difficulty lies, and which the Atheists are wont to deny, is proved: An infinite process, if it were given, would take place either in causes subordinated per se, or in causes subordinated per accidens: but in neither way can such an infinite process take place. Not indeed in essentially subordinated causes, which I prove thus: If an infinite process in essentially subordinated causes were given, it would follow that no cause could act unless infinite causes in number, on which the subordinated causes depend, concurred at the same time, as was said in Note 2, and thus infinite time would be required for even any slight action to be done: since before such an action could be done, the subordinated cause would have to determine the first subordinating cause, and this one the second, and the second the third, and so on to infinity: and hence a person could not even move a finger, e.g., except through infinite time, because such a bending of the finger could not take place unless all the subordinating causes concurred; nor could they concur unless each of them were determined by the subordinated cause; nor could all be so determined except through infinite time. If the causes to be determined were infinite in number; therefore even to elicit the least action, infinite time would be needed; than which surely nothing more absurd can be devised; and nothing more contrary to daily experience, by which it is established that we can operate at will when and how we wish; and hence an infinite process cannot be given in essentially subordinated causes; otherwise no action could take place.

The atheists reply: that for the action of a subordinated cause it is not required that all the subordinating causes, infinite in number, co-produce, but that the concurrence of that cause which is immediately subordinating with respect to the subordinated cause suffices; so that the latter operates in the way in which some Theologians, together with Durandus, assert that God does not concur immediately to the actions of all sublunary creatures, but only through the influx of the Stars and of movable causes; which, however, does not prevent God from being called an essentially subordinating cause with respect to all created effects.

— On the contrary: Either the influx of all those subordinating causes is necessarily required for the effect and action of any subordinated cause, or it is not. If not: therefore those causes are not essentially subordinating; for an essential subordinating cause is said to be that alone from which the subordinated cause so depends that without it it can neither exist nor operate, for the Philosophers never understood anything else by an essentially subordinating cause. If it is required: therefore in like manner infinite time will be needed so that all those subordinating causes can be determined by the subordinated cause and concur with it. — Nor does the opinion of Durandus break or dissolve the force of this argument: for although this were true — which, however, is false in itself, and is rejected by almost all Theologians — nevertheless there is the greatest disparity between God and those essentially subordinating causes, if they were given; because although God did not concur immediately with the subordinated cause, nevertheless the latter would be said to depend essentially on Him both in being, because He is its author and conserver, and in operating, because it acts only through the power which it receives and borrows from God. For all the power and entity of creatures essentially depends on and emanates from Him, who, since He is infinite, contains every notion and perfection of being, and bestows it on the other beings at His nod and choice; all of which could not belong to the aforesaid subordinating causes, since they would not be of infinite entity and perfection.

— The preceding argument is confirmed: An infinite process in essentially ordered causes cannot be admitted unless God is admitted. This the Doctor proves thus: a superior subordinating cause is more perfect than the inferior and subordinated cause, because it is less dependent in operation and in the power of causing: therefore a cause superior to infinity will be infinitely perfect, and will have infinite power, independent in every way; but that which has such power and perfection is God: therefore even if an infinite process were given, nevertheless God would have to be admitted; and thus from the negation of the existence of God its affirmation is inferred.

The atheists reply: that this discourse is sophistical and concludes from a false supposition. For it is supposed that in the infinity of essentially subordinated causes there is given some first, most perfect cause, infinitely distant, which plainly appears false from the very notion of infinity. For just as, although possible creatures are infinite in number, as Theologians commonly acknowledge, no one would nevertheless, except foolishly, infer that among them some one could be assigned which would be of infinite possible perfection: so too, although according to Saint Augustine, lib. 12. De Civitate, cap. 18, the numbers which are known and understood by God are infinite; nevertheless none of them can be called infinite; therefore by a similar argument it does not seem to follow that if an infinite number of causes were given, some of them would have to be of infinite power and perfection.

— I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that, since subordinated causes have a connection among themselves and a certain dependence of the inferior on the superior, it evidently follows that the more superior one will be, the less dependent it will be, and hence the more perfect and vigorous in causing; and consequently a cause which will be superior to infinity will also have infinite perfection and power independent in every way; and thus it will be God, since by the name of God we understand that cause which is of infinite power and perfection. But a different judgment must be formed of possible creatures and infinite numbers; for since there is no connection among them, nor dependence of the power of one on another, it is no wonder if from their infinity the infinite power and perfection of any one of them cannot be inferred.

The second part of the minor is proved, namely that an infinite process cannot take place in accidentally subordinated causes unless God is admitted; Every being is either made, or not made; but not all beings are made: therefore there is some being not made; this, however, is God; therefore He is given. The major is evident, because being made and not being made are contradictories, and consequently it is necessary that one or the other belong to any being. The minor is proved: If all things were made, they would have had to be made either by themselves or by another: not by themselves, because nothing can produce itself, as we demonstrated above: nor again are all things made by another: therefore it is necessary that some things be made by something which is unproduced. — The minor is proved: If whatever is were produced by another, it would follow that the whole collection of beings is in like manner produced by another: for such is the collection as are the things out of which it is formed; but it is false that the whole collection of beings can be said to be produced by another; for that whole collection would be produced either by something within the collection or outside it. Not by something within the collection, because what is the cause of the collection is also the cause of all things which are contained in the collection: therefore if it were the cause of the collection, it would also be the cause of itself, since it is involved in the collection; but it implies a contradiction for something to be the cause of itself: therefore in like manner it implies a contradiction for the whole collection of beings to be produced by something contained within itself: therefore either the whole collection of beings is not produced, and thus some unproduced being is given; or it must be produced by something which is outside the collection of beings, which implies a contradiction in terms; for whoever says the whole collection of beings supposes no other being which is not involved within that collection, otherwise it would not be the collection of all beings. Therefore it is necessary that some unproduced being be admitted, which produces the rest: this, however, is God: therefore. To solve this argument, various Atheists make various replies.

For they reply first that this argumentation is vicious, because it proceeds from the distributive to the collective; which is altogether sophistical, for just as it does not follow: every one of men is an individual of human nature: therefore the whole collection of men is an individual of human nature; so neither should it follow: if every being is produced by another: therefore also the whole collection of beings must be produced by another: for there is a parity between both inferences; and hence since the former is vicious, the latter will also be vicious.

— I deny the parity; For although the inference from the distributive to the collective does not hold whenever the predicate is a continuous or discrete quantity, or when the collection is made from things by reason of the quantity which constitutes them, it nevertheless holds and is legitimate when the predicate is neither a quantity nor has the mode of a quantity. Thus, e.g., although it is not permitted to infer: individual men taken separately are one individual: therefore all men taken collectively are one individual; it is nevertheless permitted to infer: individual men are rational and white; therefore the whole collection of men is rational and white; because rationality and whiteness are not quantitative predicates nor have the mode of quantity; but since the individual and unity are the principle of number and form discrete quantity, therefore in them the inference from the distributive to the collective does not hold; because a collection from quantitative predicates adds something to the whole collection which does not belong to the parts, namely number; but the inability of being from oneself, or the exigency of being from another in a contingent being, is not a predicate of continuous or discrete quantity; nor does it have any affinity with either quantity, but belongs essentially to created beings from their intrinsic notion, and from the limitation and imperfection of their essence, which, since it is contingent, necessarily requires being from another; and consequently the inference is excellent, that if every being requires being from another, then also the whole collection of beings must be from another.

They reply secondly that the argument concludes from a false supposition: First, because it supposes that a collection of all beings can be given, which is false, since they are infinite to infinity; but of infinite things (they say) there can be no collection, because not so many can be conceived but that still more are conceivable. Second, because it supposes that the terms all and whole can be said of the infinite, which however Aristotle proves to be false, 3. Physic. cap. 7. Third, because it supposes that every being is produced or unproduced, which is false, since several Theologians even maintain that the essences of things are from eternity according to some diminished real being: this, however, as such, is neither produced nor unproduced. Fourth and finally, it supposes that something cannot produce itself, the contrary of which appears in the Phoenix, which is said naturally to reproduce itself and to come to life again from its own ashes. Whence Tertullian, in the book De Resurrectione carnis, cap. 13., takes up this natural history in confirmation and as a specimen of the future resurrection of men; Behold, he says, a most full and most firm specimen of this hope… I mean that bird peculiar to the East, famous for its singularity, monstrous in its posterity, which willingly burying itself renews itself: departing and succeeding by its natal end, again a Phoenix. Of which in like manner Lactantius sang in a poem on the same:

It is its own offspring, its own father and its own heir: Its own nurse, ever its own nursling.

He had, however, premised in the same place:

For it perishes that it may live, yet it creates itself.

Therefore this argument is utterly null.

— I deny both the antecedent and the consequence. And to the first and second proof of the antecedent I say that it is wholly alien from the truth that a collection of all beings cannot be given, if they are supposed to be infinite in number: that it is in like manner false that the terms all and whole cannot be attributed to this collection of infinite beings: for it is evident that there is nothing which is not that whole which it is, and all that it is, whatever Aristotle may object; for it is evidently impossible that something be that which it is, unless it have all that by which it is constituted in its being: but it cannot be so constituted unless it be taken collectively, and as it is a whole; nothing can also be that which it is, unless it have its parts and involve all things out of which it is constituted. Whence whatever is, is collectively that whole which it is, whether in the meantime it be finite or infinite; for the whole is nothing other than the parts taken collectively, especially the whole per accidens; for a multitude of stones, e.g., whether it be infinite or finite, is nothing other than the collection of all the stones which form this multitude: therefore it is not repugnant that all beings, even if they were infinite¹, be taken collectively, and that the terms all and whole be able to be attributed to this collection.

— It is confirmed: Whoever says every being, or all beings, either says only some one among beings; or he designates absolutely all beings. Not the first, otherwise every being would be every being, which is plainly false. If the second: therefore he signifies and conceives all beings collectively; for to say and signify all beings collectively is nothing other than to signify this or that or any other to infinity, if beings are infinite.

You will perhaps reply, that this word every being can be used not collectively, but only distributively, because a collection of all beings is impossible, since not so many are conceived but that more can be conceived; and so no collection can be conceived so great but that a much greater and ampler one must still be conceived.

— On the contrary: Although in an infinite multitude there is no part beyond which there is not another, and so no last part; it is nevertheless false that all beings cannot be taken collectively, because in order that an infinite collection be taken as a whole, it is not necessary that its last part be taken, for this is impossible, because in fact there is no last part: but it suffices that those individual beings be conceived together in kind and universally, and as it were unitedly expressed by these words, every being: for since there would be no being in this infinite multitude that would not truly have the notion of being, so also there would be none that would not be designated by these words.

— To the second proof of the antecedent I say that the essences of things cannot be said to be, from eternity, midway between production and non-production; for it belongs to things that they have not been produced, and consequently that they are unproduced, and that they do not have the actual existence which is acquired through production. Add that it is not true that they are real in themselves, but only insofar as they are conceived by the divine intellect and are represented in the divine essence.

— To the third proof I answer, first, that the story of the phoenix seems to be a fable rather than a history, as Pliny affirms, Lib. 10. cap. 2.; or I say that not all things which are reported of it are true, but that most are wholly fabulous, as Scaliger observes against Cardanus.

— I answer, second, that although it is true that the phoenix is born again from its ashes, it is nevertheless not the same in number, but the same in species, as Tertullian observes; for he adds: again he himself: who is no longer another, but the same; by which words he indicates that not the one which had died is born again, but another of the same species. Add that Tertullian in the same place calls the history of the phoenix a parable of the divine operation; so that God has not only spoken in parables, but has also worked in them. Nor does it matter that he takes the phoenix as a specimen and proof of the resurrection: for he only intends, from the supposed truth of this history, to relate some likeness of the resurrection shadowed forth in natural things; but a likeness is not true in all things, and always limps in some. And so Tertullian takes the example of the phoenix for this alone, to persuade that the reproduction of a dead man, the same in number and individual, is possible through divine power, which, he says, ought not to seem difficult to believe: for if by natural power alone another of the same species rises from a dead phoenix, why could not the same man in number rise again by divine power? But that this is the genuine mind of Tertullian is openly evident from those things which he had premised, cap. 12. where, to illustrate the mystery of the resurrection, he has these words:

The day dies into night and is buried everywhere in darkness; the world's honor is darkened, every substance is blackened… and yet again, with its adornment, with its dowry, with its Sun, the same and whole and entire universe is born again to the world; night killing its own death, darkness cutting short its own burial: being heir to itself, until night too is born again with its own dais. For the rays of the stars too are relit,which the morning kindling had extinguished, etc.

From these things it is evident that he speaks of the origin and destruction of the phoenix in the same way as of the renewal of day and night. It is certain, however, that the past day does not return the same, nor does the put-to-flight night succeed the same, but another of the same kind: and consequently Tertullian does not hold that anything can produce itself again. Nor does Lactantius either: for he adds: it itself indeed, but not the same, because it is both itself and not itself.

They finally reply, that although a thing cannot produce itself, nevertheless, in order that the force of the preceding argument be blunted and wholly broken, it suffices that natural things can produce themselves by circular generation: so that at different times the very thing which today produces something can be reproduced by the same after some years: for once this circle of generations is posited, it cannot be gathered that there is some first unproduced principle of all things.

— On the contrary: This reply supposes that it can naturally come about that the same thing in number can be produced again, and consequently that the resurrection of man is natural; which evidently appears false: for this wholly exceeds the powers of nature. Whence it is no wonder if the Gentile philosophers mocked the Apostle announcing the resurrection of the dead. Then, if a son, v. g., could naturally reproduce his dead father after some years, why could he not also have done so while he was still living? For an existing thing does not impede the natural power of another, especially when it does not resist it nor puts an obstacle by a contrary action: but a father actually existing does not impede the natural power and operation of his son: therefore if a son has the natural power of regenerating his father, he will be able to reproduce him as much while he lives as when he is dead. And much more will the father himself be able to reproduce his son, who consequently would begin to be in many places at once, and would be younger and older at the same time, healthy and sick, all of which things are wholly false. Finally, if that circle of generations could be given, and the same thing which produced another could be reproduced by the same, then the regress from privation to habit would be natural, and so a blind man could naturally recover lost sight, which is plainly known to be false; and therefore all produced things must be produced not by one another in circular generation, but it is necessary that they be produced by some supreme Artificer of things.

Second demonstration. From the ultimate end. — A single ultimate end is given: therefore also God. The consequence is clear, since by the name of God is understood the first principle and the ultimate end of all things. The antecedent is proved: either there is one ultimate end, or the ends are infinite in number: but the ends are not infinite in number: therefore there is one ultimate end. The major is clear: for if no ultimate one is assigned, it is necessary that they be infinite and innumerable. The minor is proved: If there were infinite ends, they would have to be known in order to be desired, because elicited appetite is not borne toward the unknown: but infinite ends cannot be known by men, because they would be known either at once or successively: but they could not be known at once, because a finite intellect, such as the human one is, cannot know infinite things in number at once, as is certain: because such is the knowledge as is the cognitive power; but this is finite and limited, just as is the entity of man: therefore it cannot be occupied about infinite objects at once. Nor likewise could they be known successively, because if there were infinite ends, our appetite could nowhere enjoy so many but that much more would still remain enjoyable; but it is false that our appetite can nowhere rest and be satisfied; otherwise it would be futile; but nature does nothing in vain. Then, if there were infinite ends, none of them would be an end, for where all things are means, there is no end: but if there were infinite ends, all intermediate ends would be means, because they would be ordered to another further end; and consequently none of them could be called an end.

— This discourse can be confirmed by all the arguments by which we proved above that some first principle of all things is given; for just as the whole collection of caused things, whether actually existing or possible, must have some principle from which it is; so it must have some end on account of which it is, and which exists outside that collection. For since there is no caused being within that collection which is not caused on account of some end, so also the whole collection must be caused on account of some end; for such is the collection as are the things which are collected, as was proved above; and therefore the collection of beings caused on account of an end must also be caused on account of an end: but this collection cannot be caused on account of an end which is within itself: otherwise, as was said above, the same thing would be the efficient and final cause of itself: therefore it must be caused on account of some end which is outside the order of caused beings, and consequently which is an uncaused and unproduced end; but the uncaused and unproduced end is God: therefore He is given.

Third demonstration. From the most perfect being. — From the fact that that than which a greater and more perfect cannot be thought out exists: but God is the being than which no greater can be thought out: therefore He exists. The minor is admitted by all. The major is proved, first indeed by St. Anselm in the Monologion: an existing being is better and more perfect than a non-existing being: therefore it is necessary that the being than which no greater and more perfect can be thought be existing; for if it did not exist, something more perfect than it could be thought, namely an existing being: therefore it is necessary that the being than which nothing greater can be thought exist. But because, as St. Anselm also very well noted in the Proslogion, the atheist could reply that this is indeed the case with things if it were truly thought, but otherwise if it is only fictitiously thought: for even if what someone thinks, v. g., some region filled with all goods, than which no other richer and more delightful could be thought out, it does not follow from this that this region thus thought out exists in the nature of things: so by parity one would first have to prove that the being than which a greater cannot be thought is truly thought, and not feigned, before it be inferred that it exists; otherwise the argument would be sophistical. Therefore the same major is proved from the Doctor: Pure and actual being, that is, pure act, is the being than which a greater cannot be thought; indeed pure act must involve every perfection, otherwise it would not be pure act, but would be in potency to perfection; but pure act truly thought exists. I prove it: If pure act does not imply a contradiction, it necessarily exists; but pure act does not imply a contradiction: therefore it necessarily exists. The major is clear from the terms; for that is called pure act which is nothing but act and excludes all potentiality whatever, but in act it is wholly that which it can be: whence if it can be something, it is at once necessarily that which it can be. The minor is proved: If its being a being which is pure act implied a contradiction, chiefly because it would be a contradiction, and it would be true to say that it was at once and was not: but such a contradiction does not appear. Proof: To be pure act does not include in its concept being at once and non-being; for pure act imports nothing other than being so actual as to exclude all potentiality whatever: therefore so far is that concept from including at once being and non-being, that indeed it simply says being, and simply excludes non-being: and therefore there is no contradiction that pure act exists: therefore it necessarily exists; otherwise it would not be pure act, since it would involve potentiality.

You will perhaps reply, that the existence of pure act does not import a contradiction directly and formally in its concept, but only consequently, just as, by parity, those who deny the infinite say that in the concept of the infinite no contradiction is precisely imported, but only consequently; namely because from the admission of the infinite several contradictions follow. Why then, they say, could not the same be said of pure act?

— On the contrary: That which does not even consequently involve being and non-being imports a contradiction neither directly nor indirectly; indeed it wholly denies and excludes non-being; but pure act wholly denies non-being from its formal notion; since it denies all potentiality and the passage from non-being to being: therefore even consequently it imports no contradiction: therefore it is not repugnant that pure act be: therefore it necessarily is, because pure act is necessarily that which it can be, otherwise it would not be pure act.

Fourth demonstration. From the necessary being. — Some necessary being must be admitted in the nature of things which exists essentially and independently: but that is God: therefore He is given. The minor is clear: for a necessary being existing essentially is from itself and unproduced, and produces the rest, and consequently is God; for by the name of God we understand nothing else. The major, in which the whole difficulty lies, is proved. If no necessary being existing essentially is given, it follows that all beings which are in the nature of things are contingent: but this is false: therefore some necessary being existing essentially is given. The major is certain; for if whatever exists is not contingent, it is necessary that either the whole be necessary, or that something exist necessarily: but no one would say that all beings are necessary; for by experience it is certain that very many things arise and perish daily: therefore it is necessary that something be necessary. The minor is proved: If all beings which are in the nature of things are contingent, it follows that it could have come about that from eternity no being existed; for that is contingent which can be or not be: but it is false that it could have come about that from eternity nothing existed: therefore not all things which are and have been are contingent. The minor is proved: If it could have come about that from eternity nothing existed, something had to be given by which the whole, which was, would be determined to exist: therefore it could not have come about that from eternity nothing existed. The major is certain: for what is indeterminate with respect to existing must be determined to existence in order to be. The minor is proved: The whole which was could not determine itself from eternity to exist; just as if now nothing existed, it would wholly imply a contradiction that something be newly determined to exist: therefore there was nothing by which that whole would be determined to exist.

— It is confirmed first: If it could have come about that no thing at all existed, some reason must be given why it was rather than was not: but no reason at all can be given; for this cannot be assigned, why a thing was determined rather to being than to non-being: therefore it could not have come about that no thing at all existed: therefore not all things were contingent.

— It is confirmed second: Contingent things could not be determined to exist from eternity any more than now, if nothing at all existed: but if now nothing at all existed, it would imply a contradiction that something be determined to exist: therefore neither could they have been determined from eternity; for no reason of disparity can be brought forth.

The atheists reply, that there is no need to have recourse to some necessary being; for although a contingent being can be and not be, nevertheless where it is, it can produce another contingent being: just as hot water, v. g., although from its nature it does not have heat, nevertheless when it has obtained it, it can produce it in another subject and heat it: therefore by parity, although a contingent being does not have being from itself, nevertheless when it has obtained it, it can bestow it on another; and so all contingent beings could in turn have been produced by another contingent being, and therefore there is no need of any necessary being.

— On the contrary: Just as water which is not hot from itself must beg heat from something which is hot per se, either formally, as fire, or virtually, as the Sun; so by a similar reasoning, since a contingent being does not have existence from itself, it must necessarily receive it from something which exists per se and necessarily.

They reply 2. That would indeed be true if all contingent beings were determined in number; for with this posited, one would have to arrive at some first being which would exist per se: but (they say) contingent beings are not determined in number, because they are infinite without end, and therefore since this contingent being was produced by another contingent being, and that one again by another, and so on to infinity; there is no need to have recourse to some necessary being, from which contingent beings would have to be produced.

— On the contrary: First, it is false that there is a process to infinity in causes subordinated both essentially and accidentally, as was effectively proved in the first demonstration; Second, even granted the infinity of contingent beings, one must nevertheless admit some being existing from itself and per se, from which this infinite multitude of contingent beings was produced; which I prove thus. Such is the multitude and collection of contingent beings as are the collected beings: therefore since collected beings must necessarily be from another, the whole multitude too must necessarily be from another. The antecedent is clear, by a similar reasoning; for because individual men are rational, individual swans are white, and individual crows are black, it is legitimately inferred that the collection of all men is rational, and that of swans is white, and that of crows is black: therefore in like manner it is true that if individual beings are contingent and from another, the collection of beings too must be from another: but it cannot be from another contingent being, both because otherwise it would not be the whole collection of contingent beings; and so there would be an implication in terms; and because the whole cannot be produced by a part of itself, otherwise the part itself, since it is something of the whole, would also produce itself, which wholly implies a contradiction.

— Nor does it matter that that multitude of contingent beings is feigned to be infinite. For just as extinguished candles, even if infinite, can no more light themselves and recover lost light than if they were only finite in number: and just as stones, even if they were infinite, can no more be moved upward than if they were only in a determined number, because upward motion does not belong to them from their nature, but only downward motion, namely on account of inborn gravity: moreover, just as a multitude, whether finite or infinite, of men, of whom each without exception is wholly foolish, and needy of the direction and instruction of another for all and each thing, cannot by itself alone be wise, or not need the instruction and direction of another existing outside that whole collection, and not similarly needing the wisdom and direction of another: finally, just as a multitude of the starving, of whom none separately has a sufficiency of that food, but each needs to receive it from another individual having it beforehand, cannot abound in food or be satisfied, if it is not helped by some other existing outside the whole collection of this kind and having from its own resources a sufficiency of food, and not needing to receive it from another; whether in the meantime that multitude be finite or infinite; for who would bring it into his mind that the whole need of this kind of individuals was helped, precisely because the multitude of the needy was increased to infinity, and an infinite regress was made from the last needy one to another and another, so that each of the needy needs another helping to infinity? so by parity no one, unless wholly alien to reason, will be able to assert that the multitude of contingent beings, of which each demands to be produced by another, does not need some producer, because namely that multitude grew to infinity: therefore it is necessary that some necessary being be admitted which exists per se and essentially, and is productive of the other beings: and therefore that God be admitted: since by the name of God we understand nothing other than a being existing necessarily, which has being from itself, and produces the rest.

There are other demonstrations; but they are either insufficient, or can easily be reduced to these. Therefore let it be:

Second conclusion. — Physics supplies a varied, but chiefly a threefold, argument for proving God's existence. The first, indeed, is deduced from the whole fabric of the world; the second from its principal parts; the third from its epitome, namely man, who is for that reason called Microcosm by the Greeks and, by the Latins, the abbreviated world.

The first, I say, is deduced from the wonderful and artful fabric of the world, its disposition, its beauty, and its varied and elegant adornment: for, as Durandus acutely observes in the prologue of the Book of Sentences, there is a threefold book in which God has, as it were, traced out and inscribed himself: the first is the book of the creatures of the world; the second, of the Prophets and of the Old Testament; the third, of the Evangelists and the writers of the New Law. The first he gave to the philosophers to read, as Saint Paul says ad Romanos 1: The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also and divinity: whence creatures are called by Trismegistus rays of the Divinity; by Plato, a mirror of the Deity; by Solomon, species and images of the Creator; by David, voices and oracles of his divine Maker: for there is none so speechless that it does not proclaim with silent speech: He made us, and not we ourselves. — The second book he gave to the Jews, as Ecclesiasticus says, cap. 39.: The wise man will search out the hidden things of the Proverbs, and will be occupied in the Prophets, etc. The third, however, he offered to Christians and the faithful, as Saint Paul says ad Romanos, cap. 15: Whatsoever things were written, were written for our doctrine. Whence, just as Christians can easily draw all supernatural truths from the Gospel scriptures, just as the Jews were able to understand from the Old Testament and the oracles of the Prophets the blessings divinely promised to them, and that the divine Deity was to be worshipped and supreme worship shown to God: so likewise the philosophers can easily discern from creatures the existence and perfections of God: For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, their Creator may be seen so as to be known, says the Wise Man, cap. 13. Whence Lactantius, lib. 1. cap. 3:

who, unless he were wholly blind and bereft of reason, would not judge that this vastest mass, compacted of so many heavens, so many elements, and so many other bodies, was built by some most excellent and divine Artificer? Who suspended the earth with firm stability, who distinguished the heaven with shining stars, who kindled the Sun, the clearest and singular light for human affairs, as an argument of his unique majesty, etc.

Therefore from the book of the world the divine existence is established.

You will reply. Perhaps, with Hermogenes and certain atheists, you will say that all these things came forth from Hyle, that is, from the bosom of first matter, by a spontaneous eruption. — But what is more inept than that first matter — the least of beings, the most imperfect and almost pure nothing, subject to all mutations, subservient to all natural agents, destitute in itself, and wholly formless, and begging all its perfection from others — should have been from eternity from itself, independent of every cause, and endowed with the fecundity of producing the other beings? What is more alien from truth than to attribute the highest perfection, such as is the necessity of being from oneself, to a being so small and imperfect, and to deny it to some efficient Cause and maker of all things? Add that if first matter were from itself, since it has no determinate form from itself, but is wholly indifferent to all forms, if there had been no efficient cause at the beginning of things, by what, I ask, would that matter have been determined to one form rather than to another? Moreover, if for the eduction of the first forms from the bosom of matter no agent was needed, why is an agent needed now in each and every daily generation? Why does fire not burst forth from matter informed with the form of water? Why does man not draw his origin from the hardest rock? Finally, all philosophers confess that when one of the extremes is given in the nature of things, the other also must be given: therefore if there is given a matter which is pure potency from eternity, as the atheists imagine, there must also be given from eternity something which is pure act: and that is God, the maker of all things: therefore He exists.

The atheists reply with Democritus, that all nature whatsoever coalesced from the collision and coagulation of atoms moving in the vastest bosom of nothingness. — But truly, says Minucius Felix, does not Democritus himself for the most part speak of nature, which pours forth the images of things, and of intelligence, as God? and accordingly Democritus himself admits God as the maker and framer of his atoms. Moreover, if from this revolution and coagulation of atoms all things were heaped together and ordered, why in a similar way do wood, cement, stones, and the other things necessary for a building, cast down from some very high mountain into a valley and rolling along together, and in their revolution cemented to one another by the cement, not build and shape an orderly and magnificent Palace? Finally, why does a similar revolution of atoms not now take place for the formation of some new being? Is the fecundity of those atoms exhausted? Does the glue fail by which they cohere to one another? — Lactantius presses this argument wonderfully, lib. 1. De ira Dei, cap. 10.

Who, he says, as an artisan could have fabricated the heart of man, or the voice, or wisdom itself? Does any sane man, then, think that what man cannot do by reason and counsel could have been accomplished by the collision of atoms cohering here and there… By what counsel, then, by what reason did the atoms gather themselves together from the confused heap, so that from some of them the earth was conglobed below, the heaven was stretched out above, distinguished by so great a rarity of stars that nothing more ornate could ever be devised? He, then, who sees things so great and so wondrous, can he think that they were produced by no counsel, no fittingness, no divine reason: but that such great miracles were concreted from subtle and tiny atoms? Is it not like a prodigy either that a man was born who would say these things, or that there were those who would believe them?

Finally, the rest reply, that all these things were indeed formed, but by chance. — But truly, says Seneca, lib. 1. Quaestionum naturalium, in the preface: Who is so devoid of reason as to think that this, than which nothing is more beautiful, nothing more well-ordered, nothing more constant in purpose, is fortuitous and rolled about by chance, and not ordered by some supreme Reason? For, as Trismegistus speaks in the Pimander, since no one would dare to assert that a statue is made without a craftsman and a painter, shall we think that the wonderful constitution of this world stood without a Founder? With him Saint Chrysostom agrees on this verse of Psal. 13., The fool said, etc.: There is no foundation, he says; how then does the building stand? There is no builder; how was the House made? There is no architect; and who founded the city? There is no musician; and how does the harmony appear in the lyre of the world? Saint Gregory Nazianzen uses the same argument, in his second oration on Theology, bringing forward the example of the cithara, of which, when we hear the harmony, we know for certain that it is struck by some most perfect artisan. Whence Saint Augustine concludes, lib. 10. Confessionum and 11. De Civitate, cap. 4: The world itself, by its most ordered mutability and mobility and the most beautiful appearance of all visible things, in a certain way, while silent, proclaims both that it was made and that its maker is God. Hence Trismegistus aptly says that this world is a book full of Divinity and a mirror of divine things, in which the most splendid image of the divine being shines; for as many creatures as are beheld in the world, so many are the vestiges of the Divinity, so many images, so many heralds of its divine Artificer; for indeed there is none so speechless that it does not pour forth with silent speech: He made us, and not we ourselves.

The second Argument is drawn from the celestial body, the noblest part of the whole world-machine. For, says the royal bard, Psal. 18.: The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the works of his hands. Expounding these words in homily 9 to the people, Saint Chrysostom says:

How do they declare the glory of God? Tell me. They have no voice, they possess no mouth, they have no tongue; how then do they declare? Through their very aspect. For when you see beauty, magnitude, height, position, form pervading so great a body, as if hearing a voice and learning from the sight, you admire him who created so beautiful and wonderful a body. The heaven is silent, but its aspect sends forth a voice clearer than a trumpet, teaching us through the eyes, not through the ears.

Whence the same royal Psalmist, alluding to the custom of the Ancients, who used to make books from skins, says in Psalm 103: Stretching out the heaven like a skin, that is, like an open book, in which the authority, dignity, and power of the Divinity is read, according to that saying of Isaiae 34.: The heavens shall be folded up like the book of heaven. Hence Saint Prosper, lib. 2. De Vocatione Gentium, cap. 1.: Before the sacred letters, the World served as a testimony to the Lord, and the ineffable beauty of the Heavens, through which certain tablets were offered to men, so that, as it were, in the pages of the elements and the volumes of the times, the doctrine of the divine institution might be read. Therefore the heaven and all heavenly things, with the consonant harmony of their species and order, testify to the glory of God, and with perpetual preaching speak the majesty of their Author. Whence Minucius Felix concludes in the Octavius:

What can be so open, so confessed, so perspicuous, when you have lifted your eyes to the Heaven and surveyed the things that are below and around, than that there is some Deity of most excellent mind, by which all nature is inspired, moved, nourished, governed? See the heaven itself, how widely it is stretched out, how rapidly it is rolled around — either because in the night it is marked out by stars, or because in the day it is illuminated by the sun; then you will know that in it there is the wonderful and divine balancing of the supreme Governor… What, when the order of the seasons and of the crops is distinguished by a stable variety, does it not testify to its Author and Parent? Spring alike with its flowers, and summer with its harvests, the pleasing ripeness of autumn, and the needful olive-harvest of winter — which order would easily be disturbed, unless it stood fast by the greatest reason. What great providence, then, it is, to interpose the mean tempering of Autumn and Spring, lest Winter alone burn with ice, or Summer alone scorch with heat.

Finally, the third Argument is gathered from man himself: for, as Minucius Felix continues,

The beauty of our form itself especially confesses God as the artificer: the upright stature, the erect countenance, the eyes placed on high as on a watchtower, and all the other senses as if stationed in a citadel: it would be long to go through them one by one; there is no member in man which is not there both for the sake of necessity and of grace. And what is more wonderful, the same figure belongs to all, but certain lineaments are deflected for each one. Thus we all seem similar, and yet each one is found dissimilar to the others.

The other holy Fathers and the weightier philosophers have similar things everywhere, even those living among the idolaters, who from the wonderful structure of man acknowledged the supreme prudence and wisdom of the divine Artificer, as may be seen in Lessius, lib. 1. De Providentia Numinis, n. 64. The most unconquered mother of the seven Maccabees also once used this argument, who, 2. Machab. c. 7., addressing her sons, says: I know not how you appeared in my womb; for neither did I give you spirit and soul and life, nor did I myself compact the members of each one: but the Creator of the world, who formed the nativity of man. Whence rightly the royal Psalmist, Ps. 102: Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all things that are within me, his holy name. All my bones shall say: Lord, who is like to thee? And Ps. 138: Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me. Nothing, therefore, commends the divine Power and its infinite Wisdom more than the wonderful fabric of man.

Third conclusion. — There are very many moral arguments by which the existence of God is urged; but especially there are the following five.

First. That the fear of God cannot be erased from the conscience of men, even of the most wicked, a fear felt not only at lightnings and thunders, but also at the encounter of any harmful and adverse thing, as Job manifestly testifies in cap. 15², where he says of the impious man: He has stretched out his hand against God, and has been strengthened against the Almighty; he has run against him with erect neck, and is armed with a fat neck. Yet the sound of terror is always in his ears, and when there is peace, he always suspects treachery. Whence with Tertullian, in the book De Testimonio Animae, we may conclude: Hence, then, O soul, from conscience you have at hand, at home and abroad, with none mocking or forbidding, to preach: God sees all things, and to God I commend, and God will repay, and God will judge between us: whence is this to you, if not from Christianity?

Second. It is open madness and most shameless rashness to wish to defend anything against the consensus of the whole world: but he who denies that God exists affirms this while the whole assembly of mankind cries out against him; since there is one veneration and confession of some Divinity among all nations, even the most savage. Whence Lactantius, lib. 3. cap. 10., from Cicero: There is no animal, except man, which has some knowledge of God: and among men themselves there is no nation so untamed, nor so iron-hard, which does not have the sense of some Religion. Hence Plato in the Protagoras, in Marsilio Ficino, lib. 17. De Immortalitate, cap. 9., holds that the greatest indication of our Divinity is this, that we alone, as partakers of the divine lot, on account of a certain kinship, acknowledge and desire God as Author, invoke and love him as Father, venerate him as King, fear him as Lord. Is it not, then, the greatest arrogance and madness to call into doubt, on account of some trivial quibbles, the existence of God, which creatures proclaim, all men venerate, the whole world testifies to?

Third. That from the denial of the supreme Deity the reward of virtue perishes, all piety is extinguished, and the reins are loosened for the wicked to commit every vice. For what will the mad lust of men not contrive? What will malice not attempt, if no avenger of crimes is feared, no punisher of hidden wickedness appears? Whence, when David had said that the foolish had denied God in their heart, he immediately adds: They are corrupt, and have become abominable in their ways, etc. From which things I argue thus: That doctrine which opens the way to the committing of vices and crimes, even the fouler ones, must be eliminated by the most exquisite punishments; but that which denies that God exists is such. The major is certain. The minor is proved: Nothing recalls men from committing crimes and misdeeds so much as vengeance and punishment, which is thought to be taken upon them if they commit them; for:

The good hate to sin out of love of virtue. The wicked hate to sin out of fear of punishment.

Therefore nothing opens wider access to crimes than a doctrine from which it follows that there is no avenger of crimes: but from that which denies that God exists it follows that there is no avenger of crimes and misdeeds: therefore a doctrine which denies that God exists opens the way to all crimes and misdeeds. The subsumption is proved: Only two avengers of crimes can be conceived, man and God: but man cannot be the avenger of crimes: therefore it remains that God is: therefore if God is not granted, it follows that there is no avenger and punisher of crimes. The major is evident.

The minor is proved: Man can be the avenger of crimes only through gallows and similar temporal torments, which human power inflicts: but this does not suffice for it to be said that there is an avenger or punisher of crimes. Which I prove thus: An avenger of crimes is one who can and must take vengeance for all crimes, by whomever they are committed; for if he takes vengeance only for some crimes, he will not be called simply the avenger of crimes, but only of certain crimes. And if he cannot take vengeance for crimes committed even by any kind of men whatsoever, he will likewise not be called simply the avenger of crime. But man can take vengeance neither for all crimes whatsoever, because many crimes are hidden; for who can punish so many fornications, adulteries, homicides, detractions, robberies, hidden hatreds, and other things of that kind? Nor can man take vengeance from all men whatsoever who have committed crimes. For although vengeance can be taken by man for a public crime perpetrated by some plebeian, it is not so if it has been perpetrated by a powerful man or a Prince: therefore from that doctrine which denies that God exists it follows that there is no avenger of all crimes.

The atheists reply: It is indeed rightly inferred that from the fact that God is admitted, an avenger of crime is also to be admitted; but that this avenger was invented and devised by the Princes and Rulers of peoples, so that by this device they might keep them in their duty. — Against 1. If that avenger of crimes was so rashly devised: then in reality there is no one whom men should fear, and by whose fear they could be recalled from perpetrating any crimes whatsoever. And if it is so, it follows that both Princes and common men can safely rush into all the fouler hidden crimes, and loosen the reins to all vices. Whence it comes about that men not only excel nothing over brute beasts, but will also be far more miserable in many respects, since, being subject to the forms of evils, they will drag out forever a tumultuous and restless life; for what will they not fear from a man who is for the most part more ferocious than wild beasts? — Against 2. The falsehood and madness of this reply is exposed by the very fear of an avenger of crimes fixed, as it were, in the very marrow of men, whence it comes about that even the most impious have never in any way been able to extricate themselves from that fear, as is evident from Caligula himself, who, as no one more insolently denied that God is the avenger of crimes, so no one trembled more miserably at his vengeance and lightnings. It is evident from the experience of those most abandoned men, who, when they cast off all piety and religion, are so cruelly tormented by the furies of their crimes and the stings of conscience, that they tremble with fear where there is no fear. Add that if no God existed, there would likewise be no reward of virtue and piety; for it is evident from daily experience that upright men in this mortal life are tossed about by various temptations, pressed by troubles, tormented by pains, vexed by anxieties, and are mocked, despised, and afflicted by impious men, while the impious, on the contrary, ascend to the summit of honors, heap up immense wealth, abound in treasures, friends, clients, and are celebrated with the highest praises, even when they have violated divine and human laws: therefore with David, in Psalm 57., it must rightly be concluded: If indeed there is fruit for the just, there is indeed a God judging them on the earth.