Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since the existence of God is not known per se, as was proved in the preceding Question; hence it comes about that some most wicked men have called into doubt that He exists. The leaders of this most pestilential error were Protagoras, Diagoras, Evemerus, Thegeates and Bion Boristhenites with his teacher Theodorus of Cyrene, who was therefore called an atheist, that is, one without God, as St. Augustine relates, lib. 3. Contra litteras Petiliani, cap. 21. and Lactantius, De ira Dei, cap. 9. Indeed, even among the later writers Pliny himself, although most learned in natural philosophy, lib. 2. cap. 7. leaves it in doubt whether there is any deity, and that, whatever it may be, it is ridiculous that it should take care of human affairs, by which he certainly did away with deity from the midst; for as Lactantius, praised above, says of Epicurus, when he took away providence he also denied God. And St. Augustine, lib. 5. De civitate Dei, cap. 9.: To confess God, he says, and to deny the foreknowledge of future things, is the most open madness. Hence David also, in Psalm 13, calls the atheist a fool, The fool, he says, has said in his heart: There is no God.

— But what is most to be lamented is that even in our own times they have roused atheism from the underworld, not only countless politicians, whose patronage Nicolaus Machiavellus, a most impious man, took up in his published writings, but also already many innovators and heretics: for, as Lyndanus testifies in his Dubitantius, while the wicked men of this time pass with the greatest inconstancy from Catholics to Lutherans, from Lutherans to Zwinglians, and from these to Calvinists; and thus they profess each single sect; at length they forswear and cast off all religion whatsoever, and affirm with the greatest impiety that God does not exist. Against whom both the present and the following Question will be directed.

In the present Question, indeed, it will have to be resolved: 1. Whether it can be established that God exists by a proper and perfect demonstration; 2. By what demonstration His existence can become known: which, so that it may be perceived more easily;

Note 1. or, to be recalled from the Logicians, a demonstration is usually defined as a syllogism producing science through an effect: through causes, on the other hand, a syllogism is said to be one consisting of causes of the conclusion that are certain, primary, immediate, better known and prior. Aristotle approves both definitions, 1. Posteriorum, cap. 2.

Note 2. The middle term, from whose diversity the diversity of demonstration is gathered, is twofold; the first is called a priori, which namely is the cause why the predicate of the conclusion belongs to the subject: thus rational is called the middle term with respect to this conclusion, Every man is risible, because it is the reason why being risible belongs to man. The second is called a posteriori, which is not indeed the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; but it is so necessarily connected with it that one can be inferred from the other: thus being risible, for example, is called the middle term with respect to this conclusion, Man is rational: for although being risible is not the cause why rational belongs to man, it is nevertheless so necessarily joined to man and to rational that through it these two are duly inferred to be connected. The former is called the cause of the conclusion in being; the latter is called the cause of the conclusion in knowing. The former is called the middle of the demonstration a priori or propter quid: the latter is called the middle of the demonstration quia, or a posteriori, by which a cause is demonstrated through effects, or an essence through its own properties.

First conclusion. — That God exists can be demonstrated by a discourse so evident that the intellect cannot dissent from it. Proof: If the divine existence could not be demonstrated, that would arise either on the part of itself, or on the part of the intellect; that is, either from the fact that it would not be demonstrable, or from the fact that the intellect could not apprehend it through discourse: but it is not repugnant on either part: therefore its existence can be demonstrated. The major is evident; for every knowledge is produced from the object and the intellect. The minor is proved: every cause can be manifested and demonstrated through the effects with which it has a necessary connection; for in this way we can, by reasoning, detect and openly know any cause through its effects: but God is the cause of creatures, and has so necessary a connection with their existence that they could in no way exist without Him; and our intellect can apprehend this connection: therefore it can likewise demonstrate the existence of God through creatures. This Conclusion is confirmed by all the authorities and reasons by which we proved the third Conclusion of the first Question.

You will say 1. The existence of a necessary being cannot be certainly inferred through the existence of a contingent being: but God is a necessary being and creatures are contingent: therefore the existence of God cannot be inferred through creatures.

I distinguish the major. If the existence of a contingent being does not have a necessary connection with the existence of a necessary being, I concede: if it does have it, I deny: but the existence of creatures has so necessary a connection and dependence on the existence of God that if He did not exist, they would not be: and consequently He can be demonstrated through them.

You will say 2. So far is it from being the case that the existence of God can be apprehended from creatures, that rather they turn men away from God and call them back; for Wisdom 11 The creatures of God have become objects of hatred, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the unwise: therefore the existence of God cannot become known through creatures.

I answer 1. The Wise Man is not there speaking of any creatures whatsoever, but only of the idols which men fabricate for themselves from stones, woods and other metals, so that afterwards they may worship and venerate them as gods; for the Wise Man had premised these words: In the idols of the nations there will be no respect for him, since the creatures of God have become objects of hatred, etc. By which, as is evident, he inveighs against the idolaters, who make the creatures created for the glory and honor of God redound to His disgrace by sacrificing them to demons. Whence he adds: The beginning of all fornication is the seeking out of idols, etc., by which he openly signifies that he is treating of idols alone. Nevertheless, I answer 2. that if these words are taken of creatures in general, they are indeed a snare and a temptation to the feet of men, not indeed of the wise, but of the unwise; in almost the same way in which Christ the Lord is said in Sacred Scripture: Set for the ruin and resurrection of many, for a stone of offense and a rock of scandal; not indeed per se, but from the malice of perverse men, who were rebels against the light and rejected His doctrine and grace.

Second conclusion. — The existence of God cannot be demonstrated a priori by us: it could, however, be demonstrated by the Blessed and the Angels under that concept which we who are wayfarers form of Him. This is the teaching of the Doctor as to both parts, in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 1.

The first part is proved. A demonstration a priori must be made through a cause or a reason connecting the attribute with the subject: but nothing can be assigned by us in God which is the cause or reason of the connection of that existence with the essence: therefore that existence cannot be demonstrated a priori. Secondly. Whatever is demonstrated of something must be outside the formal concept of that of which it is demonstrated; otherwise the same would be demonstrated of itself: but existence is not outside the formal concept of the divine essence, since it is of the essence of God, as will appear in the following Disputation: therefore this cannot be demonstrated of God.

Thirdly. Every demonstration a priori rests on some objective proposition known to us per se and declarative of the union of the predicate with the subject: but we have no such proposition per se about God which could be declarative of the union of that existence with the essence: therefore in no way can the divine existence be demonstrated a priori by us.

The second part of the Conclusion has been proved more than enough in the second Conclusion of the preceding Question, in which we said that the divine existence, inasmuch as God is conceived by us, is not known per se; for all those concepts which we can form of God in this mortal life, whether they are absolute or relative, can be demonstrated through the divine existence by the Blessed, who, since they behold God intuitively, likewise see that the divine essence belongs to Him essentially. And consequently it can be taken as a means for demonstrating all the things which belong to God intrinsically, whether after the manner of an attribute, or as an intrinsic mode, in which manner alone God is conceivable by us; since we do not conceive Him under the formal notion of essence: Truly, says St. Dionysius, in the book De Divinis nominibus, cap. 7., we shall say that we know God not from His own nature; for that is unknown, and surpasses all reason and sense: but from the most ordered disposition of creatures. Therefore, just as rational animal, which is the essence of man, is taken as a means for demonstrating a priori all the properties of man; so likewise the divine existence, since it is essential to God, can be taken by the blessed minds as a means for demonstrating a priori all the concepts which we form of God, while we conceive Him as a being supremely necessary, infinite, the first principle of all things, the governor and end, etc. For all these things belong to God precisely because God is, and are as it were properties emanating from His essence, and demonstrable through it.