Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

In order that we may the more easily cut away all the empty subtleties of argument which are wont to be proposed concerning the resolution of the present Question, and spend time and labor rather on acquiring solid doctrine than on discussing vain and frivolous little questions; we here propose only two things to be resolved: 1. Whether it is known per se that God exists insofar as He is God, or as He is conceivable in Himself under the precise notion of His Deity and divine essence; 2. Whether it is known per se that He exists insofar as He is conceived by us under the notion of first cause, of being most necessary, infinite, and the principle, moderator, and end of all beings: so that these may appear more evidently

Note 1. That just as a threefold truth is distinguished, namely of the thing, of cognition, and of speech, of which the first consists in the conformity of the thing to its principles, or to its idea; the second, in the conformity of cognition with the object known; the third, in the conformity of speech with the internal concept of the mind: the first is opposed to falsity and appearance, the second to error, the third to lying: so likewise a threefold proposition is said to exist, namely vocal, mental, and objective. The vocal proposition consists of vocal terms expressing and signifying the concept: the mental is the internal concept by which one thing is affirmed of another: the objective, however, is the very real union of the terms on the side of the thing, namely the real union of the predicate with the subject; e.g., the union of animal with rational in man, which is represented by the mental and signified by the vocal enunciation. — Although, however, strictly speaking, only the objective proposition should precisely be called known per se, for just as only a thing is said to be known per se or unknown, so likewise it alone is said to be known per se or through another: nevertheless usage has now prevailed that, the sign being taken for the thing signified, vocal and mental propositions are also called known per se by reason of the objective proposition which they express and signify.

Note 2. Concerning the definition of a proposition known per se, the opinion of the Authors is so great and so varied that scarcely two agree with one another in assigning it. We, however, clinging to the footsteps of the Subtle Doctor, say with him in 1. dist. 2. qu. 2. n. 2. and 3. that a proposition is said to be known per se whose truth is evident from the terms, known either distinctly or confusedly, of which it consists; so that, beyond the knowledge of the terms, the intellect needs no other means to perceive the necessary and immediate connection of the subject and predicate from which that proposition is formed.

Thus, e.g., the whole is greater than its part is commonly said to be a proposition known per se, because when one knows what "whole" signifies, what "part", and what "greater", he needs no other cognition and no proof to perceive evidently that every whole is greater than its part. — Hence, just as the Sun is said to be visible per se, because it needs no other light in order to appear to those who see, since it is the fount and origin of all light: so likewise that proposition is fittingly said to be known per se whose truth is evident from its terms; and which, says the Doctor, n. 3, is apt to have the evident truth contained in the terms, even in any intellect conceiving the terms: so that, just as the Sun, although it is not seen by the blind and by closed eyes, is nonetheless no less visible of itself and per se, so although some intellect may not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, that proposition is nonetheless no less known per se as far as it is in itself. Whence he gathers in the same place: therefore every and only that proposition is known per se which, from terms conceived as they are its terms, is apt to have the evident truth of the complex.

Note 3. For a proposition to be known per se, three conditions are chiefly required. — The first is that the predicate belong to the subject immediately and per se; for if it belongs to it through another, its connection with the subject will also be made known through another; and so it will not be a proposition known per se, but through another; for which reason all propositions in which a property is affirmed of its subject, e.g., capable of laughter, of man, are not precisely said to be known per se, because being capable of laughter does not belong to man immediately, but only through rational; for man is capable of laughter because he is rational: they can, however, be said to be known per se improperly, insofar as the predicate necessarily belongs to the subject, nor can it be separated from it in any way, whence it comes about that this consequence is true: He is a man: therefore he is capable of laughter.

— The second condition is that the predicate belong to the subject essentially and intrinsically; for want of which this proposition, snow is white, is indeed known per se to the senses and the eyes, which evidently perceive all snow to be white; but it is not known per se to the intellect, because although whiteness belongs to snow immediately, and not by reason of another form or predicate; nevertheless, since snow can exist without whiteness, and hence the connection of the predicate with the subject, namely of whiteness with snow, is not necessary and inseparable, that proposition too is not known per se to the intellect. — The third condition is that it cannot be demonstrated a priori that the predicate belongs to the subject; otherwise it would not be immediate, nor consequently known per se, if through some means conceivable as prior in the thing which is known, the predicate which is affirmed of it belonged to it. The demonstration a posteriori, however, is not excluded, by which our intellect is led as if by the hand, so that through the effects or properties of the thing it may perceive that the predicate which is affirmed of it belongs to it per se and immediately.

First conclusion. — God is, or exists, is a proposition known per se. So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 4. q. 2. n. 1., and St. Thomas with his followers.

Proof. That proposition is known per se in which the predicate is of the essence of the subject; for that cannot be demonstrated, or made known, through anything prior, since nothing is prior to the essence of a thing: but in this proposition, God is, or exists, the predicate (namely existence) is of the essence of the subject; for since God is being through essence and pure act, it is necessary that existence be of the quidditative concept of the divine essence: therefore that proposition, God is, must be said to be known per se. — Secondly, that proposition is known per se which from its known terms has evident truth, and needs nothing else in order to become known; and which is immediate, and in the first mode of saying per se, that is, one in which the predicate belongs to the subject essentially: but such is the proposition, God is, for, as the cited Doctor says, n. 4, the predicate belongs to the subject per se in the first mode, and that proposition is immediate; indeed most immediate, to which are resolved all propositions enunciating something about God conceived in any way whatsoever: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. That proposition ought not to be said to be known per se, for evidently perceiving whose truth a demonstration and discourse are needed: but for perceiving the truth of this proposition, God is, discourse and a demonstration, at least a posteriori, are needed: therefore it is not known per se.

I answer. The major being conceded, distinguishing the minor: that discourse is needed for those who perfectly know the terms, namely what God is, and what to exist is, as the Angels and the blessed spirits perceive them, who see God as He is, and behold Him face to face, I deny: that discourse is needed for those who perceive the aforesaid terms only imperfectly, such as we are as long as we live this mortal life, I concede; for since we know God only through the mirror of creatures, and in the enigma of faith, hence it is no wonder if we conceive and detect His invisible things through the things that have been made, by discoursing.

Add. That the demonstration a posteriori does not stand in the way of a proposition known per se, as was observed in the third note; otherwise there would be no proposition known per se, since there is none whose truth cannot become known, either by induction or by demonstration a posteriori.

You will say 2. That expression, God is, is not a proposition: therefore it is not a proposition known per se. The antecedent is proved: a proposition must consist of two terms; for if only one appears, it will not be a proposition, but a simple term; but in this proposition, God is, not two terms appear but one; for the Deity, or the divine essence, is a single and simple entity, indivisible into several formalities; and hence in its concept it does not admit several terms: therefore it does not form a proposition known per se either.

I distinguish the minor. That two or more terms formally and actually distinct do not appear, let it pass: that at least virtually distinct ones do not appear, I deny; for although the Deity and its existence are not distinguished formally, since the Deity cannot be conceived without existence; nevertheless they are distinguished virtually; and insofar as they form a proposition, they are conceived as two distinct things, which suffices for forming the two terms that are required in a proposition.

Second conclusion. — This proposition, God is, insofar as it is conceived by us wayfarers, is not known per se. So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 4. and 5.

Proof. Through this proposition, God is, we conceive God either as infinite being, or as necessarily existing, or as the highest good, or as the principle, moderator, and end of all things: but under none of these concepts is it known per se that God exists; therefore this proposition, God is, insofar as it is conceived by us, is not known per se. The major is certain; for all the concepts which we can form of God are either absolute or respective, that is, they concern God either insofar as He is in Himself, or insofar as He bears a relation to creatures. If He is conceived insofar as He is in Himself, He is apprehended either as a being from itself necessarily existing and in every way independent, or as being infinitely perfect and embracing in His bosom the complete notion and perfection of being: if He is conceived through the relation which He has to creatures, He is conceived either as their principle, or insofar as He is their moderator, or end; and hence the truth of the major proposition is evident.

— The Doctor proves the minor, however, with three arguments. First indeed thus: those concepts are not known per se which are demonstrable a priori; but the aforesaid concepts are demonstrable a priori. Proof: those concepts are demonstrable a priori which can be demonstrated through the divine existence as through something from which they emanate; but such concepts can be demonstrated in this way. Proof: every property or mode of a thing can be demonstrated through the essence from which it emanates: but those objective concepts of God are related in the manner of a property or a mode: therefore they can be demonstrated through the existence which belongs to God essentially.

— Secondly: a proposition known per se is one which from known terms evidently appears true: but although one may know what the infinite is, and what to exist is, he does not on that account see evidently the truth of that proposition: Infinite being exists; the same is to be said of the other concepts: therefore those propositions are not known per se.

— Thirdly: nothing can be known about a concept that is not simply simple, that is, which includes several concepts, unless it is known that those concepts are united among themselves; thus, e.g., it cannot be known that in such a state we have no proper concept of God which is simply simple; for every proper concept which we form of Him includes several other concepts; for the concepts of the highest good, of infinite being, of necessary being, of first cause, etc. involve several concepts; for the concept of cause is one thing, and that of first cause another; since something can have the notion of cause, and not be the first cause, just as it can have the notion of being, and not be infinite and necessary being: therefore in this state we can form no concept of God which does not involve several concepts; nor can those concepts be known per se, unless it is established that they are united per se: but it is in no way established for us that all the concepts which we form of God are united per se, as experience makes clear. Therefore it is not established that those concepts are known per se.

— It is confirmed by experience itself, since it openly appears that while we conceive God under some one of the aforesaid concepts, our intellect is not immediately determined to assent that such a being exists; but in order to be certainly determined to this assent, it must be urged to it by certain reasons and led by the hand; and hence this proposition, God is, is not known per se.

You will say 1. That cognition is known per se which is instilled in us by nature: but the cognition of the existence of God is instilled in us by nature, as was proved in the preceding Question. Therefore it is known per se. The major is evident, for the first principles of cognition are not said to be known per se from any other source, except because we perceive their truth from the light of reason alone innate in us and without any discourse.

I distinguish the major. If the terms of that proposition become distinctly known even with nature as teacher, and their connection appears necessary, let it pass; if the terms come to mind only confusedly, and their connection is not certain and evident for us, I deny: but it is certain that the terms of that proposition, God is, are apprehended by the natural light only confusedly, and that their connection does not appear evidently and per se: whence it comes about that, together with the natural light and intuition, we also need the light and discourse of reason, by which we detect and persuade ourselves of the existence of God: and hence although that proposition, God is, is evident with nature as leader and teacher, it is not on that account known per se.

You will say 2. It is known to us per se that that exists than which a greater cannot be conceived: but God is that than which a greater cannot be or be conceived: therefore that God exists is a proposition known per se. The major is evident both from the mind of St. Anselm, who uses this single argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if He did not exist, He would not be that than which a greater could not be conceived, because it is greater for a thing to exist than not to exist.

I distinguish the major. That is known per se, if by known per se is understood that which can easily be proved, I concede: if what is understood is that which is evident from the simple apprehension and knowledge of the terms, I deny. St. Anselm, however, held this proposition, God exists, to be known per se only insofar as it is easily proved and demonstrated; since he himself composed an entire book to demonstrate that there exists that than which nothing greater can be; but this would have been altogether superfluous if the aforementioned proposition were known per se; for a proposition known per se, strictly taken, needs no proof for its truth to appear, but becomes known by the mere exposition and knowledge of the terms.

I distinguish otherwise. If it is known per se that that than which nothing greater can be is possible, it will likewise be known per se that it actually exists, I concede: if it is not known per se that it is possible, I deny: but it is not known to us per se that there is something possible than which nothing greater can be conceived; and consequently neither will it be known that it actually exists. Hence for a proposition to be known per se it does not suffice that the opposite of the predicate be repugnant to the subject; but it is further required that the possible or actual connection of the predicate and the subject appear evidently. Thus, e.g., for it to be known per se that man is a rational animal, it does not suffice that irrationality be repugnant to man; but it is further required that the necessary connection of the rational animal with man appear evidently.

You will say 3. It is known per se that truth exists: but God is truth: therefore it is known per se that God exists. The major is clear, for either it is certain that truth exists, and so the intended conclusion is obtained; or it is certain that it does not exist, and then it would be true that truth does not exist; and so there would be truth that truth does not exist; and thus the existence of truth is gathered from the negation of truth.

He answers 1. The Doctor, n. 8., says the argument does not conclude, but that in it lies the fallacy of the consequent; for one argues from the common to the special; namely, from truth in general to truth in particular. Hence just as it does not follow: an animal exists: but man is an animal: therefore man exists; because an animal could exist in a brute, even though man did not exist; so it does not follow: truth in general is given: therefore God is given; for God is indeed truth, but in a determinate, although infinite, species of being.

He answers 2. by denying the major: and to its proof he says that if no truth exists, it cannot follow that some truth is given, but rather it follows well that it is not true that some truth exists, because none exists; for it does not follow, he says, therefore it is true that some truth does not exist: for it is the fallacy of the consequent from a negative having two causes of truth to the affirmative which is one of them. Add that it is not known to us per se that God is truth; since Marcion, albeit unskilfully, admitted one God who would be the author of evils and the parent of lies; and consequently the argument collapses.

You will say 4. Some propositions, in which the union of the predicate with the subject is only necessary secundum quid, are known per se: therefore much more ought those propositions, in which the union of the predicate with the subject is absolutely necessary, to be known per se: but in this proposition, God exists, the predicate is united to the subject with a supremely necessary union: therefore it ought to be known per se. The major is clear, for these propositions, the whole is greater than its part, and man is a rational animal, and similar ones, have only a truth and a connection necessary secundum quid, and on the hypothesis that they exist: but it is otherwise with God, whose existence is absolutely invariable and necessary.

I deny the sequel of the major. For to the notion of a proposition known per se it does not suffice that the union of the predicate with the subject be greater and stricter; but it is further required that that greater connection be able to appear evidently from the terms, and move the intellect to give assent to that proposition. Hence it comes about that since a proposition necessary secundum quid becomes known to the intellect more easily and appears more evidently than one which is necessary simpliciter, it does not follow that if the former ought to be known, the latter likewise ought always to appear known. Indeed, since the propositions which are made about the supremely necessary or divine Being are of a higher order than those which are hypothetical, which are made about created being; those too are less evident to us and more impenetrable.

You will say 5. That which is the cause and reason of knowing all things ought to be first known and known per se: but God is the reason why all other beings are known: therefore He ought to be known per se. The major is certain: because that on account of which each thing is such, that itself is more so: therefore that which is that cause, according to which we are and according to which, whether in ourselves or in bodies, we do something by true and right reason, we behold with the sight of the mind.

I distinguish the major. That which is the cause of knowing all things objectively and formally ought to be more known to them, I concede: that which is the cause only effectively and exemplarily, I deny. But God is only the effective and exemplary cause of the knowledge of all things, inasmuch as He has granted us the light and activity of the intellect through which we can know all things. He is also the exemplary cause toward which it is necessary to look, as toward the exemplar of all things according to which their truth is to be measured; so that he is to be said to know things perfectly who knows them not only according to all that they comprehend in themselves, but also according to the proportion which they have to their divine exemplar, as St. Augustine indicates.

You will say 6. It is known to us per se that a being necessarily existing exists: but God is conceived by us as a being necessarily existing: therefore it is known to us per se that God exists under the concept by which we conceive Him. Likewise, it is known to us per se that one operating in act exists actually: but God is conceived by us as operating in act; for God is commonly said, according to Damascene, lib. 1. cap. 12., from the active, to foster, or to burn, or to consider: therefore it is known to us per se that He exists as we conceive Him. The major of both objections is clear, because it is repugnant that a thing necessarily existing and operating in act not exist, because, says the Doctor, in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. num. 6, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if it is not, it is not a being necessarily existing; and if it is not, it is not a being operating in act. Therefore, etc.

The Doctor answers. It is indeed known to us that non-existence is repugnant to a thing necessarily existing, and operating with independence: but he denies that it is known per se that some thing necessarily exists, and operates with independence. Hence for some proposition to be known per se, it does not suffice that it be known that the opposite of the predicate of that proposition cannot belong to the subject; but it is further required that either the subject be apprehended with a concept simply simple; or if it involves several concepts, it is necessary that those concepts appear evidently united to one another.

You will insist. By the very fact that some predicate is repugnant to a subject, it is evident that the opposite predicate belongs to it; hence if the negation of animal, e.g., is repugnant to man, it is evident that animal necessarily belongs to him; because otherwise contradictories would not be immediately conflicting, and it could be said that neither of the contradictories belonged to the thing: therefore if the negation of existence is repugnant to a being necessarily existing and operating in act, it manifestly follows that existence necessarily belongs to it: and consequently of whatever it is said that it is a being necessarily existing and independently operating in act, of the same it is evidently gathered that it exists: therefore since it is said of God that He is a necessary being and independently operating in act; and since it is repugnant that a necessary being operating in act not exist, it is evidently gathered that God necessarily exists.

I answer. That consequence indeed holds: God is a necessary being: therefore He is existing, by virtue of this proposition from which it is elicited: That which is a necessary being is existing; but the minor to be deduced from it, namely that God is a necessary being or independently operating in act, is not known to us per se.

You will say lastly. The Subtle Doctor, in the cited question, n. 3, when he had attacked the opinion of St. Thomas asserting that a proposition known per se is divided into a proposition known in itself, and into one known per se to us, gathered that whatever proposition is known in itself is also known per se to any intellect: but from the first conclusion it is certain that this proposition, God exists, is known per se in itself: therefore it ought also to be known per se to us; otherwise either the Doctor would contradict himself, or we ourselves.

I answer. The Doctor neither contradicts himself, nor do we contradict him: for it is one thing to say that some proposition is known per se, yet not actually known by any intellect; but it is another to say that one proposition is known per se, and another is knowable per se: because these two stand together, that some proposition be known per se, that is, that once its terms have been apprehended it have evidence, and yet there be no intellect which apprehends those terms and knows that proposition: for even if there were no intellect which apprehended those terms, whole and part, nevertheless this proposition, the whole is greater than its part, would be no less known per se, although it would not be actually known. Thus by way of similarity this proposition, God exists, is indeed known per se, yet not actually and evidently known by all intellects; but only by those who distinctly and clearly apprehend these terms, God and existence, and apprehend God signified through them only as He is a necessary being, omnipotent, etc., apprehended in which manner He is not evidently known and expressed through this proposition: God exists.

From these gather 1. That there is no division of the proposition into a proposition known per se to fools and known per se to the wise.

For if some proposition be known per se to the wise and unknown to fools, this does not come from the fact that this proposition is not known per se with respect to all who conceive its terms, but from the fact that fools do not apprehend those terms; which if they conceived, it would be equally known to them as to the wise. — Nor does it matter that Boethius distinguishes the common conception of the mind of the wise from the common conception of the mind of fools, as if he intimated that a proposition known per se to the wise is distinguished from a proposition known per se to fools. — For the Doctor answers; 1. that the common conception of the mind is not the same as a proposition known per se. 2. On the hypothesis that the common conception of the mind is the same as a proposition known per se, he answers that Boethius does not take a proposition known per se for that which is truly known per se, but only for that which is in fact known. It is certain, however, that the wise know many propositions which are not known to fools, not indeed by a defect of the proposition, but from the fact that fools do not perceive the terms of the proposition in the way in which they ought to perceive them in order that the proposition be known per se to them.

Gather 2. That likewise there is no division of the proposition into known per se and knowable per se: because it is the same for a proposition to be known per se and to be knowable per se; for that proposition is known per se which, although not actually known, can nevertheless be known from the simple apprehension of the terms; but such also is the proposition knowable per se, and consequently they are altogether one and the same.

Gather 3. Finally, that there is absolutely no division into a proposition known per se in itself and known per se to us. Because, says the Doctor, whatever proposition is known in itself and per se is also known to any intellect apprehending the terms of that proposition, although it is not actually known by every intellect. For a proposition is said to be known per se which from the terms evidently lies open to every intellect apprehending the terms; and so a proposition known per se in itself and known per se to us are not opposed members.

You will say. From Aristotle some things are better known by nature, or in themselves, and less known to us; some things, however, are better known to us and less known in themselves, from which the argument is made thus: every comparative presupposes the positive: therefore if there is given something better known in itself and less known to us, there ought also to be given something known in itself and known to us; and consequently there must be admitted something known per se from itself, and something known per se to us.

He answers by distinguishing the last consequence: there is something known per se from itself, and something known per se to us, in such a way that that which is known in itself is not known to us, when it is apprehended by us as it is known per se in itself, I deny the consequence; in any other sense, let the consequence pass; but it is not to the point. Aristotle, however, wills only that some things are better known in themselves than others, which nevertheless are less known to us, because some things are prior to others, as, e.g., substance is prior to accidents, and yet we know accidents before substance; each of the two, however, both accident and substance, is known from itself and known to us, because from their nature they can be known and are known; but accidents are known by us wayfarers before substance; by the blessed, however, substance is perceived before accidents. From this, however, it does not follow that there is given some proposition known from itself which is not known to anyone apprehending its terms; although there are many propositions whose terms cannot be apprehended by anyone. For which reason the Doctor in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. says that God under the notion of Deity is indeed the first object conceptible in itself, but not with respect to us, because we do not distinctly perceive what this term, Deity, signifies.