Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

In the present Question this single point is proposed for determination: whether God truly exists, that is, whether among all really existing beings some supreme being is to be admitted, upon which the rest depend as upon their principle, and toward which they tend and are ordered as toward their ultimate end. In order that this may be grasped

Note 1. Although the common sciences for the most part prescind from the existence of their object, lest — since that existence is contingent and subject to change — it should detract from and impair the certainty and infallibility of science: nevertheless Theology, the queen of the sciences, is not without reason engaged in discovering and proving the existence of God. For since all theological cognition depends upon divine revelation, which cannot be had except from a God who exists; rightly must it first be established for us that God exists, before we can attain any certain theological cognition. Add that since existence belongs to God necessarily and essentially, and is one and the chief of His essential predicates, it is evident that His essence cannot be discovered, unless His existence first become known.

Note 2. That this divine existence can become certainly known to us mortals only in a threefold way: namely, either through natural intelligence, or through faith, or through reasoning. For since only a fourfold light shines upon us by which we can discover the truth — namely, the light of faith, above us; of natural intelligence, within us; of reasoning, from ourselves; and of experience, which arises from the things that are around us — and since God is not manifest to our bodily senses, on account of His spirituality and His being purified from all matter; it is manifest that His existence cannot be detected, nor proved, by the light of experience; and therefore that divine existence cannot become known to us, except either by the light of intelligence innate in everyone: or by some witness worthy of faith testifying: or finally by reasoning itself. Whether, however, the divine existence is made manifest by these three ways is what must be resolved in this Question.

Note 3. That ignorance, which is the lack of that cognition which man is born apt to have, is wont by Theologians to be distinguished as threefold: namely, invincible, crass, and affected. The first is that by which, with no study and no exercise and diligence, it can be driven off and overcome; the second is that in which we apply little or no diligence to perceiving that thing which we are nevertheless bound to know; the third is that in which someone voluntarily ignores those things he is bound to know, in order to sin more freely. The first removes all malice; the second, part of the malice; the third increases it itself, in that from the determination of the human will it adds to a prohibited act the affectation of such ignorance.

First conclusion. — That the existence of God is established by the light of intelligence innate in everyone is not improbable.

Proof first. That is apprehended by the innate power of understanding which comes into everyone's mind with no one teaching and without any study or formal reasoning, but through the mere knowledge of the terms: but such is the cognition and manifestation of the existence of God: therefore it is inserted into our minds by the natural power of understanding. The major is evident, for the cognition of the first principles is for that reason called Understanding, because it is known to everyone without any study or any reasoning. The minor is proved by the authority of St. Damascene, book 7. De fide, cap. 1.: The knowledge, he says, of God is implanted in all by nature: nor can anyone who uses reason be ignorant of this. — Tertullian affirms the same thing, book 1 against Marcion, saying: The first endowment of the rational soul is the knowledge of God. Whence in the Apologetico cap. 17. when he had said: This is the height of the offense of those unwilling to recognize Him whom they cannot be ignorant of; he adds the testimony of the soul itself;

By which, he says, although pressed down by the prison of the body, although hemmed in by evil institutions, although enervated by lusts and concupiscences, although enslaved to false gods; nevertheless when it recovers its senses as from a debauch, as from sleep, as from some sickness, and recovers its health, it names God... and that God has given it is the voice of all... O testimony of the soul, naturally Christian!

For, he says, in the book De Testimonio animae, cap. 5: Who would not have thought that eruptions of this kind of the soul are the teaching of nature, and things tacitly committed to an inborn and innate conscience?... Certainly the soul is prior to the Letter, and speech prior to the book, and the first sense prior to the stylus, and man himself prior to the Philosopher and the Poet. Hence he had premised above: These testimonies of the soul, inasmuch as they are true, are so simple: inasmuch as simple, so vulgar: inasmuch as vulgar, so common: inasmuch as common, so natural: inasmuch as natural, so divine... Nature the mistress, the soul the disciple, whatever either she taught or it learned, has been handed down by God, the master, namely, of the mistress herself. — Ambrose subscribes, book 1. contra Gentes, saying that this is the natural knowledge without which no one is born; so much so that it is innate and fixed in everyone, and impressed and implanted in the mother's womb, that He is the King and Lord of all things, governing whatsoever exists, etc. — This same truth (that I may omit the other Holy Fathers proving the same thing) the Philosophers confirmed with their vote, and first of all Epicurus himself, who, as Cicero reports, book 1. De natura Deorum: says that nature itself impressed the notion of the gods upon the minds of all. For what nation, or what race of men, that does not have without instruction a certain anticipation of the gods, which Epicurus calls Prolepsis, that is, a certain anticipation of the thing conceived in the mind, without which nothing could be known, sought, or disputed. By which he openly confesses that the notion of God is impressed upon us by nature; and therefore he calls it the anticipation of doctrine, because without any

Teacher it is inserted into our minds by nature itself, and precedes all reasoning, like a certain most universal principle of the whole discourse, without which nothing could be understood, nor disputed; as if the certain cognition of all beings depended upon the prior cognition of God, just as the power and nature of all things depend upon His efficiency. Whence rightly, book 1. De Legibus, the same Cicero affirms: Of men, he says, there is no nation, neither so wild, nor so iron-hearted, which does not, even if it ignores what kind of God it befits it to have, nevertheless know that one ought to be had.

The same is proved by reason. Nature implanted the worship and observance of God in each and every man: therefore much more the knowledge of His existence. The consequence is evident, for nothing can be worshipped, unless it has first been established that it exists. The antecedent is proved from the Apostle to the Romans, cap. 2. where he says: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things of the law; these, not having such a law, are a law unto themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts.

Secondly. Invincible ignorance of God cannot be given: therefore the natural power of understanding instills the knowledge of Him into the mind of every man. The consequence is evident: for there are many men who cannot know God either through faith, or through reasoning; for instance infidels, to whom the Gospel has not yet been preached, and rude and ignorant men who have attained no art or skill of reasoning: therefore if they know God, it is necessary that they acknowledge Him through the natural power of understanding.

The antecedent is evident, both from the cited passage to the Romans, in which those who are ignorant of God are said to be inexcusable: but they would not be inexcusable if they could invincibly be ignorant of His existence; for invincible ignorance excuses from all fault, according to that saying of St. Augustine, lib. 3. De libero arbitrio, cap. 15. where he says: That is not imputed to you as fault which you are unwillingly ignorant of, but that you neglect to seek what you acknowledge. Then because if man could inculpably be ignorant of the true God, he could also without fault worship a false god and idols, and so by reason of that invincible ignorance could be excused from the sin of Idolatry, which Tertullian lib. De Idololatria, cap. 1., calls the principal crime of the human race, the supreme guilt of the age, the whole cause of judgment. And therefore it is by no means to be excused.

Finally, because, as Theologians commonly teach, the precepts of the law of nature cannot be invincibly ignored: therefore neither can God, who is the author and end of such precepts; and consequently since there are many infidels and dull-witted men, who cannot acknowledge God through faith and reasoning, it is necessary that they apprehend His existence by the innate power of understanding.

You will say 1. What the innate power of understanding manifests comes into everyone's mind at the first glance of reason: but the existence of God does not come into the minds of all men using reason; since Molina, 1. par. q. 2. art. 1., reports that the inhabitants of Brazil worshipped and acknowledged no Deity, before they heard and received religion from the Portuguese: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. For, as St. Jerome says, Epist. 3. ad Nepotianum, The Persian, the Copt, the Egyptian, the Turk acknowledge Him; the fierceness of the Bessi and the crowd of skin-clad peoples have broken their harsh cry into the sweet melody of His name; and the one voice of the whole world: God exists. I confess indeed, that a distinct and evident knowledge of the existence of God is not instilled into every man by the natural power of understanding, as if it appeared certainly and evidently to each one that God exists; but at least there is present in everyone some cognition of Him, for as the same St. Jerome says in these words of Iob. 36: All men see Him, that is, through the good of nature the knowledge of the Creator is present in hearts, and although someone may be so depraved and cold, that he strives to be a stranger to his Creator, there is nevertheless no one who hides himself from His heat.

You will say 2. What is known by nature cannot be called into doubt; for who doubts, v. g., that the whole is greater than its part? but the existence of God is called into doubt; indeed it is actually denied, For the fool has said in his heart: There is no God, Psal. 13. And not only the fool, but also very many of the wiser Philosophers and the more shrewd Politicians ridicule and assail that existence of God: therefore the knowledge of Him is not innate from nature.

I distinguish the major. That it cannot be called into doubt by a man of sound mind and reasoning according to the light and dictate of reason, I concede: by a man either deprived of reason, or blinded by malice, I deny: for although, says St. Damascene, lib. 1. De fide orthodoxa, cap. 3., the cognition of the existence of God is naturally impressed upon us: nevertheless the pernicious malice of men has so prevailed, that it says there is no God: not indeed outwardly, lest it should be convicted of falsity and impiety by all creatures, but inwardly and in its heart. For neither (says St. Augustine on these words) have the sacrilegious and detestable Philosophers themselves, who think perverse and false things about God, dared to say: There is no God: therefore he said: in his heart, because no one dares to say this even if he has dared to think it.

To the minor I say. That he who doubts the existence of God is not without reason called a fool, since he so extinguishes the light of reason, that he does not see the light of the face of God signed upon himself, nor hear all the parts of his body and the faculties of his soul crying out within: He made us and not we ourselves; whence also it is pleasing to say of the Atheists themselves what St. Paul brought forth of the Idolaters in the 1. cap. ad Romanos: When they had known God (nature teaching) they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks; but they became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for saying themselves to be wise, they became fools. However, we shall attempt to repress this insanity of the Atheists in the third following Question by an efficacious and manifold reason.

You will insist. The light implanted in our minds by nature, with no mist of error or ignorance supervening, can nowhere within be extinguished; for it remains as long as nature itself; so v. g. the light and dictate of conscience never perishes, whatever corruption of morals supervenes: but the cognition of the existence of God perishes in the heart of the depraved fool (for he says: There is no God): therefore it is not implanted by nature.

He distinguishes the minor. St. Anselm in the Prosologio, cap. 4., and with him our Alensis, 1. parte, quaest. 3. membro 2. ad. 2: that the cognition of God perishes in the heart of the fool in words, he concedes: in reality he denies: for either that fool in fact understands and knows the thing he denies, or not: if he does not know it, nor seriously think of it, while he denies it, he will indeed be able to deny it, but in words: but if he perceives it, certainly he will not be able to deny it: for no one understanding what God is will be able to deny His existence, for God, says St. Anselm, is that than which nothing greater can be conceived; which he who understands well, certainly understands that it is so, that it cannot even in thought not exist: he therefore who thus understands that

God exists, cannot think that He does not exist. We shall weigh this argument of St. Anselm in quaest. 3.

Second conclusion. — It is established by the light and certainty of faith that God exists.

The truth of the conclusion is evident, and is strengthened by almost innumerable texts of Sacred Scripture, by which God revealed and testified not only other things, but also the existence of Himself, and confirmed the truth of that revelation with so many signs and so many miracles and prodigies, and confirms it day by day, since wonders are wrought at His invocation, so that no one, unless wholly strayed from reason, can doubt this truth.

Hence of the existence of God we can affirm with all the more right what Picus Mirandulanus brought forth of the truth and credibility of the Gospel, Epistola prima: Great indeed, he says, would be the madness of not believing the Gospel, whose truth the blood of the martyrs cries out, the Apostolic voices resound, prodigies prove, reason confirms, the world testifies, the elements speak, the demons confess.

Moreover, the truth of this conclusion is not only of faith, but is also the basis and foundation of all the articles of divine and supernatural faith; as is evident both from the Creed of the Apostles, whose first article is: I believe in God; and also from St. Paul to the Hebrews, cap. 11. where he says: He who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him; in which he distinguishes two things, namely that God is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him, wherefore both are to be believed with divine faith, and consequently that God exists is of faith.

Add that the whole certainty of faith depends upon the infallibility of divine revelation; but what truth of revelation could there be, unless it were certainly established that the revealer exists and is truthful? Therefore with the same faith by which it is believed that God revealed this or that, it ought to be believed that He exists.

You will say. It cannot happen that anyone believe by divine faith that God exists: therefore the existence of God is not established by the light of faith. The antecedent is proved. The assent of divine faith rests upon the testimony of God: therefore faith in its assent supposes that God exists who bears testimony to the truth to be believed, and consequently it cannot happen that His existence becomes known through the light of faith, since it supposes it.

I deny the first antecedent, and I distinguish the second consequence. Faith in its assent supposes that God is in entity and in His real existence, I concede: that it supposes this in the formal and distinct knowledge of the believer, I deny: for he who believes God's existence, because God has revealed that He exists, must indeed suppose that He is; for He would not have revealed unless He existed; but while he assents to this revelation, he does not think about that presupposed existence of the revealing God: or if he does think of it, he thinks of it only confusedly and indistinctly: so that that thought terminates first and immediately, as it were, at this proposition, God is, because He revealed that He is, rather than at this one, He could not have revealed unless He existed: for the first proposition is, as it were, immediate with respect to the one assenting; the second, however, only mediate and confused.

You will insist. If we believe by the same act of faith that God exists, by which He testifies that He is, it follows that through the same assent we twice believe that God exists; once indeed, because He revealed that He is; and again, because He could not have revealed unless He existed; and so we would believe God's existence before we believe Him to be existing, which is altogether nugatory.

I distinguish the antecedent. It would follow that we twice believe that God is, by the same motive, means and mode, I deny: by a diverse motive, means and mode, I concede. For we believe by divine faith that He is precisely, formally and explicitly, because He revealed and said that He is, so that that revelation is the means and the motive of that assent; but we believe that He is only virtually, mediately and consequently, namely that He could not have revealed unless He existed. The first motive of such an assent is indeed from revelation; the second from demonstration: the first pertains precisely to faith; the latter, however, looks to Metaphysics, by which, from the fact that it is impossible for the same thing to act and not to be, it is gathered that if God testifies that He is, He must necessarily be, in order that He testify that; for acting follows upon being. Whence the aforesaid assent, if it is simple in entity, is at least virtually multiple, since it has a diverse virtual motive and a diverse means.

Third conclusion. — By the light of natural discourse it is certainly established that God exists.

This conclusion St. Paul indicates and proves in explicit words to the Romans, where, speaking of men illumined only by natural reason, and not taught by that divine revelation, he says: What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has manifested it to them: namely by natural light, and by the discourse from effects and created things to the Creator: For His invisible things are seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that are made; His eternal power and Divinity also, so that they are inexcusable. Because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God.

— Whence the Sage rightly says in cap. 13.: Vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and of these good things that are seen they could not understand Him who is, nor, attending to the works, did they acknowledge who was the Artisan. A few words interposed, he concludes: For from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, their Creator will be able to be seen in a knowable manner. From these things it is established that from God's works His existence is made known through discourse and the light of natural reason so certainly and openly, that the holy Fathers rightly called that knowledge evident.

Hence Augustine, in the second Tractate on John: God, he says, can be found evidently through creatures, as the Apostle says: The invisible things of God are seen, being understood through the things that are made: that is, says St. Jerome on this passage, they were understood so evidently, that they are said to have been seen.

With these the other holy Fathers agree, but of all most elegantly Minucius Felix in the Octavius: What, he says, can be so open, so acknowledged, and so clear, when you have lifted your eyes to heaven and surveyed the things that are below and around, than that there is some Deity of most excellent mind, by which all nature is inspired, moved, nourished, governed? It is established, therefore, that God's existence is made known through the light of reason. What, however, are the natural arguments by which it is proved, and effectively demonstrated against the Atheists, will appear below.

You will say first. Natural reason cannot apprehend God's existence: therefore God's existence is not made known through it. The antecedent is proved: Between the object to be known and the knowing power there must be some proportion: for God is infinite; the intellect, however, is a finite faculty; but of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion. Whence St. Dionysius, book 5. De Divinis nominibus, says: It is possible neither to say nor to understand God: therefore God cannot be known through natural reason.

I deny the antecedent. And I distinguish the major of that proof with St. Bonaventure, in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 1. ad 1: Between the knowing intellect and the knowable object there must be some proportion, either of suitability or of equivalence, I concede: of equivalence always, I deny. For just as there is a twofold knowledge of the object, namely apprehensive and comprehensive; of which the former consists in the manifestation of some truth of the known object; the latter, however, in the penetrating vision and contemplation of all those things which are in the object; so that there is nothing in it which lies hidden from the one seeing and knowing: so also between intellect and object there is a twofold proportion: one of suitability, by which the intellect is borne toward an object suitable to itself, and insofar as it is intelligible; the other of equivalence, or equality, by which it comes about that there is as much power of understanding in the knowing faculty, as there is knowable perfection in the object. The first proportion is required in apprehensive knowledge: the second, however, is required for comprehensive knowledge. The former is found between God to be known and the soul knowing, because since God is knowable, He is within the breadth of the intellect's object, which is concerned with everything intelligible; not so the latter; whence the soul can indeed know God, but not comprehend Him. St. Dionysius speaks of the latter, not however of the former.

You will insist. But between God and the soul there is also no proportion of suitability, sufficient for the soul to be able to know God. Therefore the soul cannot know Him. The antecedent is proved: Sense and the spirit of a creature differ less from one another than God and the human intellect; because sense and the spirit of a creature agree in the notion of created and finite being; but there is a greater suitability between two finite beings, than between the intellect which is finite, and God who is infinite: but notwithstanding that greater suitability, sense can never be elevated to the knowledge and perception of spirit. Therefore much less will the soul be able to know God.

I distinguish the antecedent of the proof. With the same St. Bonaventure in the same place: sense and spirit differ less from one another than God and the soul, in the notion of knowable object, I deny; in the notion of being, I concede. Sense indeed and spirit, insofar as they are created and finite beings, agree with one another more than God and the soul: but insofar as spirit is a perceptible object, and God likewise a perceptible object, God agrees with the human intellect more than spirit agrees with sense; for since the intellect has as its object everything intelligible, it includes even God within the breadth of its object; sense, however, since it has as its object everything sensible, and spirit is not from itself sensible, spirit is not comprehended under the object of sense either: therefore, although sense cannot perceive spirit, still the soul will be able to acknowledge God.

You will say 2. In general, against the resolution of the Question: If God existed, He would be a being infinitely good: but no being infinitely good is given: therefore neither is God. The major is evident, since by the name of God a being infinitely perfect, and consequently infinitely good, is designated. The minor is proved: If one of two contraries were infinite and existed, and acted necessarily, the other contrary, even a finite one, could not be given; if, e.g., infinite heat existed in the nature of things, the least cold could not be found, nor subsist with it; similarly if the light were infinite, there would be no darkness: therefore if infinite good were given in the nature of things, no evil, even finite, could be given: but there are very many evils, as experience makes clear; therefore infinite good is not given, nor consequently God.

Some answer. That the minor is true of contraries formally and per se, such as are, e.g., heat and cold; not however of contraries virtually and by reason of the effects which they can produce, just as the Sun, e.g., is said to be virtually contrary to water; because the former produces heat, the latter cold. God, however, they say, has no evil formally contrary to Himself, but only virtually, inasmuch as He either prohibits or hates evil, and consequently need not necessarily exclude every evil from the nature of things.

— But the Subtle Doctor shows this reply to be worth nothing, in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. n. 1., because (he says) whether something is contrary to another formally or virtually, if it is of infinite power, it will not tolerate the other thing contrary to itself; for what is of infinite power not only excludes what is formally contrary to itself, but also what is contrary to its effect: e.g., if the Sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would not tolerate with itself any cold in the nature of things, any more than if it were formally hot: therefore if God is infinitely contrary to evil, He will not admit with Himself any evil in the nature of things, any more than if He were formally contrary to evil itself: and so in form, with the same Doctor in the same place q. 2. n. 30.: I deny the minor, and I distinguish the major of its proof. If that infinite contrary acted necessarily, it would not tolerate another thing contrary to itself or to its effect, I concede: for if the Sun virtually, and fire formally, were infinitely hot, e.g., since they would act necessarily and from the impulse of nature, they would also act according to their whole power; which, since it would be infinite, would produce infinite heat, which would accordingly drive all cold from the nature of things: if it acted freely, I deny. But God does not act necessarily ad extra, but altogether freely: For He has made all things whatsoever He willed in heaven and on earth. Nor does He necessarily produce any effects incompossible with evils, whether possible or existing; and therefore, although He is infinitely good, He nevertheless permits evils to be and to be done, either from punishing justice, or from providence ordering the evils themselves to some fitting end.

You will say 3. If some body of infinite magnitude according to every extension were given, it would not admit another body with itself in the nature of things, because it would entirely fill every place, and so would drive any other body from its place; therefore by a like argument, if some infinite being were given, it would not admit another infinite being with itself in the nature of things. But it is certain that there are several finite beings in the nature of things. Therefore in it no infinite being is given. The first point indeed is evident: for as extension is related to extension, so entity is related to entity: therefore if infinite extension excludes another finite extension, infinite entity will also exclude every other entity, or will really embrace and absorb it in its bosom, and consequently, if any infinite entity is given in the nature of things, other finite entities could not be admitted in it.

He denies the parity. The Doctor does so in the same place, and offers this reason of the disparity, that one entity does not fight with another entity, as one quantified body fights with another quantified body in respect of occupying the same place: for since two quantified bodies are naturally impenetrable, and therefore cannot occupy the same place at the same time; it is evident that if some body were infinitely extended, it would entirely fill every place; and hence would exclude every other body that fills a place. One entity, however, has no incompossibility and fight with another entity: neither by reason of itself, since they are not contraries, inasmuch as they are substances, to which it is proper not to be contrary to one another; nor by reason of place, since they are considered only insofar as they are entities, not however as extended: therefore, although an infinite body would exclude finite bodies; still infinite entity ought not to exclude finite entity.

— Indeed the argument can be turned back: for just as an infinite body would not exclude some quantified bodies, if it did not fight with them by reason of extension, because they would not be impenetrable nor filling of place, such as are glorious bodies, which neither fill a place nor are impenetrable; so by parity infinite entity ought not to exclude finite entities, because it has no fight with them.

You will insist. For that reason a finite quantified body cannot be with an infinite quantified body, because if it were given, it would make it greater with it, which implies a contradiction; for to the infinite nothing can be added nor taken away: therefore for the same reason, neither can a finite entity subsist with an infinite one. The antecedent is evident; for to be made greater is nothing other than to receive a new quantity superadded to itself; but an infinite body would receive a new quantity, if another finite body were placed with it in the nature of things. Therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. It would be made greater, if a finite quantified body were united to the infinite one, I concede: if it were not united, I deny. Similarly, an infinite entity could be said to be made more perfect, if other finite entities were united to it really and formally, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is certain that a finite entity cannot be united with an infinite one either really or formally; and consequently, from the fact that both are placed in the nature of things, the infinite entity ought not to be said to be more perfect on account of the fellowship and coexistence of the finite entity: just as, e.g., Paul is not made more perfect through the production and coexistence of Peter: because Peter's perfections are not really and formally in Paul.

You will say 4. If God existed, He would have to be infinite according to entity and perfection: but there is no being which is infinite according to entity and perfection: therefore God does not exist. The minor is proved: What is so here that it is not elsewhere, is finite according to its where and position in place: and what is so today, that it was not yesterday, nor will be tomorrow, is finite according to time and duration; and what so does this, that it cannot do another, is finite according to action and power: therefore by a like argument, what is so this singular being, that it is not another, is finite as to entity and perfection: but God, if He were given, would so be this divine being, that He would not be another, say a man, a stone, wood, etc. Therefore He would be finite according to entity, and for that reason would not be God.

The Doctor answers. In 1. dist. 1. q. 2. n. 36., denying the consequence, and he offers this reason of the disparity, that the place and time in which a thing would be, and not elsewhere, or at another time, are finite: for if they were infinite, the antecedent would be false: for indeed, says the Doctor: If there were some infinite where, per impossibile, and an infinite body, it would fill that where; it would not follow: this body is here so that it is not elsewhere: therefore it is finite according to its where, because the word “here” demonstrates nothing but the infinite. So according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time infinite, it would not follow: this motion is in this time, and not in another: therefore it is finite according to time. So in the present matter it must be proved that that which is demonstrated by “this being” is finite.

Or in form, I distinguish the minor. If place and time were infinite, what is in them would have to be finite, I deny; if they are finite, I concede. Whence, with the minor conceded, I deny the consequence: for that singular being which is called God is infinite according to entity and perfection, for He embraces in His bosom the perfection of all other beings, either formally or eminently, and consequently from the fact that He is this being, singular and determinate, it does not follow thence that He is a finite being; for determinate is indeed opposed to indeterminate, not however to finite; because something can be an infinite being and at the same time determinate, for if an infinite line were given, it would be a determinate being, because it would be a quantity, and not a quality, nor a relation, nor a substance; nevertheless for that reason it would be no less infinite.

You will say 5. If God were given, He would have infinite power: but there is no infinite power: therefore neither is God. The major is evident: since by the name of God we understand an infinite being, both in entity, and in perfections. The minor is proved from Aristotle, 8. Physicorum textu 79., where he says: If there were infinite power, it would move in no time: but no power can move in no time: therefore infinite power is not given, nor consequently God.

I prove the minor thus from the Doctor cited at n. 36. If infinite power did not act in no time, it would follow that it could be equalled in motion through the action and activity of finite power: but the consequent is false, because of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion: therefore if infinite power acts infinitely, it must act in no time. He proves the major from the hypothesis 1. that infinite power acts in time, which for the sake of clarity let be called A; and finite power acts in time, which let be named B; 2. that time A, in which infinite power acts, exceeds time B a hundredfold or a thousandfold; 3. that to the finite power another new power is added, a hundredfold or a thousandfold greater, so that it has sufficient activity for moving and acting, not only in time B, in which it previously operated through its prior activity; but also in time A. With these three, I say, supposed as possible, as indeed they appear possible of being done; the Doctor openly gathers that finite power would equal infinite power, which it previously exceeded. Therefore if infinite power acts according to all its activity, it is necessary either that it acts in no time, or that it be equalled by finite power, which will be able to operate with it in a similar time.

I distinguish the minor with the Doctor in the same place. If that infinite power is supposed to act in a body, and necessarily, and according to the leading and impulse of nature, I concede: if it is supposed to act outside a body, and to be spiritual and free, I deny. I confess indeed that if that infinite power acted necessarily, as Aristotle falsely judged God to operate, that power, certainly acting thus according to all its activity, would have to act in no time, so that it could not be equalled by finite power. — Moreover: if that infinite power were in an extended body, as Aristotle supposes in the place cited in the objection, it could not move in no time, because it would act about a body, whose parts, since some would be more distant from the mover, others less, it could not move them at the same time; and it would also have some resistance on the part of that body which it would move; which resistance of the mobile, and the diverse approximation of its parts, are the two causes of succession; and hence of temporal duration. Therefore it would follow that that infinite power acts in time, because it would act with succession, and acts in no time, lest it be equalled by finite power: but to act in time and not to act in time are contradictories: therefore Aristotle rightly concludes and proves that no infinite power can be given which at the same time acts necessarily and in an extended body, because thus it would have to act in time and not in time, which implies a contradiction. And so he does not absolutely deny that some infinite power which is free, and without a body, such as God is, acts in no time, but he denies that only of an infinite power which would be in a body, and would act necessarily.

You will say finally. What is neither from itself nor from another, is not: but God, if He were given, would be neither from Himself nor from another. Therefore He is not. The minor is proved: First, He would not be from another, otherwise He would not be the first being, nor independent: and consequently He would not be God. Nor would He be from Himself: neither effectively: because nothing produces itself, otherwise it would be before it was; for production is made through operation, but to operate follows and supposes being: nor emanatively, because what emanates presupposes that from which it emanates, as a river presupposes the spring, and a ray the sun; therefore He would suppose Himself to be before He was, which implies a contradiction. — Our Bassolius distinguishes the minor, in 1. d. 2. qu. 2. art. 2. principali: God is not from Himself effectively, positively, or by production, he concedes: that He is not from Himself negatively, or by the negation of production, both from Himself and from another, he denies. And so the phrase “to be from oneself” does not import an effecting, nor an emanation, as if God produced Himself, or emanated from Himself: but only the negation of production; so that to be from oneself is the same as to be altogether unproduced.