Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Three things are to be discussed in the present Article. First, whether and how it is established that God exists; Second, whether His Existence is per se nota: Third, whether and by what arguments it is demonstrable. The first, indeed, against Atheists and Politicians, who, so that they may indulge their inclination the more willingly and shamelessly, call the existence of God into doubt; the Second against certain Philosophers, who judge the existence of God to be difficult to grasp; the Third against certain Theologians, who affirm that God is utterly indemonstrable by natural reason. These three difficulties, moreover, are to be resolved in the three following Questions.

In the present Question this single point is proposed for determination: whether God truly exists, that is, whether among all really existing beings some supreme being is to be admitted, upon which the rest depend as upon their principle, and toward which they tend and are ordered as toward their ultimate end. In order that this may be grasped

Note 1. Although the common sciences for the most part prescind from the existence of their object, lest — since that existence is contingent and subject to change — it should detract from and impair the certainty and infallibility of science: nevertheless Theology, the queen of the sciences, is not without reason engaged in discovering and proving the existence of God. For since all theological cognition depends upon divine revelation, which cannot be had except from a God who exists; rightly must it first be established for us that God exists, before we can attain any certain theological cognition. Add that since existence belongs to God necessarily and essentially, and is one and the chief of His essential predicates, it is evident that His essence cannot be discovered, unless His existence first become known.

Note 2. That this divine existence can become certainly known to us mortals only in a threefold way: namely, either through natural intelligence, or through faith, or through reasoning. For since only a fourfold light shines upon us by which we can discover the truth — namely, the light of faith, above us; of natural intelligence, within us; of reasoning, from ourselves; and of experience, which arises from the things that are around us — and since God is not manifest to our bodily senses, on account of His spirituality and His being purified from all matter; it is manifest that His existence cannot be detected, nor proved, by the light of experience; and therefore that divine existence cannot become known to us, except either by the light of intelligence innate in everyone: or by some witness worthy of faith testifying: or finally by reasoning itself. Whether, however, the divine existence is made manifest by these three ways is what must be resolved in this Question.

Note 3. That ignorance, which is the lack of that cognition which man is born apt to have, is wont by Theologians to be distinguished as threefold: namely, invincible, crass, and affected. The first is that by which, with no study and no exercise and diligence, it can be driven off and overcome; the second is that in which we apply little or no diligence to perceiving that thing which we are nevertheless bound to know; the third is that in which someone voluntarily ignores those things he is bound to know, in order to sin more freely. The first removes all malice; the second, part of the malice; the third increases it itself, in that from the determination of the human will it adds to a prohibited act the affectation of such ignorance.

First conclusion. — That the existence of God is established by the light of intelligence innate in everyone is not improbable.

Proof first. That is apprehended by the innate power of understanding which comes into everyone's mind with no one teaching and without any study or formal reasoning, but through the mere knowledge of the terms: but such is the cognition and manifestation of the existence of God: therefore it is inserted into our minds by the natural power of understanding. The major is evident, for the cognition of the first principles is for that reason called Understanding, because it is known to everyone without any study or any reasoning. The minor is proved by the authority of St. Damascene, book 7. De fide, cap. 1.: The knowledge, he says, of God is implanted in all by nature: nor can anyone who uses reason be ignorant of this. — Tertullian affirms the same thing, book 1 against Marcion, saying: The first endowment of the rational soul is the knowledge of God. Whence in the Apologetico cap. 17. when he had said: This is the height of the offense of those unwilling to recognize Him whom they cannot be ignorant of; he adds the testimony of the soul itself;

By which, he says, although pressed down by the prison of the body, although hemmed in by evil institutions, although enervated by lusts and concupiscences, although enslaved to false gods; nevertheless when it recovers its senses as from a debauch, as from sleep, as from some sickness, and recovers its health, it names God... and that God has given it is the voice of all... O testimony of the soul, naturally Christian!

For, he says, in the book De Testimonio animae, cap. 5: Who would not have thought that eruptions of this kind of the soul are the teaching of nature, and things tacitly committed to an inborn and innate conscience?... Certainly the soul is prior to the Letter, and speech prior to the book, and the first sense prior to the stylus, and man himself prior to the Philosopher and the Poet. Hence he had premised above: These testimonies of the soul, inasmuch as they are true, are so simple: inasmuch as simple, so vulgar: inasmuch as vulgar, so common: inasmuch as common, so natural: inasmuch as natural, so divine... Nature the mistress, the soul the disciple, whatever either she taught or it learned, has been handed down by God, the master, namely, of the mistress herself. — Ambrose subscribes, book 1. contra Gentes, saying that this is the natural knowledge without which no one is born; so much so that it is innate and fixed in everyone, and impressed and implanted in the mother's womb, that He is the King and Lord of all things, governing whatsoever exists, etc. — This same truth (that I may omit the other Holy Fathers proving the same thing) the Philosophers confirmed with their vote, and first of all Epicurus himself, who, as Cicero reports, book 1. De natura Deorum: says that nature itself impressed the notion of the gods upon the minds of all. For what nation, or what race of men, that does not have without instruction a certain anticipation of the gods, which Epicurus calls Prolepsis, that is, a certain anticipation of the thing conceived in the mind, without which nothing could be known, sought, or disputed. By which he openly confesses that the notion of God is impressed upon us by nature; and therefore he calls it the anticipation of doctrine, because without any

Teacher it is inserted into our minds by nature itself, and precedes all reasoning, like a certain most universal principle of the whole discourse, without which nothing could be understood, nor disputed; as if the certain cognition of all beings depended upon the prior cognition of God, just as the power and nature of all things depend upon His efficiency. Whence rightly, book 1. De Legibus, the same Cicero affirms: Of men, he says, there is no nation, neither so wild, nor so iron-hearted, which does not, even if it ignores what kind of God it befits it to have, nevertheless know that one ought to be had.

The same is proved by reason. Nature implanted the worship and observance of God in each and every man: therefore much more the knowledge of His existence. The consequence is evident, for nothing can be worshipped, unless it has first been established that it exists. The antecedent is proved from the Apostle to the Romans, cap. 2. where he says: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things of the law; these, not having such a law, are a law unto themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts.

Secondly. Invincible ignorance of God cannot be given: therefore the natural power of understanding instills the knowledge of Him into the mind of every man. The consequence is evident: for there are many men who cannot know God either through faith, or through reasoning; for instance infidels, to whom the Gospel has not yet been preached, and rude and ignorant men who have attained no art or skill of reasoning: therefore if they know God, it is necessary that they acknowledge Him through the natural power of understanding.

The antecedent is evident, both from the cited passage to the Romans, in which those who are ignorant of God are said to be inexcusable: but they would not be inexcusable if they could invincibly be ignorant of His existence; for invincible ignorance excuses from all fault, according to that saying of St. Augustine, lib. 3. De libero arbitrio, cap. 15. where he says: That is not imputed to you as fault which you are unwillingly ignorant of, but that you neglect to seek what you acknowledge. Then because if man could inculpably be ignorant of the true God, he could also without fault worship a false god and idols, and so by reason of that invincible ignorance could be excused from the sin of Idolatry, which Tertullian lib. De Idololatria, cap. 1., calls the principal crime of the human race, the supreme guilt of the age, the whole cause of judgment. And therefore it is by no means to be excused.

Finally, because, as Theologians commonly teach, the precepts of the law of nature cannot be invincibly ignored: therefore neither can God, who is the author and end of such precepts; and consequently since there are many infidels and dull-witted men, who cannot acknowledge God through faith and reasoning, it is necessary that they apprehend His existence by the innate power of understanding.

You will say 1. What the innate power of understanding manifests comes into everyone's mind at the first glance of reason: but the existence of God does not come into the minds of all men using reason; since Molina, 1. par. q. 2. art. 1., reports that the inhabitants of Brazil worshipped and acknowledged no Deity, before they heard and received religion from the Portuguese: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. For, as St. Jerome says, Epist. 3. ad Nepotianum, The Persian, the Copt, the Egyptian, the Turk acknowledge Him; the fierceness of the Bessi and the crowd of skin-clad peoples have broken their harsh cry into the sweet melody of His name; and the one voice of the whole world: God exists. I confess indeed, that a distinct and evident knowledge of the existence of God is not instilled into every man by the natural power of understanding, as if it appeared certainly and evidently to each one that God exists; but at least there is present in everyone some cognition of Him, for as the same St. Jerome says in these words of Iob. 36: All men see Him, that is, through the good of nature the knowledge of the Creator is present in hearts, and although someone may be so depraved and cold, that he strives to be a stranger to his Creator, there is nevertheless no one who hides himself from His heat.

You will say 2. What is known by nature cannot be called into doubt; for who doubts, v. g., that the whole is greater than its part? but the existence of God is called into doubt; indeed it is actually denied, For the fool has said in his heart: There is no God, Psal. 13. And not only the fool, but also very many of the wiser Philosophers and the more shrewd Politicians ridicule and assail that existence of God: therefore the knowledge of Him is not innate from nature.

I distinguish the major. That it cannot be called into doubt by a man of sound mind and reasoning according to the light and dictate of reason, I concede: by a man either deprived of reason, or blinded by malice, I deny: for although, says St. Damascene, lib. 1. De fide orthodoxa, cap. 3., the cognition of the existence of God is naturally impressed upon us: nevertheless the pernicious malice of men has so prevailed, that it says there is no God: not indeed outwardly, lest it should be convicted of falsity and impiety by all creatures, but inwardly and in its heart. For neither (says St. Augustine on these words) have the sacrilegious and detestable Philosophers themselves, who think perverse and false things about God, dared to say: There is no God: therefore he said: in his heart, because no one dares to say this even if he has dared to think it.

To the minor I say. That he who doubts the existence of God is not without reason called a fool, since he so extinguishes the light of reason, that he does not see the light of the face of God signed upon himself, nor hear all the parts of his body and the faculties of his soul crying out within: He made us and not we ourselves; whence also it is pleasing to say of the Atheists themselves what St. Paul brought forth of the Idolaters in the 1. cap. ad Romanos: When they had known God (nature teaching) they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks; but they became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for saying themselves to be wise, they became fools. However, we shall attempt to repress this insanity of the Atheists in the third following Question by an efficacious and manifold reason.

You will insist. The light implanted in our minds by nature, with no mist of error or ignorance supervening, can nowhere within be extinguished; for it remains as long as nature itself; so v. g. the light and dictate of conscience never perishes, whatever corruption of morals supervenes: but the cognition of the existence of God perishes in the heart of the depraved fool (for he says: There is no God): therefore it is not implanted by nature.

He distinguishes the minor. St. Anselm in the Prosologio, cap. 4., and with him our Alensis, 1. parte, quaest. 3. membro 2. ad. 2: that the cognition of God perishes in the heart of the fool in words, he concedes: in reality he denies: for either that fool in fact understands and knows the thing he denies, or not: if he does not know it, nor seriously think of it, while he denies it, he will indeed be able to deny it, but in words: but if he perceives it, certainly he will not be able to deny it: for no one understanding what God is will be able to deny His existence, for God, says St. Anselm, is that than which nothing greater can be conceived; which he who understands well, certainly understands that it is so, that it cannot even in thought not exist: he therefore who thus understands that

God exists, cannot think that He does not exist. We shall weigh this argument of St. Anselm in quaest. 3.

Second conclusion. — It is established by the light and certainty of faith that God exists.

The truth of the conclusion is evident, and is strengthened by almost innumerable texts of Sacred Scripture, by which God revealed and testified not only other things, but also the existence of Himself, and confirmed the truth of that revelation with so many signs and so many miracles and prodigies, and confirms it day by day, since wonders are wrought at His invocation, so that no one, unless wholly strayed from reason, can doubt this truth.

Hence of the existence of God we can affirm with all the more right what Picus Mirandulanus brought forth of the truth and credibility of the Gospel, Epistola prima: Great indeed, he says, would be the madness of not believing the Gospel, whose truth the blood of the martyrs cries out, the Apostolic voices resound, prodigies prove, reason confirms, the world testifies, the elements speak, the demons confess.

Moreover, the truth of this conclusion is not only of faith, but is also the basis and foundation of all the articles of divine and supernatural faith; as is evident both from the Creed of the Apostles, whose first article is: I believe in God; and also from St. Paul to the Hebrews, cap. 11. where he says: He who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him; in which he distinguishes two things, namely that God is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him, wherefore both are to be believed with divine faith, and consequently that God exists is of faith.

Add that the whole certainty of faith depends upon the infallibility of divine revelation; but what truth of revelation could there be, unless it were certainly established that the revealer exists and is truthful? Therefore with the same faith by which it is believed that God revealed this or that, it ought to be believed that He exists.

You will say. It cannot happen that anyone believe by divine faith that God exists: therefore the existence of God is not established by the light of faith. The antecedent is proved. The assent of divine faith rests upon the testimony of God: therefore faith in its assent supposes that God exists who bears testimony to the truth to be believed, and consequently it cannot happen that His existence becomes known through the light of faith, since it supposes it.

I deny the first antecedent, and I distinguish the second consequence. Faith in its assent supposes that God is in entity and in His real existence, I concede: that it supposes this in the formal and distinct knowledge of the believer, I deny: for he who believes God's existence, because God has revealed that He exists, must indeed suppose that He is; for He would not have revealed unless He existed; but while he assents to this revelation, he does not think about that presupposed existence of the revealing God: or if he does think of it, he thinks of it only confusedly and indistinctly: so that that thought terminates first and immediately, as it were, at this proposition, God is, because He revealed that He is, rather than at this one, He could not have revealed unless He existed: for the first proposition is, as it were, immediate with respect to the one assenting; the second, however, only mediate and confused.

You will insist. If we believe by the same act of faith that God exists, by which He testifies that He is, it follows that through the same assent we twice believe that God exists; once indeed, because He revealed that He is; and again, because He could not have revealed unless He existed; and so we would believe God's existence before we believe Him to be existing, which is altogether nugatory.

I distinguish the antecedent. It would follow that we twice believe that God is, by the same motive, means and mode, I deny: by a diverse motive, means and mode, I concede. For we believe by divine faith that He is precisely, formally and explicitly, because He revealed and said that He is, so that that revelation is the means and the motive of that assent; but we believe that He is only virtually, mediately and consequently, namely that He could not have revealed unless He existed. The first motive of such an assent is indeed from revelation; the second from demonstration: the first pertains precisely to faith; the latter, however, looks to Metaphysics, by which, from the fact that it is impossible for the same thing to act and not to be, it is gathered that if God testifies that He is, He must necessarily be, in order that He testify that; for acting follows upon being. Whence the aforesaid assent, if it is simple in entity, is at least virtually multiple, since it has a diverse virtual motive and a diverse means.

Third conclusion. — By the light of natural discourse it is certainly established that God exists.

This conclusion St. Paul indicates and proves in explicit words to the Romans, where, speaking of men illumined only by natural reason, and not taught by that divine revelation, he says: What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has manifested it to them: namely by natural light, and by the discourse from effects and created things to the Creator: For His invisible things are seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that are made; His eternal power and Divinity also, so that they are inexcusable. Because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God.

— Whence the Sage rightly says in cap. 13.: Vain are all men in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and of these good things that are seen they could not understand Him who is, nor, attending to the works, did they acknowledge who was the Artisan. A few words interposed, he concludes: For from the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, their Creator will be able to be seen in a knowable manner. From these things it is established that from God's works His existence is made known through discourse and the light of natural reason so certainly and openly, that the holy Fathers rightly called that knowledge evident.

Hence Augustine, in the second Tractate on John: God, he says, can be found evidently through creatures, as the Apostle says: The invisible things of God are seen, being understood through the things that are made: that is, says St. Jerome on this passage, they were understood so evidently, that they are said to have been seen.

With these the other holy Fathers agree, but of all most elegantly Minucius Felix in the Octavius: What, he says, can be so open, so acknowledged, and so clear, when you have lifted your eyes to heaven and surveyed the things that are below and around, than that there is some Deity of most excellent mind, by which all nature is inspired, moved, nourished, governed? It is established, therefore, that God's existence is made known through the light of reason. What, however, are the natural arguments by which it is proved, and effectively demonstrated against the Atheists, will appear below.

You will say first. Natural reason cannot apprehend God's existence: therefore God's existence is not made known through it. The antecedent is proved: Between the object to be known and the knowing power there must be some proportion: for God is infinite; the intellect, however, is a finite faculty; but of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion. Whence St. Dionysius, book 5. De Divinis nominibus, says: It is possible neither to say nor to understand God: therefore God cannot be known through natural reason.

I deny the antecedent. And I distinguish the major of that proof with St. Bonaventure, in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 1. ad 1: Between the knowing intellect and the knowable object there must be some proportion, either of suitability or of equivalence, I concede: of equivalence always, I deny. For just as there is a twofold knowledge of the object, namely apprehensive and comprehensive; of which the former consists in the manifestation of some truth of the known object; the latter, however, in the penetrating vision and contemplation of all those things which are in the object; so that there is nothing in it which lies hidden from the one seeing and knowing: so also between intellect and object there is a twofold proportion: one of suitability, by which the intellect is borne toward an object suitable to itself, and insofar as it is intelligible; the other of equivalence, or equality, by which it comes about that there is as much power of understanding in the knowing faculty, as there is knowable perfection in the object. The first proportion is required in apprehensive knowledge: the second, however, is required for comprehensive knowledge. The former is found between God to be known and the soul knowing, because since God is knowable, He is within the breadth of the intellect's object, which is concerned with everything intelligible; not so the latter; whence the soul can indeed know God, but not comprehend Him. St. Dionysius speaks of the latter, not however of the former.

You will insist. But between God and the soul there is also no proportion of suitability, sufficient for the soul to be able to know God. Therefore the soul cannot know Him. The antecedent is proved: Sense and the spirit of a creature differ less from one another than God and the human intellect; because sense and the spirit of a creature agree in the notion of created and finite being; but there is a greater suitability between two finite beings, than between the intellect which is finite, and God who is infinite: but notwithstanding that greater suitability, sense can never be elevated to the knowledge and perception of spirit. Therefore much less will the soul be able to know God.

I distinguish the antecedent of the proof. With the same St. Bonaventure in the same place: sense and spirit differ less from one another than God and the soul, in the notion of knowable object, I deny; in the notion of being, I concede. Sense indeed and spirit, insofar as they are created and finite beings, agree with one another more than God and the soul: but insofar as spirit is a perceptible object, and God likewise a perceptible object, God agrees with the human intellect more than spirit agrees with sense; for since the intellect has as its object everything intelligible, it includes even God within the breadth of its object; sense, however, since it has as its object everything sensible, and spirit is not from itself sensible, spirit is not comprehended under the object of sense either: therefore, although sense cannot perceive spirit, still the soul will be able to acknowledge God.

You will say 2. In general, against the resolution of the Question: If God existed, He would be a being infinitely good: but no being infinitely good is given: therefore neither is God. The major is evident, since by the name of God a being infinitely perfect, and consequently infinitely good, is designated. The minor is proved: If one of two contraries were infinite and existed, and acted necessarily, the other contrary, even a finite one, could not be given; if, e.g., infinite heat existed in the nature of things, the least cold could not be found, nor subsist with it; similarly if the light were infinite, there would be no darkness: therefore if infinite good were given in the nature of things, no evil, even finite, could be given: but there are very many evils, as experience makes clear; therefore infinite good is not given, nor consequently God.

Some answer. That the minor is true of contraries formally and per se, such as are, e.g., heat and cold; not however of contraries virtually and by reason of the effects which they can produce, just as the Sun, e.g., is said to be virtually contrary to water; because the former produces heat, the latter cold. God, however, they say, has no evil formally contrary to Himself, but only virtually, inasmuch as He either prohibits or hates evil, and consequently need not necessarily exclude every evil from the nature of things.

— But the Subtle Doctor shows this reply to be worth nothing, in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. n. 1., because (he says) whether something is contrary to another formally or virtually, if it is of infinite power, it will not tolerate the other thing contrary to itself; for what is of infinite power not only excludes what is formally contrary to itself, but also what is contrary to its effect: e.g., if the Sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would not tolerate with itself any cold in the nature of things, any more than if it were formally hot: therefore if God is infinitely contrary to evil, He will not admit with Himself any evil in the nature of things, any more than if He were formally contrary to evil itself: and so in form, with the same Doctor in the same place q. 2. n. 30.: I deny the minor, and I distinguish the major of its proof. If that infinite contrary acted necessarily, it would not tolerate another thing contrary to itself or to its effect, I concede: for if the Sun virtually, and fire formally, were infinitely hot, e.g., since they would act necessarily and from the impulse of nature, they would also act according to their whole power; which, since it would be infinite, would produce infinite heat, which would accordingly drive all cold from the nature of things: if it acted freely, I deny. But God does not act necessarily ad extra, but altogether freely: For He has made all things whatsoever He willed in heaven and on earth. Nor does He necessarily produce any effects incompossible with evils, whether possible or existing; and therefore, although He is infinitely good, He nevertheless permits evils to be and to be done, either from punishing justice, or from providence ordering the evils themselves to some fitting end.

You will say 3. If some body of infinite magnitude according to every extension were given, it would not admit another body with itself in the nature of things, because it would entirely fill every place, and so would drive any other body from its place; therefore by a like argument, if some infinite being were given, it would not admit another infinite being with itself in the nature of things. But it is certain that there are several finite beings in the nature of things. Therefore in it no infinite being is given. The first point indeed is evident: for as extension is related to extension, so entity is related to entity: therefore if infinite extension excludes another finite extension, infinite entity will also exclude every other entity, or will really embrace and absorb it in its bosom, and consequently, if any infinite entity is given in the nature of things, other finite entities could not be admitted in it.

He denies the parity. The Doctor does so in the same place, and offers this reason of the disparity, that one entity does not fight with another entity, as one quantified body fights with another quantified body in respect of occupying the same place: for since two quantified bodies are naturally impenetrable, and therefore cannot occupy the same place at the same time; it is evident that if some body were infinitely extended, it would entirely fill every place; and hence would exclude every other body that fills a place. One entity, however, has no incompossibility and fight with another entity: neither by reason of itself, since they are not contraries, inasmuch as they are substances, to which it is proper not to be contrary to one another; nor by reason of place, since they are considered only insofar as they are entities, not however as extended: therefore, although an infinite body would exclude finite bodies; still infinite entity ought not to exclude finite entity.

— Indeed the argument can be turned back: for just as an infinite body would not exclude some quantified bodies, if it did not fight with them by reason of extension, because they would not be impenetrable nor filling of place, such as are glorious bodies, which neither fill a place nor are impenetrable; so by parity infinite entity ought not to exclude finite entities, because it has no fight with them.

You will insist. For that reason a finite quantified body cannot be with an infinite quantified body, because if it were given, it would make it greater with it, which implies a contradiction; for to the infinite nothing can be added nor taken away: therefore for the same reason, neither can a finite entity subsist with an infinite one. The antecedent is evident; for to be made greater is nothing other than to receive a new quantity superadded to itself; but an infinite body would receive a new quantity, if another finite body were placed with it in the nature of things. Therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. It would be made greater, if a finite quantified body were united to the infinite one, I concede: if it were not united, I deny. Similarly, an infinite entity could be said to be made more perfect, if other finite entities were united to it really and formally, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is certain that a finite entity cannot be united with an infinite one either really or formally; and consequently, from the fact that both are placed in the nature of things, the infinite entity ought not to be said to be more perfect on account of the fellowship and coexistence of the finite entity: just as, e.g., Paul is not made more perfect through the production and coexistence of Peter: because Peter's perfections are not really and formally in Paul.

You will say 4. If God existed, He would have to be infinite according to entity and perfection: but there is no being which is infinite according to entity and perfection: therefore God does not exist. The minor is proved: What is so here that it is not elsewhere, is finite according to its where and position in place: and what is so today, that it was not yesterday, nor will be tomorrow, is finite according to time and duration; and what so does this, that it cannot do another, is finite according to action and power: therefore by a like argument, what is so this singular being, that it is not another, is finite as to entity and perfection: but God, if He were given, would so be this divine being, that He would not be another, say a man, a stone, wood, etc. Therefore He would be finite according to entity, and for that reason would not be God.

The Doctor answers. In 1. dist. 1. q. 2. n. 36., denying the consequence, and he offers this reason of the disparity, that the place and time in which a thing would be, and not elsewhere, or at another time, are finite: for if they were infinite, the antecedent would be false: for indeed, says the Doctor: If there were some infinite where, per impossibile, and an infinite body, it would fill that where; it would not follow: this body is here so that it is not elsewhere: therefore it is finite according to its where, because the word “here” demonstrates nothing but the infinite. So according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time infinite, it would not follow: this motion is in this time, and not in another: therefore it is finite according to time. So in the present matter it must be proved that that which is demonstrated by “this being” is finite.

Or in form, I distinguish the minor. If place and time were infinite, what is in them would have to be finite, I deny; if they are finite, I concede. Whence, with the minor conceded, I deny the consequence: for that singular being which is called God is infinite according to entity and perfection, for He embraces in His bosom the perfection of all other beings, either formally or eminently, and consequently from the fact that He is this being, singular and determinate, it does not follow thence that He is a finite being; for determinate is indeed opposed to indeterminate, not however to finite; because something can be an infinite being and at the same time determinate, for if an infinite line were given, it would be a determinate being, because it would be a quantity, and not a quality, nor a relation, nor a substance; nevertheless for that reason it would be no less infinite.

You will say 5. If God were given, He would have infinite power: but there is no infinite power: therefore neither is God. The major is evident: since by the name of God we understand an infinite being, both in entity, and in perfections. The minor is proved from Aristotle, 8. Physicorum textu 79., where he says: If there were infinite power, it would move in no time: but no power can move in no time: therefore infinite power is not given, nor consequently God.

I prove the minor thus from the Doctor cited at n. 36. If infinite power did not act in no time, it would follow that it could be equalled in motion through the action and activity of finite power: but the consequent is false, because of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion: therefore if infinite power acts infinitely, it must act in no time. He proves the major from the hypothesis 1. that infinite power acts in time, which for the sake of clarity let be called A; and finite power acts in time, which let be named B; 2. that time A, in which infinite power acts, exceeds time B a hundredfold or a thousandfold; 3. that to the finite power another new power is added, a hundredfold or a thousandfold greater, so that it has sufficient activity for moving and acting, not only in time B, in which it previously operated through its prior activity; but also in time A. With these three, I say, supposed as possible, as indeed they appear possible of being done; the Doctor openly gathers that finite power would equal infinite power, which it previously exceeded. Therefore if infinite power acts according to all its activity, it is necessary either that it acts in no time, or that it be equalled by finite power, which will be able to operate with it in a similar time.

I distinguish the minor with the Doctor in the same place. If that infinite power is supposed to act in a body, and necessarily, and according to the leading and impulse of nature, I concede: if it is supposed to act outside a body, and to be spiritual and free, I deny. I confess indeed that if that infinite power acted necessarily, as Aristotle falsely judged God to operate, that power, certainly acting thus according to all its activity, would have to act in no time, so that it could not be equalled by finite power. — Moreover: if that infinite power were in an extended body, as Aristotle supposes in the place cited in the objection, it could not move in no time, because it would act about a body, whose parts, since some would be more distant from the mover, others less, it could not move them at the same time; and it would also have some resistance on the part of that body which it would move; which resistance of the mobile, and the diverse approximation of its parts, are the two causes of succession; and hence of temporal duration. Therefore it would follow that that infinite power acts in time, because it would act with succession, and acts in no time, lest it be equalled by finite power: but to act in time and not to act in time are contradictories: therefore Aristotle rightly concludes and proves that no infinite power can be given which at the same time acts necessarily and in an extended body, because thus it would have to act in time and not in time, which implies a contradiction. And so he does not absolutely deny that some infinite power which is free, and without a body, such as God is, acts in no time, but he denies that only of an infinite power which would be in a body, and would act necessarily.

You will say finally. What is neither from itself nor from another, is not: but God, if He were given, would be neither from Himself nor from another. Therefore He is not. The minor is proved: First, He would not be from another, otherwise He would not be the first being, nor independent: and consequently He would not be God. Nor would He be from Himself: neither effectively: because nothing produces itself, otherwise it would be before it was; for production is made through operation, but to operate follows and supposes being: nor emanatively, because what emanates presupposes that from which it emanates, as a river presupposes the spring, and a ray the sun; therefore He would suppose Himself to be before He was, which implies a contradiction. — Our Bassolius distinguishes the minor, in 1. d. 2. qu. 2. art. 2. principali: God is not from Himself effectively, positively, or by production, he concedes: that He is not from Himself negatively, or by the negation of production, both from Himself and from another, he denies. And so the phrase “to be from oneself” does not import an effecting, nor an emanation, as if God produced Himself, or emanated from Himself: but only the negation of production; so that to be from oneself is the same as to be altogether unproduced.

In order that we may the more easily cut away all the empty subtleties of argument which are wont to be proposed concerning the resolution of the present Question, and spend time and labor rather on acquiring solid doctrine than on discussing vain and frivolous little questions; we here propose only two things to be resolved: 1. Whether it is known per se that God exists insofar as He is God, or as He is conceivable in Himself under the precise notion of His Deity and divine essence; 2. Whether it is known per se that He exists insofar as He is conceived by us under the notion of first cause, of being most necessary, infinite, and the principle, moderator, and end of all beings: so that these may appear more evidently

Note 1. That just as a threefold truth is distinguished, namely of the thing, of cognition, and of speech, of which the first consists in the conformity of the thing to its principles, or to its idea; the second, in the conformity of cognition with the object known; the third, in the conformity of speech with the internal concept of the mind: the first is opposed to falsity and appearance, the second to error, the third to lying: so likewise a threefold proposition is said to exist, namely vocal, mental, and objective. The vocal proposition consists of vocal terms expressing and signifying the concept: the mental is the internal concept by which one thing is affirmed of another: the objective, however, is the very real union of the terms on the side of the thing, namely the real union of the predicate with the subject; e.g., the union of animal with rational in man, which is represented by the mental and signified by the vocal enunciation. — Although, however, strictly speaking, only the objective proposition should precisely be called known per se, for just as only a thing is said to be known per se or unknown, so likewise it alone is said to be known per se or through another: nevertheless usage has now prevailed that, the sign being taken for the thing signified, vocal and mental propositions are also called known per se by reason of the objective proposition which they express and signify.

Note 2. Concerning the definition of a proposition known per se, the opinion of the Authors is so great and so varied that scarcely two agree with one another in assigning it. We, however, clinging to the footsteps of the Subtle Doctor, say with him in 1. dist. 2. qu. 2. n. 2. and 3. that a proposition is said to be known per se whose truth is evident from the terms, known either distinctly or confusedly, of which it consists; so that, beyond the knowledge of the terms, the intellect needs no other means to perceive the necessary and immediate connection of the subject and predicate from which that proposition is formed.

Thus, e.g., the whole is greater than its part is commonly said to be a proposition known per se, because when one knows what "whole" signifies, what "part", and what "greater", he needs no other cognition and no proof to perceive evidently that every whole is greater than its part. — Hence, just as the Sun is said to be visible per se, because it needs no other light in order to appear to those who see, since it is the fount and origin of all light: so likewise that proposition is fittingly said to be known per se whose truth is evident from its terms; and which, says the Doctor, n. 3, is apt to have the evident truth contained in the terms, even in any intellect conceiving the terms: so that, just as the Sun, although it is not seen by the blind and by closed eyes, is nonetheless no less visible of itself and per se, so although some intellect may not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, that proposition is nonetheless no less known per se as far as it is in itself. Whence he gathers in the same place: therefore every and only that proposition is known per se which, from terms conceived as they are its terms, is apt to have the evident truth of the complex.

Note 3. For a proposition to be known per se, three conditions are chiefly required. — The first is that the predicate belong to the subject immediately and per se; for if it belongs to it through another, its connection with the subject will also be made known through another; and so it will not be a proposition known per se, but through another; for which reason all propositions in which a property is affirmed of its subject, e.g., capable of laughter, of man, are not precisely said to be known per se, because being capable of laughter does not belong to man immediately, but only through rational; for man is capable of laughter because he is rational: they can, however, be said to be known per se improperly, insofar as the predicate necessarily belongs to the subject, nor can it be separated from it in any way, whence it comes about that this consequence is true: He is a man: therefore he is capable of laughter.

— The second condition is that the predicate belong to the subject essentially and intrinsically; for want of which this proposition, snow is white, is indeed known per se to the senses and the eyes, which evidently perceive all snow to be white; but it is not known per se to the intellect, because although whiteness belongs to snow immediately, and not by reason of another form or predicate; nevertheless, since snow can exist without whiteness, and hence the connection of the predicate with the subject, namely of whiteness with snow, is not necessary and inseparable, that proposition too is not known per se to the intellect. — The third condition is that it cannot be demonstrated a priori that the predicate belongs to the subject; otherwise it would not be immediate, nor consequently known per se, if through some means conceivable as prior in the thing which is known, the predicate which is affirmed of it belonged to it. The demonstration a posteriori, however, is not excluded, by which our intellect is led as if by the hand, so that through the effects or properties of the thing it may perceive that the predicate which is affirmed of it belongs to it per se and immediately.

First conclusion. — God is, or exists, is a proposition known per se. So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 4. q. 2. n. 1., and St. Thomas with his followers.

Proof. That proposition is known per se in which the predicate is of the essence of the subject; for that cannot be demonstrated, or made known, through anything prior, since nothing is prior to the essence of a thing: but in this proposition, God is, or exists, the predicate (namely existence) is of the essence of the subject; for since God is being through essence and pure act, it is necessary that existence be of the quidditative concept of the divine essence: therefore that proposition, God is, must be said to be known per se. — Secondly, that proposition is known per se which from its known terms has evident truth, and needs nothing else in order to become known; and which is immediate, and in the first mode of saying per se, that is, one in which the predicate belongs to the subject essentially: but such is the proposition, God is, for, as the cited Doctor says, n. 4, the predicate belongs to the subject per se in the first mode, and that proposition is immediate; indeed most immediate, to which are resolved all propositions enunciating something about God conceived in any way whatsoever: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. That proposition ought not to be said to be known per se, for evidently perceiving whose truth a demonstration and discourse are needed: but for perceiving the truth of this proposition, God is, discourse and a demonstration, at least a posteriori, are needed: therefore it is not known per se.

I answer. The major being conceded, distinguishing the minor: that discourse is needed for those who perfectly know the terms, namely what God is, and what to exist is, as the Angels and the blessed spirits perceive them, who see God as He is, and behold Him face to face, I deny: that discourse is needed for those who perceive the aforesaid terms only imperfectly, such as we are as long as we live this mortal life, I concede; for since we know God only through the mirror of creatures, and in the enigma of faith, hence it is no wonder if we conceive and detect His invisible things through the things that have been made, by discoursing.

Add. That the demonstration a posteriori does not stand in the way of a proposition known per se, as was observed in the third note; otherwise there would be no proposition known per se, since there is none whose truth cannot become known, either by induction or by demonstration a posteriori.

You will say 2. That expression, God is, is not a proposition: therefore it is not a proposition known per se. The antecedent is proved: a proposition must consist of two terms; for if only one appears, it will not be a proposition, but a simple term; but in this proposition, God is, not two terms appear but one; for the Deity, or the divine essence, is a single and simple entity, indivisible into several formalities; and hence in its concept it does not admit several terms: therefore it does not form a proposition known per se either.

I distinguish the minor. That two or more terms formally and actually distinct do not appear, let it pass: that at least virtually distinct ones do not appear, I deny; for although the Deity and its existence are not distinguished formally, since the Deity cannot be conceived without existence; nevertheless they are distinguished virtually; and insofar as they form a proposition, they are conceived as two distinct things, which suffices for forming the two terms that are required in a proposition.

Second conclusion. — This proposition, God is, insofar as it is conceived by us wayfarers, is not known per se. So the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 4. and 5.

Proof. Through this proposition, God is, we conceive God either as infinite being, or as necessarily existing, or as the highest good, or as the principle, moderator, and end of all things: but under none of these concepts is it known per se that God exists; therefore this proposition, God is, insofar as it is conceived by us, is not known per se. The major is certain; for all the concepts which we can form of God are either absolute or respective, that is, they concern God either insofar as He is in Himself, or insofar as He bears a relation to creatures. If He is conceived insofar as He is in Himself, He is apprehended either as a being from itself necessarily existing and in every way independent, or as being infinitely perfect and embracing in His bosom the complete notion and perfection of being: if He is conceived through the relation which He has to creatures, He is conceived either as their principle, or insofar as He is their moderator, or end; and hence the truth of the major proposition is evident.

— The Doctor proves the minor, however, with three arguments. First indeed thus: those concepts are not known per se which are demonstrable a priori; but the aforesaid concepts are demonstrable a priori. Proof: those concepts are demonstrable a priori which can be demonstrated through the divine existence as through something from which they emanate; but such concepts can be demonstrated in this way. Proof: every property or mode of a thing can be demonstrated through the essence from which it emanates: but those objective concepts of God are related in the manner of a property or a mode: therefore they can be demonstrated through the existence which belongs to God essentially.

— Secondly: a proposition known per se is one which from known terms evidently appears true: but although one may know what the infinite is, and what to exist is, he does not on that account see evidently the truth of that proposition: Infinite being exists; the same is to be said of the other concepts: therefore those propositions are not known per se.

— Thirdly: nothing can be known about a concept that is not simply simple, that is, which includes several concepts, unless it is known that those concepts are united among themselves; thus, e.g., it cannot be known that in such a state we have no proper concept of God which is simply simple; for every proper concept which we form of Him includes several other concepts; for the concepts of the highest good, of infinite being, of necessary being, of first cause, etc. involve several concepts; for the concept of cause is one thing, and that of first cause another; since something can have the notion of cause, and not be the first cause, just as it can have the notion of being, and not be infinite and necessary being: therefore in this state we can form no concept of God which does not involve several concepts; nor can those concepts be known per se, unless it is established that they are united per se: but it is in no way established for us that all the concepts which we form of God are united per se, as experience makes clear. Therefore it is not established that those concepts are known per se.

— It is confirmed by experience itself, since it openly appears that while we conceive God under some one of the aforesaid concepts, our intellect is not immediately determined to assent that such a being exists; but in order to be certainly determined to this assent, it must be urged to it by certain reasons and led by the hand; and hence this proposition, God is, is not known per se.

You will say 1. That cognition is known per se which is instilled in us by nature: but the cognition of the existence of God is instilled in us by nature, as was proved in the preceding Question. Therefore it is known per se. The major is evident, for the first principles of cognition are not said to be known per se from any other source, except because we perceive their truth from the light of reason alone innate in us and without any discourse.

I distinguish the major. If the terms of that proposition become distinctly known even with nature as teacher, and their connection appears necessary, let it pass; if the terms come to mind only confusedly, and their connection is not certain and evident for us, I deny: but it is certain that the terms of that proposition, God is, are apprehended by the natural light only confusedly, and that their connection does not appear evidently and per se: whence it comes about that, together with the natural light and intuition, we also need the light and discourse of reason, by which we detect and persuade ourselves of the existence of God: and hence although that proposition, God is, is evident with nature as leader and teacher, it is not on that account known per se.

You will say 2. It is known to us per se that that exists than which a greater cannot be conceived: but God is that than which a greater cannot be or be conceived: therefore that God exists is a proposition known per se. The major is evident both from the mind of St. Anselm, who uses this single argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if He did not exist, He would not be that than which a greater could not be conceived, because it is greater for a thing to exist than not to exist.

I distinguish the major. That is known per se, if by known per se is understood that which can easily be proved, I concede: if what is understood is that which is evident from the simple apprehension and knowledge of the terms, I deny. St. Anselm, however, held this proposition, God exists, to be known per se only insofar as it is easily proved and demonstrated; since he himself composed an entire book to demonstrate that there exists that than which nothing greater can be; but this would have been altogether superfluous if the aforementioned proposition were known per se; for a proposition known per se, strictly taken, needs no proof for its truth to appear, but becomes known by the mere exposition and knowledge of the terms.

I distinguish otherwise. If it is known per se that that than which nothing greater can be is possible, it will likewise be known per se that it actually exists, I concede: if it is not known per se that it is possible, I deny: but it is not known to us per se that there is something possible than which nothing greater can be conceived; and consequently neither will it be known that it actually exists. Hence for a proposition to be known per se it does not suffice that the opposite of the predicate be repugnant to the subject; but it is further required that the possible or actual connection of the predicate and the subject appear evidently. Thus, e.g., for it to be known per se that man is a rational animal, it does not suffice that irrationality be repugnant to man; but it is further required that the necessary connection of the rational animal with man appear evidently.

You will say 3. It is known per se that truth exists: but God is truth: therefore it is known per se that God exists. The major is clear, for either it is certain that truth exists, and so the intended conclusion is obtained; or it is certain that it does not exist, and then it would be true that truth does not exist; and so there would be truth that truth does not exist; and thus the existence of truth is gathered from the negation of truth.

He answers 1. The Doctor, n. 8., says the argument does not conclude, but that in it lies the fallacy of the consequent; for one argues from the common to the special; namely, from truth in general to truth in particular. Hence just as it does not follow: an animal exists: but man is an animal: therefore man exists; because an animal could exist in a brute, even though man did not exist; so it does not follow: truth in general is given: therefore God is given; for God is indeed truth, but in a determinate, although infinite, species of being.

He answers 2. by denying the major: and to its proof he says that if no truth exists, it cannot follow that some truth is given, but rather it follows well that it is not true that some truth exists, because none exists; for it does not follow, he says, therefore it is true that some truth does not exist: for it is the fallacy of the consequent from a negative having two causes of truth to the affirmative which is one of them. Add that it is not known to us per se that God is truth; since Marcion, albeit unskilfully, admitted one God who would be the author of evils and the parent of lies; and consequently the argument collapses.

You will say 4. Some propositions, in which the union of the predicate with the subject is only necessary secundum quid, are known per se: therefore much more ought those propositions, in which the union of the predicate with the subject is absolutely necessary, to be known per se: but in this proposition, God exists, the predicate is united to the subject with a supremely necessary union: therefore it ought to be known per se. The major is clear, for these propositions, the whole is greater than its part, and man is a rational animal, and similar ones, have only a truth and a connection necessary secundum quid, and on the hypothesis that they exist: but it is otherwise with God, whose existence is absolutely invariable and necessary.

I deny the sequel of the major. For to the notion of a proposition known per se it does not suffice that the union of the predicate with the subject be greater and stricter; but it is further required that that greater connection be able to appear evidently from the terms, and move the intellect to give assent to that proposition. Hence it comes about that since a proposition necessary secundum quid becomes known to the intellect more easily and appears more evidently than one which is necessary simpliciter, it does not follow that if the former ought to be known, the latter likewise ought always to appear known. Indeed, since the propositions which are made about the supremely necessary or divine Being are of a higher order than those which are hypothetical, which are made about created being; those too are less evident to us and more impenetrable.

You will say 5. That which is the cause and reason of knowing all things ought to be first known and known per se: but God is the reason why all other beings are known: therefore He ought to be known per se. The major is certain: because that on account of which each thing is such, that itself is more so: therefore that which is that cause, according to which we are and according to which, whether in ourselves or in bodies, we do something by true and right reason, we behold with the sight of the mind.

I distinguish the major. That which is the cause of knowing all things objectively and formally ought to be more known to them, I concede: that which is the cause only effectively and exemplarily, I deny. But God is only the effective and exemplary cause of the knowledge of all things, inasmuch as He has granted us the light and activity of the intellect through which we can know all things. He is also the exemplary cause toward which it is necessary to look, as toward the exemplar of all things according to which their truth is to be measured; so that he is to be said to know things perfectly who knows them not only according to all that they comprehend in themselves, but also according to the proportion which they have to their divine exemplar, as St. Augustine indicates.

You will say 6. It is known to us per se that a being necessarily existing exists: but God is conceived by us as a being necessarily existing: therefore it is known to us per se that God exists under the concept by which we conceive Him. Likewise, it is known to us per se that one operating in act exists actually: but God is conceived by us as operating in act; for God is commonly said, according to Damascene, lib. 1. cap. 12., from the active, to foster, or to burn, or to consider: therefore it is known to us per se that He exists as we conceive Him. The major of both objections is clear, because it is repugnant that a thing necessarily existing and operating in act not exist, because, says the Doctor, in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. num. 6, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if it is not, it is not a being necessarily existing; and if it is not, it is not a being operating in act. Therefore, etc.

The Doctor answers. It is indeed known to us that non-existence is repugnant to a thing necessarily existing, and operating with independence: but he denies that it is known per se that some thing necessarily exists, and operates with independence. Hence for some proposition to be known per se, it does not suffice that it be known that the opposite of the predicate of that proposition cannot belong to the subject; but it is further required that either the subject be apprehended with a concept simply simple; or if it involves several concepts, it is necessary that those concepts appear evidently united to one another.

You will insist. By the very fact that some predicate is repugnant to a subject, it is evident that the opposite predicate belongs to it; hence if the negation of animal, e.g., is repugnant to man, it is evident that animal necessarily belongs to him; because otherwise contradictories would not be immediately conflicting, and it could be said that neither of the contradictories belonged to the thing: therefore if the negation of existence is repugnant to a being necessarily existing and operating in act, it manifestly follows that existence necessarily belongs to it: and consequently of whatever it is said that it is a being necessarily existing and independently operating in act, of the same it is evidently gathered that it exists: therefore since it is said of God that He is a necessary being and independently operating in act; and since it is repugnant that a necessary being operating in act not exist, it is evidently gathered that God necessarily exists.

I answer. That consequence indeed holds: God is a necessary being: therefore He is existing, by virtue of this proposition from which it is elicited: That which is a necessary being is existing; but the minor to be deduced from it, namely that God is a necessary being or independently operating in act, is not known to us per se.

You will say lastly. The Subtle Doctor, in the cited question, n. 3, when he had attacked the opinion of St. Thomas asserting that a proposition known per se is divided into a proposition known in itself, and into one known per se to us, gathered that whatever proposition is known in itself is also known per se to any intellect: but from the first conclusion it is certain that this proposition, God exists, is known per se in itself: therefore it ought also to be known per se to us; otherwise either the Doctor would contradict himself, or we ourselves.

I answer. The Doctor neither contradicts himself, nor do we contradict him: for it is one thing to say that some proposition is known per se, yet not actually known by any intellect; but it is another to say that one proposition is known per se, and another is knowable per se: because these two stand together, that some proposition be known per se, that is, that once its terms have been apprehended it have evidence, and yet there be no intellect which apprehends those terms and knows that proposition: for even if there were no intellect which apprehended those terms, whole and part, nevertheless this proposition, the whole is greater than its part, would be no less known per se, although it would not be actually known. Thus by way of similarity this proposition, God exists, is indeed known per se, yet not actually and evidently known by all intellects; but only by those who distinctly and clearly apprehend these terms, God and existence, and apprehend God signified through them only as He is a necessary being, omnipotent, etc., apprehended in which manner He is not evidently known and expressed through this proposition: God exists.

From these gather 1. That there is no division of the proposition into a proposition known per se to fools and known per se to the wise.

For if some proposition be known per se to the wise and unknown to fools, this does not come from the fact that this proposition is not known per se with respect to all who conceive its terms, but from the fact that fools do not apprehend those terms; which if they conceived, it would be equally known to them as to the wise. — Nor does it matter that Boethius distinguishes the common conception of the mind of the wise from the common conception of the mind of fools, as if he intimated that a proposition known per se to the wise is distinguished from a proposition known per se to fools. — For the Doctor answers; 1. that the common conception of the mind is not the same as a proposition known per se. 2. On the hypothesis that the common conception of the mind is the same as a proposition known per se, he answers that Boethius does not take a proposition known per se for that which is truly known per se, but only for that which is in fact known. It is certain, however, that the wise know many propositions which are not known to fools, not indeed by a defect of the proposition, but from the fact that fools do not perceive the terms of the proposition in the way in which they ought to perceive them in order that the proposition be known per se to them.

Gather 2. That likewise there is no division of the proposition into known per se and knowable per se: because it is the same for a proposition to be known per se and to be knowable per se; for that proposition is known per se which, although not actually known, can nevertheless be known from the simple apprehension of the terms; but such also is the proposition knowable per se, and consequently they are altogether one and the same.

Gather 3. Finally, that there is absolutely no division into a proposition known per se in itself and known per se to us. Because, says the Doctor, whatever proposition is known in itself and per se is also known to any intellect apprehending the terms of that proposition, although it is not actually known by every intellect. For a proposition is said to be known per se which from the terms evidently lies open to every intellect apprehending the terms; and so a proposition known per se in itself and known per se to us are not opposed members.

You will say. From Aristotle some things are better known by nature, or in themselves, and less known to us; some things, however, are better known to us and less known in themselves, from which the argument is made thus: every comparative presupposes the positive: therefore if there is given something better known in itself and less known to us, there ought also to be given something known in itself and known to us; and consequently there must be admitted something known per se from itself, and something known per se to us.

He answers by distinguishing the last consequence: there is something known per se from itself, and something known per se to us, in such a way that that which is known in itself is not known to us, when it is apprehended by us as it is known per se in itself, I deny the consequence; in any other sense, let the consequence pass; but it is not to the point. Aristotle, however, wills only that some things are better known in themselves than others, which nevertheless are less known to us, because some things are prior to others, as, e.g., substance is prior to accidents, and yet we know accidents before substance; each of the two, however, both accident and substance, is known from itself and known to us, because from their nature they can be known and are known; but accidents are known by us wayfarers before substance; by the blessed, however, substance is perceived before accidents. From this, however, it does not follow that there is given some proposition known from itself which is not known to anyone apprehending its terms; although there are many propositions whose terms cannot be apprehended by anyone. For which reason the Doctor in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. says that God under the notion of Deity is indeed the first object conceptible in itself, but not with respect to us, because we do not distinctly perceive what this term, Deity, signifies.

Since the existence of God is not known per se, as was proved in the preceding Question; hence it comes about that some most wicked men have called into doubt that He exists. The leaders of this most pestilential error were Protagoras, Diagoras, Evemerus, Thegeates and Bion Boristhenites with his teacher Theodorus of Cyrene, who was therefore called an atheist, that is, one without God, as St. Augustine relates, lib. 3. Contra litteras Petiliani, cap. 21. and Lactantius, De ira Dei, cap. 9. Indeed, even among the later writers Pliny himself, although most learned in natural philosophy, lib. 2. cap. 7. leaves it in doubt whether there is any deity, and that, whatever it may be, it is ridiculous that it should take care of human affairs, by which he certainly did away with deity from the midst; for as Lactantius, praised above, says of Epicurus, when he took away providence he also denied God. And St. Augustine, lib. 5. De civitate Dei, cap. 9.: To confess God, he says, and to deny the foreknowledge of future things, is the most open madness. Hence David also, in Psalm 13, calls the atheist a fool, The fool, he says, has said in his heart: There is no God.

— But what is most to be lamented is that even in our own times they have roused atheism from the underworld, not only countless politicians, whose patronage Nicolaus Machiavellus, a most impious man, took up in his published writings, but also already many innovators and heretics: for, as Lyndanus testifies in his Dubitantius, while the wicked men of this time pass with the greatest inconstancy from Catholics to Lutherans, from Lutherans to Zwinglians, and from these to Calvinists; and thus they profess each single sect; at length they forswear and cast off all religion whatsoever, and affirm with the greatest impiety that God does not exist. Against whom both the present and the following Question will be directed.

In the present Question, indeed, it will have to be resolved: 1. Whether it can be established that God exists by a proper and perfect demonstration; 2. By what demonstration His existence can become known: which, so that it may be perceived more easily;

Note 1. or, to be recalled from the Logicians, a demonstration is usually defined as a syllogism producing science through an effect: through causes, on the other hand, a syllogism is said to be one consisting of causes of the conclusion that are certain, primary, immediate, better known and prior. Aristotle approves both definitions, 1. Posteriorum, cap. 2.

Note 2. The middle term, from whose diversity the diversity of demonstration is gathered, is twofold; the first is called a priori, which namely is the cause why the predicate of the conclusion belongs to the subject: thus rational is called the middle term with respect to this conclusion, Every man is risible, because it is the reason why being risible belongs to man. The second is called a posteriori, which is not indeed the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; but it is so necessarily connected with it that one can be inferred from the other: thus being risible, for example, is called the middle term with respect to this conclusion, Man is rational: for although being risible is not the cause why rational belongs to man, it is nevertheless so necessarily joined to man and to rational that through it these two are duly inferred to be connected. The former is called the cause of the conclusion in being; the latter is called the cause of the conclusion in knowing. The former is called the middle of the demonstration a priori or propter quid: the latter is called the middle of the demonstration quia, or a posteriori, by which a cause is demonstrated through effects, or an essence through its own properties.

First conclusion. — That God exists can be demonstrated by a discourse so evident that the intellect cannot dissent from it. Proof: If the divine existence could not be demonstrated, that would arise either on the part of itself, or on the part of the intellect; that is, either from the fact that it would not be demonstrable, or from the fact that the intellect could not apprehend it through discourse: but it is not repugnant on either part: therefore its existence can be demonstrated. The major is evident; for every knowledge is produced from the object and the intellect. The minor is proved: every cause can be manifested and demonstrated through the effects with which it has a necessary connection; for in this way we can, by reasoning, detect and openly know any cause through its effects: but God is the cause of creatures, and has so necessary a connection with their existence that they could in no way exist without Him; and our intellect can apprehend this connection: therefore it can likewise demonstrate the existence of God through creatures. This Conclusion is confirmed by all the authorities and reasons by which we proved the third Conclusion of the first Question.

You will say 1. The existence of a necessary being cannot be certainly inferred through the existence of a contingent being: but God is a necessary being and creatures are contingent: therefore the existence of God cannot be inferred through creatures.

I distinguish the major. If the existence of a contingent being does not have a necessary connection with the existence of a necessary being, I concede: if it does have it, I deny: but the existence of creatures has so necessary a connection and dependence on the existence of God that if He did not exist, they would not be: and consequently He can be demonstrated through them.

You will say 2. So far is it from being the case that the existence of God can be apprehended from creatures, that rather they turn men away from God and call them back; for Wisdom 11 The creatures of God have become objects of hatred, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the unwise: therefore the existence of God cannot become known through creatures.

I answer 1. The Wise Man is not there speaking of any creatures whatsoever, but only of the idols which men fabricate for themselves from stones, woods and other metals, so that afterwards they may worship and venerate them as gods; for the Wise Man had premised these words: In the idols of the nations there will be no respect for him, since the creatures of God have become objects of hatred, etc. By which, as is evident, he inveighs against the idolaters, who make the creatures created for the glory and honor of God redound to His disgrace by sacrificing them to demons. Whence he adds: The beginning of all fornication is the seeking out of idols, etc., by which he openly signifies that he is treating of idols alone. Nevertheless, I answer 2. that if these words are taken of creatures in general, they are indeed a snare and a temptation to the feet of men, not indeed of the wise, but of the unwise; in almost the same way in which Christ the Lord is said in Sacred Scripture: Set for the ruin and resurrection of many, for a stone of offense and a rock of scandal; not indeed per se, but from the malice of perverse men, who were rebels against the light and rejected His doctrine and grace.

Second conclusion. — The existence of God cannot be demonstrated a priori by us: it could, however, be demonstrated by the Blessed and the Angels under that concept which we who are wayfarers form of Him. This is the teaching of the Doctor as to both parts, in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 1.

The first part is proved. A demonstration a priori must be made through a cause or a reason connecting the attribute with the subject: but nothing can be assigned by us in God which is the cause or reason of the connection of that existence with the essence: therefore that existence cannot be demonstrated a priori. Secondly. Whatever is demonstrated of something must be outside the formal concept of that of which it is demonstrated; otherwise the same would be demonstrated of itself: but existence is not outside the formal concept of the divine essence, since it is of the essence of God, as will appear in the following Disputation: therefore this cannot be demonstrated of God.

Thirdly. Every demonstration a priori rests on some objective proposition known to us per se and declarative of the union of the predicate with the subject: but we have no such proposition per se about God which could be declarative of the union of that existence with the essence: therefore in no way can the divine existence be demonstrated a priori by us.

The second part of the Conclusion has been proved more than enough in the second Conclusion of the preceding Question, in which we said that the divine existence, inasmuch as God is conceived by us, is not known per se; for all those concepts which we can form of God in this mortal life, whether they are absolute or relative, can be demonstrated through the divine existence by the Blessed, who, since they behold God intuitively, likewise see that the divine essence belongs to Him essentially. And consequently it can be taken as a means for demonstrating all the things which belong to God intrinsically, whether after the manner of an attribute, or as an intrinsic mode, in which manner alone God is conceivable by us; since we do not conceive Him under the formal notion of essence: Truly, says St. Dionysius, in the book De Divinis nominibus, cap. 7., we shall say that we know God not from His own nature; for that is unknown, and surpasses all reason and sense: but from the most ordered disposition of creatures. Therefore, just as rational animal, which is the essence of man, is taken as a means for demonstrating a priori all the properties of man; so likewise the divine existence, since it is essential to God, can be taken by the blessed minds as a means for demonstrating a priori all the concepts which we form of God, while we conceive Him as a being supremely necessary, infinite, the first principle of all things, the governor and end, etc. For all these things belong to God precisely because God is, and are as it were properties emanating from His essence, and demonstrable through it.

Since various reasons are at hand by which the divine existence can be urged — nay, even convincingly shown — some of which are customarily drawn from Metaphysical principles, several from Physical ones, others from Moral ones, it is worthwhile to set forth and unfold in this Question which among them appear the more efficacious. In order that this may be done more efficaciously

Note 1. Causes are of a twofold order: for some are called subordinating, that is, containing certain causes under themselves; others, however, depend on these or on higher causes and are for that reason called subordinated. Again, a cause is said to be subordinated to another in two ways: namely, either per se, or per accidens. A cause subordinated per se is said to be that which, as the Doctor says in 1. dist. 2. q. 2. n. 11, has the following three conditions: 1. That it so depend on the subordinating cause that without it it can neither exist nor operate; thus a creature is said to be subordinated to the Creator; 2. That it have a causality of a different notion from the subordinating cause; because no cause essentially and necessarily requires another cause which is of the same notion with itself, and hence if it necessarily requires the concurrence of another cause, this concurrence must be of a different notion; 3. That all essentially subordinating causes must necessarily concur to the effect together with the cause to which it is subordinated, and hence must exist together with it.

Note 2. According to the Doctor in the same place, there is a threefold distinction between a cause subordinated per se and one subordinated per accidens. For first, a cause subordinated per accidens does not require the concurrence of the subordinating cause in order to act; for fire produced by another fire can heat independently of it. Second, it does not require a causality of a different notion; for fire producing and fire produced can concur at the same time through a causality of the same notion to the same effect. Third and finally, a cause per accidens does not require the presence of the subordinating cause; for fire produced can act even when the fire which produced it has been destroyed. It is otherwise with a cause subordinated per se; for this so depends on the subordinating cause that without its concurrence it can in no way act, and the causality of the subordinating cause is essentially distinct from the causality of the subordinated cause; e.g. the action of the Sun is distinguished from the action of a man generating. Finally, the subordinating cause must necessarily concur together with the subordinated cause in producing the effect, so that, for want of the concurrence of the subordinating cause, the second subordinated cause can in no way act.

First conclusion. — There are several metaphysical reasons by which the divine existence can be demonstrated. Chiefly, however, three.

The first — and the most powerful — is supplied by the Subtle Doctor in 1. d. 2. q. 2. n. 11. and the following, where he demonstrates four things: 1. That there is given some being simply first according to the notion of efficient cause, and of final cause, and of supereminent being; 2. That that being which is first by this threefold primacy is also first according to all other primacies, namely first in duration, dignity, dominion, wisdom, power, etc.; 3. That this threefold primacy can belong to one being alone; 4. That this being, to which those three primacies belong, is that very being which we call God. But that a first efficient Cause is given, from the admission of which the other proofs of the Existence of God can easily be gathered, is now to be demonstrated.

First demonstration. On the existence of God, from the fact that He is the first efficient cause. — An effectible, or producible, being is given: therefore an effective, or productive, being is given, and hence a first cause is given. The antecedent is evident from experience itself, by which it is established that very many things are produced and perish from day to day, such as especially living things; For the form of being born is the cause of dying, and the end depends on the origin, says Tertullian. Or, as he says in the book De anima, cap. 10: We declare by the public judgment of the whole human race that death is a debt of nature; this is what the voice of God stipulated, this is what everything that is born has promised. Whence Lactantius, lib. 2. cap. 11., says: All things must necessarily consist of three times, past, present, and future; of the past is the origin, of the present the substance, of the future the dissolution; as we find confirmed in each of the animals, plants, and whatever bodily living things. Thus it is established that several effectible and producible beings are given; and consequently that some first effective and productive being is given.

This consequence is proved: Everything that comes to be and is produced is produced either by a thing or by another; it is not produced by itself, because, as Saint Augustine says, lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 1.: There is absolutely no thing which generates itself so that it may exist; otherwise it would be before it was. For since nothing comes to be except through production, and since production presupposes a producing thing, because what is not cannot operate; hence it comes about that if something were produced by itself, it would be before it was; it would indeed be, because it would produce; but it would not be, because it would be produced; for what is does not come to be, but has been made: therefore it implies a contradiction that something could produce itself; and hence it is necessary that whatever is produced be produced by another: but it cannot be produced by one and another to infinity: therefore one must come to rest in some first productive being, which produces all the other things, while it itself is produced by no other, but subsists from itself.

— The minor, in which the whole difficulty lies, and which the Atheists are wont to deny, is proved: An infinite process, if it were given, would take place either in causes subordinated per se, or in causes subordinated per accidens: but in neither way can such an infinite process take place. Not indeed in essentially subordinated causes, which I prove thus: If an infinite process in essentially subordinated causes were given, it would follow that no cause could act unless infinite causes in number, on which the subordinated causes depend, concurred at the same time, as was said in Note 2, and thus infinite time would be required for even any slight action to be done: since before such an action could be done, the subordinated cause would have to determine the first subordinating cause, and this one the second, and the second the third, and so on to infinity: and hence a person could not even move a finger, e.g., except through infinite time, because such a bending of the finger could not take place unless all the subordinating causes concurred; nor could they concur unless each of them were determined by the subordinated cause; nor could all be so determined except through infinite time. If the causes to be determined were infinite in number; therefore even to elicit the least action, infinite time would be needed; than which surely nothing more absurd can be devised; and nothing more contrary to daily experience, by which it is established that we can operate at will when and how we wish; and hence an infinite process cannot be given in essentially subordinated causes; otherwise no action could take place.

The atheists reply: that for the action of a subordinated cause it is not required that all the subordinating causes, infinite in number, co-produce, but that the concurrence of that cause which is immediately subordinating with respect to the subordinated cause suffices; so that the latter operates in the way in which some Theologians, together with Durandus, assert that God does not concur immediately to the actions of all sublunary creatures, but only through the influx of the Stars and of movable causes; which, however, does not prevent God from being called an essentially subordinating cause with respect to all created effects.

— On the contrary: Either the influx of all those subordinating causes is necessarily required for the effect and action of any subordinated cause, or it is not. If not: therefore those causes are not essentially subordinating; for an essential subordinating cause is said to be that alone from which the subordinated cause so depends that without it it can neither exist nor operate, for the Philosophers never understood anything else by an essentially subordinating cause. If it is required: therefore in like manner infinite time will be needed so that all those subordinating causes can be determined by the subordinated cause and concur with it. — Nor does the opinion of Durandus break or dissolve the force of this argument: for although this were true — which, however, is false in itself, and is rejected by almost all Theologians — nevertheless there is the greatest disparity between God and those essentially subordinating causes, if they were given; because although God did not concur immediately with the subordinated cause, nevertheless the latter would be said to depend essentially on Him both in being, because He is its author and conserver, and in operating, because it acts only through the power which it receives and borrows from God. For all the power and entity of creatures essentially depends on and emanates from Him, who, since He is infinite, contains every notion and perfection of being, and bestows it on the other beings at His nod and choice; all of which could not belong to the aforesaid subordinating causes, since they would not be of infinite entity and perfection.

— The preceding argument is confirmed: An infinite process in essentially ordered causes cannot be admitted unless God is admitted. This the Doctor proves thus: a superior subordinating cause is more perfect than the inferior and subordinated cause, because it is less dependent in operation and in the power of causing: therefore a cause superior to infinity will be infinitely perfect, and will have infinite power, independent in every way; but that which has such power and perfection is God: therefore even if an infinite process were given, nevertheless God would have to be admitted; and thus from the negation of the existence of God its affirmation is inferred.

The atheists reply: that this discourse is sophistical and concludes from a false supposition. For it is supposed that in the infinity of essentially subordinated causes there is given some first, most perfect cause, infinitely distant, which plainly appears false from the very notion of infinity. For just as, although possible creatures are infinite in number, as Theologians commonly acknowledge, no one would nevertheless, except foolishly, infer that among them some one could be assigned which would be of infinite possible perfection: so too, although according to Saint Augustine, lib. 12. De Civitate, cap. 18, the numbers which are known and understood by God are infinite; nevertheless none of them can be called infinite; therefore by a similar argument it does not seem to follow that if an infinite number of causes were given, some of them would have to be of infinite power and perfection.

— I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is that, since subordinated causes have a connection among themselves and a certain dependence of the inferior on the superior, it evidently follows that the more superior one will be, the less dependent it will be, and hence the more perfect and vigorous in causing; and consequently a cause which will be superior to infinity will also have infinite perfection and power independent in every way; and thus it will be God, since by the name of God we understand that cause which is of infinite power and perfection. But a different judgment must be formed of possible creatures and infinite numbers; for since there is no connection among them, nor dependence of the power of one on another, it is no wonder if from their infinity the infinite power and perfection of any one of them cannot be inferred.

The second part of the minor is proved, namely that an infinite process cannot take place in accidentally subordinated causes unless God is admitted; Every being is either made, or not made; but not all beings are made: therefore there is some being not made; this, however, is God; therefore He is given. The major is evident, because being made and not being made are contradictories, and consequently it is necessary that one or the other belong to any being. The minor is proved: If all things were made, they would have had to be made either by themselves or by another: not by themselves, because nothing can produce itself, as we demonstrated above: nor again are all things made by another: therefore it is necessary that some things be made by something which is unproduced. — The minor is proved: If whatever is were produced by another, it would follow that the whole collection of beings is in like manner produced by another: for such is the collection as are the things out of which it is formed; but it is false that the whole collection of beings can be said to be produced by another; for that whole collection would be produced either by something within the collection or outside it. Not by something within the collection, because what is the cause of the collection is also the cause of all things which are contained in the collection: therefore if it were the cause of the collection, it would also be the cause of itself, since it is involved in the collection; but it implies a contradiction for something to be the cause of itself: therefore in like manner it implies a contradiction for the whole collection of beings to be produced by something contained within itself: therefore either the whole collection of beings is not produced, and thus some unproduced being is given; or it must be produced by something which is outside the collection of beings, which implies a contradiction in terms; for whoever says the whole collection of beings supposes no other being which is not involved within that collection, otherwise it would not be the collection of all beings. Therefore it is necessary that some unproduced being be admitted, which produces the rest: this, however, is God: therefore. To solve this argument, various Atheists make various replies.

For they reply first that this argumentation is vicious, because it proceeds from the distributive to the collective; which is altogether sophistical, for just as it does not follow: every one of men is an individual of human nature: therefore the whole collection of men is an individual of human nature; so neither should it follow: if every being is produced by another: therefore also the whole collection of beings must be produced by another: for there is a parity between both inferences; and hence since the former is vicious, the latter will also be vicious.

— I deny the parity; For although the inference from the distributive to the collective does not hold whenever the predicate is a continuous or discrete quantity, or when the collection is made from things by reason of the quantity which constitutes them, it nevertheless holds and is legitimate when the predicate is neither a quantity nor has the mode of a quantity. Thus, e.g., although it is not permitted to infer: individual men taken separately are one individual: therefore all men taken collectively are one individual; it is nevertheless permitted to infer: individual men are rational and white; therefore the whole collection of men is rational and white; because rationality and whiteness are not quantitative predicates nor have the mode of quantity; but since the individual and unity are the principle of number and form discrete quantity, therefore in them the inference from the distributive to the collective does not hold; because a collection from quantitative predicates adds something to the whole collection which does not belong to the parts, namely number; but the inability of being from oneself, or the exigency of being from another in a contingent being, is not a predicate of continuous or discrete quantity; nor does it have any affinity with either quantity, but belongs essentially to created beings from their intrinsic notion, and from the limitation and imperfection of their essence, which, since it is contingent, necessarily requires being from another; and consequently the inference is excellent, that if every being requires being from another, then also the whole collection of beings must be from another.

They reply secondly that the argument concludes from a false supposition: First, because it supposes that a collection of all beings can be given, which is false, since they are infinite to infinity; but of infinite things (they say) there can be no collection, because not so many can be conceived but that still more are conceivable. Second, because it supposes that the terms all and whole can be said of the infinite, which however Aristotle proves to be false, 3. Physic. cap. 7. Third, because it supposes that every being is produced or unproduced, which is false, since several Theologians even maintain that the essences of things are from eternity according to some diminished real being: this, however, as such, is neither produced nor unproduced. Fourth and finally, it supposes that something cannot produce itself, the contrary of which appears in the Phoenix, which is said naturally to reproduce itself and to come to life again from its own ashes. Whence Tertullian, in the book De Resurrectione carnis, cap. 13., takes up this natural history in confirmation and as a specimen of the future resurrection of men; Behold, he says, a most full and most firm specimen of this hope… I mean that bird peculiar to the East, famous for its singularity, monstrous in its posterity, which willingly burying itself renews itself: departing and succeeding by its natal end, again a Phoenix. Of which in like manner Lactantius sang in a poem on the same:

It is its own offspring, its own father and its own heir: Its own nurse, ever its own nursling.

He had, however, premised in the same place:

For it perishes that it may live, yet it creates itself.

Therefore this argument is utterly null.

— I deny both the antecedent and the consequence. And to the first and second proof of the antecedent I say that it is wholly alien from the truth that a collection of all beings cannot be given, if they are supposed to be infinite in number: that it is in like manner false that the terms all and whole cannot be attributed to this collection of infinite beings: for it is evident that there is nothing which is not that whole which it is, and all that it is, whatever Aristotle may object; for it is evidently impossible that something be that which it is, unless it have all that by which it is constituted in its being: but it cannot be so constituted unless it be taken collectively, and as it is a whole; nothing can also be that which it is, unless it have its parts and involve all things out of which it is constituted. Whence whatever is, is collectively that whole which it is, whether in the meantime it be finite or infinite; for the whole is nothing other than the parts taken collectively, especially the whole per accidens; for a multitude of stones, e.g., whether it be infinite or finite, is nothing other than the collection of all the stones which form this multitude: therefore it is not repugnant that all beings, even if they were infinite¹, be taken collectively, and that the terms all and whole be able to be attributed to this collection.

— It is confirmed: Whoever says every being, or all beings, either says only some one among beings; or he designates absolutely all beings. Not the first, otherwise every being would be every being, which is plainly false. If the second: therefore he signifies and conceives all beings collectively; for to say and signify all beings collectively is nothing other than to signify this or that or any other to infinity, if beings are infinite.

You will perhaps reply, that this word every being can be used not collectively, but only distributively, because a collection of all beings is impossible, since not so many are conceived but that more can be conceived; and so no collection can be conceived so great but that a much greater and ampler one must still be conceived.

— On the contrary: Although in an infinite multitude there is no part beyond which there is not another, and so no last part; it is nevertheless false that all beings cannot be taken collectively, because in order that an infinite collection be taken as a whole, it is not necessary that its last part be taken, for this is impossible, because in fact there is no last part: but it suffices that those individual beings be conceived together in kind and universally, and as it were unitedly expressed by these words, every being: for since there would be no being in this infinite multitude that would not truly have the notion of being, so also there would be none that would not be designated by these words.

— To the second proof of the antecedent I say that the essences of things cannot be said to be, from eternity, midway between production and non-production; for it belongs to things that they have not been produced, and consequently that they are unproduced, and that they do not have the actual existence which is acquired through production. Add that it is not true that they are real in themselves, but only insofar as they are conceived by the divine intellect and are represented in the divine essence.

— To the third proof I answer, first, that the story of the phoenix seems to be a fable rather than a history, as Pliny affirms, Lib. 10. cap. 2.; or I say that not all things which are reported of it are true, but that most are wholly fabulous, as Scaliger observes against Cardanus.

— I answer, second, that although it is true that the phoenix is born again from its ashes, it is nevertheless not the same in number, but the same in species, as Tertullian observes; for he adds: again he himself: who is no longer another, but the same; by which words he indicates that not the one which had died is born again, but another of the same species. Add that Tertullian in the same place calls the history of the phoenix a parable of the divine operation; so that God has not only spoken in parables, but has also worked in them. Nor does it matter that he takes the phoenix as a specimen and proof of the resurrection: for he only intends, from the supposed truth of this history, to relate some likeness of the resurrection shadowed forth in natural things; but a likeness is not true in all things, and always limps in some. And so Tertullian takes the example of the phoenix for this alone, to persuade that the reproduction of a dead man, the same in number and individual, is possible through divine power, which, he says, ought not to seem difficult to believe: for if by natural power alone another of the same species rises from a dead phoenix, why could not the same man in number rise again by divine power? But that this is the genuine mind of Tertullian is openly evident from those things which he had premised, cap. 12. where, to illustrate the mystery of the resurrection, he has these words:

The day dies into night and is buried everywhere in darkness; the world's honor is darkened, every substance is blackened… and yet again, with its adornment, with its dowry, with its Sun, the same and whole and entire universe is born again to the world; night killing its own death, darkness cutting short its own burial: being heir to itself, until night too is born again with its own dais. For the rays of the stars too are relit,which the morning kindling had extinguished, etc.

From these things it is evident that he speaks of the origin and destruction of the phoenix in the same way as of the renewal of day and night. It is certain, however, that the past day does not return the same, nor does the put-to-flight night succeed the same, but another of the same kind: and consequently Tertullian does not hold that anything can produce itself again. Nor does Lactantius either: for he adds: it itself indeed, but not the same, because it is both itself and not itself.

They finally reply, that although a thing cannot produce itself, nevertheless, in order that the force of the preceding argument be blunted and wholly broken, it suffices that natural things can produce themselves by circular generation: so that at different times the very thing which today produces something can be reproduced by the same after some years: for once this circle of generations is posited, it cannot be gathered that there is some first unproduced principle of all things.

— On the contrary: This reply supposes that it can naturally come about that the same thing in number can be produced again, and consequently that the resurrection of man is natural; which evidently appears false: for this wholly exceeds the powers of nature. Whence it is no wonder if the Gentile philosophers mocked the Apostle announcing the resurrection of the dead. Then, if a son, v. g., could naturally reproduce his dead father after some years, why could he not also have done so while he was still living? For an existing thing does not impede the natural power of another, especially when it does not resist it nor puts an obstacle by a contrary action: but a father actually existing does not impede the natural power and operation of his son: therefore if a son has the natural power of regenerating his father, he will be able to reproduce him as much while he lives as when he is dead. And much more will the father himself be able to reproduce his son, who consequently would begin to be in many places at once, and would be younger and older at the same time, healthy and sick, all of which things are wholly false. Finally, if that circle of generations could be given, and the same thing which produced another could be reproduced by the same, then the regress from privation to habit would be natural, and so a blind man could naturally recover lost sight, which is plainly known to be false; and therefore all produced things must be produced not by one another in circular generation, but it is necessary that they be produced by some supreme Artificer of things.

Second demonstration. From the ultimate end. — A single ultimate end is given: therefore also God. The consequence is clear, since by the name of God is understood the first principle and the ultimate end of all things. The antecedent is proved: either there is one ultimate end, or the ends are infinite in number: but the ends are not infinite in number: therefore there is one ultimate end. The major is clear: for if no ultimate one is assigned, it is necessary that they be infinite and innumerable. The minor is proved: If there were infinite ends, they would have to be known in order to be desired, because elicited appetite is not borne toward the unknown: but infinite ends cannot be known by men, because they would be known either at once or successively: but they could not be known at once, because a finite intellect, such as the human one is, cannot know infinite things in number at once, as is certain: because such is the knowledge as is the cognitive power; but this is finite and limited, just as is the entity of man: therefore it cannot be occupied about infinite objects at once. Nor likewise could they be known successively, because if there were infinite ends, our appetite could nowhere enjoy so many but that much more would still remain enjoyable; but it is false that our appetite can nowhere rest and be satisfied; otherwise it would be futile; but nature does nothing in vain. Then, if there were infinite ends, none of them would be an end, for where all things are means, there is no end: but if there were infinite ends, all intermediate ends would be means, because they would be ordered to another further end; and consequently none of them could be called an end.

— This discourse can be confirmed by all the arguments by which we proved above that some first principle of all things is given; for just as the whole collection of caused things, whether actually existing or possible, must have some principle from which it is; so it must have some end on account of which it is, and which exists outside that collection. For since there is no caused being within that collection which is not caused on account of some end, so also the whole collection must be caused on account of some end; for such is the collection as are the things which are collected, as was proved above; and therefore the collection of beings caused on account of an end must also be caused on account of an end: but this collection cannot be caused on account of an end which is within itself: otherwise, as was said above, the same thing would be the efficient and final cause of itself: therefore it must be caused on account of some end which is outside the order of caused beings, and consequently which is an uncaused and unproduced end; but the uncaused and unproduced end is God: therefore He is given.

Third demonstration. From the most perfect being. — From the fact that that than which a greater and more perfect cannot be thought out exists: but God is the being than which no greater can be thought out: therefore He exists. The minor is admitted by all. The major is proved, first indeed by St. Anselm in the Monologion: an existing being is better and more perfect than a non-existing being: therefore it is necessary that the being than which no greater and more perfect can be thought be existing; for if it did not exist, something more perfect than it could be thought, namely an existing being: therefore it is necessary that the being than which nothing greater can be thought exist. But because, as St. Anselm also very well noted in the Proslogion, the atheist could reply that this is indeed the case with things if it were truly thought, but otherwise if it is only fictitiously thought: for even if what someone thinks, v. g., some region filled with all goods, than which no other richer and more delightful could be thought out, it does not follow from this that this region thus thought out exists in the nature of things: so by parity one would first have to prove that the being than which a greater cannot be thought is truly thought, and not feigned, before it be inferred that it exists; otherwise the argument would be sophistical. Therefore the same major is proved from the Doctor: Pure and actual being, that is, pure act, is the being than which a greater cannot be thought; indeed pure act must involve every perfection, otherwise it would not be pure act, but would be in potency to perfection; but pure act truly thought exists. I prove it: If pure act does not imply a contradiction, it necessarily exists; but pure act does not imply a contradiction: therefore it necessarily exists. The major is clear from the terms; for that is called pure act which is nothing but act and excludes all potentiality whatever, but in act it is wholly that which it can be: whence if it can be something, it is at once necessarily that which it can be. The minor is proved: If its being a being which is pure act implied a contradiction, chiefly because it would be a contradiction, and it would be true to say that it was at once and was not: but such a contradiction does not appear. Proof: To be pure act does not include in its concept being at once and non-being; for pure act imports nothing other than being so actual as to exclude all potentiality whatever: therefore so far is that concept from including at once being and non-being, that indeed it simply says being, and simply excludes non-being: and therefore there is no contradiction that pure act exists: therefore it necessarily exists; otherwise it would not be pure act, since it would involve potentiality.

You will perhaps reply, that the existence of pure act does not import a contradiction directly and formally in its concept, but only consequently, just as, by parity, those who deny the infinite say that in the concept of the infinite no contradiction is precisely imported, but only consequently; namely because from the admission of the infinite several contradictions follow. Why then, they say, could not the same be said of pure act?

— On the contrary: That which does not even consequently involve being and non-being imports a contradiction neither directly nor indirectly; indeed it wholly denies and excludes non-being; but pure act wholly denies non-being from its formal notion; since it denies all potentiality and the passage from non-being to being: therefore even consequently it imports no contradiction: therefore it is not repugnant that pure act be: therefore it necessarily is, because pure act is necessarily that which it can be, otherwise it would not be pure act.

Fourth demonstration. From the necessary being. — Some necessary being must be admitted in the nature of things which exists essentially and independently: but that is God: therefore He is given. The minor is clear: for a necessary being existing essentially is from itself and unproduced, and produces the rest, and consequently is God; for by the name of God we understand nothing else. The major, in which the whole difficulty lies, is proved. If no necessary being existing essentially is given, it follows that all beings which are in the nature of things are contingent: but this is false: therefore some necessary being existing essentially is given. The major is certain; for if whatever exists is not contingent, it is necessary that either the whole be necessary, or that something exist necessarily: but no one would say that all beings are necessary; for by experience it is certain that very many things arise and perish daily: therefore it is necessary that something be necessary. The minor is proved: If all beings which are in the nature of things are contingent, it follows that it could have come about that from eternity no being existed; for that is contingent which can be or not be: but it is false that it could have come about that from eternity nothing existed: therefore not all things which are and have been are contingent. The minor is proved: If it could have come about that from eternity nothing existed, something had to be given by which the whole, which was, would be determined to exist: therefore it could not have come about that from eternity nothing existed. The major is certain: for what is indeterminate with respect to existing must be determined to existence in order to be. The minor is proved: The whole which was could not determine itself from eternity to exist; just as if now nothing existed, it would wholly imply a contradiction that something be newly determined to exist: therefore there was nothing by which that whole would be determined to exist.

— It is confirmed first: If it could have come about that no thing at all existed, some reason must be given why it was rather than was not: but no reason at all can be given; for this cannot be assigned, why a thing was determined rather to being than to non-being: therefore it could not have come about that no thing at all existed: therefore not all things were contingent.

— It is confirmed second: Contingent things could not be determined to exist from eternity any more than now, if nothing at all existed: but if now nothing at all existed, it would imply a contradiction that something be determined to exist: therefore neither could they have been determined from eternity; for no reason of disparity can be brought forth.

The atheists reply, that there is no need to have recourse to some necessary being; for although a contingent being can be and not be, nevertheless where it is, it can produce another contingent being: just as hot water, v. g., although from its nature it does not have heat, nevertheless when it has obtained it, it can produce it in another subject and heat it: therefore by parity, although a contingent being does not have being from itself, nevertheless when it has obtained it, it can bestow it on another; and so all contingent beings could in turn have been produced by another contingent being, and therefore there is no need of any necessary being.

— On the contrary: Just as water which is not hot from itself must beg heat from something which is hot per se, either formally, as fire, or virtually, as the Sun; so by a similar reasoning, since a contingent being does not have existence from itself, it must necessarily receive it from something which exists per se and necessarily.

They reply 2. That would indeed be true if all contingent beings were determined in number; for with this posited, one would have to arrive at some first being which would exist per se: but (they say) contingent beings are not determined in number, because they are infinite without end, and therefore since this contingent being was produced by another contingent being, and that one again by another, and so on to infinity; there is no need to have recourse to some necessary being, from which contingent beings would have to be produced.

— On the contrary: First, it is false that there is a process to infinity in causes subordinated both essentially and accidentally, as was effectively proved in the first demonstration; Second, even granted the infinity of contingent beings, one must nevertheless admit some being existing from itself and per se, from which this infinite multitude of contingent beings was produced; which I prove thus. Such is the multitude and collection of contingent beings as are the collected beings: therefore since collected beings must necessarily be from another, the whole multitude too must necessarily be from another. The antecedent is clear, by a similar reasoning; for because individual men are rational, individual swans are white, and individual crows are black, it is legitimately inferred that the collection of all men is rational, and that of swans is white, and that of crows is black: therefore in like manner it is true that if individual beings are contingent and from another, the collection of beings too must be from another: but it cannot be from another contingent being, both because otherwise it would not be the whole collection of contingent beings; and so there would be an implication in terms; and because the whole cannot be produced by a part of itself, otherwise the part itself, since it is something of the whole, would also produce itself, which wholly implies a contradiction.

— Nor does it matter that that multitude of contingent beings is feigned to be infinite. For just as extinguished candles, even if infinite, can no more light themselves and recover lost light than if they were only finite in number: and just as stones, even if they were infinite, can no more be moved upward than if they were only in a determined number, because upward motion does not belong to them from their nature, but only downward motion, namely on account of inborn gravity: moreover, just as a multitude, whether finite or infinite, of men, of whom each without exception is wholly foolish, and needy of the direction and instruction of another for all and each thing, cannot by itself alone be wise, or not need the instruction and direction of another existing outside that whole collection, and not similarly needing the wisdom and direction of another: finally, just as a multitude of the starving, of whom none separately has a sufficiency of that food, but each needs to receive it from another individual having it beforehand, cannot abound in food or be satisfied, if it is not helped by some other existing outside the whole collection of this kind and having from its own resources a sufficiency of food, and not needing to receive it from another; whether in the meantime that multitude be finite or infinite; for who would bring it into his mind that the whole need of this kind of individuals was helped, precisely because the multitude of the needy was increased to infinity, and an infinite regress was made from the last needy one to another and another, so that each of the needy needs another helping to infinity? so by parity no one, unless wholly alien to reason, will be able to assert that the multitude of contingent beings, of which each demands to be produced by another, does not need some producer, because namely that multitude grew to infinity: therefore it is necessary that some necessary being be admitted which exists per se and essentially, and is productive of the other beings: and therefore that God be admitted: since by the name of God we understand nothing other than a being existing necessarily, which has being from itself, and produces the rest.

There are other demonstrations; but they are either insufficient, or can easily be reduced to these. Therefore let it be:

Second conclusion. — Physics supplies a varied, but chiefly a threefold, argument for proving God's existence. The first, indeed, is deduced from the whole fabric of the world; the second from its principal parts; the third from its epitome, namely man, who is for that reason called Microcosm by the Greeks and, by the Latins, the abbreviated world.

The first, I say, is deduced from the wonderful and artful fabric of the world, its disposition, its beauty, and its varied and elegant adornment: for, as Durandus acutely observes in the prologue of the Book of Sentences, there is a threefold book in which God has, as it were, traced out and inscribed himself: the first is the book of the creatures of the world; the second, of the Prophets and of the Old Testament; the third, of the Evangelists and the writers of the New Law. The first he gave to the philosophers to read, as Saint Paul says ad Romanos 1: The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also and divinity: whence creatures are called by Trismegistus rays of the Divinity; by Plato, a mirror of the Deity; by Solomon, species and images of the Creator; by David, voices and oracles of his divine Maker: for there is none so speechless that it does not proclaim with silent speech: He made us, and not we ourselves. — The second book he gave to the Jews, as Ecclesiasticus says, cap. 39.: The wise man will search out the hidden things of the Proverbs, and will be occupied in the Prophets, etc. The third, however, he offered to Christians and the faithful, as Saint Paul says ad Romanos, cap. 15: Whatsoever things were written, were written for our doctrine. Whence, just as Christians can easily draw all supernatural truths from the Gospel scriptures, just as the Jews were able to understand from the Old Testament and the oracles of the Prophets the blessings divinely promised to them, and that the divine Deity was to be worshipped and supreme worship shown to God: so likewise the philosophers can easily discern from creatures the existence and perfections of God: For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, their Creator may be seen so as to be known, says the Wise Man, cap. 13. Whence Lactantius, lib. 1. cap. 3:

who, unless he were wholly blind and bereft of reason, would not judge that this vastest mass, compacted of so many heavens, so many elements, and so many other bodies, was built by some most excellent and divine Artificer? Who suspended the earth with firm stability, who distinguished the heaven with shining stars, who kindled the Sun, the clearest and singular light for human affairs, as an argument of his unique majesty, etc.

Therefore from the book of the world the divine existence is established.

You will reply. Perhaps, with Hermogenes and certain atheists, you will say that all these things came forth from Hyle, that is, from the bosom of first matter, by a spontaneous eruption. — But what is more inept than that first matter — the least of beings, the most imperfect and almost pure nothing, subject to all mutations, subservient to all natural agents, destitute in itself, and wholly formless, and begging all its perfection from others — should have been from eternity from itself, independent of every cause, and endowed with the fecundity of producing the other beings? What is more alien from truth than to attribute the highest perfection, such as is the necessity of being from oneself, to a being so small and imperfect, and to deny it to some efficient Cause and maker of all things? Add that if first matter were from itself, since it has no determinate form from itself, but is wholly indifferent to all forms, if there had been no efficient cause at the beginning of things, by what, I ask, would that matter have been determined to one form rather than to another? Moreover, if for the eduction of the first forms from the bosom of matter no agent was needed, why is an agent needed now in each and every daily generation? Why does fire not burst forth from matter informed with the form of water? Why does man not draw his origin from the hardest rock? Finally, all philosophers confess that when one of the extremes is given in the nature of things, the other also must be given: therefore if there is given a matter which is pure potency from eternity, as the atheists imagine, there must also be given from eternity something which is pure act: and that is God, the maker of all things: therefore He exists.

The atheists reply with Democritus, that all nature whatsoever coalesced from the collision and coagulation of atoms moving in the vastest bosom of nothingness. — But truly, says Minucius Felix, does not Democritus himself for the most part speak of nature, which pours forth the images of things, and of intelligence, as God? and accordingly Democritus himself admits God as the maker and framer of his atoms. Moreover, if from this revolution and coagulation of atoms all things were heaped together and ordered, why in a similar way do wood, cement, stones, and the other things necessary for a building, cast down from some very high mountain into a valley and rolling along together, and in their revolution cemented to one another by the cement, not build and shape an orderly and magnificent Palace? Finally, why does a similar revolution of atoms not now take place for the formation of some new being? Is the fecundity of those atoms exhausted? Does the glue fail by which they cohere to one another? — Lactantius presses this argument wonderfully, lib. 1. De ira Dei, cap. 10.

Who, he says, as an artisan could have fabricated the heart of man, or the voice, or wisdom itself? Does any sane man, then, think that what man cannot do by reason and counsel could have been accomplished by the collision of atoms cohering here and there… By what counsel, then, by what reason did the atoms gather themselves together from the confused heap, so that from some of them the earth was conglobed below, the heaven was stretched out above, distinguished by so great a rarity of stars that nothing more ornate could ever be devised? He, then, who sees things so great and so wondrous, can he think that they were produced by no counsel, no fittingness, no divine reason: but that such great miracles were concreted from subtle and tiny atoms? Is it not like a prodigy either that a man was born who would say these things, or that there were those who would believe them?

Finally, the rest reply, that all these things were indeed formed, but by chance. — But truly, says Seneca, lib. 1. Quaestionum naturalium, in the preface: Who is so devoid of reason as to think that this, than which nothing is more beautiful, nothing more well-ordered, nothing more constant in purpose, is fortuitous and rolled about by chance, and not ordered by some supreme Reason? For, as Trismegistus speaks in the Pimander, since no one would dare to assert that a statue is made without a craftsman and a painter, shall we think that the wonderful constitution of this world stood without a Founder? With him Saint Chrysostom agrees on this verse of Psal. 13., The fool said, etc.: There is no foundation, he says; how then does the building stand? There is no builder; how was the House made? There is no architect; and who founded the city? There is no musician; and how does the harmony appear in the lyre of the world? Saint Gregory Nazianzen uses the same argument, in his second oration on Theology, bringing forward the example of the cithara, of which, when we hear the harmony, we know for certain that it is struck by some most perfect artisan. Whence Saint Augustine concludes, lib. 10. Confessionum and 11. De Civitate, cap. 4: The world itself, by its most ordered mutability and mobility and the most beautiful appearance of all visible things, in a certain way, while silent, proclaims both that it was made and that its maker is God. Hence Trismegistus aptly says that this world is a book full of Divinity and a mirror of divine things, in which the most splendid image of the divine being shines; for as many creatures as are beheld in the world, so many are the vestiges of the Divinity, so many images, so many heralds of its divine Artificer; for indeed there is none so speechless that it does not pour forth with silent speech: He made us, and not we ourselves.

The second Argument is drawn from the celestial body, the noblest part of the whole world-machine. For, says the royal bard, Psal. 18.: The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the works of his hands. Expounding these words in homily 9 to the people, Saint Chrysostom says:

How do they declare the glory of God? Tell me. They have no voice, they possess no mouth, they have no tongue; how then do they declare? Through their very aspect. For when you see beauty, magnitude, height, position, form pervading so great a body, as if hearing a voice and learning from the sight, you admire him who created so beautiful and wonderful a body. The heaven is silent, but its aspect sends forth a voice clearer than a trumpet, teaching us through the eyes, not through the ears.

Whence the same royal Psalmist, alluding to the custom of the Ancients, who used to make books from skins, says in Psalm 103: Stretching out the heaven like a skin, that is, like an open book, in which the authority, dignity, and power of the Divinity is read, according to that saying of Isaiae 34.: The heavens shall be folded up like the book of heaven. Hence Saint Prosper, lib. 2. De Vocatione Gentium, cap. 1.: Before the sacred letters, the World served as a testimony to the Lord, and the ineffable beauty of the Heavens, through which certain tablets were offered to men, so that, as it were, in the pages of the elements and the volumes of the times, the doctrine of the divine institution might be read. Therefore the heaven and all heavenly things, with the consonant harmony of their species and order, testify to the glory of God, and with perpetual preaching speak the majesty of their Author. Whence Minucius Felix concludes in the Octavius:

What can be so open, so confessed, so perspicuous, when you have lifted your eyes to the Heaven and surveyed the things that are below and around, than that there is some Deity of most excellent mind, by which all nature is inspired, moved, nourished, governed? See the heaven itself, how widely it is stretched out, how rapidly it is rolled around — either because in the night it is marked out by stars, or because in the day it is illuminated by the sun; then you will know that in it there is the wonderful and divine balancing of the supreme Governor… What, when the order of the seasons and of the crops is distinguished by a stable variety, does it not testify to its Author and Parent? Spring alike with its flowers, and summer with its harvests, the pleasing ripeness of autumn, and the needful olive-harvest of winter — which order would easily be disturbed, unless it stood fast by the greatest reason. What great providence, then, it is, to interpose the mean tempering of Autumn and Spring, lest Winter alone burn with ice, or Summer alone scorch with heat.

Finally, the third Argument is gathered from man himself: for, as Minucius Felix continues,

The beauty of our form itself especially confesses God as the artificer: the upright stature, the erect countenance, the eyes placed on high as on a watchtower, and all the other senses as if stationed in a citadel: it would be long to go through them one by one; there is no member in man which is not there both for the sake of necessity and of grace. And what is more wonderful, the same figure belongs to all, but certain lineaments are deflected for each one. Thus we all seem similar, and yet each one is found dissimilar to the others.

The other holy Fathers and the weightier philosophers have similar things everywhere, even those living among the idolaters, who from the wonderful structure of man acknowledged the supreme prudence and wisdom of the divine Artificer, as may be seen in Lessius, lib. 1. De Providentia Numinis, n. 64. The most unconquered mother of the seven Maccabees also once used this argument, who, 2. Machab. c. 7., addressing her sons, says: I know not how you appeared in my womb; for neither did I give you spirit and soul and life, nor did I myself compact the members of each one: but the Creator of the world, who formed the nativity of man. Whence rightly the royal Psalmist, Ps. 102: Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all things that are within me, his holy name. All my bones shall say: Lord, who is like to thee? And Ps. 138: Thy knowledge is become wonderful from me. Nothing, therefore, commends the divine Power and its infinite Wisdom more than the wonderful fabric of man.

Third conclusion. — There are very many moral arguments by which the existence of God is urged; but especially there are the following five.

First. That the fear of God cannot be erased from the conscience of men, even of the most wicked, a fear felt not only at lightnings and thunders, but also at the encounter of any harmful and adverse thing, as Job manifestly testifies in cap. 15², where he says of the impious man: He has stretched out his hand against God, and has been strengthened against the Almighty; he has run against him with erect neck, and is armed with a fat neck. Yet the sound of terror is always in his ears, and when there is peace, he always suspects treachery. Whence with Tertullian, in the book De Testimonio Animae, we may conclude: Hence, then, O soul, from conscience you have at hand, at home and abroad, with none mocking or forbidding, to preach: God sees all things, and to God I commend, and God will repay, and God will judge between us: whence is this to you, if not from Christianity?

Second. It is open madness and most shameless rashness to wish to defend anything against the consensus of the whole world: but he who denies that God exists affirms this while the whole assembly of mankind cries out against him; since there is one veneration and confession of some Divinity among all nations, even the most savage. Whence Lactantius, lib. 3. cap. 10., from Cicero: There is no animal, except man, which has some knowledge of God: and among men themselves there is no nation so untamed, nor so iron-hard, which does not have the sense of some Religion. Hence Plato in the Protagoras, in Marsilio Ficino, lib. 17. De Immortalitate, cap. 9., holds that the greatest indication of our Divinity is this, that we alone, as partakers of the divine lot, on account of a certain kinship, acknowledge and desire God as Author, invoke and love him as Father, venerate him as King, fear him as Lord. Is it not, then, the greatest arrogance and madness to call into doubt, on account of some trivial quibbles, the existence of God, which creatures proclaim, all men venerate, the whole world testifies to?

Third. That from the denial of the supreme Deity the reward of virtue perishes, all piety is extinguished, and the reins are loosened for the wicked to commit every vice. For what will the mad lust of men not contrive? What will malice not attempt, if no avenger of crimes is feared, no punisher of hidden wickedness appears? Whence, when David had said that the foolish had denied God in their heart, he immediately adds: They are corrupt, and have become abominable in their ways, etc. From which things I argue thus: That doctrine which opens the way to the committing of vices and crimes, even the fouler ones, must be eliminated by the most exquisite punishments; but that which denies that God exists is such. The major is certain. The minor is proved: Nothing recalls men from committing crimes and misdeeds so much as vengeance and punishment, which is thought to be taken upon them if they commit them; for:

The good hate to sin out of love of virtue. The wicked hate to sin out of fear of punishment.

Therefore nothing opens wider access to crimes than a doctrine from which it follows that there is no avenger of crimes: but from that which denies that God exists it follows that there is no avenger of crimes and misdeeds: therefore a doctrine which denies that God exists opens the way to all crimes and misdeeds. The subsumption is proved: Only two avengers of crimes can be conceived, man and God: but man cannot be the avenger of crimes: therefore it remains that God is: therefore if God is not granted, it follows that there is no avenger and punisher of crimes. The major is evident.

The minor is proved: Man can be the avenger of crimes only through gallows and similar temporal torments, which human power inflicts: but this does not suffice for it to be said that there is an avenger or punisher of crimes. Which I prove thus: An avenger of crimes is one who can and must take vengeance for all crimes, by whomever they are committed; for if he takes vengeance only for some crimes, he will not be called simply the avenger of crimes, but only of certain crimes. And if he cannot take vengeance for crimes committed even by any kind of men whatsoever, he will likewise not be called simply the avenger of crime. But man can take vengeance neither for all crimes whatsoever, because many crimes are hidden; for who can punish so many fornications, adulteries, homicides, detractions, robberies, hidden hatreds, and other things of that kind? Nor can man take vengeance from all men whatsoever who have committed crimes. For although vengeance can be taken by man for a public crime perpetrated by some plebeian, it is not so if it has been perpetrated by a powerful man or a Prince: therefore from that doctrine which denies that God exists it follows that there is no avenger of all crimes.

The atheists reply: It is indeed rightly inferred that from the fact that God is admitted, an avenger of crime is also to be admitted; but that this avenger was invented and devised by the Princes and Rulers of peoples, so that by this device they might keep them in their duty. — Against 1. If that avenger of crimes was so rashly devised: then in reality there is no one whom men should fear, and by whose fear they could be recalled from perpetrating any crimes whatsoever. And if it is so, it follows that both Princes and common men can safely rush into all the fouler hidden crimes, and loosen the reins to all vices. Whence it comes about that men not only excel nothing over brute beasts, but will also be far more miserable in many respects, since, being subject to the forms of evils, they will drag out forever a tumultuous and restless life; for what will they not fear from a man who is for the most part more ferocious than wild beasts? — Against 2. The falsehood and madness of this reply is exposed by the very fear of an avenger of crimes fixed, as it were, in the very marrow of men, whence it comes about that even the most impious have never in any way been able to extricate themselves from that fear, as is evident from Caligula himself, who, as no one more insolently denied that God is the avenger of crimes, so no one trembled more miserably at his vengeance and lightnings. It is evident from the experience of those most abandoned men, who, when they cast off all piety and religion, are so cruelly tormented by the furies of their crimes and the stings of conscience, that they tremble with fear where there is no fear. Add that if no God existed, there would likewise be no reward of virtue and piety; for it is evident from daily experience that upright men in this mortal life are tossed about by various temptations, pressed by troubles, tormented by pains, vexed by anxieties, and are mocked, despised, and afflicted by impious men, while the impious, on the contrary, ascend to the summit of honors, heap up immense wealth, abound in treasures, friends, clients, and are celebrated with the highest praises, even when they have violated divine and human laws: therefore with David, in Psalm 57., it must rightly be concluded: If indeed there is fruit for the just, there is indeed a God judging them on the earth.

Such is the affinity and connection of Polytheism with Atheism, that the affirmation of many gods is the complete negation of the one true God. Indeed, to Tertullian it seems far less a crime to deny God altogether than to multiply him; for God, he says, in book 1. contra Marcionem, if he is not one, he is not, because we believe not to be, whatever has not been such as it ought to be. Hence he begins his book De Idololatria with these words: The principal crime of the human race, the highest guilt of the age, the whole cause of judgment, is Idolatry. Therefore, after Atheism has been vanquished, it is worthwhile also to expugn Idolatry, and to demonstrate by natural reason that the plurality of gods is altogether impossible.

Note 1. The Demon is the parent and artificer of all Idolatry, inasmuch as he tried to introduce it into the heavenly and earthly Paradise, and from there into the whole circle of the earth. For scarcely had that emulator of the Divinity been formed, when he wished to become like the Most High, to ascend into the heaven of the Godhead, and to exalt above the stars the throne of his pseudo-divine majesty. Scarcely had the first parents of men greeted the day, when that artificer of malice and cunning solicited them to Idolatry, saying: You will be like gods. Scarcely, finally, had the men who survived the strangling waters of the flood begun again to cultivate the earth, and to raise up the human race, almost extinct, when the Demon urged upon them the worship of many gods, in order to turn man away from the thought and knowledge of the true Divinity, and that he himself, under the false name of Idols, uttering certain empty Oracles, might hunt for divine honors. Whence Tertullian aptly, in cap. 22. of the Apologeticum: They emulate divinity, while they steal divination.

Note 2. So great was the blindness and folly of the Gentiles, that they adored an almost innumerable multitude of gods. For as Eusebius reports, book 9. of Praeparationis Evangelicae, cap. 15., Hesiod reckoned that there are thirty thousand gods on earth. Hence St. Augustine, book 4. of De Civitate Dei, cap. 8: When (he says) could all the names of the Gods or Goddesses be commemorated in one place of this book, which they could scarcely contain in huge volumes, distributing to single things the proper offices of the Divinities? And after a few words interposed, relating the twelve gods whom they had appointed for the preserving and fostering of a single ear of grain, he says:

They therefore set Proserpina over the sprouting grains; over the joints and knots of the stalks, the god Nodutus; over the coverings of the husks, the goddess Volutina; when the husks open so that the ear may come forth, the goddess Patelina; when the crops are equaled by new ears, because the ancients said hostire for to equal, the goddess Hostilina; when the grains are in flower, the goddess Flora; when they are milky, the god Lacturnus; when they ripen, the goddess Matura; when they are weeded, that is, taken away from the earth, the goddess Runcina. Nor do I mention all things, because it disgusts me that they are not ashamed.

But how much men endowed with reason ought to have blushed, to worship, and as it were to adore, invoke, and fear as gods, others not only mortal men, and in all things similar to themselves, but even fever, pestilence, pallor, and other infirmities and disasters, which (says the same St. Augustine, ibidem cap. 23.) were not the divinities of the worshippers, but the crimes of the worshippers. Nay more, to venerate, and to hold as gods all the stupid and harmful animals, even small plants, such as leek and onion, which the Egyptians also held as gods, and venerated in such a way that they dared neither to break nor to eat them. Concerning which Juvenal writes wittily, Satire 15.

Who does not know, Volusius of Bithynia, what monsters mad Egypt worships? It adores the crocodile… Leek and onion it is a crime to violate and to break with a bite. O holy peoples! for whom these deities spring up in the gardens.

Note 3. That although, with the Gospel light irradiating, all this error of idolatry was driven away, according to that prophecy of Isaiah, cap. 2., The Lord alone shall be lifted up in that day, and the idols shall be utterly crushed; for at the rising of that most splendid Sun of justice, the dense darkness of superstition began to diminish, and from then on the Demon himself, returning to his ancient seats of darkness and foretelling that a perpetual silence was to be in the Delphic Oracle and the rest, departing from it, says:

Me a Hebrew boy, God himself ruling the gods, Bids yield the seat, and sad return beneath Orcus,

nevertheless certain infamous heretics broke forth from among the Christians, who introduced a plurality of gods, since the Manichaeans, Cerdonians, Gnostics, and Marcionites established two gods, one Good, the other Evil. Whence Tertullian, speaking of Marcion, in book 1. which he wrote against him, cap. 2.: The Pontic man, he says, brings forward two gods, like the Symplegades of his shipwreck: one whom he could not deny, that is, the Creator and ours, and the other whom he could not prove, that is, his own. And in cap. 5., speaking of Valentinus the heresiarch, he says: More honest and more liberal is Valentinus, who dared at once to conceive two, Bythus and Sige, when he poured out the godhead of divinity up to the thirty offspring of Aeons, like an Aeonic sow. Therefore, not only against the idolaters, but also against the heretics, the unity of the Godhead is to be demonstrated by reasons, both natural and moral.

First conclusion. — God is so necessarily unique, that it is altogether impossible for there to be many gods. The Subtle Doctor proves this conclusion in 1. dist. 2. q. 3. by seven natural reasons, of which the First is drawn from the infinite intellect, the second from the infinite will, the Third from infinite goodness, the Fourth from infinite power, the Fifth from the very notion of infinity, the Sixth from necessary existence, the Seventh from omnipotence; all of which, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I have judged to be reducible to three heads, namely, to the divine entity, operation, and dignity, from which, as from a threefold source of light, the unity of the Divinity is established, and, as far as can be done, demonstrated.

First indeed thus: What is essentially singular is unique: but God is essentially singular: therefore he is unique. The major is clear, for singularity formally carries with itself the negation of communicability and multiplicability into several numerically distinct things: whence all Philosophers admit, that if human nature, for example, were singular from its essential principles, it could be found in one individual only. The minor is proved: What is essentially existing is essentially singular: but God is essentially existing: therefore he is singular. The minor is clear; since the name of God sounds nothing other than a being by essence, and so necessarily existing from itself, that it is impossible for it not to exist. The major also is evident; since existence belongs only to a singular thing, for it is the last grade of the thing and its last complement: whence Aristotle rightly teaches, that common natures, whether generic or specific, have no existence except in the singulars to which they belong and of which they are predicated: therefore it is necessary, that if God be essentially existing, he be also essentially singular, and consequently altogether incapable of multiplication into many gods; and consequently God is necessarily unique.

It is confirmed: If the Godhead could be multiplied, there would be infinite gods: but there are not infinite gods: therefore the Godhead cannot be multiplied. The minor is clear, for no Polytheist has so far asserted an infinite throng of gods. Because since God is to be worshipped by us, and we cannot worship infinite ones through our limited and finite operations, if they were infinite, it would follow that innumerable gods would be left altogether destitute of all worship and veneration, and entirely banished among us from the fellowship of the gods. — Whence Octavius, in Minucius Felix, wittily attacking the procreation and generation of the gods, says:

Why, if gods were born, are they not born even today? Unless perhaps Jupiter has grown old, and childbirth has failed in Juno, and Minerva grew gray before she gave birth. And therefore did that generation cease, because no assent was given to fables of this kind? But if gods could be created and could not perish, we would have more gods than all men, so that already neither could heaven contain them, nor the air hold them, nor the earth sustain them.

— The cited Doctor proves the major in n. 5: Every essence that is multiplicable and capable of being pluralized in individuals is not determined of itself to a certain number of individuals: but by whatever reason it can be in two, by the same it can be in four, in a hundred, in a thousand, and so on to infinity, as is clear of human nature, which could be in infinite men, if they were given: therefore if the divine nature can be in several individuals, it will be able to be in infinite ones. For why would its communication stop rather at one number, for example at a hundred, than at a thousand, and so on for the rest? Moreover, why could any created nature be capable of multiplication and pluralization to infinity, and the divine one not? Therefore if there could be many gods, there could be infinite ones. But if there could be infinite ones, they would in fact and actually exist, because since God is the being supremely necessary-to-be, whatever can be, in fact is: but there are not infinite gods existing: therefore they cannot be: therefore there cannot be many: therefore there is only one. Maironius judges this reason to be maximally convincing, in his commentary on the first book, dist. 2. quaest. 4. Yet against it

The Polytheists reply that, in order to break the force of this reason, those consequences are invalid, just as by way of analogy these inferences are invalid: 1. Human nature is not in fact determined to a certain number of men: therefore in fact there can be infinite men actually existing; 2. A blacksmith is not in fact determined to make one knife: therefore he will be able to make infinite ones; 3. I am not determined to carry a weight of three or four pounds: therefore I can carry infinite pounds of weight; 4. The Father in the Divinity is not determined to produce a single divine supposit: therefore he will be able to produce infinite divine supposits in number. But it is certain that these four consequences are false: therefore the sequel of our proof will also be false, by which we inferred, that if the divine nature is not necessarily determined to a single individual, but is multiplicable into several, it will be able to be multiplied into infinite ones, and thus there could be infinite gods. — Our Maironius answers: to the first, that although indeed human nature and any other is not of itself determined to a certain number of individuals, otherwise God could not perpetuate the world as long and as much as he would wish, since beyond the determined number of men he could not produce others, nevertheless it is determined from without, namely, by the divine will, which has decreed to produce so many men and not more. But if the divine nature could of itself be multiplied, its multiplication could be limited by nothing extrinsic, and consequently there would be as many of its individuals as could be, because since God is a being necessary-to-be, in him to be and to be able are the same. To the second, he says that the smith is determined by the matter and the brevity of life, so that if he lived forever and had infinite iron, he could make infinite knives. To the third, he says that that repugnance with respect to carrying an infinite weight is to be traced back not to the side of infinity, but to the side of simultaneity, for successively I could carry infinite pounds of weight, if indeed I lived infinite days and carried one pound on each single day: but I could not carry those infinite ones at the same time, unless God infused infinite strength into me. To the fourth, he distinguishes the antecedent: that the Father in the Divinity is not determined to produce a single supposit of the same notion and by the same faculty and operation, he denies; that it is to be produced by diverse faculties and operations, he concedes; for he is determined to produce the supposit of the Son by the utterance of the intellect, and to produce the supposit of the Holy Spirit by the spiration of the will. Whence it does not follow that he could produce infinite divine supposits: that indeed would follow if he were undetermined to produce two supposits of the same notion by the same faculty and operation, for example, two divine Sons or two Holy Spirits, because by whatever reason God could produce two, he could also produce infinite ones. Just as it legitimately follows, that if the divine nature were communicable to two divine individuals, it would also be communicable to a thousand and to infinite ones; because the same is the reason concerning communication to infinite ones as to two; since this communication could be limited and determined by nothing extrinsic to a certain number rather than to another: and therefore the firmness and strength of the aforesaid reason stands.

The second reason is sought from the infinite power of operating: since in God a threefold operation is supposed, namely, that of Omnipotence, by which he produces all things, of Intelligence, by which he knows himself and other things, and of Will, by which he loves himself and all other goods, from this threefold manner of operating the Doctor proves that the plurality of gods is repugnant.

First indeed from Omnipotence: It is repugnant for there to be several omnipotent beings: therefore also several gods. The consequence is clear, since by the name of God we signify the first cause altogether independent and unlimited, both in its entity and in its operations. For although the omnipotence of God cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, as the Doctor observes in n. 6., nevertheless, as the name of God is commonly received, it designates an omnipotent cause. The antecedent is proved: If there were two Omnipotent beings and one of them wished to produce some creature, either the other could impede the production of that creature or destroy it once produced, or he could not; if he could not, certainly he would not be to be called Omnipotent, since he could not carry out whatever he wished; if he could, it would follow that the other is not Omnipotent, since he could not complete his work or preserve it once done. Whence St. Athanasius rightly concludes: To say that several gods are equally powerful is to say that several are equally powerless.

You will reply that perhaps they are of equal virtue and power, but that there is so great and so close a bond of prudence and love among them, that one cannot dissent from the will of another. — On the contrary. Each of them would be altogether free, and consequently could sometimes dissent from the other: but supposing that they do not think alike about some work which one of them intends to undertake, either he will be able to carry out the intended work, or not: if he can, with the others opposing, who would not see that they are weak and powerless? since they could not prevent a work repugnant to them from being done. If he cannot, certainly he will not be omnipotent, nor consequently is he to be called God. Thus, on the part of the operation of Omnipotence, it is altogether repugnant for there to be several gods.

Secondly, the same is repugnant on the part of the operation of the divine Intellect, which the Doctor proves thus, and with him Bassolius in 1. dist. 2. q. 3: God must have an intellect of infinite perfection: but if there were several gods, neither of them would have an intellect of infinite perfection: therefore neither would be God. The major is established; for since God is an infinitely perfect being, above all he must have an intellect of infinite power and perfection in knowing, for knowledge is the greatest perfection of a spiritual being. The minor is proved: An intellect of infinite perfection must know all intelligible things in the most perfect manner in which they are knowable of themselves: but if there were several gods, for example two, of whom one, for the sake of greater clarity, may be called God the Father, and the other God the Son, neither of them could know any intelligible thing in the most perfect manner in which it is intelligible of itself, for indeed God the Father, for example, could not so know God the Son. The Doctor proves: In order that God the Father might know God the Son most perfectly, he would have to know him through the essence of God the Son himself: but he cannot know him so: therefore he would not know him most perfectly. The major is clear, for nothing is known most perfectly which is not known through its own essence, or through something else in which its essence is contained in a more perfect and nobler manner than in itself, namely, in the manner in which Theologians teach that creatures are and are known more perfectly in God than in themselves: but that God the Son, if he were given, would be knowable through his own essence, since he himself would so know himself, nor would there be anything in which his essence was contained in a more perfect manner than in itself, since it is supposed to be of infinite perfection, and consequently there is nothing which is more perfect than it: therefore he could not be known most perfectly by God the Father unless he were known through his essence. The minor also is evident, namely, that God the Father could not know God the Son through his essence: both because it would follow (says the Doctor) that the knowledge of God the Father would be posterior in nature to the essence of God the Son really distinct from him, for every knowledge really distinct from its object presupposes the object with at least a priority of nature, as the effect does the cause; for from the object and the potency every knowledge is begotten: and because (says Bassolius) God the Father would depend on God the Son in acquiring his knowledge, as on something extrinsic, and consequently would not be independent in the operation most proper to himself, such as knowledge is, and consequently would not be God.

You will reply that perhaps one God would know the other through his own essence, that is, through the essence of the knowing God himself, which would be altogether similar to the essence of the known God: or he would know him through some species representing the essence of the known God, by which consequently he would represent it most perfectly. — On the contrary: In this hypothesis (says the Doctor) the knowledge of the knowing God would not be most perfect, since a thing is not known as perfectly in something similar and representative as in itself, for intuitive knowledge is more perfect than abstractive knowledge: therefore if God the Father knew God the Son only by abstractive knowledge, namely, through his own essence or through a representative species of the essence of God the Son, his knowledge would not be most perfect, nor consequently would he be God.

Thirdly, finally, plurality is repugnant from the operation of the divine Will, which the Doctor thus proves in n. 3: The divine Will, since it is of infinite perfection, must be ordered and regulated, and therefore must love whatever is lovable as much as it is lovable: but if there were several gods, one could not love the other as much as he is lovable. It is proved: Either one would love the other infinitely, or not: if not, therefore his will would not be regulated, because since the other God is supposed infinitely perfect, he is infinitely lovable: if so, therefore he would love the other equally with himself, and consequently his love would not be ordered. For just as anyone by a natural weight inclines more toward his own preservation than toward that of another, so also he is bound to love himself more than another: but if one God loved another infinitely, he could not love himself more than the other, for in the infinite there is no more nor less: therefore if there were several gods, their will would be disordered, and consequently would not be divine: therefore they would not be gods. — Then, if there were several gods, either one would enjoy himself and the others at the same time, or he would use the others and enjoy himself; but neither can be said. Not the first, because then he would enjoy two adequately beatifying objects, for each of them, since it would be infinite good, would beatify adequately, and thus one would contribute to the beatitude of the other, and would not contribute: he would contribute indeed, because he would enjoy him; but he would not contribute, because with either of them removed, he would be no less blessed. Nor the second, because since one God is not ordered of himself to another as to an end, if one of them enjoyed the other, he would misuse him; and thus his will would not be ordered, nor consequently would he be God.

Finally, the third reason is sought from the dignity of the Godhead, which is chiefly threefold, according to the threefold respect which all creatures have toward God as toward their principle, moderator, and end, from whom they arise, by whom they are ruled, and to whom they are ordered.

For first it is established from the Physicists that for one and the same effect several total and adequate causes cannot be assigned, otherwise the cause would be total, as is supposed, and would not be, because for the production of the effect it would admit the consortium and activity of another cause: therefore neither can several first principles of all things be admitted. For either each of them would be the total principle, or not: not the first, because it implies that the same thing have several total causes: nor the second, otherwise it would not be God, since it would not have infinite power, but would admit the aid of another. Whence Lactantius rightly, in the book De vera sapientia, cap. 3.: If nature (he says) does not suffer that one man have several fathers, for from one they are procreated: therefore also to worship many gods is against nature, and against piety.

Secondly. It is clear from moral philosophy that several total and adequate ends cannot be admitted; for that end is called total to which all desirable things are referred. Therefore, where a man proposes to himself one God as his ultimate total end, it is necessary that he order and refer all other things to Him, and consequently he cannot propose another God to himself as a total end; otherwise the first God would be the total end, and would not be; He would be, indeed, by supposition; but He would not be, because the other gods would not be referred to Him. Thus from the dignity and notion of the total end only one God is necessarily to be admitted.

Thirdly. Finally, it is clear from politics that the monarchical government is the best of all: and hence it is to be attributed to God, the supreme moderator of all things:

Therefore God alone is the Lord of all, says St. Cyprian, in the book De vanitate Idolorum; for that sublimity cannot have a partner, since it alone holds all power and the divine dominion. Let us also borrow an example from earthly things. When ever did a partnership of rule either begin with good faith or end without bloodshed? Thus the brotherhood of the Thebans was broken, and the discord persisting upon the divided pyres even in death, and one kingdom does not hold the Roman twins, whom the single lodging of one womb received. Pompey and Caesar had been kinsmen, and yet the bond of their relationship did not hold against rival power. Nor should you wonder at this in man alone, since in this all nature agrees. There is one king among the bees, and one leader in the flocks, and one ruler in the herds. Much more is there one Ruler of the world, who commands whatever things exist by His word, disposes them by His reason, and brings them to completion by His power.

You will say 1. From the Apostle, primae ad Corinth. 8: There are many lords, and many gods: therefore there is not only one God. — I distinguish. That there are many true gods, I deny; fictitious ones, I concede. For all the gods of the Gentiles are demons, says the Royal Psalmist.

You will insist. Those are true gods who have the true characteristics of divinity: but the gods of the Gentiles have the true characteristics of divinity. Proof: There are chiefly three characteristics that make divinity known to us, namely, the working of miracles, according to that of Psal. 71.: who alone dost wonderful things; the sudden cure of infirmities, as is related in primo Regum cap. 2: The Lord killeth and maketh alive, He bringeth down to hell and bringeth back; and the foretelling of future things, according to that of Isaiae 41: Declare the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. But the gods of the Gentiles have wrought these three things, as is established by countless histories: therefore they are to be called true gods. — I deny the minor, and to the proofs I say that all those things which are narrated as done at the invocation of the false divinities were wrought by the native aid and power of the demons; of such a kind were those astonishing works brought forth by the two Vestals in sign and confirmation of their undefiled virginity, of whom one, by the name of Tuscia, held and carried water in a sieve, and the other, by the name of Claudia, could by her girdle move and bring to port a ship in the middle of the waters of the Tiber, in which a great stone sacred to the great Mother of the Gods was carried, a ship so stuck fast that it could be moved by no human strength. For these and similar things were brought forth by the demons under the name of the gods (says Tertullian) that stones might be believed to be divinities and the true God not sought after. In Apologetico c. 22.

— To the second proof I say that these cures of diseases by the false divinities were rather the demons' disturbing of one's rest than the driving away of illness; for first, says Tertullian in the same place, they harm, then they prescribe remedies that are new to the point of a miracle, or contrary ones, after which they cease to harm and are believed to have cured. Or as Octavius speaks in Minucius Felix: they feign diseases, terrify minds, torment limbs, that they may force men to worship them, and that, being fattened by the splendor of the altars or by the victims of flocks, once they have relaxed what they had bound, they may seem to have cured. — To the third proof I say that all those declarations of absent things, or notifications and predictions of future ones, were likewise made by the industry of the demons, who by their wonderful swiftness survey the world in a moment and can report what is done in the most remote regions. They can likewise, by the admirable subtlety of their genius, conjecture future events from the influence of the stars, the interpretation of the Scriptures, and the oracles of the Prophets.

Tertullian elegantly uncovers and lays open all these things in the same place:

Every spirit, he says, is winged; this is so of Angels and demons. Therefore in a moment they are everywhere. The whole world is one place to them; what is done everywhere they know as easily as they declare it. Their swiftness is believed to be divinity, because their substance is not known. They also cull even the dispositions of God, now gathering them while the presiding officers are composing them, and now snatching them while the readings resound; and so, taking from this source certain lots of the times, they emulate Divinity while they steal divination.

But with what skill they temper ambiguities in oracles toward the events, the Croesuses know, the Pyrrhuses know. For when Croesus had consulted the Oracle of Apollo, to which he was devoted, whether he should move war against the Persians, the Oracle answered, as Eusebius relates, lib. 3. De praeparatione Evangelica: If Croesus crosses the river Halys undaunted, He will destroy a great empire and a proud kingdom. Deceived by that ambiguity of the word 'destroy', Croesus declared war on the Persians, judging that the kingdom of the Persians was to be destroyed and laid waste by his own arms; but he himself lost his own kingdom of Lydia by the unhappy outcome of the war. Something similar happened to Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, who, when he had consulted the same Oracle whether, fighting against the Romans, he would escape, heard this ambiguous Oracle: I declare that you, son of Aeacus, can conquer the Romans. Whence it came about that Pyrrhus, animated by the hope of victory, fought against the Romans; but, conquered and prostrated by them, he learned the sense of the ambiguous Oracle by his own loss.

You will say 2. Whatever is better must be admitted, especially in divinity: but it is better that there be several gods than one only: therefore several gods must be admitted. The minor is proved. It is better that there be several goods than one only: but several gods are several goods: therefore it is better that there be several gods than one only. — I distinguish the major. If that which is thought to be better is possible and admissible, I concede. If it is impossible, I deny. But that there be several gods has been shown to be impossible more than enough. I likewise distinguish the proof of the minor: that several goods are better than one only, if that one does not contain in itself whatever perfection is found in the others, I concede; if it contains it, I deny. For although ten pounds of silver, v. gr., are several goods compared with one gold coin, yet they do not exceed it in price, because the gold coin contains in itself the value and price of those ten pounds: so, by parity, although several gods, if they were given, would be several goods, yet since the one God is infinitely perfect, and consequently contains in Himself whatever perfection would be found in the others, hence it comes about that it would not be better that there be several gods than one only.

You will say 3. with Marcion and the Manichaeans: There are to be admitted as many gods as there are first producers of things, supreme moderators, and ultimate ends: but those are at least two: therefore there are also two gods. The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proved: There are as many producers, moderators, and ends of things as there are wholly opposite effects, contrary laws, and perpetually different terms: but those are at least of two kinds and orders. The major is clear; for from opposite effects, laws, and perpetual terms, the diversity and distinction of the cause, ruler, and end is known. The minor is likewise established by experience itself and by Scripture; for bodies and spirits are opposite effects, whence there is a perpetual struggle between body and soul, according to that of St. Paul, Romanorum 7: For I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man: but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Likewise the divine laws are wholly opposite: for the Old and Mosaic law threatened nothing but severity, terror, and punishments; but the New and Evangelical law presents nothing but love, pardon, and mercy. Likewise two perpetual terms of rational creatures, namely beatitude and damnation, Heaven and Hell, happiness and gehenna. Therefore there must necessarily be admitted two producers of things, one of whom produced the evil corporeal and visible things, the other the good spiritual and invisible ones; likewise two rulers of the world, one of whom savors of vengeance and evils from his nature corrupted by malice, while the other is prone to love and mercy from his innate goodness; finally two ultimate ends, one of whom delights in tormenting and perpetually torturing human bodies, while the other is occupied in freeing, saving, and soothing with eternal delights the animals made to his own likeness. — I deny the minor, and to its first proof I say that the diversity of effects does indeed sometimes indicate the diversity of finite causes, whose virtue, since it is limited, is also determined to produce certain effects in such a way that it could not produce others: thus fire produces fire and not water; but it is otherwise with the divine power, which, since it is of infinite virtue and fecundity, can produce whatever effects, whether similar, disparate, or contrary; whence in the Creed God is rightly called the Creator of Heaven and Earth, of visible and invisible things. Add that if two first producers were to be assigned, one of whom should produce the corporeal and visible things, the other the spiritual things, and they could not be produced at once by a single one on account of their opposition, then also numberless producers of corporeal things would have to be assigned, since these are found not only disparate, but even properly opposed and contrary to one another, for example heat and cold, white and black, light and darkness; nay, different first craftsmen of the same human body will have to be assigned, for, says Tertullian, lib. 1. In Marcionem, cap. 16:

Diversity tempered man himself, as much in body as in sense: some members strong, others weak, some honorable, others dishonorable, some double, others single, some alike, others unlike. So too in sense, now joy, now anxiety, now love, now hatred, now anger, now gentleness, which is so ordered that this whole rival universe of condition is modulated among itself. Therefore now also visible things are owed to visible things, not to be assigned to another Author.

— To the second proof Tertullian himself also responds, lib. 2. cap. 4.

The law which you accuse, he says, which you twist in controversies, goodness dispensed, providing for man to which God he should adhere: lest he should seem not so much free as abject, to be placed on a level with his servants the other animals, released from God and free from the height: but that man alone might glory, because he alone had been worthy to receive the law from God.

But in order to show that the two laws, both the Old and the New, did not have different founders, he shows that whatever had been sketched in the one was fulfilled in the other, and the things which Marcion objected against the God, the Author of the Old Law, the same Tertullian at the end of this second book turns back against the artificer of the new law, so greatly celebrated by Marcion.

— To the third proof he likewise himself replies that justice and goodness, vengeance and indulgence, beatitude and damnation do not imply a diversity of gods, but rather prove unity; for, he says, lib. 2. cap. 12:

From the beginning the Creator proceeded equally as good and as just. His goodness wrought the world, His justice modulated it... The separations of His justice which were pronounced between light and darkness, between day and night, between Heaven and Earth, between the upper and lower water, between the sea and the mass of the dry land, between the greater and lesser lights, the diurnal and the nocturnal, between male and female, between the tree of the knowledge of death and of life, between the world and Paradise, between all the water-born and earth-born animals — as goodness conceived, so justice distinguished.

And in cap. 18., showing that in God, who is supremely good, severity is necessary, he says:

With so many allurements of evil assaulting the good, who would seek after that which he could despise with impunity? Who would guard what he could lose without danger? The way of slight evil is broad and far more frequented. Would not all slip into it if nothing in it were feared? We shudder at the terrible threats of the Creator and are scarcely torn away from evil; what if He threatened nothing? Will you call that justice evil, which does not favor evil? Will you deny that this is good, which looks out for the good? What kind of God would you wish Him to be; what kind would suit the wicked, under whom offenses would rejoice, whom the Devil would mock? Would you judge God to be good, who could make man worse by the security of sinning?

From this he concludes:

The justice of God is the fullness of divinity, showing God perfect both as Father and as Lord; as Father by clemency, as Lord by discipline; as Father by gentle power, as Lord by severe power; as Father to be loved piously, as Lord to be feared necessarily. To be loved, because He prefers mercy to sacrifice; and to be feared, because He wills not sin: to be loved, because He prefers the repentance of the sinner to death; and to be feared, because He wills sinners no longer repentant.

You will say 4. God can do more than the human intellect can think: but the human intellect, as is clear from the idolaters and the pagans, can think of several gods: therefore God can make several gods: but in divine things to be and to be able are the same: therefore in fact there are several gods. — The Seraphic Doctor answers in 1. dist. 2. art. 1. quaest. 1. that the pagans did not understand God according to His divine nobility; therefore it is no wonder that they thought of, or rather fancied, many gods; for the plurality of gods was a fiction of the human intellect. Whence to the argument I say that the intellect is twofold: namely, rational and phantastic. Of the first the objection is true, but not of the second; that is, if we think those things which are according to reason, then it is true that God can do more than we can think; for God does more things than we can think of, for God does many things which we cannot understand by natural reason, as is clear from the mysteries of our faith. If, however, we wish to think those things which occur to our phantasy and imagination, without doubt we can think more things than God can do, because we can think many absurd and unfitting things, which are said to be fancied rather than understood; but for God the least unfitting thing is impossible.

You will say 5. Great is the power which can do a great thing, greater that which can do a greater, greatest that which can do the greatest, and supreme that which can do the supreme; but the power of God is supreme: therefore it can produce the supreme: but this is God: therefore God can produce another. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that something can produce another in three ways: either from itself, or from something created, or from nothing. From Himself God can produce, and truly does produce, the supreme simply; for the divine Father generates the Son from His own substance: but He cannot produce another God on account of the simplicity of the divine nature. From another, or from nothing, God cannot produce the supreme simply, but in a genus: not on account of a defect of His power, but on account of a defect of the creature, which must of necessity be limited: and so He cannot produce another God.