Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

THREE things are proposed to be resolved in the present question. 1. Whether theology proceeds in a philosophical manner by inferring and proving conclusions from premises. 2. Since the truth of the theological conclusion depends on the truth of the premises, it is asked whether, when those principles are denied, the theologian can prove them by arguments: 3. Whether the theological habit, by which the intellect is directed to infer theological conclusions, makes it adhere to and give assent to the conclusion deduced from the premises, in such a way that, the premises being granted, the intellect cannot dissent from the conclusion; or whether this habit is only explicative and declarative of the truths of faith, as Aureolus held in q. 2. of the Prologue: which, that they may appear more evidently

Note 1. An argument is a discourse in which a less known proposition is inferred from a more known one; whether meanwhile that proposition is known by natural light or by supernatural light: whether it is evident or only certain. In an argument, moreover, there are three things: 1. The antecedent, and it is the proposition from which another is inferred. 2. The consequent, and it is the proposition which is inferred from another. 3. The consequence, in which the connection of the antecedent with the consequent is made. Furthermore, an argument requires a twofold judgment of the intellect; the first, by which it judges that the consequent has a necessary connection with the antecedent, and it is called the judgment of the consequent: the second, by which it judges that the consequent is legitimately inferred from the antecedent according to syllogistic rules, and it is named the judgment of the consequence. But the essence of an argument consists in the former judgment, not in the latter, as we have proved more than enough in Logica nostra.

Note 2. Something can be proved in two ways: namely, either through an extrinsic locus, when indeed the adversary concedes some proposition, from which, once conceded, another is inferred; thus, because the Jews admit the Old Testament and the Calvinists the New, from the Old Testament the theologian proves the incarnation of Christ against the Jews; and from the New he proves that the body of Christ is really in the Eucharist against the heretics denying it: or through an intrinsic locus: namely, through arguments sought from reason and natural light; which moreover is done either positively or negatively. The positive proof occurs when through some assumed medium the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject is shown in that which is affirmed; the negative, however, when it is opened up and established that there is no contradiction and repugnance in that which is affirmed. But this proof is more rightly called the solution of objections than the exhibition of reasons.

All, however, agree that the theologian can prove his principles through an extrinsic locus, as was just said. They likewise agree that those principles cannot be proved positively, since they are not known by natural light, but are believed by faith alone. Whence it remains to be discussed whether at least they can be proved evidently in a negative way.

Note 3. The premises are causes of the conclusion either in being, when the middle term is the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; thus, rational is the cause why risible belongs to man; or in knowing, when the medium leads into the knowledge of the union of the predicate with the subject; thus, risible indicates that rational belongs to man. Since, however, every cause virtually contains its effect, the premises virtually involve the conclusion; whence it happens that the assent of the premises virtually embraces the assent of the conclusion, so that he who has given assent to the premises cannot deny it to the conclusion, as the Doctor proves in 1. d. 1. q. 4. n. 16.

First conclusion. — Our theology is argumentative.

It is proved first indeed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, 2. ad Timotheum, 3: All Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching and for reproving; and likewise ad Titum 1: A bishop ought to be... holding fast the faithful word which is according to doctrine, so that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict. Moreover, Sap. 8. the wise man, and the theologian, knows the subtleties of discourses and the solutions of arguments.

Secondly, the same thing is clear by example; first indeed of Christ, the prince and parent of theologians, who frequently argued against the Scribes and Pharisees opposing him; thus Matth. 19. he proves the indissolubility of marriage from that passage of Genes. 2: For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and will cleave to his wife, and they will be two in one flesh, from which he infers: what therefore God has joined, let not man separate. Likewise cap. 22. from these words of Psal. 109. The Lord said to my Lord, he infers that the Messiah is not a pure man, nor only the son of David, but also God, in that David calls him Lord; which name the Pharisees conceded to be proper to God; and cap. 12. from Psalmo 8. and 117. he proves that he is the Messiah: for when the Pharisees and the Priests complained that the children in the temple were acclaiming him as the blessed of the Lord, he answered: Have you indeed never read that out of the mouth of infants and sucklings you have perfected praise?

Likewise the Apostles frequently argued, especially St. Paul, who almost everywhere constructs arguments in order to persuade the evangelical truths, but especially in 1. ad Corinth. c. 15., rising up against the Pseudo-Apostles who asserted that there would be no resurrection of the dead, he argues thus:

But if the resurrection of the dead is not: then neither has Christ risen: but if Christ has not risen, then our preaching is vain, and your faith is also vain; and we are found also false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony against God, that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise up, if the dead do not rise: for if the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; and if Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, for you are still in your sins: therefore also those who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished.

In this repeated argumentation, however, he assumes the resurrection of Christ as the medium for proving the resurrection of the other men, in that there is not required in God greater strength and power for raising the other dead than for raising Christ.

You will say 1. St. Ambrose in lib. 1. De Fide says: Take away arguments from here where faith is sought; but faith is sought to be strengthened and protected through theology. And in the last chapter of John: These things are written that you may believe. He does not say that you may dispute and argue. Whence Tertullian in lib. De praescript. cap. 7. says: We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel: when we believe, we desire to believe nothing further.

I answer. St. Ambrose there treats only of the assent of faith, which is supported not by human reason and natural arguments, but by the word of God, whence he adds: It is not believed by Philosophers, it is believed by fishermen, it is not believed by Dialecticians, it is believed by Publicans. For he acts there against the Arians, who attacked the divinity of Christ the Lord with many natural reasons. He does not, however, judge that every argumentation should be banished and removed from Christians, since he himself in the same place uses arguments drawn from Sacred Scripture against the Arians. In the same way satisfaction is made to the words of Tertullian, for he himself does not disapprove of argumentative doctrine, which he employs in all his writings; but he contends only that the mysteries of faith are not to be measured and investigated by natural reasons.

You will say 2. If theology is argumentative, it will argue either by authority or by reason: but neither can be said. Not by authority, because, says Boetius, the locus from authority is less efficacious and weak, and hence it does not suit the dignity and firmness of theology. Nor by reason, because this is opposed to the end of theology; for it empties the merit of faith; for as St. Gregory says: Faith has no merit, where human reason supplies proof.

I answer. Theology argues from authority, not indeed human and fallible, but divine and truthful, for it rests upon the revelation of God himself, to which it is repugnant that falsity be subject; but to argue from divine and infallible authority does not disgrace the dignity and firmness of theology. It likewise uses human reason as an extrinsic principle, so that natural reason serves faith, and illustrates it as far as possible.

Second conclusion. — Theology can argue, so as to prove positively that its principles are credible: not, however, so as to demonstrate that they are naturally possible.

This conclusion has two parts, of which the first

It is proved 1. That can be shown evidently credible which can be shown not to involve contradiction and repugnance, and which has valid and firm motives of credibility: but such is the case with the principles of theology; since all the arguments and all the contradictions which are wont to be urged against the articles of faith can be resolved; as in fact all the holy Fathers and the sacred Doctors resolved the entanglements urged by the Philosophers against the faith. Likewise many motives are supplied by which the articles of faith appear credible, of which sort are the miracles wrought in confirmation of the faith, the declaration and universal consensus of the visible Church, the sanctity of its doctrine and morals, the assent of the most learned in every age, etc.

Moreover, from St. Bonaventure, prooemial quaest. 2.: We ought to be ready to give a reason to everyone asking of the faith which is in us, says St. Peter in 1. Epist. cap. 3. Since, therefore, there are many who attack our faith, it is necessary that we establish it through reason in an inquisitive and argumentative manner.

Thirdly. From the same: The truths of our faith are not of a worse condition than other truths: but other truths have this, that they can be defended through reason, just as they can also be attacked: therefore the same is to be said of the truths of our faith.

Fourthly. From the same. Our faith is not now of a worse condition than in the beginning: but in the beginning, when it was attacked through the false miracles of the Magi, it was defended through the true miracles of the Saints: therefore, since it is now attacked through the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended through the true arguments of the Doctors.

The latter part likewise stands: since the mysteries of faith exceed the natural capacity of the human mind, natural reason can supply no medium by which those mysteries could be demonstrated to be naturally possible, which I establish thus: Those things which are demonstrated to be naturally possible are contained within the limits of nature and through a medium naturally known: but the principles of theology are not contained within the limits of nature, since they cannot be made by any natural agent; nor is there any medium naturally known that could establish them; for every medium by which the possibility of a thing is demonstrated must be intrinsic to the thing; and consequently the medium of a supernatural thing, such as the mysteries are, cannot be naturally known.

You will say 1. The mysteries of faith, which are the principles of theology, can be proved positively to be credible: therefore also to be possible. The consequence is clear, for nothing is credible unless it is likewise possible; because nothing is credible unless it is true, and nothing is true unless it is possible or existing; for the impossible, since it is not a being, is likewise not true, because truth is a property of being.

I deny the consequence. For although what is credible is also possible, it does not however follow from this that the possibility of the thing can be proved in the same way: it is proved through a medium extrinsic to the thing believed, for instance through the authority of the one speaking, miracles, etc.; but possibility must be proved through a medium intrinsic to the thing known, by which it is proved that the predicate can belong to the subject. Whence, although there are positive external media by which the credibility of the mysteries is proved, it does not follow that there are likewise positive intrinsic media, naturally known, by which their possibility is demonstrated.

You will say 2. The mysteries of faith can be proved not to be impossible: therefore they can be proved to be possible, because between being possible and being impossible no middle is given; and hence if a thing is not impossible, it follows that it is possible.

I deny the consequence. Likewise also its proof, since, as the Philosopher observes and warns, lib. De interpretatione, cap. 3., possible and impossible are not precisely contradictories, because each is affirmative. Then, although perhaps a parte rei nothing lies between a thing being possible and impossible; nevertheless between a thing being able to be demonstrated possible and being able to be demonstrated impossible there is given a middle, namely, not being able to be demonstrated possible, nor being able to be demonstrated impossible, namely while no urgent reasons appear by which the possibility or impossibility of the thing is established. And hence, although the mysteries of faith can be naturally proved not to be impossible, it does not follow that their being possible can be naturally demonstrated.

Third conclusion. — The theological habit is not only explicative of the articles of faith; but also illative and adhaesive.

It is proved first. If theology were only explicative of the Scriptures, as Aureolus holds, one would not arrive at theological knowledge through faith; rather, that knowledge itself would lead to faith as if by the hand: but this is false, for St. Augustine says in serm. 51. De verbis Domini: Receive thus, believe thus, that you may merit to understand: for faith ought to precede understanding, so that understanding may be the reward of faith; for the Prophet (Isaias, cap. I. according to the version of the 70) most openly said: Unless you believe, you will not understand.

Secondly. If theology were only explicative, any infidel, who gives no assent at all to theological propositions, could be a theologian; for if he had skill in the languages, and applied diligence in reading the Sacred Scriptures, he could explain them, and open their hidden sense; but it is false that he who does not have faith, nor assents to theological conclusions, can be called a theologian, as all admit: therefore etc.

Thirdly. The theological discourse proceeding from believed premises, duly disposed in form and syllogistic figure, generates and confirms a necessary conclusion: therefore it is necessary that the intellect, having given assent to the premises, also assent to the conclusion; because, as was said in the 3rd note, the assent of the conclusion is virtually contained in the assent of the premises, so that the intellect which assents to the premises cannot not consent to the conclusion; and hence it is necessary that the theological habit be adhaesive, and not only declarative of the Scriptures and expositive of the mysteries of faith.

You will say 1. From St. Augustine, lib. 14. De Trinitate, cap. 1., the theological habit is that by which faith is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened: but this is done through the mere literal exposition of Sacred Scripture, not through inference or argumentation. Proof: Through the knowledge of the conclusions the knowledge of the principles is not generated, nor through it is it defended, nourished, strengthened; rather, on the contrary, the knowledge of the conclusions is generated and strengthened through the knowledge of the principles: therefore faith is not generated by deduced conclusions; nor consequently is theology, ordered to generating and nourishing faith, occupied in inferring conclusions.

I answer. Theology indeed fulfills not only the office of science, by deducing and inferring conclusions from believed principles; but also sometimes performs and supplies the role of the habit of principles, insofar as it is occupied with the mysteries of faith which are its principles, namely that it illustrate, explain, and defend them, partly through the explicative knowledge of Scripture, partly through the knowledge of argumentation: but from this it does not follow that, once it has explained and grasped such principles, it cannot deduce conclusions from them.

You will say 2. The whole theology of the holy Fathers is engaged in the exposition of Sacred Scripture, whether they expound books expressly, or on occasion, disputing with heretics, they draw forth some texts from it, or they clarify the Sacred Scriptures twisted by heretics into a perverse sense: therefore the adequate office of theology is to unlock and expound the mysteries of faith hidden in Sacred Scripture.

It is confirmed. By the authority of St. Dionysius, in the book De divinis nominibus, cap. 1.: By no reason (he says) is it to be presumed to say or think anything about the supersubstantial and most secret Deity, beyond those things which the sacred utterances have handed down to us.

I answer. Indeed the holy Fathers were wont to use expository theology, yet they did not neglect the argumentative and illative one, as is clear from their writings, and as we proved in the third quaest. of the first art.

To St. Dionysius. I say that he understands by the sacred utterances not only Sacred Scripture, but also those things which have been deduced from the sacred letters, as another version of his work has it.

It is certain, however, that theology is occupied either in expounding Sacred Scripture, or in inferring from it conclusions for the clearer understanding and persuasion of the mysteries.