Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Three things are to be resolved in the present question. 1. Whether theological conclusions, and the assent given to them, is more certain than the assent which one gives to the natural and evident sciences. 2. Whether theological assent has the same certainty as the assent of faith. 3. Whether the theological act and habit is more worthy than the natural sciences.

Note 1. Philosophers commonly distinguish a threefold certainty: of object, of subject, and of motive. Certainty of object is the immobility and invariability of the thing in itself; which is twofold, namely the immutability of essence and of existence, which belongs to God alone, and the invariability of an essential proposition, by which there is a necessary connection of predicate with subject. And this in turn is either Metaphysical, by which a thing cannot be otherwise even by divine power, e.g. man is certainly a rational animal; or Physical, by which a proposition is at least naturally always true, e.g. every fire burns. Subjective certainty is the firm adherence of the intellect to some known object, which is thought to be true although it is not such; by which it happens that some adhere more firmly and tenaciously to a false proposition, which they think to be true: e.g. heretics, more firmly than others would adhere to a true one. Hence Arist. 7. Ethic. 3. says: There are those who believe their own opinion no less than others believe their own science. But this is better called obstinacy than certainty. Finally, certainty of motive is the infallible connection of the known means with the thing which is known. This connection, moreover, appears either through experience, of which kind is the certainty we have that every fire is hot: or from the evidence of natural light, of which kind is the certainty concerning first principles: or through a due inference from evident principles, of which kind is the certainty of a conclusion duly inferred from evident premises: or finally through the revelation of someone truthful, of which kind is the certainty of faith, which rests on the truthfulness of God revealing.

Note 2. from our Aureolus, q. 2. of the Prologue, art. 2., a threefold process and inference is made in Theology: for sometimes one proceeds to a conclusion known from elsewhere, as when it is asked whether God is one and infinite, for these things are evident through Metaphysics: but sometimes one proceeds to a conclusion to be believed, about which it has not yet been determined what is to be believed, as when it is asked whether the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son, if He did not proceed from Him: but sometimes to a conclusion already believed and determined, as when it is asked whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the truth of which the Church has already determined in the general Councils.

Note 3. From the same author, in the same place, that the second mode of inferring and proceeding can take place in four ways. 1. For a conclusion can be inferred from one believed proposition and another necessary one: e.g. Christ is a man, but man is a rational animal: therefore Christ is a rational animal; the first proposition is believed, and the second is necessary. 2. From two believed ones, e.g. Christ is blessed, but the blessed see God face to face: therefore, etc. 3. From one believed proposition and another probable one; e.g. Christ has a true body, but a true body has a substantial form distinct from the rational soul: therefore, etc. For the first proposition stands by faith: but the second is discussed and debated on both sides among the Scotists affirming and the Thomists denying and contending that in the human body, besides the rational soul, there is no other form than that of a cadaver.

4. From two probable ones, e.g.: The essence of quantity consists in the extension of parts in relation to one another: but Christ in the Eucharist has quantity: therefore also the extension of parts in relation to one another. Therefore, etc. It is certain, moreover, that from two probable premises, or from one believed and another probable one, only opinion is formed and generated; because the conclusion follows the lot of the premises, and especially the condition of the weaker premise; for a cause cannot bestow on its effect any perfection which it itself does not have; whence, since the premises are the cause of the conclusion, such will be the conclusion as is the less certain and less perfect premise. But whether from two believed propositions, or from one believed and another necessary one, supernatural faith is generated, as Aureolus holds in the same place; or whether there is generated a theological habit midway between faith and science, which is more certain than science, and less certain than faith, as the Doctor affirms in 3. d. 24. n. 20., this is to be resolved here.

First conclusion. — The theological conclusion, which is deduced either from two revealed and believed premises, or from one necessary and another revealed one, is more certain by certainty of object and of motive than any natural science; but not by certainty of subject. This conclusion has two parts, of which

Proof of the first. That knowledge is more certain by certainty of object and of motive which is borne toward a more immutable object, and through a firmer and more certain motive: but Theology is concerned with God, who has greater certainty and immobility and necessity of being than the objects of the natural sciences; it also tends toward Him through a means and motive firmer than the motives of the natural sciences; since it rests on revealed principles believed by divine faith, which certainly have far greater certainty than the principles known by natural light, on which the natural sciences are supported; for Christ says, Lucae 21: Heaven and earth will pass away; but my words will not pass away. Therefore, etc. Hence Augustine, 7. Confess. cap. 10: I heard, as one hears in the heart, and there was absolutely nothing from which I could doubt: and I would more readily doubt that I live, than that truth does not exist.

Second. Supernatural and divine certainty is far greater than any natural certainty: but theological knowledge has divine and supernatural certainty on the part of the object and of the motive; while the natural sciences have only natural certainty, and that from purely natural causes. Therefore the former is more certain than these.

Third. That which rests on the first and essential truth is more certain than that which is founded only on participated truth: but Theology rests on the first truth, namely the revelation of God; while the natural sciences rest on creatures, which have only participated truth: therefore, etc.

Fourth. Absolute and necessary certainty is greater and more excellent than contingent and hypothetical certainty: but the certainty of Theology is absolute and necessary on the part of the object, which it is impossible to change, and of the motive, to which it is repugnant that falsity underlie it; while the certainty of the natural sciences is hypothetical and contingent, since their existence and entity depend entirely on the free ordination of God. Therefore, etc.

The second part is also evident. First. That certainty is greater by reason of the subject by which the intellect excludes every movement of doubt: but experience shows that the intellect excludes absolutely every doubt while it assents to a conclusion evidently deduced from an evidently known principle, such as this one; e.g. The whole is greater than its part; but while it assents to a conclusion deduced from revealed principles, it sometimes suffers doubt and anxiety. For the firmness of the intellect assenting to a theological conclusion cannot be greater than when it assents by faith to an immediately revealed proposition: but when it assents by faith, it sometimes does not exclude every doubt; for the Doctor says in 3. d. 23. n. 15: Faith does not exclude every doubt, but the doubt drawing toward the opposite of the believable. This also the Lord Christ indicates while rebuking the Disciples, Matth. 8., He says: Why are you fearful, O you of little faith? And in cap. 14., addressing Peter: O you of little faith, why did you doubt? Therefore by reason of the subject, Theology is less certain than the natural sciences.

Second. That certainty is greater on the part of the subject which quiets and strengthens the intellect more, and is connatural and proportioned to it: but the certainty of the natural sciences, since it has evidence joined to it, quiets and satisfies the intellect more, and is more connatural to its way of operating, than the certainty of faith, which transcends the powers of the intellect and has obscurity joined to it. Whence it happens that the intellect must put off its natural mode of knowing, and as it were be deprived and stripped of its native privileges, while it gives assent to a revealed proposition. Hence St. Paul calls that assent the captivity of the intellect, 2. Corinth. 10: Leading every intellect captive into the obedience of Christ. Therefore, etc.

You will object 1. against the first part: A habit which is certain in every respect is to be called simply more certain than one which suffers uncertainty in some part of itself: but the habit of natural science is certain in every respect, namely of object, subject and motive; while the habit of Theology is indeed always certain on the part of object and motive; but for the most part uncertain on the part of subject: therefore the latter is less certain than the former.

I distinguish the major. it is more certain in itself, I deny; in relation to us, I concede. And so the certainty of a habit (as has been said) can be considered in two ways; either as to itself and according to the infallibility of object and motive; or as to us and according to the facility and firmness of the assent toward which our intellect inclines. In the former way, a habit is the more certain and firmer the more the object and motive are infallible and necessary. In the latter, however, beyond the infallibility of the object, it is also required that such certainty be more proportioned and connatural to our intellect, and that the intellect be more quieted in that assent and exclude natural doubt and hesitation; which is indeed brought about through the scientific habit on account of its natural evidence. Whence this habit is more certain than the theological habit in relation to us, on account of the weakness of our intellect, which adheres more to an evident proposition, and on account of the natural motive, than on account of the supernatural motive; not that the latter is less certain than the former, but because it is not equally connatural.

You will say 2. That which is the cause of the certainty of the theological conclusion is more certain than the conclusion itself: but natural principles, and the conclusions of the natural sciences, are often causes of the certainty of the theological conclusion: therefore these are more certain. The major is evident from that philosophical maxim: That because of which each thing is such, is itself more so. The minor is also evident, for in a theological demonstration often one of the premises is scientific and known by natural light alone.

I distinguish the major. An adequate cause, I concede: but an inadequate one, I deny: and with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. For the natural premise is only an inadequate cause of the theological conclusion; and it becomes an adequate cause of it insofar as it is joined to the other revealed premise, which since it is more certain than every scientific conclusion, also confers greater certainty on the theological conclusion than that scientific and natural premise would confer.

You will insist. From what has been said in the proof of the preceding conclusion, and from the common axiom of the Dialecticians, The conclusion always follows the weaker premise: therefore where one premise in the theological discourse is natural, the certainty of the conclusion must also be natural, and consequently it is not more certain than the natural sciences; nay, it is less certain, since it lacks evidence.

The Authors commonly respond to this objection that the aforesaid axiom is true when the two premises are of the same order and influence the assent to the conclusion equally: but in the theological discourse, they say, only the revealed premise is the cause of the assent to the conclusion; since the conclusion is resolved into it alone; while the natural premise seems only an applicative and explicative condition of the revealed premise and of the supernatural principle, so that the intellect may give assent to the conclusion with greater facility.

But since from this reply it seems to follow that an opinative and probable premise, together with another premise of faith, would have supernatural certainty: and likewise that the assent to the theological conclusion would be the same as the assent to a proposition of faith, which the following conclusion will show to be plainly false, therefore others respond that the conclusion follows the weaker part in those premises which exclude the partnership of the other, so that if one proposition is negative, the conclusion must also be negative, because it cannot be partly affirmative and partly negative; similarly if one premise is particular, the conclusion must also be particular, because it cannot be at the same time particular and universal; for the reason that the particular and the universal fight with one another, and one does not admit the partnership of the other. But in those premises which do not exclude the partnership of the other, the conclusion should not participate more in the weaker proposition than in the more certain and more valid one, from which it is drawn: but it is evident that natural light does not exclude the partnership of the light of faith as to causing the theological conclusion: therefore it is not necessary that the theological conclusion follow the less certain proposition.

I answer. with our Smising, qu. 1. n. 115., that for the truth of the aforesaid axiom it suffices that the conclusion does not equal the perfection of the nobler and more valid premise, but it is not necessary that the conclusion be as imperfect as the premise of lesser perfection. For just as in natural things, a mule born from a horse and a she-ass is indeed more imperfect than the horse, although it is more perfect than the she-ass; so (if we may sketch spiritual things from these cruder shadows) we can say that the theological assent caused by a revealed premise and by another evident one is indeed less certain than the revealed one: but on account of the partnership with the revealed one, it is more certain than the evident natural premise; and so the theological conclusion deduced from them is more certain than any natural science.

You will say 3. The certainty of the theological conclusion does not arise immediately from the revealed premise, but only through the discourse by which it is deduced from such a premise: but the discourse is not more certain in Theology than in the natural sciences; since it rests on the same natural light and the same rules of the syllogism: therefore neither will the theological conclusion be more certain than the others.

I distinguish the minor. The theological discourse is the same as the scientific one, as to form and method, I concede: as to the matter and the things about which it treats, I deny: for since the matter of the theological discourse is far more certain than the matter of the natural sciences on account of the revealed premises, it comes about that the theological conclusion is also more certain than the others: just as among the sciences themselves, although the mode of discoursing is the same, yet since the matter of one science is more certain and more necessary than the matter of another, it also comes about that one science is more certain than another.

You will say 4. If theological knowledge is more certain than the natural sciences, it follows equally that it is more certain than the assent to the first principles, especially this one: Anything either is or is not, and the other: The first truth can neither deceive nor be deceived: but this cannot be said; since the revealed premises rest on these two principles, and consequently are less certain than them, because that because of which each thing is such, is itself more so.

I deny the minor. For the revealed premises, insofar as they are revealed, are more certain than any first principle, nor are they supported by any discourse: for it must be known that by the same act by which one assents to some proposition through faith, by the same one dissents from the opposite proposition; and so by the very fact that something is proposed as it is, its opposite is at the same time proposed not to be; wherefore this proposition: Everything is, or is not, is contained in the revealed propositions, and is revealed virtually in those articles which are proposed as existing.

Likewise, the same faith which moves us to believe something on account of the first infallible truth, consequently moves us to believe that there exists a first infallible truth.

Second conclusion. — The theological assent is less certain than the assent of faith.

This is the teaching of the Doctor in many places, especially in 3. dist. 24. quaest. unica, n. 16. and 20.

Proof first. From Aristotle 1. Posteriorum, the certainty of the assent to a conclusion nowhere equals the certainty of the premises, because that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so: but a theological conclusion is certain only on account of the premises, one of which is of faith: therefore the premises of a theological conclusion are by that very fact more certain.

Secondly. The motive of certainty is not equal in the theological assent and in the assent of faith: therefore the latter is more certain than the former. The antecedent is proved: The motive of the assent of faith is pure and immediate divine revelation without any reasoning; the motive, however, for assenting to a theological conclusion is only mediated, virtual and complex revelation, that is, one involving natural reasoning: but pure and immediate revelation is far more certain than that which is known only mediately through reasoning. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. No theologian gives as firm an assent to theological conclusions as to propositions of faith, as is evident to everyone: therefore the two assents are not of equal certainty.

Fourthly. The theological assent cannot be of equal certainty with the assent of faith, unless it proceeds from the habit of faith: but it does not proceed from it: therefore it is not of equal certainty with it. The major is certain: for either the habit of faith should move one to this equally certain assent, or some other habit which would have the same or an equal certainty with the habit of faith: but no such other habit is given which is of equal certainty with the habit of faith: therefore it would be necessary that the theological assent proceed from the habit of faith. The minor is proved: the theological habit is distinct from the habit of faith: therefore the theological assent does not proceed from the habit of faith. The consequence is evident, because the theological assent is made only by an intellect informed by the theological habit.

The antecedent is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, book 14. De Trinit. cap. 1., where, after having said that by the theological habit faith is generated, nourished, defended and strengthened, he adds:

Many of the faithful do not abound in this knowledge, although they abound greatly in faith itself: for it is one thing to know merely what a man ought to believe in order to obtain the blessed life, which is none other than eternal; but it is another thing to know how this very same thing both helps the devout and is defended against the impious.

Whence the Doctor, in the cited place n. 20., weighing these words of St. Augustine, says:

I say that the simple believe implicitly all things which the Church believes, and neither know how to explain nor to defend the faith; those same ones who do not know have a habit distinct from faith, but not by another light than faith: Nor does that habit rest upon principles evidently known in some light: Yet many of the faithful do not abound in this habit, because that habit is distinct from faith; it is not, however, science as described by the Philosopher.

From these things it is evident how wrongly some affirm that the Doctor asserts that the habit of faith is the same as the theological habit.

You will say 1. That proposition is of equal certainty with faith, such that whoever denies it is a heretic: but whoever denies a proposition deduced from the principles of faith is a heretic: therefore etc. The minor is proved: The Monothelites were condemned in the sixth Council for this reason, that they denied that there are two wills in Christ: but that there are two wills in Christ is gathered and established only through this theological reasoning: Where there are two intellectual natures, there are two wills; but in Christ there are two intellectual natures, namely the divine and the human: therefore also two wills. And hence whoever denies a theological conclusion is a heretic.

I distinguish the minor. Whoever denies a theological conclusion precisely as it is theological, that is, insofar as it is inferred through theological reasoning, is a heretic, I deny; insofar as that proposition which he denies is also immediately revealed, I concede. But to the proof I say that it is equally immediately revealed that there are two wills in Christ, as it is immediately revealed that there are in him two natures, divine and human; because it is impossible for an intellectual nature to be severed from its intellect and its will, since it is called intellectual and free from intellect and will.

Whence the Monothelites were rightly condemned as heretics, not because they denied a theological conclusion; but because they refused to admit a proposition that was immediately, at least implicitly, revealed.

But in order that all those things which can be objected against this conclusion may be solved without difficulty

Note 1. With our Smising, q. 1. n. 16., a theological conclusion can be considered: either insofar as it is inferred through reasoning, and thus it is not of faith, nor would one who denied it be a heretic: or insofar as it is also immediately revealed, and thus it is to be called a proposition of faith, not however a theological conclusion: or insofar as it is contained in a revealed proposition, so that it is apprehended as altogether the same with it, e.g., if someone, having heard this syllogism: Every supposit having a twofold spiritual nature has two wills; but the supposit of Christ has a twofold spiritual nature: therefore two wills. If someone (I say) apprehends these two propositions, to have a twofold nature, and to have two wills, as one connected thing, and attributes that connected thing to Christ, he will believe that there are two wills in Christ, with the same faith by which he believes that there are in him two natures, although the connection of those two propositions appears to him through reasoning. But if he judges those propositions to be distinct, and conceives that it is one thing to have two natures, and another to have two wills, and infers this latter proposition from the former only by the light of natural reasoning, then if he denies it, he will not be a heretic, because he considers that proposition not as immediately revealed, but only as inferred from a revealed one.

Note 2. One proposition can be deduced from premises in two ways: 1. By way of persuasion, when the reasoning is not so much illative as explicative of terms. E.g., if someone inferred that since Christ is a true man, consequently he is a rational animal, in this way: Every man is a rational animal: Christ is a man: therefore he is a rational animal: for since man and rational animal are formally the same, this conclusion is regarded not so much as an inference as an exposition of terms. 2. By way of inference, when the conclusion is inferred from an ordered connection of the premises. E.g., if someone inferred that Christ is capable of laughter from the fact that he is a man, and every man is capable of laughter; for although risibility is really identified with man, it is not however formally identified; for it is a property formally distinct from the essence of man. The first conclusion would be of faith; the second, however, not.

Third conclusion. — Our theology is more worthy than any natural science.

This conclusion is plainly evident; both because theology regards a more excellent object, namely divine and supernatural things which by their dignity transcend reason; the other sciences, however, are occupied with natural things and with those which are subject to reason: and because it has greater certainty; for the other sciences borrow their certainty from natural light alone, which is often liable to error; theology, however, rests upon the first truth, which can neither be deceived nor deceive: and finally because the other sciences serve it as handmaids, and it uses them to disclose, confirm and commend its own truths. Whence Prov. 9. it is said of this divine wisdom, that it sent its handmaids to call to the citadel.

You will say 1. Evidence is a perfection of science: and hence the more evident the sciences will be, the more perfect they will be: but the natural sciences are more evident than theology: therefore also more perfect.

I distinguish the major. Evidence is a perfection of science in a certain respect and in order to a greater perfection, I concede: simply and absolutely, I deny. For evidence is ordered to certainty, which is the greatest perfection of science, whence the more certain a science will be, the more perfect it will be: but it is established that theology is more certain than the other sciences: therefore also more excellent.

You will say 2. That science is more excellent which attains its object in a more perfect way; but the natural sciences attain their object in a more perfect way than theology: for they uncover and lay open the nature of their object and all its parts and properties; this one, however, perceives scarcely anything of the nature of its object: therefore it is more imperfect than they.

I distinguish the major. If it beholds a more excellent or an equally worthy object, I concede: if a less perfect one, I deny: theology, however, considers a more excellent object than the natural sciences: But it is nobler to attain a little of the nobler subjects, than much of others; as from Aristotle 2. De animalibus, the Doctor reports in 3. dist. 23. at the end. With this agrees D. Thomas, quaest. 1. of the Prologue, article 5., saying: The least that can be had of the knowledge of the most exalted things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge which is had of the least things.

Or I say with the same Doctor in the same place, that the dignity of an act can be considered either absolutely and in itself; or relatively and according to the attainment of the object about which it is engaged. In the former way, theological knowledge is nobler than philosophical knowledge, because it arises from more sublime principles and is occupied with a nobler object: in the latter way, however, philosophical knowledge can be said to be more perfect, because it attains and comprehends its object more perfectly. Just as, e.g., the vision of the sun by the eagle is said to be in itself more perfect than the vision of a candle by my eye; because the former is from a more perfect and keener power and is about a more excellent object: the latter, however, is said to be more perfect according to attainment, because my eye is more proportioned to its object, namely the candle, and comprehends its object better by sight, than the eye of the eagle is proportioned to the sun.