Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Since all knowledge can be obtained in two ways, namely either by infusion, which is an action of God producing something without our cooperation, such as is the knowledge of faith; or by study and practice, such as are the kinds of knowledge of the arts and the natural sciences; and since Theology depends on the supernatural principles of faith, hence it is rightly asked whether it is in us supernatural.

Note 1. According to the Doctor, q. 1. of the Prologue n. 20., something can be said to be supernatural in two ways: namely, either with respect to entity or with respect to mode. That is said to be supernatural as to entity which by its own nature transcends and exceeds the perfection of all natural things that agree with it in the same generic notion, and cannot be produced by an agent according to that agent's innate and natural power; in which manner the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, grace both actual and habitual, are said to be supernatural as to entity, because by their own nature they exceed the perfection of any natural agent, nor can they be caused, nor acquired, by a man operating according to his innate power.

That, however, is said to be supernatural as to mode which does not entirely exceed the natural perfection of the things that are of the same kind, and could be obtained by natural power, but not with so great facility, nor in so short a time; in which manner would be the infusion of philosophical science into a man who could otherwise attain it by study and practice.

Hence it appears how shamefully they hallucinate who accuse the Doctor of error, as if he had not admitted that some form is supernatural intrinsically and as to entity, but only extrinsically and by relation to the agent producing it: for he openly teaches the contrary both in the aforementioned place and in several others which the Scholiast cites on the aforementioned passage.

Note 2. From the same source, ibidem, the naturalness and supernaturalness of things can be detected and known through the relation which a potency bears either to the Form or to the Agent: for a receptive potency can be compared either to the act and form which it receives, or to the agent from which it receives. If it is compared to the act, or to the form, either it has a natural inclination toward it, as fire toward heat, and thus the potency and the form are said to be natural; or it has a natural repugnance and opposition to the form, as water to heat, and the form and the potency are said to be violent; or it has an indifference toward the form and its opposite, as a wall toward whiteness and blackness, and thus the potency and the form are said to be neutral.

Hence the Doctor gathers that no form is said to be supernatural by order to potency, since through this relation it is only either natural or neutral.

But it is otherwise if it is compared to the agent; for either the agent has a natural power of producing the form, v. g. the heat of fire, and thus the form is said to be natural, inasmuch as natural is opposed to supernatural; or there is no natural power which could produce such a form, e.g. grace, and thus that form is said to be supernatural. Hence the naturalness of a form is taken from two things, namely on the part of the potency having a natural inclination toward the form, and on the part of the agent having a natural productive power of such a form. But the supernatural is detected only on the part of the supernatural agent.

Note 3. The principles of Theology (namely the Articles of faith from which theological conclusions are drawn) can be regarded in two ways. First, indeed, in themselves and insofar as they are absolutely true by reason of the order which they bear to the first truth revealing. Second, insofar as they bear an order to the conclusions which are deduced from them by means of discourse, and insofar as they virtually contain them, or are contained in them. In the former way those principles are said to be formally revealed and pertain to faith: in the latter, however, they are said to be virtually revealed, or revealing the theological conclusions which are elicited from them, or are resolved into them.

These things having been premised, it must be resolved whether the theological habit inclining to elicit theological conclusions from the articles of faith is supernatural or not. Regarding this resolution the opinion of the Authors is twofold. For some, with Molina, Disp. 1. art. 2., teach that every theological conclusion is simply supernatural, and consequently the habit inclining to elicit them, for the reason that those conclusions are inferred from at least one of the premises known by the supernatural light of faith. Others, however, commonly maintain that theological conclusions are merely natural, whether meanwhile they are deduced from a double premise of faith, or from only one; whence they infer that the theological habit inclining to elicit them is likewise merely natural. Whoever they may be.

First conclusion. — The habit of Theology is not intrinsically and entitatively supernatural. This is the more common and truer opinion.

Proof 1. That habit is not intrinsically supernatural which is acquired by our acts and studies: but the habit of Theology is acquired by our exercises and studies: therefore it is not intrinsically and entitatively supernatural. The major is evident from Note 2: for that is not supernatural which does not exceed the activity and native powers of the agent. But what is acquired by our exercises does not exceed our innate powers, hence it cannot be called supernatural. The minor is clear from experience itself, by which it is established that the manner of acquiring Theology is not devotion and prayer, by which men are wont to prepare themselves for attaining supernatural habits; but the greatest study and assiduous practice are needed, and the aid of the natural sciences, especially Philosophy, for anyone to be able to become a skilled Theologian. Hence we see that those who devote assiduous labor to theological matters at length attain its habit, and acquire for themselves a facility for discoursing on the things of faith and explaining them; while those who indulge only in prayer, and despise studies and exercises of this kind, remain empty and void of theological matters.

Proof 2., and the prior reason is confirmed. That habit would be supernatural insofar as it would be made by the actual theological cognition, which is supernatural: but from that it cannot be supernatural; both because it is false that actual Theology is supernatural, as will appear in the second conclusion; and because even if that actual theological knowledge were supernatural, it would not nevertheless beget a supernatural habit: since the acts of faith, which are supernatural in entity, beget a merely natural habit in him who more often elicits such acts, as will be proved in Tractatu de Virtutibus Theologicis, and as is evident from the very experience of those who fall into heresy, for although they lose the supernatural habit of faith, nonetheless they keep the prior facility of believing the other articles, about which there is no controversy between them and Catholics. This facility, however, proceeds from nothing other than an acquired and merely natural habit of believing, generated by the various supernatural acts of faith, and still persisting after the loss of faith: therefore even if actual Theology were supernatural, it would not nevertheless produce a supernatural habit.

Thirdly. That habit is purely natural whose specifying formal notion is merely natural: but the specifying formal notion of the theological habit is merely natural: therefore also the habit of Theology. The major is evident; for such is the entity of a thing as is its constitutive notion distinguishing and specifying it from others.

Proof of the minor. The notion specifying and distinguishing our Theology from the Theology of God and from faith is discourse: but discourse in the wayfaring Theologian is purely natural, since it is the offspring of the agent intellect according to its natural power; for to discourse is the natural power and property of the intellect.

Fourthly. That habit is not supernatural and infused which can concur to a false assent; for who would say that God infuses a habit which inclines to error and falsity? But the habit of Theology can incline the intellect to a false assent; for since several opposed conclusions are inferred from the same principles of faith, not only by Heretics and Catholics, but even by the faithful Theologians themselves, who for the most part fight among themselves with contrary opinions, it is necessary that one or the other of those opposed conclusions be false; and consequently the theological habit which inclines to eliciting them leads to the false.

Fifthly and finally, that habit is merely natural which is obtained in the same way as other merely natural sciences and kinds of knowledge: but the habit of Theology is acquired in this way, namely through the precepts and teaching of some master teaching, and through the study and labor of the disciple and student: therefore, etc.

The adversaries reply. Study and teaching are indeed required for obtaining the habit of Theology, not as its productive causes, but as conditions and dispositions by which the subject is prepared for the infusion of that habit; just as by way of analogy the will is prepared through various acts for the infusion and reception of sanctifying grace; which preparation does not prevent sanctifying grace from being an intrinsically supernatural habit.

On the contrary. If those acts were required as dispositions, most of all either as moving or removing dispositions, that is, either as

they would move God to the infusion of the habit itself; or as disposing the subject for that infusion by removing those things which would be contrary to this infusion: but neither can be said; not indeed the first, for it is certain that God is moved to this infusion more efficaciously by prayers, fasts, alms, etc. than by study and labor; for those works of piety are more acceptable to Him than any study; yet those who apply themselves more to these works of piety are not on that account more perfect Theologians. Moreover, if such exercises and studies moved God to the infusion of the theological habit, that would be chiefly on account of some pact and promise on His part, just as happens in the Sacraments: but no similar pact, and no such promise, is found in Sacred Scripture: indeed, as often as science is proposed to be acquired, so often is the labor to be undergone imposed, for he who added science added also labor, says Solomon. Eccl. 1.

Not the second either: for just as no natural dispositions are required for the infusion of the other supernatural habits, so neither would they be required for the infusion of the theological habit. Moreover, dispositions must be of the same order as the form to which they dispose: whence Theologians infer that man cannot dispose himself proximately for the reception of first grace, but that it is infused by God out of mercy: therefore if Theology is supernatural in entity, no one will be able to dispose himself to it through natural studies and works.

You will say 1. from St. James 1: If anyone lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly and does not reproach, and it will be given to him. Likewise Eccli. 1: God pours out wisdom upon all his works, and upon all flesh according to his gift, and has given it to those who love him: therefore Theology, since it is true wisdom, is infused and given by God.

I deny the consequence. For those sacred Texts are not to be understood of the wisdom which is taught and learned by study, and which deduces conclusions from the articles of faith; but of the wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, by which heavenly and divine things taste sweet to us through their mystical speculation and contemplation, and which God sometimes bestows upon those who fear Him out of His good will. We are speaking of the former acceptation of wisdom, not of the latter.

You will say 2. That science is supernatural whose certainty is supernatural: but the certainty of Theology is supernatural: therefore that also. The major is evident; for science is such as is its difference; but certainty is the difference by which science is distinguished essentially from error and opinion; and hence if this is supernatural, that also will be. The minor is likewise evident; for that certainty is supernatural which rests on a supernatural principle, and is greater than every natural certainty; but the certainty of Theology is such: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. Of that whose certainty is supernatural formally and immediately, I concede: only remotely and illatively or resolutively, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. I say therefore that just as the theological assent does not rest immediately on a supernatural principle, but only mediately and through inference or resolution, namely through the natural discourse by which the theological conclusions are inferred from the articles of faith and resolved into them; so its certainty is not supernatural except radically and remotely, insofar namely as through discourse the theological conclusions are resolved into supernatural principles, namely into the articles of faith; just as through the same discourse those conclusions are inferred from those articles. This, however, suffices for the certainty of Theology to be firmer than the certainty of the natural sciences is, although it is not equally firm as the immediately supernatural certainty of faith; because the natural sciences are resolved neither mediately nor immediately into supernaturally certain principles, but only into naturally certain ones.

You will say 3. Sciences are specified by their principles: but the principles of Theology are supernatural: therefore also Theology.

I distinguish the major. Sciences are specified by intrinsic, immediate and proximate principles, I concede: by ultimate and remote ones, I deny: otherwise the subalternate sciences would be specified by the principles of the subalternating ones, because they are resolved into them, and are drawn from their principles; which, however, is false, otherwise the subalternate ones would not differ from the subalternating ones. And in like manner the minor is to be distinguished, and the consequence denied.

Or I distinguish the minor. The principles of Theology are supernatural as to entity, I concede: as to use and application, I deny. They are indeed supernatural as to entity, because they are Articles of faith; but they are natural as to application, because they are not applied, nor ordered among themselves and in order to inferring a conclusion, except through theological discourse; that discourse, however, is natural; and hence also the use and application of the principles is natural.

Second conclusion. — Actual Theology, that is, the actual inference of a theological conclusion from its principles, is not supernatural.

Proof first. It would be supernatural insofar as it would be formed and depend intrinsically on a supernatural principle, namely on the habit or act of infused faith: but from that it cannot be said to be intrinsically supernatural. Proof: Neither the habit nor the act of faith concurs efficiently and physically to forming the theological conclusion, just as neither do the premises concur physically to the philosophical conclusion, but the intellect alone is its artisan: therefore the theological act does not depend intrinsically, nor is it formed by the act or habit of faith as by supernatural causes; and thus from that it is not supernatural.

Secondly. Although it would depend physically on the act of infused faith, it should not on that account be said to be intrinsically supernatural; because the acquired habit of faith, generated by the act of infused faith, is not supernatural, as was said above (2. prob. Concl. 1.) although it is formed by that supernatural act: therefore by parity, even if the act of Theology were caused efficiently and physically by the act of faith, it would not from that be intrinsically supernatural.

Thirdly. The theological conclusion is for the most part formed from two premises, of which one is revealed and supernatural: the other philosophical and natural. Therefore, since it always follows the lot of the weaker premise, it cannot from that be said to be supernatural.

Fourthly. That actual knowledge is not supernatural which is formed by a potency and an intellect natural insofar as it is natural: but actual Theology is made in this way. Proof: That act is formed by the intellect insofar as it is natural which is the more perfect the more perfect and perspicacious the intellect eliciting it is: but such is theological knowledge; for it is established that those who have a sharper intellect become more skilled Theologians, and reason more subtly about the mysteries of faith, than those who have been allotted a less subtle mind: therefore, etc.

You will perhaps reply. that this arises from the fact that that intellect is elevated through habitual faith: so that just as the more vigorous intellect of the Blessed, with equal light of glory, sees God more clearly than another would see who had equal light, but unequal activity; so by way of analogy the more vigorous intellect of the wayfarer, equipped with the habit of faith, discourses about things more subtly than another.

On the contrary. The intellect of the Blessed which is of lesser natural activity, but has more of the light of glory, beholds God more clearly than one who would have greater natural activity and less light of glory: therefore, for the reply to stand and the parity to hold, it would be necessary that those who have a more abundant and more perfect faith would also have a greater facility for discoursing on divine and theological matters; but experience testifies that this is false; for from a more perfect and greater habit of faith a greater capacity for explaining and perceiving theological matters is not gathered; for many unlettered and uneducated persons for the most part obtain a more perfect faith than the more skilled and more learned: therefore, etc.

You will say. Every act which has a supernatural object is supernatural; for habits are specified by acts, and acts by the object: but theological acts have a supernatural object, since they are concerned either with God, or with the mysteries of faith, which are supernatural both in entity and in the mode of cognition, since they become known through the light of faith: therefore they are supernatural.

I distinguish the major. If the act is concerned with a supernatural object insofar as it is supernatural, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But the act of Theology is not concerned with God nor with the mysteries of faith precisely insofar as they are supernatural, but as certain; and Theology, regarding the articles of faith as its principles, does not consider in them precisely the notion of supernaturalness, but of certainty, so as to infer from them a certain conclusion. Hence if those articles could have that certainty, which they have through the supernatural light of faith, through a light which would be natural, Theology would elicit its conclusions from them no less: therefore, since it is per accidens that the object of Theology is supernatural, it does not from that follow that its act is supernatural, since it does not regard the object insofar as it is supernatural.

You will insist. The act of faith is not terminated at its object precisely as supernatural either, but only as certain; nor is it on that account any less intrinsically supernatural: therefore by parity, although the theological act does not regard its object precisely as supernatural, it will be no less supernatural.

I deny the antecedent. For although the act of faith is not explicitly terminated at the supernaturalness of its object; nevertheless it regards it at least implicitly, because since the object of faith can in no way be attained by the powers of nature, it is necessary that faith regard it insofar as it is supernatural. But it is otherwise with Theology, which, since it supposes that object already known through faith, does not attend in it to the supernaturalness, but only to the certainty, so as to infer its conclusions from it. These things will be revealed more evidently.