Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Note 1. That science is said to be speculative which rests in the simple and naked contemplation of its object, and is not ordered to directing another faculty of the intellect in eliciting its acts: while that is practical by which the intellect is instructed and illumined, so as to direct the other faculties proceeding from itself, in their operations which are truly called practices. Praxis, moreover, is a Greek word, signifying in Latin the same as operation: hence, just as potency is twofold, namely Effective and Affective, so likewise a twofold praxis is commonly distinguished. The former is the operation of the effective and corporeal potency or faculty, which can produce some external and sensible work: the latter, however, is the operation of the appetitive faculty, which, since it is twofold, the one corporeal and called the sensitive Appetite, the other spiritual and named the rational Appetite or will, is likewise called a twofold practical operation, namely Rational and Animal.

Note 2. As regards the operation which is truly praxis, the Subtle Doctor, q. 4. of the Prologue n. 3., requires three conditions. First, that it be an operation of the appetitive or effective faculty, not of the intellective. Second, that that act presuppose a knowledge of the object to which it is ordered. Third, that it be directable and ordainable to moral good, if it is an act of the appetitive faculty; or to artificial good, if it is an act of the effective faculty. Whence every knowledge is called practical which is ordered to directing the faculty, whether Affective or Effective.

Note 3. That some perfection can be found in a subject in either of these three ways: namely, either formally only, as heat is in hot water; or virtually only, as heat is in the sun, which although it is not hot, is nevertheless calefactive; or formally and virtually at once, as heat is in fire, which from its innate virtue is at once hot and calefactive.

Hence there is especially a threefold opinion among the weightier authors concerning the resolution of the present question; for some, with St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 1. art. 4., judge our theology to be formally partly speculative and partly practical, more however speculative than practical: not a few, with Henry in the Summa art. 9., judge it to be purely and absolutely speculative. The rest, however, with the Subtle Doctor, quaest. 4. of the Prologue n. 32., contend that it is simply practical. In order that we may embrace and defend this opinion, and attack and overthrow the others, let there be

First conclusion. — Our theology is not at once speculative and practical.

Proof. It is impossible for two opposite dividing differences of a genus, or their properties taking the place of differences, to be found in the same thing at once: but the speculative and the practical are essential differences dividing science, or at least properties consequent upon diverse differences and dividing science: therefore they cannot be found in the same science. The major is clear; for if opposite differences, or the properties consequent upon them, could be found in the same thing, it would follow that the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, corruptible and incorruptible, that the same animal could be sensible and insensible, that the same man could be rational and irrational, capable of laughter and of neighing, which are manifestly impossible. The minor is likewise evident; since the speculative and the practical either are essential differences dividing science, or at least properties connoting diverse differences and emanating from them, as the Scotists concede, and accordingly cannot belong to the same science, and so theology cannot be partly speculative and partly practical.

The modern Thomists reply with Cajetan that the speculative and the practical are not dividing differences of science as such, and insofar as science is the supreme genus with respect to theology and the natural sciences: but that they are only dividing differences of natural science, and insofar as it is a subalternate genus with respect to all the natural sciences, from which it abstracts and into which it is diffused. So that (says Cajetan)

the speculative and the practical are related to science as such, as hearing and sight are to the common and proper sense, whence just as sense as such is first divided into common and proper; the proper, however, is subdivided into sight, hearing, etc., so science as such is first divided into infinite, that is, that which has an infinite object, such as theology, and finite, that is, having a finite object, such as purely natural science; this, however, is subdivided into speculative and practical. Whence although these cannot indeed stand together in any natural science, they can nevertheless be together in theology. Against this, 1. This is rather a furtive evasion of the difficulty and of the argument than a solid solution of it; since in this manner all arguments drawn from Philosophy against supernatural things could easily be solved, nor would it be at all lawful to philosophize from natural things to theological ones: for easily anyone who is the adversary will be able to respond that reasons of this kind hold place in philosophical matters indeed, but not in theological ones and those which are of a higher order.

Second. No difference includes the predicates of the difference opposed and contradistinguished to itself; but the finite and the infinite, according to the Thomists, are the differences first distinguishing science: therefore the predicates of finite science cannot belong to infinite science. I subsume: but according to them, the speculative and the practical are differences of finite science: therefore they cannot belong to infinite science. The major is certain; for since the rational and the irrational are opposite differences, it is evident that what is able to neigh, to roar, and the other differences which fall under the irrational, cannot belong to the rational: for from that from which the genus and the whole are removed, the species of the genus and the parts of that whole are likewise removed; but the neighing and the roaring are species and subjective parts of the irrational, and accordingly repugnant to that to which the irrational is repugnant. The minor is of the Thomists themselves, and likewise the subsumption.

Third. The practical and the speculative are contradictory opposites: therefore they cannot belong to one and the same subject. The antecedent is proved: Practical knowledge is that which is ordered to a work, speculative however that which is not ordered to a work: but to be ordered to a work and not to be ordered are contradictories: therefore they cannot belong to one and the same thing.

Nor does the example of the common sense help anything. For there is not a like ratio between the common sense and the particular senses, and between finite and infinite science. For by the common sense they either understand sense in common, and insofar as it prescinds from all the particular senses, as the universal from its inferiors and the common from the particulars, as Cajetan understood it; but thus there is no parity between it and infinite science: for the former is a genus and is truly predicated of the particular senses, and contains them in potency as the universal does its inferiors, but infinite science is not a genus with respect to finite science, which is called speculative and practical, and hence contains neither it nor its differences in any way. Or by the common sense they understand the phantasy, that is, that internal faculty which is as it were the matrix of the other senses, and thus there is much less parity: for it is one thing to speak of a faculty regarding only disparate acts, another indeed of a habit regarding acts opposed contradictorily; but the common sense is a potency regarding the acts of the external senses, which are disparate, and which accordingly can be received in the same subject; the speculative and the practical, however, are acts opposed contradictorily, and consequently cannot be in the same subject. And thus the valid argument and example of the adversaries falls and is utterly overthrown.

You will say 1. The theology of God is formally speculative and practical: therefore so too is ours, which is a certain emanation and expression of it.

I answer 1. The antecedent can be denied: for although the Subtle Doctor in the cited q. 4. n. 36. determines nothing expressly concerning this difficulty, but seems problematic, solving the arguments on both sides, nevertheless he seems to incline more to that opinion which affirms the theology of God to be speculative: both because the divine will is the first rule of its own act, and accordingly does not presuppose a practical knowledge in the intellect by which it might be regulated: and because God loves himself naturally, and accordingly his love is not directable, and consequently he does not have a practical knowledge directive of his own love: and because between the directing and the directed there is a real distinction, since the directing has the notion of cause with respect to the directed, whence the practical knowledge of the intellect is really distinguished from the love of the will which it directs: but between the divine understanding and willing there is no real distinction, and hence the one does not have the notion of directing.

I answer 2. The antecedent being admitted, the consequence can be denied. For since the theology of God is infinite, ours however finite, there is no proportion between the two, nor does it follow that if divine theology is at once speculative and practical, ours also ought to be such: for the Thomists themselves confess that God, by reason of infinity, involves virtually and formally many things which in finite and limited creatures are incompossible.

You will say 2. God is formally a speculable and practical object: therefore our theology, which has God for its object, will be at once practical and speculative.

I answer 1. The antecedent can be denied: for since there is nothing in God which ought not to win and kindle love, so too there is nothing which is not an object of praxis and of love.

I answer 2. The antecedent being admitted, the consequence must be denied: for our theology is not wholly adequate to its object, which is God. Whence although God were at once a speculable and appetible object, it would not follow that theology can attain him in both ways, since the speculative and the practical cannot belong to the same finite science.

You will say 3. If our theology could not be at once speculative and practical, this would be especially because the speculative and the practical cannot be in the same thing at once: but this is false, both because in the same intellect there are a speculative and a practical science: and because Aristotle says that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension; and accordingly something can be at once practical and speculative.

I distinguish the minor. The speculative and the practical can be in the same thing at once subjectively or affectively, that is, be in the same thing as in a subject, or from the same thing as from a cause, I concede; formally and by way of differences or of properties taking the place of differences, I deny. I confess therefore that the same intellect can subjectively be called at once practical through practical knowledge and speculative through speculative knowledge, just as the same milk is white through whiteness and sweet through sweetness: likewise that the same intellect, which concurs effectively to produce practical knowledge, also concurs effectively to form speculative knowledge: but from this it does not follow that the same science is speculative and practical: otherwise it would also follow that whiteness is sweetness, because the same milk is subjectively white and sweet.

Or I deny the parity. For the speculative and the practical are accidental differences with respect to the intellect, and accordingly it can receive either: but they are essential differences with respect to science, or properties taking the place of differences, and consequently since opposite differences dividing something common cannot agree with any same thing contained under that common, so neither can the speculative and the practical, dividing science, belong to the same science.

You will say 3. Those things which are dispersed in the lower are united in the higher, as the visive and the auditive in the common sense, the vegetative and the sensitive in the rational soul, etc.: but theology is higher than all the natural sciences, because it is concerned with an infinite object, and attains it by a supernatural light: therefore the speculative and the practical, which are dividing differences of the natural sciences, are united in theology and contained in it.

I distinguish the major. When those dispersed things are only disparate, and are not opposed contradictorily, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is established from what has been said that the speculative and the practical are opposed to each other contradictorily, because the practical is ordered to a work, the speculative however is not ordered; but to be ordered to a work and not to be ordered are contradictories, and hence in nothing, whether lower or higher, can they stand together.

Nor should you say with certain Thomists that those things indeed cannot agree with something at once formally, but well eminently. For this reply is utterly insipid and alien from the truth; for contradictories fight against each other eminently just as formally: for just as God cannot be formally wise and formally not wise, so neither can he be eminently just and eminently not just. Moreover, the properties of an opposite difference seek to be in another opposite difference neither formally nor eminently: for a man can be neither formally nor eminently risible and able to neigh: but the speculative and the practical are properties of diverse differences dividing science: therefore neither formally nor eminently can they belong to one and the same thing.

Second conclusion. — Our theology is in no way speculative, but simply practical.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, quaest. 4. of the Prologue n. 3., and he proves it thus:

First. That knowledge is practical which is ordered to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but such is our theology; therefore it is practical. The major is evident from note 1: for right volition is properly praxis. Therefore the knowledge which is prior to it and directive of it is truly practical. The minor is proved: the primary and adequate object of theology, which is God, is virtually conformed to right volition, since from Him are taken the first principles of rightness in the will, such as: God is to be loved, worshipped, etc.; and this object determines the created intellect to the knowledge of rightness, before the created will wills it; therefore that knowledge is to be called practical.

Second. The principles of our theology are practical; therefore the conclusions deduced from them are also practical. The consequence is evident: for such is the conclusion as are the principles from which it is deduced. The antecedent is proved: the principles of theology are taken from God, who is the ultimate end; but principles taken from the ultimate end are practical, for they are ordered to action and to applying the means by which the ultimate end is acquired, according to that saying of Ioannis 20.: These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name.

He does not say that the divine mysteries, which are the principles of our theology, were therefore committed to writing so that we might investigate God and His perfections and operations more acutely and explain them more subtly, but that, knowing Him, we might love Him more ardently and serve Him more readily and fervently in all things.

It is confirmed. From St. Augustino lib. 1. De Doctrina Christiana, toward the end: the habit of theology is ordered to directing four acts, namely to believe, to hope, to love, and to live virtuously; therefore it is not ordered to simple speculation, but to practice.

Third. It is proved from Aureolus, art. 3, and this first a priori, thus: that habit is practical which is ordered to an operable object attainable through a nobler act and operation than is its simple speculation and contemplation; but theology is concerned with God, who is an object attainable through nobler acts than is its simple speculation; therefore it is practical. The major is evident: for medicine and the other sciences are practical for this reason, that their object is operable and attainable in a nobler way than is their simple speculation; for it is better for a man to have health than to know what health is; likewise it is better to have virtue than to know what virtue is, as Aristotle teaches, 2. Ethic. cap. 2. He proves the minor: he attains God more nobly who adheres to Him through faith, rises up to Him through hope, loves Him through charity, and wins His love for himself through obedience and worship, than he who disputes subtly about Him and unlocks and expounds all His most profound mysteries. Therefore the theological habit will on this account be purely practical.

It is confirmed. Because when the object is operable or acquirable through operations, the habit which regards it is chiefly occupied with the works by which it can be attained, as the Philosopher teaches, 1. Ethic. cap. 7.; but this is what the theologian does, since he is chiefly occupied with setting forth how God can be attained by us through the acts of faith, hope, love, and obedience. Therefore, etc.

Fourth. From the same author it is proved a posteriori: that habit is practical which has as its end not only the act it elicits, but the act it directs; but the theological habit has as its end not the act it elicits, but the act it directs, namely the act of faith, because through this habit, according to St. Augustine, faith is defended and rendered stable against unbelievers, is strengthened and rendered delightful as regards the pious, is engendered and rendered capable as regards the doubtful, etc. Therefore it is practical. This proof is efficacious if Aureolus speaks of faith formed by charity and the connection of the virtues, but not of unformed faith, which only unlocks the mysteries of faith. For since faith is an act of the intellect, from its direction alone the intellect or the habit could not be called practical: for praxis is the operation of a power other than the intellect, and on that account the operations of the intellect cannot be praxes; yet the very opposite of this was taught by Aureolus himself, who in this opinion, as in many others, is a stranger to the doctrine of Scotus.

Fifth. Finally, that science should be called practical of which there is no conclusion that is not ordered, either formally or virtually, to practice; but there is no theological conclusion that is not thus ordered to practice.

I prove it: if there are any theological conclusions which cannot be ordered to practice, they are chiefly those which seem per se and formally speculative, for example: God is triune, the Father generates the Word by speaking, etc. But these are virtually practical. For the first (says the Doctor, n. 32) virtually includes the knowledge of the rightness of the love tending toward the three Persons, so that if an act of love were elicited toward only one of them, excluding the others, as an unbeliever would elicit it, it would be an act that is not right. The second, indeed, includes the knowledge of rightness according as the act is about two Persons, one of whom is from the other in this way. That is, any knowledge of the Divinity and of the divine Persons, however speculative it may seem, nevertheless, since that knowledge represents the divine Persons as they are divine Persons, and accordingly as they have the Godhead formally and essentially, and consequently as they are the highest good of man and his ultimate end, it comes about that that knowledge provokes and enkindles love and honor toward those divine Persons; and so that knowledge is at least virtually practical.

You will say 1. If theology is to be called practical because there is no conclusion of it which cannot at least virtually and remotely be ordered to practice, then all the other sciences will equally have to be called practical; for there is none which cannot virtually be ordered to loving or worshipping God, and so there will be no perfectly speculative science; but the consequence is absurd; therefore so is that from which it follows.

I deny the consequence. And the reason for the disparity is that the natural speculative sciences are in no way ordered to practice, neither formally nor virtually, while they regard their own proper object; whence they could not become practical in any way except by wandering and extending themselves beyond their own proper limits and the consideration of their object, and so they would no longer be the same sciences; for a science varies with the variation of the object. But theology does not wander beyond its limits, nor does it change its object, while those of its pieces of knowledge which seem speculative are ordered virtually to regulating the acts of the will about that very object which it considers.

You will insist. Therefore by this reasoning metaphysics at least will be able to be called practical: for since it considers God as the object of attribution, it will not wander beyond its limits, nor will it look upon a foreign object, while it orders its pieces of knowledge to worshipping and loving Him; but it is false that metaphysics can be called practical; for it is the greatest of all the speculative sciences, since it is their prince; therefore by the same reasoning theology is not to be called practical.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is, 1., that although metaphysics contemplates God as the object of attribution and as the chief among its special objects, it does not however regard God as the total and adequate object; for thus it regards being as being, that is, insofar as it prescinds from all its species; and it contemplates God for this reason, because He is the noblest species of being. But since the knowledge of the total object is not ordered to the less chief object — indeed the knowledge of the less chief object ought to be ordered to the total object — it comes about that not all the conclusions of metaphysics can be ordered to God.

2. Metaphysics does not consider God in a practical way, but only in a speculative way; for it does not regard Him as appetible and enjoyable, nor did the philosophers know that we are ordered to the enjoyment of God, and that our appetite is to be satisfied by His possession; but metaphysics regards God only as He is the noblest species of being; which consideration does not induce practice. Whence the philosophers held that God is indeed the object of our intellect, but not of the will. But since theologians know that God is the object of our will, which can be satisfied and filled only in His possession alone, it comes about that all theological knowledge can become practical and be ordered to exciting and regulating love toward God.

You will say 2. That science is not generally to be called practical the greater part of whose conclusions is concerned with a speculable object; but the greater part of the theological conclusions is concerned with a purely speculable object. Proof: theology is chiefly concerned with the divine Persons and with the notional acts, not indeed with the essential attributes, because these can be known by us by natural light through metaphysics; for in metaphysics the philosophers have handed down many things about God and His attributes, but nothing about the personal, which are made known only through theology and faith; but the personal in God are not appetible, because formally they state no perfection, nor do they terminate the act of our love, which is terminated only at the essential. Therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. And the Doctor distinguishes the minor of that proof: that the essential alone can terminate the act of love, as the reason by which, he concedes; as the reason which, he denies. That is, the essential are indeed the reason by which God is to be loved, worshipped, etc.; for paternity, e.g., is not the formal notion by which the eternal Father is to be loved, but the Godhead; so that He is loved by us not precisely insofar as He is Father, but insofar as He is the divine Father. Whence the personal, together with the essential — e.g., the relation of paternity joined with the Godhead — can terminate the practical act of our love as the object which.

You will say 3. God is not the object of theology, nor is He considered by it as He is the ultimate end, but under the notion of the Godhead, as has been said. Therefore by this reasoning theology cannot be called practical.

I distinguish the antecedent. That He is not the object of theology as He is the ultimate end formally and respectively, I concede; as He is the ultimate end absolutely and simply, I deny; for the notion of the ultimate end in God is founded in His Godhead and essence, from which alone precisely the practical principles are drawn, as the Doctor puts it, and not from the precise notion of end; for God is not to be loved or worshipped precisely because He is the end, but because He is God, and insofar as He is the highest good and the most high Lord and Ruler of all things.

You will say 4. If theology were practical, the more skilled theologians would be holier, and would produce more excellent acts of divine worship and love; for the more skilled craftsmen produce more excellent works of art; but the contrary is often seen; for the more learned not rarely become the worse.

I distinguish the minor. That the more learned become the worse through a defect of theological science, as if it itself paved and opened the way to malice, I deny; through a defect of the theologian, who abuses the science to his own greater ruin and damnation, I concede.

You will say 5. Since theology is the Prince and Queen of the sciences, it is to be placed among the nobler sciences; but the speculative sciences, since they are for their own sake and are not ordered to work, are nobler than the practical; therefore theology is rather to be named speculative than practical.

I distinguish the minor. Speculative science is more excellent than practical, when the operations for the regulating of which the practical is ordered are not nobler than simple and bare speculation, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But to love God, to worship Him, and to merit His possession by meritorious works is far more excellent than to know and merely speculate about Him: since knowledge rests on faith alone, whereas the operation of love and virtue arises from charity, which is more excellent and more perfect than faith; therefore theology is nobler as practical and directive of those operations than it would be if it merely speculated about God. Hence Aureolus rightly infers, art. 3. §. 2.:

That moral Philosophy is nobler than Geometry: for although Geometry is speculative, and proceeds in a more certain way, nevertheless Moral is about a better subject, namely about man and human acts. And moreover the certainty of choice to which Moral is ordered, since in morals not the act but the choice is weighed, as is said in 3. Ethic., this certainty and choice itself is nobler than any speculation whatever, because it is the act of a higher power, namely of the will.