Scotus Academicus, Tomus primus: De Deo in se subsistente

Now it is already sufficiently and more than sufficiently evident how great is the necessity and majesty of our theology; it remains for us to examine closely its genuine characteristics and dispositions. These are indeed various; but we shall touch upon and weigh the principal ones in the following questions.

Note 1. That science is said to be speculative which rests in the simple and naked contemplation of its object, and is not ordered to directing another faculty of the intellect in eliciting its acts: while that is practical by which the intellect is instructed and illumined, so as to direct the other faculties proceeding from itself, in their operations which are truly called practices. Praxis, moreover, is a Greek word, signifying in Latin the same as operation: hence, just as potency is twofold, namely Effective and Affective, so likewise a twofold praxis is commonly distinguished. The former is the operation of the effective and corporeal potency or faculty, which can produce some external and sensible work: the latter, however, is the operation of the appetitive faculty, which, since it is twofold, the one corporeal and called the sensitive Appetite, the other spiritual and named the rational Appetite or will, is likewise called a twofold practical operation, namely Rational and Animal.

Note 2. As regards the operation which is truly praxis, the Subtle Doctor, q. 4. of the Prologue n. 3., requires three conditions. First, that it be an operation of the appetitive or effective faculty, not of the intellective. Second, that that act presuppose a knowledge of the object to which it is ordered. Third, that it be directable and ordainable to moral good, if it is an act of the appetitive faculty; or to artificial good, if it is an act of the effective faculty. Whence every knowledge is called practical which is ordered to directing the faculty, whether Affective or Effective.

Note 3. That some perfection can be found in a subject in either of these three ways: namely, either formally only, as heat is in hot water; or virtually only, as heat is in the sun, which although it is not hot, is nevertheless calefactive; or formally and virtually at once, as heat is in fire, which from its innate virtue is at once hot and calefactive.

Hence there is especially a threefold opinion among the weightier authors concerning the resolution of the present question; for some, with St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 1. art. 4., judge our theology to be formally partly speculative and partly practical, more however speculative than practical: not a few, with Henry in the Summa art. 9., judge it to be purely and absolutely speculative. The rest, however, with the Subtle Doctor, quaest. 4. of the Prologue n. 32., contend that it is simply practical. In order that we may embrace and defend this opinion, and attack and overthrow the others, let there be

First conclusion. — Our theology is not at once speculative and practical.

Proof. It is impossible for two opposite dividing differences of a genus, or their properties taking the place of differences, to be found in the same thing at once: but the speculative and the practical are essential differences dividing science, or at least properties consequent upon diverse differences and dividing science: therefore they cannot be found in the same science. The major is clear; for if opposite differences, or the properties consequent upon them, could be found in the same thing, it would follow that the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, corruptible and incorruptible, that the same animal could be sensible and insensible, that the same man could be rational and irrational, capable of laughter and of neighing, which are manifestly impossible. The minor is likewise evident; since the speculative and the practical either are essential differences dividing science, or at least properties connoting diverse differences and emanating from them, as the Scotists concede, and accordingly cannot belong to the same science, and so theology cannot be partly speculative and partly practical.

The modern Thomists reply with Cajetan that the speculative and the practical are not dividing differences of science as such, and insofar as science is the supreme genus with respect to theology and the natural sciences: but that they are only dividing differences of natural science, and insofar as it is a subalternate genus with respect to all the natural sciences, from which it abstracts and into which it is diffused. So that (says Cajetan)

the speculative and the practical are related to science as such, as hearing and sight are to the common and proper sense, whence just as sense as such is first divided into common and proper; the proper, however, is subdivided into sight, hearing, etc., so science as such is first divided into infinite, that is, that which has an infinite object, such as theology, and finite, that is, having a finite object, such as purely natural science; this, however, is subdivided into speculative and practical. Whence although these cannot indeed stand together in any natural science, they can nevertheless be together in theology. Against this, 1. This is rather a furtive evasion of the difficulty and of the argument than a solid solution of it; since in this manner all arguments drawn from Philosophy against supernatural things could easily be solved, nor would it be at all lawful to philosophize from natural things to theological ones: for easily anyone who is the adversary will be able to respond that reasons of this kind hold place in philosophical matters indeed, but not in theological ones and those which are of a higher order.

Second. No difference includes the predicates of the difference opposed and contradistinguished to itself; but the finite and the infinite, according to the Thomists, are the differences first distinguishing science: therefore the predicates of finite science cannot belong to infinite science. I subsume: but according to them, the speculative and the practical are differences of finite science: therefore they cannot belong to infinite science. The major is certain; for since the rational and the irrational are opposite differences, it is evident that what is able to neigh, to roar, and the other differences which fall under the irrational, cannot belong to the rational: for from that from which the genus and the whole are removed, the species of the genus and the parts of that whole are likewise removed; but the neighing and the roaring are species and subjective parts of the irrational, and accordingly repugnant to that to which the irrational is repugnant. The minor is of the Thomists themselves, and likewise the subsumption.

Third. The practical and the speculative are contradictory opposites: therefore they cannot belong to one and the same subject. The antecedent is proved: Practical knowledge is that which is ordered to a work, speculative however that which is not ordered to a work: but to be ordered to a work and not to be ordered are contradictories: therefore they cannot belong to one and the same thing.

Nor does the example of the common sense help anything. For there is not a like ratio between the common sense and the particular senses, and between finite and infinite science. For by the common sense they either understand sense in common, and insofar as it prescinds from all the particular senses, as the universal from its inferiors and the common from the particulars, as Cajetan understood it; but thus there is no parity between it and infinite science: for the former is a genus and is truly predicated of the particular senses, and contains them in potency as the universal does its inferiors, but infinite science is not a genus with respect to finite science, which is called speculative and practical, and hence contains neither it nor its differences in any way. Or by the common sense they understand the phantasy, that is, that internal faculty which is as it were the matrix of the other senses, and thus there is much less parity: for it is one thing to speak of a faculty regarding only disparate acts, another indeed of a habit regarding acts opposed contradictorily; but the common sense is a potency regarding the acts of the external senses, which are disparate, and which accordingly can be received in the same subject; the speculative and the practical, however, are acts opposed contradictorily, and consequently cannot be in the same subject. And thus the valid argument and example of the adversaries falls and is utterly overthrown.

You will say 1. The theology of God is formally speculative and practical: therefore so too is ours, which is a certain emanation and expression of it.

I answer 1. The antecedent can be denied: for although the Subtle Doctor in the cited q. 4. n. 36. determines nothing expressly concerning this difficulty, but seems problematic, solving the arguments on both sides, nevertheless he seems to incline more to that opinion which affirms the theology of God to be speculative: both because the divine will is the first rule of its own act, and accordingly does not presuppose a practical knowledge in the intellect by which it might be regulated: and because God loves himself naturally, and accordingly his love is not directable, and consequently he does not have a practical knowledge directive of his own love: and because between the directing and the directed there is a real distinction, since the directing has the notion of cause with respect to the directed, whence the practical knowledge of the intellect is really distinguished from the love of the will which it directs: but between the divine understanding and willing there is no real distinction, and hence the one does not have the notion of directing.

I answer 2. The antecedent being admitted, the consequence can be denied. For since the theology of God is infinite, ours however finite, there is no proportion between the two, nor does it follow that if divine theology is at once speculative and practical, ours also ought to be such: for the Thomists themselves confess that God, by reason of infinity, involves virtually and formally many things which in finite and limited creatures are incompossible.

You will say 2. God is formally a speculable and practical object: therefore our theology, which has God for its object, will be at once practical and speculative.

I answer 1. The antecedent can be denied: for since there is nothing in God which ought not to win and kindle love, so too there is nothing which is not an object of praxis and of love.

I answer 2. The antecedent being admitted, the consequence must be denied: for our theology is not wholly adequate to its object, which is God. Whence although God were at once a speculable and appetible object, it would not follow that theology can attain him in both ways, since the speculative and the practical cannot belong to the same finite science.

You will say 3. If our theology could not be at once speculative and practical, this would be especially because the speculative and the practical cannot be in the same thing at once: but this is false, both because in the same intellect there are a speculative and a practical science: and because Aristotle says that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension; and accordingly something can be at once practical and speculative.

I distinguish the minor. The speculative and the practical can be in the same thing at once subjectively or affectively, that is, be in the same thing as in a subject, or from the same thing as from a cause, I concede; formally and by way of differences or of properties taking the place of differences, I deny. I confess therefore that the same intellect can subjectively be called at once practical through practical knowledge and speculative through speculative knowledge, just as the same milk is white through whiteness and sweet through sweetness: likewise that the same intellect, which concurs effectively to produce practical knowledge, also concurs effectively to form speculative knowledge: but from this it does not follow that the same science is speculative and practical: otherwise it would also follow that whiteness is sweetness, because the same milk is subjectively white and sweet.

Or I deny the parity. For the speculative and the practical are accidental differences with respect to the intellect, and accordingly it can receive either: but they are essential differences with respect to science, or properties taking the place of differences, and consequently since opposite differences dividing something common cannot agree with any same thing contained under that common, so neither can the speculative and the practical, dividing science, belong to the same science.

You will say 3. Those things which are dispersed in the lower are united in the higher, as the visive and the auditive in the common sense, the vegetative and the sensitive in the rational soul, etc.: but theology is higher than all the natural sciences, because it is concerned with an infinite object, and attains it by a supernatural light: therefore the speculative and the practical, which are dividing differences of the natural sciences, are united in theology and contained in it.

I distinguish the major. When those dispersed things are only disparate, and are not opposed contradictorily, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it is established from what has been said that the speculative and the practical are opposed to each other contradictorily, because the practical is ordered to a work, the speculative however is not ordered; but to be ordered to a work and not to be ordered are contradictories, and hence in nothing, whether lower or higher, can they stand together.

Nor should you say with certain Thomists that those things indeed cannot agree with something at once formally, but well eminently. For this reply is utterly insipid and alien from the truth; for contradictories fight against each other eminently just as formally: for just as God cannot be formally wise and formally not wise, so neither can he be eminently just and eminently not just. Moreover, the properties of an opposite difference seek to be in another opposite difference neither formally nor eminently: for a man can be neither formally nor eminently risible and able to neigh: but the speculative and the practical are properties of diverse differences dividing science: therefore neither formally nor eminently can they belong to one and the same thing.

Second conclusion. — Our theology is in no way speculative, but simply practical.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, quaest. 4. of the Prologue n. 3., and he proves it thus:

First. That knowledge is practical which is ordered to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but such is our theology; therefore it is practical. The major is evident from note 1: for right volition is properly praxis. Therefore the knowledge which is prior to it and directive of it is truly practical. The minor is proved: the primary and adequate object of theology, which is God, is virtually conformed to right volition, since from Him are taken the first principles of rightness in the will, such as: God is to be loved, worshipped, etc.; and this object determines the created intellect to the knowledge of rightness, before the created will wills it; therefore that knowledge is to be called practical.

Second. The principles of our theology are practical; therefore the conclusions deduced from them are also practical. The consequence is evident: for such is the conclusion as are the principles from which it is deduced. The antecedent is proved: the principles of theology are taken from God, who is the ultimate end; but principles taken from the ultimate end are practical, for they are ordered to action and to applying the means by which the ultimate end is acquired, according to that saying of Ioannis 20.: These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name.

He does not say that the divine mysteries, which are the principles of our theology, were therefore committed to writing so that we might investigate God and His perfections and operations more acutely and explain them more subtly, but that, knowing Him, we might love Him more ardently and serve Him more readily and fervently in all things.

It is confirmed. From St. Augustino lib. 1. De Doctrina Christiana, toward the end: the habit of theology is ordered to directing four acts, namely to believe, to hope, to love, and to live virtuously; therefore it is not ordered to simple speculation, but to practice.

Third. It is proved from Aureolus, art. 3, and this first a priori, thus: that habit is practical which is ordered to an operable object attainable through a nobler act and operation than is its simple speculation and contemplation; but theology is concerned with God, who is an object attainable through nobler acts than is its simple speculation; therefore it is practical. The major is evident: for medicine and the other sciences are practical for this reason, that their object is operable and attainable in a nobler way than is their simple speculation; for it is better for a man to have health than to know what health is; likewise it is better to have virtue than to know what virtue is, as Aristotle teaches, 2. Ethic. cap. 2. He proves the minor: he attains God more nobly who adheres to Him through faith, rises up to Him through hope, loves Him through charity, and wins His love for himself through obedience and worship, than he who disputes subtly about Him and unlocks and expounds all His most profound mysteries. Therefore the theological habit will on this account be purely practical.

It is confirmed. Because when the object is operable or acquirable through operations, the habit which regards it is chiefly occupied with the works by which it can be attained, as the Philosopher teaches, 1. Ethic. cap. 7.; but this is what the theologian does, since he is chiefly occupied with setting forth how God can be attained by us through the acts of faith, hope, love, and obedience. Therefore, etc.

Fourth. From the same author it is proved a posteriori: that habit is practical which has as its end not only the act it elicits, but the act it directs; but the theological habit has as its end not the act it elicits, but the act it directs, namely the act of faith, because through this habit, according to St. Augustine, faith is defended and rendered stable against unbelievers, is strengthened and rendered delightful as regards the pious, is engendered and rendered capable as regards the doubtful, etc. Therefore it is practical. This proof is efficacious if Aureolus speaks of faith formed by charity and the connection of the virtues, but not of unformed faith, which only unlocks the mysteries of faith. For since faith is an act of the intellect, from its direction alone the intellect or the habit could not be called practical: for praxis is the operation of a power other than the intellect, and on that account the operations of the intellect cannot be praxes; yet the very opposite of this was taught by Aureolus himself, who in this opinion, as in many others, is a stranger to the doctrine of Scotus.

Fifth. Finally, that science should be called practical of which there is no conclusion that is not ordered, either formally or virtually, to practice; but there is no theological conclusion that is not thus ordered to practice.

I prove it: if there are any theological conclusions which cannot be ordered to practice, they are chiefly those which seem per se and formally speculative, for example: God is triune, the Father generates the Word by speaking, etc. But these are virtually practical. For the first (says the Doctor, n. 32) virtually includes the knowledge of the rightness of the love tending toward the three Persons, so that if an act of love were elicited toward only one of them, excluding the others, as an unbeliever would elicit it, it would be an act that is not right. The second, indeed, includes the knowledge of rightness according as the act is about two Persons, one of whom is from the other in this way. That is, any knowledge of the Divinity and of the divine Persons, however speculative it may seem, nevertheless, since that knowledge represents the divine Persons as they are divine Persons, and accordingly as they have the Godhead formally and essentially, and consequently as they are the highest good of man and his ultimate end, it comes about that that knowledge provokes and enkindles love and honor toward those divine Persons; and so that knowledge is at least virtually practical.

You will say 1. If theology is to be called practical because there is no conclusion of it which cannot at least virtually and remotely be ordered to practice, then all the other sciences will equally have to be called practical; for there is none which cannot virtually be ordered to loving or worshipping God, and so there will be no perfectly speculative science; but the consequence is absurd; therefore so is that from which it follows.

I deny the consequence. And the reason for the disparity is that the natural speculative sciences are in no way ordered to practice, neither formally nor virtually, while they regard their own proper object; whence they could not become practical in any way except by wandering and extending themselves beyond their own proper limits and the consideration of their object, and so they would no longer be the same sciences; for a science varies with the variation of the object. But theology does not wander beyond its limits, nor does it change its object, while those of its pieces of knowledge which seem speculative are ordered virtually to regulating the acts of the will about that very object which it considers.

You will insist. Therefore by this reasoning metaphysics at least will be able to be called practical: for since it considers God as the object of attribution, it will not wander beyond its limits, nor will it look upon a foreign object, while it orders its pieces of knowledge to worshipping and loving Him; but it is false that metaphysics can be called practical; for it is the greatest of all the speculative sciences, since it is their prince; therefore by the same reasoning theology is not to be called practical.

I deny the parity. And the reason for the disparity is, 1., that although metaphysics contemplates God as the object of attribution and as the chief among its special objects, it does not however regard God as the total and adequate object; for thus it regards being as being, that is, insofar as it prescinds from all its species; and it contemplates God for this reason, because He is the noblest species of being. But since the knowledge of the total object is not ordered to the less chief object — indeed the knowledge of the less chief object ought to be ordered to the total object — it comes about that not all the conclusions of metaphysics can be ordered to God.

2. Metaphysics does not consider God in a practical way, but only in a speculative way; for it does not regard Him as appetible and enjoyable, nor did the philosophers know that we are ordered to the enjoyment of God, and that our appetite is to be satisfied by His possession; but metaphysics regards God only as He is the noblest species of being; which consideration does not induce practice. Whence the philosophers held that God is indeed the object of our intellect, but not of the will. But since theologians know that God is the object of our will, which can be satisfied and filled only in His possession alone, it comes about that all theological knowledge can become practical and be ordered to exciting and regulating love toward God.

You will say 2. That science is not generally to be called practical the greater part of whose conclusions is concerned with a speculable object; but the greater part of the theological conclusions is concerned with a purely speculable object. Proof: theology is chiefly concerned with the divine Persons and with the notional acts, not indeed with the essential attributes, because these can be known by us by natural light through metaphysics; for in metaphysics the philosophers have handed down many things about God and His attributes, but nothing about the personal, which are made known only through theology and faith; but the personal in God are not appetible, because formally they state no perfection, nor do they terminate the act of our love, which is terminated only at the essential. Therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. And the Doctor distinguishes the minor of that proof: that the essential alone can terminate the act of love, as the reason by which, he concedes; as the reason which, he denies. That is, the essential are indeed the reason by which God is to be loved, worshipped, etc.; for paternity, e.g., is not the formal notion by which the eternal Father is to be loved, but the Godhead; so that He is loved by us not precisely insofar as He is Father, but insofar as He is the divine Father. Whence the personal, together with the essential — e.g., the relation of paternity joined with the Godhead — can terminate the practical act of our love as the object which.

You will say 3. God is not the object of theology, nor is He considered by it as He is the ultimate end, but under the notion of the Godhead, as has been said. Therefore by this reasoning theology cannot be called practical.

I distinguish the antecedent. That He is not the object of theology as He is the ultimate end formally and respectively, I concede; as He is the ultimate end absolutely and simply, I deny; for the notion of the ultimate end in God is founded in His Godhead and essence, from which alone precisely the practical principles are drawn, as the Doctor puts it, and not from the precise notion of end; for God is not to be loved or worshipped precisely because He is the end, but because He is God, and insofar as He is the highest good and the most high Lord and Ruler of all things.

You will say 4. If theology were practical, the more skilled theologians would be holier, and would produce more excellent acts of divine worship and love; for the more skilled craftsmen produce more excellent works of art; but the contrary is often seen; for the more learned not rarely become the worse.

I distinguish the minor. That the more learned become the worse through a defect of theological science, as if it itself paved and opened the way to malice, I deny; through a defect of the theologian, who abuses the science to his own greater ruin and damnation, I concede.

You will say 5. Since theology is the Prince and Queen of the sciences, it is to be placed among the nobler sciences; but the speculative sciences, since they are for their own sake and are not ordered to work, are nobler than the practical; therefore theology is rather to be named speculative than practical.

I distinguish the minor. Speculative science is more excellent than practical, when the operations for the regulating of which the practical is ordered are not nobler than simple and bare speculation, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But to love God, to worship Him, and to merit His possession by meritorious works is far more excellent than to know and merely speculate about Him: since knowledge rests on faith alone, whereas the operation of love and virtue arises from charity, which is more excellent and more perfect than faith; therefore theology is nobler as practical and directive of those operations than it would be if it merely speculated about God. Hence Aureolus rightly infers, art. 3. §. 2.:

That moral Philosophy is nobler than Geometry: for although Geometry is speculative, and proceeds in a more certain way, nevertheless Moral is about a better subject, namely about man and human acts. And moreover the certainty of choice to which Moral is ordered, since in morals not the act but the choice is weighed, as is said in 3. Ethic., this certainty and choice itself is nobler than any speculation whatever, because it is the act of a higher power, namely of the will.

Since all knowledge can be obtained in two ways, namely either by infusion, which is an action of God producing something without our cooperation, such as is the knowledge of faith; or by study and practice, such as are the kinds of knowledge of the arts and the natural sciences; and since Theology depends on the supernatural principles of faith, hence it is rightly asked whether it is in us supernatural.

Note 1. According to the Doctor, q. 1. of the Prologue n. 20., something can be said to be supernatural in two ways: namely, either with respect to entity or with respect to mode. That is said to be supernatural as to entity which by its own nature transcends and exceeds the perfection of all natural things that agree with it in the same generic notion, and cannot be produced by an agent according to that agent's innate and natural power; in which manner the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, grace both actual and habitual, are said to be supernatural as to entity, because by their own nature they exceed the perfection of any natural agent, nor can they be caused, nor acquired, by a man operating according to his innate power.

That, however, is said to be supernatural as to mode which does not entirely exceed the natural perfection of the things that are of the same kind, and could be obtained by natural power, but not with so great facility, nor in so short a time; in which manner would be the infusion of philosophical science into a man who could otherwise attain it by study and practice.

Hence it appears how shamefully they hallucinate who accuse the Doctor of error, as if he had not admitted that some form is supernatural intrinsically and as to entity, but only extrinsically and by relation to the agent producing it: for he openly teaches the contrary both in the aforementioned place and in several others which the Scholiast cites on the aforementioned passage.

Note 2. From the same source, ibidem, the naturalness and supernaturalness of things can be detected and known through the relation which a potency bears either to the Form or to the Agent: for a receptive potency can be compared either to the act and form which it receives, or to the agent from which it receives. If it is compared to the act, or to the form, either it has a natural inclination toward it, as fire toward heat, and thus the potency and the form are said to be natural; or it has a natural repugnance and opposition to the form, as water to heat, and the form and the potency are said to be violent; or it has an indifference toward the form and its opposite, as a wall toward whiteness and blackness, and thus the potency and the form are said to be neutral.

Hence the Doctor gathers that no form is said to be supernatural by order to potency, since through this relation it is only either natural or neutral.

But it is otherwise if it is compared to the agent; for either the agent has a natural power of producing the form, v. g. the heat of fire, and thus the form is said to be natural, inasmuch as natural is opposed to supernatural; or there is no natural power which could produce such a form, e.g. grace, and thus that form is said to be supernatural. Hence the naturalness of a form is taken from two things, namely on the part of the potency having a natural inclination toward the form, and on the part of the agent having a natural productive power of such a form. But the supernatural is detected only on the part of the supernatural agent.

Note 3. The principles of Theology (namely the Articles of faith from which theological conclusions are drawn) can be regarded in two ways. First, indeed, in themselves and insofar as they are absolutely true by reason of the order which they bear to the first truth revealing. Second, insofar as they bear an order to the conclusions which are deduced from them by means of discourse, and insofar as they virtually contain them, or are contained in them. In the former way those principles are said to be formally revealed and pertain to faith: in the latter, however, they are said to be virtually revealed, or revealing the theological conclusions which are elicited from them, or are resolved into them.

These things having been premised, it must be resolved whether the theological habit inclining to elicit theological conclusions from the articles of faith is supernatural or not. Regarding this resolution the opinion of the Authors is twofold. For some, with Molina, Disp. 1. art. 2., teach that every theological conclusion is simply supernatural, and consequently the habit inclining to elicit them, for the reason that those conclusions are inferred from at least one of the premises known by the supernatural light of faith. Others, however, commonly maintain that theological conclusions are merely natural, whether meanwhile they are deduced from a double premise of faith, or from only one; whence they infer that the theological habit inclining to elicit them is likewise merely natural. Whoever they may be.

First conclusion. — The habit of Theology is not intrinsically and entitatively supernatural. This is the more common and truer opinion.

Proof 1. That habit is not intrinsically supernatural which is acquired by our acts and studies: but the habit of Theology is acquired by our exercises and studies: therefore it is not intrinsically and entitatively supernatural. The major is evident from Note 2: for that is not supernatural which does not exceed the activity and native powers of the agent. But what is acquired by our exercises does not exceed our innate powers, hence it cannot be called supernatural. The minor is clear from experience itself, by which it is established that the manner of acquiring Theology is not devotion and prayer, by which men are wont to prepare themselves for attaining supernatural habits; but the greatest study and assiduous practice are needed, and the aid of the natural sciences, especially Philosophy, for anyone to be able to become a skilled Theologian. Hence we see that those who devote assiduous labor to theological matters at length attain its habit, and acquire for themselves a facility for discoursing on the things of faith and explaining them; while those who indulge only in prayer, and despise studies and exercises of this kind, remain empty and void of theological matters.

Proof 2., and the prior reason is confirmed. That habit would be supernatural insofar as it would be made by the actual theological cognition, which is supernatural: but from that it cannot be supernatural; both because it is false that actual Theology is supernatural, as will appear in the second conclusion; and because even if that actual theological knowledge were supernatural, it would not nevertheless beget a supernatural habit: since the acts of faith, which are supernatural in entity, beget a merely natural habit in him who more often elicits such acts, as will be proved in Tractatu de Virtutibus Theologicis, and as is evident from the very experience of those who fall into heresy, for although they lose the supernatural habit of faith, nonetheless they keep the prior facility of believing the other articles, about which there is no controversy between them and Catholics. This facility, however, proceeds from nothing other than an acquired and merely natural habit of believing, generated by the various supernatural acts of faith, and still persisting after the loss of faith: therefore even if actual Theology were supernatural, it would not nevertheless produce a supernatural habit.

Thirdly. That habit is purely natural whose specifying formal notion is merely natural: but the specifying formal notion of the theological habit is merely natural: therefore also the habit of Theology. The major is evident; for such is the entity of a thing as is its constitutive notion distinguishing and specifying it from others.

Proof of the minor. The notion specifying and distinguishing our Theology from the Theology of God and from faith is discourse: but discourse in the wayfaring Theologian is purely natural, since it is the offspring of the agent intellect according to its natural power; for to discourse is the natural power and property of the intellect.

Fourthly. That habit is not supernatural and infused which can concur to a false assent; for who would say that God infuses a habit which inclines to error and falsity? But the habit of Theology can incline the intellect to a false assent; for since several opposed conclusions are inferred from the same principles of faith, not only by Heretics and Catholics, but even by the faithful Theologians themselves, who for the most part fight among themselves with contrary opinions, it is necessary that one or the other of those opposed conclusions be false; and consequently the theological habit which inclines to eliciting them leads to the false.

Fifthly and finally, that habit is merely natural which is obtained in the same way as other merely natural sciences and kinds of knowledge: but the habit of Theology is acquired in this way, namely through the precepts and teaching of some master teaching, and through the study and labor of the disciple and student: therefore, etc.

The adversaries reply. Study and teaching are indeed required for obtaining the habit of Theology, not as its productive causes, but as conditions and dispositions by which the subject is prepared for the infusion of that habit; just as by way of analogy the will is prepared through various acts for the infusion and reception of sanctifying grace; which preparation does not prevent sanctifying grace from being an intrinsically supernatural habit.

On the contrary. If those acts were required as dispositions, most of all either as moving or removing dispositions, that is, either as

they would move God to the infusion of the habit itself; or as disposing the subject for that infusion by removing those things which would be contrary to this infusion: but neither can be said; not indeed the first, for it is certain that God is moved to this infusion more efficaciously by prayers, fasts, alms, etc. than by study and labor; for those works of piety are more acceptable to Him than any study; yet those who apply themselves more to these works of piety are not on that account more perfect Theologians. Moreover, if such exercises and studies moved God to the infusion of the theological habit, that would be chiefly on account of some pact and promise on His part, just as happens in the Sacraments: but no similar pact, and no such promise, is found in Sacred Scripture: indeed, as often as science is proposed to be acquired, so often is the labor to be undergone imposed, for he who added science added also labor, says Solomon. Eccl. 1.

Not the second either: for just as no natural dispositions are required for the infusion of the other supernatural habits, so neither would they be required for the infusion of the theological habit. Moreover, dispositions must be of the same order as the form to which they dispose: whence Theologians infer that man cannot dispose himself proximately for the reception of first grace, but that it is infused by God out of mercy: therefore if Theology is supernatural in entity, no one will be able to dispose himself to it through natural studies and works.

You will say 1. from St. James 1: If anyone lacks wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly and does not reproach, and it will be given to him. Likewise Eccli. 1: God pours out wisdom upon all his works, and upon all flesh according to his gift, and has given it to those who love him: therefore Theology, since it is true wisdom, is infused and given by God.

I deny the consequence. For those sacred Texts are not to be understood of the wisdom which is taught and learned by study, and which deduces conclusions from the articles of faith; but of the wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, by which heavenly and divine things taste sweet to us through their mystical speculation and contemplation, and which God sometimes bestows upon those who fear Him out of His good will. We are speaking of the former acceptation of wisdom, not of the latter.

You will say 2. That science is supernatural whose certainty is supernatural: but the certainty of Theology is supernatural: therefore that also. The major is evident; for science is such as is its difference; but certainty is the difference by which science is distinguished essentially from error and opinion; and hence if this is supernatural, that also will be. The minor is likewise evident; for that certainty is supernatural which rests on a supernatural principle, and is greater than every natural certainty; but the certainty of Theology is such: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. Of that whose certainty is supernatural formally and immediately, I concede: only remotely and illatively or resolutively, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. I say therefore that just as the theological assent does not rest immediately on a supernatural principle, but only mediately and through inference or resolution, namely through the natural discourse by which the theological conclusions are inferred from the articles of faith and resolved into them; so its certainty is not supernatural except radically and remotely, insofar namely as through discourse the theological conclusions are resolved into supernatural principles, namely into the articles of faith; just as through the same discourse those conclusions are inferred from those articles. This, however, suffices for the certainty of Theology to be firmer than the certainty of the natural sciences is, although it is not equally firm as the immediately supernatural certainty of faith; because the natural sciences are resolved neither mediately nor immediately into supernaturally certain principles, but only into naturally certain ones.

You will say 3. Sciences are specified by their principles: but the principles of Theology are supernatural: therefore also Theology.

I distinguish the major. Sciences are specified by intrinsic, immediate and proximate principles, I concede: by ultimate and remote ones, I deny: otherwise the subalternate sciences would be specified by the principles of the subalternating ones, because they are resolved into them, and are drawn from their principles; which, however, is false, otherwise the subalternate ones would not differ from the subalternating ones. And in like manner the minor is to be distinguished, and the consequence denied.

Or I distinguish the minor. The principles of Theology are supernatural as to entity, I concede: as to use and application, I deny. They are indeed supernatural as to entity, because they are Articles of faith; but they are natural as to application, because they are not applied, nor ordered among themselves and in order to inferring a conclusion, except through theological discourse; that discourse, however, is natural; and hence also the use and application of the principles is natural.

Second conclusion. — Actual Theology, that is, the actual inference of a theological conclusion from its principles, is not supernatural.

Proof first. It would be supernatural insofar as it would be formed and depend intrinsically on a supernatural principle, namely on the habit or act of infused faith: but from that it cannot be said to be intrinsically supernatural. Proof: Neither the habit nor the act of faith concurs efficiently and physically to forming the theological conclusion, just as neither do the premises concur physically to the philosophical conclusion, but the intellect alone is its artisan: therefore the theological act does not depend intrinsically, nor is it formed by the act or habit of faith as by supernatural causes; and thus from that it is not supernatural.

Secondly. Although it would depend physically on the act of infused faith, it should not on that account be said to be intrinsically supernatural; because the acquired habit of faith, generated by the act of infused faith, is not supernatural, as was said above (2. prob. Concl. 1.) although it is formed by that supernatural act: therefore by parity, even if the act of Theology were caused efficiently and physically by the act of faith, it would not from that be intrinsically supernatural.

Thirdly. The theological conclusion is for the most part formed from two premises, of which one is revealed and supernatural: the other philosophical and natural. Therefore, since it always follows the lot of the weaker premise, it cannot from that be said to be supernatural.

Fourthly. That actual knowledge is not supernatural which is formed by a potency and an intellect natural insofar as it is natural: but actual Theology is made in this way. Proof: That act is formed by the intellect insofar as it is natural which is the more perfect the more perfect and perspicacious the intellect eliciting it is: but such is theological knowledge; for it is established that those who have a sharper intellect become more skilled Theologians, and reason more subtly about the mysteries of faith, than those who have been allotted a less subtle mind: therefore, etc.

You will perhaps reply. that this arises from the fact that that intellect is elevated through habitual faith: so that just as the more vigorous intellect of the Blessed, with equal light of glory, sees God more clearly than another would see who had equal light, but unequal activity; so by way of analogy the more vigorous intellect of the wayfarer, equipped with the habit of faith, discourses about things more subtly than another.

On the contrary. The intellect of the Blessed which is of lesser natural activity, but has more of the light of glory, beholds God more clearly than one who would have greater natural activity and less light of glory: therefore, for the reply to stand and the parity to hold, it would be necessary that those who have a more abundant and more perfect faith would also have a greater facility for discoursing on divine and theological matters; but experience testifies that this is false; for from a more perfect and greater habit of faith a greater capacity for explaining and perceiving theological matters is not gathered; for many unlettered and uneducated persons for the most part obtain a more perfect faith than the more skilled and more learned: therefore, etc.

You will say. Every act which has a supernatural object is supernatural; for habits are specified by acts, and acts by the object: but theological acts have a supernatural object, since they are concerned either with God, or with the mysteries of faith, which are supernatural both in entity and in the mode of cognition, since they become known through the light of faith: therefore they are supernatural.

I distinguish the major. If the act is concerned with a supernatural object insofar as it is supernatural, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But the act of Theology is not concerned with God nor with the mysteries of faith precisely insofar as they are supernatural, but as certain; and Theology, regarding the articles of faith as its principles, does not consider in them precisely the notion of supernaturalness, but of certainty, so as to infer from them a certain conclusion. Hence if those articles could have that certainty, which they have through the supernatural light of faith, through a light which would be natural, Theology would elicit its conclusions from them no less: therefore, since it is per accidens that the object of Theology is supernatural, it does not from that follow that its act is supernatural, since it does not regard the object insofar as it is supernatural.

You will insist. The act of faith is not terminated at its object precisely as supernatural either, but only as certain; nor is it on that account any less intrinsically supernatural: therefore by parity, although the theological act does not regard its object precisely as supernatural, it will be no less supernatural.

I deny the antecedent. For although the act of faith is not explicitly terminated at the supernaturalness of its object; nevertheless it regards it at least implicitly, because since the object of faith can in no way be attained by the powers of nature, it is necessary that faith regard it insofar as it is supernatural. But it is otherwise with Theology, which, since it supposes that object already known through faith, does not attend in it to the supernaturalness, but only to the certainty, so as to infer its conclusions from it. These things will be revealed more evidently.

Three things are to be resolved in the present question. 1. Whether theological conclusions, and the assent given to them, is more certain than the assent which one gives to the natural and evident sciences. 2. Whether theological assent has the same certainty as the assent of faith. 3. Whether the theological act and habit is more worthy than the natural sciences.

Note 1. Philosophers commonly distinguish a threefold certainty: of object, of subject, and of motive. Certainty of object is the immobility and invariability of the thing in itself; which is twofold, namely the immutability of essence and of existence, which belongs to God alone, and the invariability of an essential proposition, by which there is a necessary connection of predicate with subject. And this in turn is either Metaphysical, by which a thing cannot be otherwise even by divine power, e.g. man is certainly a rational animal; or Physical, by which a proposition is at least naturally always true, e.g. every fire burns. Subjective certainty is the firm adherence of the intellect to some known object, which is thought to be true although it is not such; by which it happens that some adhere more firmly and tenaciously to a false proposition, which they think to be true: e.g. heretics, more firmly than others would adhere to a true one. Hence Arist. 7. Ethic. 3. says: There are those who believe their own opinion no less than others believe their own science. But this is better called obstinacy than certainty. Finally, certainty of motive is the infallible connection of the known means with the thing which is known. This connection, moreover, appears either through experience, of which kind is the certainty we have that every fire is hot: or from the evidence of natural light, of which kind is the certainty concerning first principles: or through a due inference from evident principles, of which kind is the certainty of a conclusion duly inferred from evident premises: or finally through the revelation of someone truthful, of which kind is the certainty of faith, which rests on the truthfulness of God revealing.

Note 2. from our Aureolus, q. 2. of the Prologue, art. 2., a threefold process and inference is made in Theology: for sometimes one proceeds to a conclusion known from elsewhere, as when it is asked whether God is one and infinite, for these things are evident through Metaphysics: but sometimes one proceeds to a conclusion to be believed, about which it has not yet been determined what is to be believed, as when it is asked whether the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son, if He did not proceed from Him: but sometimes to a conclusion already believed and determined, as when it is asked whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the truth of which the Church has already determined in the general Councils.

Note 3. From the same author, in the same place, that the second mode of inferring and proceeding can take place in four ways. 1. For a conclusion can be inferred from one believed proposition and another necessary one: e.g. Christ is a man, but man is a rational animal: therefore Christ is a rational animal; the first proposition is believed, and the second is necessary. 2. From two believed ones, e.g. Christ is blessed, but the blessed see God face to face: therefore, etc. 3. From one believed proposition and another probable one; e.g. Christ has a true body, but a true body has a substantial form distinct from the rational soul: therefore, etc. For the first proposition stands by faith: but the second is discussed and debated on both sides among the Scotists affirming and the Thomists denying and contending that in the human body, besides the rational soul, there is no other form than that of a cadaver.

4. From two probable ones, e.g.: The essence of quantity consists in the extension of parts in relation to one another: but Christ in the Eucharist has quantity: therefore also the extension of parts in relation to one another. Therefore, etc. It is certain, moreover, that from two probable premises, or from one believed and another probable one, only opinion is formed and generated; because the conclusion follows the lot of the premises, and especially the condition of the weaker premise; for a cause cannot bestow on its effect any perfection which it itself does not have; whence, since the premises are the cause of the conclusion, such will be the conclusion as is the less certain and less perfect premise. But whether from two believed propositions, or from one believed and another necessary one, supernatural faith is generated, as Aureolus holds in the same place; or whether there is generated a theological habit midway between faith and science, which is more certain than science, and less certain than faith, as the Doctor affirms in 3. d. 24. n. 20., this is to be resolved here.

First conclusion. — The theological conclusion, which is deduced either from two revealed and believed premises, or from one necessary and another revealed one, is more certain by certainty of object and of motive than any natural science; but not by certainty of subject. This conclusion has two parts, of which

Proof of the first. That knowledge is more certain by certainty of object and of motive which is borne toward a more immutable object, and through a firmer and more certain motive: but Theology is concerned with God, who has greater certainty and immobility and necessity of being than the objects of the natural sciences; it also tends toward Him through a means and motive firmer than the motives of the natural sciences; since it rests on revealed principles believed by divine faith, which certainly have far greater certainty than the principles known by natural light, on which the natural sciences are supported; for Christ says, Lucae 21: Heaven and earth will pass away; but my words will not pass away. Therefore, etc. Hence Augustine, 7. Confess. cap. 10: I heard, as one hears in the heart, and there was absolutely nothing from which I could doubt: and I would more readily doubt that I live, than that truth does not exist.

Second. Supernatural and divine certainty is far greater than any natural certainty: but theological knowledge has divine and supernatural certainty on the part of the object and of the motive; while the natural sciences have only natural certainty, and that from purely natural causes. Therefore the former is more certain than these.

Third. That which rests on the first and essential truth is more certain than that which is founded only on participated truth: but Theology rests on the first truth, namely the revelation of God; while the natural sciences rest on creatures, which have only participated truth: therefore, etc.

Fourth. Absolute and necessary certainty is greater and more excellent than contingent and hypothetical certainty: but the certainty of Theology is absolute and necessary on the part of the object, which it is impossible to change, and of the motive, to which it is repugnant that falsity underlie it; while the certainty of the natural sciences is hypothetical and contingent, since their existence and entity depend entirely on the free ordination of God. Therefore, etc.

The second part is also evident. First. That certainty is greater by reason of the subject by which the intellect excludes every movement of doubt: but experience shows that the intellect excludes absolutely every doubt while it assents to a conclusion evidently deduced from an evidently known principle, such as this one; e.g. The whole is greater than its part; but while it assents to a conclusion deduced from revealed principles, it sometimes suffers doubt and anxiety. For the firmness of the intellect assenting to a theological conclusion cannot be greater than when it assents by faith to an immediately revealed proposition: but when it assents by faith, it sometimes does not exclude every doubt; for the Doctor says in 3. d. 23. n. 15: Faith does not exclude every doubt, but the doubt drawing toward the opposite of the believable. This also the Lord Christ indicates while rebuking the Disciples, Matth. 8., He says: Why are you fearful, O you of little faith? And in cap. 14., addressing Peter: O you of little faith, why did you doubt? Therefore by reason of the subject, Theology is less certain than the natural sciences.

Second. That certainty is greater on the part of the subject which quiets and strengthens the intellect more, and is connatural and proportioned to it: but the certainty of the natural sciences, since it has evidence joined to it, quiets and satisfies the intellect more, and is more connatural to its way of operating, than the certainty of faith, which transcends the powers of the intellect and has obscurity joined to it. Whence it happens that the intellect must put off its natural mode of knowing, and as it were be deprived and stripped of its native privileges, while it gives assent to a revealed proposition. Hence St. Paul calls that assent the captivity of the intellect, 2. Corinth. 10: Leading every intellect captive into the obedience of Christ. Therefore, etc.

You will object 1. against the first part: A habit which is certain in every respect is to be called simply more certain than one which suffers uncertainty in some part of itself: but the habit of natural science is certain in every respect, namely of object, subject and motive; while the habit of Theology is indeed always certain on the part of object and motive; but for the most part uncertain on the part of subject: therefore the latter is less certain than the former.

I distinguish the major. it is more certain in itself, I deny; in relation to us, I concede. And so the certainty of a habit (as has been said) can be considered in two ways; either as to itself and according to the infallibility of object and motive; or as to us and according to the facility and firmness of the assent toward which our intellect inclines. In the former way, a habit is the more certain and firmer the more the object and motive are infallible and necessary. In the latter, however, beyond the infallibility of the object, it is also required that such certainty be more proportioned and connatural to our intellect, and that the intellect be more quieted in that assent and exclude natural doubt and hesitation; which is indeed brought about through the scientific habit on account of its natural evidence. Whence this habit is more certain than the theological habit in relation to us, on account of the weakness of our intellect, which adheres more to an evident proposition, and on account of the natural motive, than on account of the supernatural motive; not that the latter is less certain than the former, but because it is not equally connatural.

You will say 2. That which is the cause of the certainty of the theological conclusion is more certain than the conclusion itself: but natural principles, and the conclusions of the natural sciences, are often causes of the certainty of the theological conclusion: therefore these are more certain. The major is evident from that philosophical maxim: That because of which each thing is such, is itself more so. The minor is also evident, for in a theological demonstration often one of the premises is scientific and known by natural light alone.

I distinguish the major. An adequate cause, I concede: but an inadequate one, I deny: and with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. For the natural premise is only an inadequate cause of the theological conclusion; and it becomes an adequate cause of it insofar as it is joined to the other revealed premise, which since it is more certain than every scientific conclusion, also confers greater certainty on the theological conclusion than that scientific and natural premise would confer.

You will insist. From what has been said in the proof of the preceding conclusion, and from the common axiom of the Dialecticians, The conclusion always follows the weaker premise: therefore where one premise in the theological discourse is natural, the certainty of the conclusion must also be natural, and consequently it is not more certain than the natural sciences; nay, it is less certain, since it lacks evidence.

The Authors commonly respond to this objection that the aforesaid axiom is true when the two premises are of the same order and influence the assent to the conclusion equally: but in the theological discourse, they say, only the revealed premise is the cause of the assent to the conclusion; since the conclusion is resolved into it alone; while the natural premise seems only an applicative and explicative condition of the revealed premise and of the supernatural principle, so that the intellect may give assent to the conclusion with greater facility.

But since from this reply it seems to follow that an opinative and probable premise, together with another premise of faith, would have supernatural certainty: and likewise that the assent to the theological conclusion would be the same as the assent to a proposition of faith, which the following conclusion will show to be plainly false, therefore others respond that the conclusion follows the weaker part in those premises which exclude the partnership of the other, so that if one proposition is negative, the conclusion must also be negative, because it cannot be partly affirmative and partly negative; similarly if one premise is particular, the conclusion must also be particular, because it cannot be at the same time particular and universal; for the reason that the particular and the universal fight with one another, and one does not admit the partnership of the other. But in those premises which do not exclude the partnership of the other, the conclusion should not participate more in the weaker proposition than in the more certain and more valid one, from which it is drawn: but it is evident that natural light does not exclude the partnership of the light of faith as to causing the theological conclusion: therefore it is not necessary that the theological conclusion follow the less certain proposition.

I answer. with our Smising, qu. 1. n. 115., that for the truth of the aforesaid axiom it suffices that the conclusion does not equal the perfection of the nobler and more valid premise, but it is not necessary that the conclusion be as imperfect as the premise of lesser perfection. For just as in natural things, a mule born from a horse and a she-ass is indeed more imperfect than the horse, although it is more perfect than the she-ass; so (if we may sketch spiritual things from these cruder shadows) we can say that the theological assent caused by a revealed premise and by another evident one is indeed less certain than the revealed one: but on account of the partnership with the revealed one, it is more certain than the evident natural premise; and so the theological conclusion deduced from them is more certain than any natural science.

You will say 3. The certainty of the theological conclusion does not arise immediately from the revealed premise, but only through the discourse by which it is deduced from such a premise: but the discourse is not more certain in Theology than in the natural sciences; since it rests on the same natural light and the same rules of the syllogism: therefore neither will the theological conclusion be more certain than the others.

I distinguish the minor. The theological discourse is the same as the scientific one, as to form and method, I concede: as to the matter and the things about which it treats, I deny: for since the matter of the theological discourse is far more certain than the matter of the natural sciences on account of the revealed premises, it comes about that the theological conclusion is also more certain than the others: just as among the sciences themselves, although the mode of discoursing is the same, yet since the matter of one science is more certain and more necessary than the matter of another, it also comes about that one science is more certain than another.

You will say 4. If theological knowledge is more certain than the natural sciences, it follows equally that it is more certain than the assent to the first principles, especially this one: Anything either is or is not, and the other: The first truth can neither deceive nor be deceived: but this cannot be said; since the revealed premises rest on these two principles, and consequently are less certain than them, because that because of which each thing is such, is itself more so.

I deny the minor. For the revealed premises, insofar as they are revealed, are more certain than any first principle, nor are they supported by any discourse: for it must be known that by the same act by which one assents to some proposition through faith, by the same one dissents from the opposite proposition; and so by the very fact that something is proposed as it is, its opposite is at the same time proposed not to be; wherefore this proposition: Everything is, or is not, is contained in the revealed propositions, and is revealed virtually in those articles which are proposed as existing.

Likewise, the same faith which moves us to believe something on account of the first infallible truth, consequently moves us to believe that there exists a first infallible truth.

Second conclusion. — The theological assent is less certain than the assent of faith.

This is the teaching of the Doctor in many places, especially in 3. dist. 24. quaest. unica, n. 16. and 20.

Proof first. From Aristotle 1. Posteriorum, the certainty of the assent to a conclusion nowhere equals the certainty of the premises, because that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so: but a theological conclusion is certain only on account of the premises, one of which is of faith: therefore the premises of a theological conclusion are by that very fact more certain.

Secondly. The motive of certainty is not equal in the theological assent and in the assent of faith: therefore the latter is more certain than the former. The antecedent is proved: The motive of the assent of faith is pure and immediate divine revelation without any reasoning; the motive, however, for assenting to a theological conclusion is only mediated, virtual and complex revelation, that is, one involving natural reasoning: but pure and immediate revelation is far more certain than that which is known only mediately through reasoning. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. No theologian gives as firm an assent to theological conclusions as to propositions of faith, as is evident to everyone: therefore the two assents are not of equal certainty.

Fourthly. The theological assent cannot be of equal certainty with the assent of faith, unless it proceeds from the habit of faith: but it does not proceed from it: therefore it is not of equal certainty with it. The major is certain: for either the habit of faith should move one to this equally certain assent, or some other habit which would have the same or an equal certainty with the habit of faith: but no such other habit is given which is of equal certainty with the habit of faith: therefore it would be necessary that the theological assent proceed from the habit of faith. The minor is proved: the theological habit is distinct from the habit of faith: therefore the theological assent does not proceed from the habit of faith. The consequence is evident, because the theological assent is made only by an intellect informed by the theological habit.

The antecedent is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, book 14. De Trinit. cap. 1., where, after having said that by the theological habit faith is generated, nourished, defended and strengthened, he adds:

Many of the faithful do not abound in this knowledge, although they abound greatly in faith itself: for it is one thing to know merely what a man ought to believe in order to obtain the blessed life, which is none other than eternal; but it is another thing to know how this very same thing both helps the devout and is defended against the impious.

Whence the Doctor, in the cited place n. 20., weighing these words of St. Augustine, says:

I say that the simple believe implicitly all things which the Church believes, and neither know how to explain nor to defend the faith; those same ones who do not know have a habit distinct from faith, but not by another light than faith: Nor does that habit rest upon principles evidently known in some light: Yet many of the faithful do not abound in this habit, because that habit is distinct from faith; it is not, however, science as described by the Philosopher.

From these things it is evident how wrongly some affirm that the Doctor asserts that the habit of faith is the same as the theological habit.

You will say 1. That proposition is of equal certainty with faith, such that whoever denies it is a heretic: but whoever denies a proposition deduced from the principles of faith is a heretic: therefore etc. The minor is proved: The Monothelites were condemned in the sixth Council for this reason, that they denied that there are two wills in Christ: but that there are two wills in Christ is gathered and established only through this theological reasoning: Where there are two intellectual natures, there are two wills; but in Christ there are two intellectual natures, namely the divine and the human: therefore also two wills. And hence whoever denies a theological conclusion is a heretic.

I distinguish the minor. Whoever denies a theological conclusion precisely as it is theological, that is, insofar as it is inferred through theological reasoning, is a heretic, I deny; insofar as that proposition which he denies is also immediately revealed, I concede. But to the proof I say that it is equally immediately revealed that there are two wills in Christ, as it is immediately revealed that there are in him two natures, divine and human; because it is impossible for an intellectual nature to be severed from its intellect and its will, since it is called intellectual and free from intellect and will.

Whence the Monothelites were rightly condemned as heretics, not because they denied a theological conclusion; but because they refused to admit a proposition that was immediately, at least implicitly, revealed.

But in order that all those things which can be objected against this conclusion may be solved without difficulty

Note 1. With our Smising, q. 1. n. 16., a theological conclusion can be considered: either insofar as it is inferred through reasoning, and thus it is not of faith, nor would one who denied it be a heretic: or insofar as it is also immediately revealed, and thus it is to be called a proposition of faith, not however a theological conclusion: or insofar as it is contained in a revealed proposition, so that it is apprehended as altogether the same with it, e.g., if someone, having heard this syllogism: Every supposit having a twofold spiritual nature has two wills; but the supposit of Christ has a twofold spiritual nature: therefore two wills. If someone (I say) apprehends these two propositions, to have a twofold nature, and to have two wills, as one connected thing, and attributes that connected thing to Christ, he will believe that there are two wills in Christ, with the same faith by which he believes that there are in him two natures, although the connection of those two propositions appears to him through reasoning. But if he judges those propositions to be distinct, and conceives that it is one thing to have two natures, and another to have two wills, and infers this latter proposition from the former only by the light of natural reasoning, then if he denies it, he will not be a heretic, because he considers that proposition not as immediately revealed, but only as inferred from a revealed one.

Note 2. One proposition can be deduced from premises in two ways: 1. By way of persuasion, when the reasoning is not so much illative as explicative of terms. E.g., if someone inferred that since Christ is a true man, consequently he is a rational animal, in this way: Every man is a rational animal: Christ is a man: therefore he is a rational animal: for since man and rational animal are formally the same, this conclusion is regarded not so much as an inference as an exposition of terms. 2. By way of inference, when the conclusion is inferred from an ordered connection of the premises. E.g., if someone inferred that Christ is capable of laughter from the fact that he is a man, and every man is capable of laughter; for although risibility is really identified with man, it is not however formally identified; for it is a property formally distinct from the essence of man. The first conclusion would be of faith; the second, however, not.

Third conclusion. — Our theology is more worthy than any natural science.

This conclusion is plainly evident; both because theology regards a more excellent object, namely divine and supernatural things which by their dignity transcend reason; the other sciences, however, are occupied with natural things and with those which are subject to reason: and because it has greater certainty; for the other sciences borrow their certainty from natural light alone, which is often liable to error; theology, however, rests upon the first truth, which can neither be deceived nor deceive: and finally because the other sciences serve it as handmaids, and it uses them to disclose, confirm and commend its own truths. Whence Prov. 9. it is said of this divine wisdom, that it sent its handmaids to call to the citadel.

You will say 1. Evidence is a perfection of science: and hence the more evident the sciences will be, the more perfect they will be: but the natural sciences are more evident than theology: therefore also more perfect.

I distinguish the major. Evidence is a perfection of science in a certain respect and in order to a greater perfection, I concede: simply and absolutely, I deny. For evidence is ordered to certainty, which is the greatest perfection of science, whence the more certain a science will be, the more perfect it will be: but it is established that theology is more certain than the other sciences: therefore also more excellent.

You will say 2. That science is more excellent which attains its object in a more perfect way; but the natural sciences attain their object in a more perfect way than theology: for they uncover and lay open the nature of their object and all its parts and properties; this one, however, perceives scarcely anything of the nature of its object: therefore it is more imperfect than they.

I distinguish the major. If it beholds a more excellent or an equally worthy object, I concede: if a less perfect one, I deny: theology, however, considers a more excellent object than the natural sciences: But it is nobler to attain a little of the nobler subjects, than much of others; as from Aristotle 2. De animalibus, the Doctor reports in 3. dist. 23. at the end. With this agrees D. Thomas, quaest. 1. of the Prologue, article 5., saying: The least that can be had of the knowledge of the most exalted things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge which is had of the least things.

Or I say with the same Doctor in the same place, that the dignity of an act can be considered either absolutely and in itself; or relatively and according to the attainment of the object about which it is engaged. In the former way, theological knowledge is nobler than philosophical knowledge, because it arises from more sublime principles and is occupied with a nobler object: in the latter way, however, philosophical knowledge can be said to be more perfect, because it attains and comprehends its object more perfectly. Just as, e.g., the vision of the sun by the eagle is said to be in itself more perfect than the vision of a candle by my eye; because the former is from a more perfect and keener power and is about a more excellent object: the latter, however, is said to be more perfect according to attainment, because my eye is more proportioned to its object, namely the candle, and comprehends its object better by sight, than the eye of the eagle is proportioned to the sun.

THREE things are proposed to be resolved in the present question. 1. Whether theology proceeds in a philosophical manner by inferring and proving conclusions from premises. 2. Since the truth of the theological conclusion depends on the truth of the premises, it is asked whether, when those principles are denied, the theologian can prove them by arguments: 3. Whether the theological habit, by which the intellect is directed to infer theological conclusions, makes it adhere to and give assent to the conclusion deduced from the premises, in such a way that, the premises being granted, the intellect cannot dissent from the conclusion; or whether this habit is only explicative and declarative of the truths of faith, as Aureolus held in q. 2. of the Prologue: which, that they may appear more evidently

Note 1. An argument is a discourse in which a less known proposition is inferred from a more known one; whether meanwhile that proposition is known by natural light or by supernatural light: whether it is evident or only certain. In an argument, moreover, there are three things: 1. The antecedent, and it is the proposition from which another is inferred. 2. The consequent, and it is the proposition which is inferred from another. 3. The consequence, in which the connection of the antecedent with the consequent is made. Furthermore, an argument requires a twofold judgment of the intellect; the first, by which it judges that the consequent has a necessary connection with the antecedent, and it is called the judgment of the consequent: the second, by which it judges that the consequent is legitimately inferred from the antecedent according to syllogistic rules, and it is named the judgment of the consequence. But the essence of an argument consists in the former judgment, not in the latter, as we have proved more than enough in Logica nostra.

Note 2. Something can be proved in two ways: namely, either through an extrinsic locus, when indeed the adversary concedes some proposition, from which, once conceded, another is inferred; thus, because the Jews admit the Old Testament and the Calvinists the New, from the Old Testament the theologian proves the incarnation of Christ against the Jews; and from the New he proves that the body of Christ is really in the Eucharist against the heretics denying it: or through an intrinsic locus: namely, through arguments sought from reason and natural light; which moreover is done either positively or negatively. The positive proof occurs when through some assumed medium the necessary connection of the predicate with the subject is shown in that which is affirmed; the negative, however, when it is opened up and established that there is no contradiction and repugnance in that which is affirmed. But this proof is more rightly called the solution of objections than the exhibition of reasons.

All, however, agree that the theologian can prove his principles through an extrinsic locus, as was just said. They likewise agree that those principles cannot be proved positively, since they are not known by natural light, but are believed by faith alone. Whence it remains to be discussed whether at least they can be proved evidently in a negative way.

Note 3. The premises are causes of the conclusion either in being, when the middle term is the cause why the predicate belongs to the subject; thus, rational is the cause why risible belongs to man; or in knowing, when the medium leads into the knowledge of the union of the predicate with the subject; thus, risible indicates that rational belongs to man. Since, however, every cause virtually contains its effect, the premises virtually involve the conclusion; whence it happens that the assent of the premises virtually embraces the assent of the conclusion, so that he who has given assent to the premises cannot deny it to the conclusion, as the Doctor proves in 1. d. 1. q. 4. n. 16.

First conclusion. — Our theology is argumentative.

It is proved first indeed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, 2. ad Timotheum, 3: All Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching and for reproving; and likewise ad Titum 1: A bishop ought to be... holding fast the faithful word which is according to doctrine, so that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict. Moreover, Sap. 8. the wise man, and the theologian, knows the subtleties of discourses and the solutions of arguments.

Secondly, the same thing is clear by example; first indeed of Christ, the prince and parent of theologians, who frequently argued against the Scribes and Pharisees opposing him; thus Matth. 19. he proves the indissolubility of marriage from that passage of Genes. 2: For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and will cleave to his wife, and they will be two in one flesh, from which he infers: what therefore God has joined, let not man separate. Likewise cap. 22. from these words of Psal. 109. The Lord said to my Lord, he infers that the Messiah is not a pure man, nor only the son of David, but also God, in that David calls him Lord; which name the Pharisees conceded to be proper to God; and cap. 12. from Psalmo 8. and 117. he proves that he is the Messiah: for when the Pharisees and the Priests complained that the children in the temple were acclaiming him as the blessed of the Lord, he answered: Have you indeed never read that out of the mouth of infants and sucklings you have perfected praise?

Likewise the Apostles frequently argued, especially St. Paul, who almost everywhere constructs arguments in order to persuade the evangelical truths, but especially in 1. ad Corinth. c. 15., rising up against the Pseudo-Apostles who asserted that there would be no resurrection of the dead, he argues thus:

But if the resurrection of the dead is not: then neither has Christ risen: but if Christ has not risen, then our preaching is vain, and your faith is also vain; and we are found also false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony against God, that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise up, if the dead do not rise: for if the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; and if Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, for you are still in your sins: therefore also those who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished.

In this repeated argumentation, however, he assumes the resurrection of Christ as the medium for proving the resurrection of the other men, in that there is not required in God greater strength and power for raising the other dead than for raising Christ.

You will say 1. St. Ambrose in lib. 1. De Fide says: Take away arguments from here where faith is sought; but faith is sought to be strengthened and protected through theology. And in the last chapter of John: These things are written that you may believe. He does not say that you may dispute and argue. Whence Tertullian in lib. De praescript. cap. 7. says: We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel: when we believe, we desire to believe nothing further.

I answer. St. Ambrose there treats only of the assent of faith, which is supported not by human reason and natural arguments, but by the word of God, whence he adds: It is not believed by Philosophers, it is believed by fishermen, it is not believed by Dialecticians, it is believed by Publicans. For he acts there against the Arians, who attacked the divinity of Christ the Lord with many natural reasons. He does not, however, judge that every argumentation should be banished and removed from Christians, since he himself in the same place uses arguments drawn from Sacred Scripture against the Arians. In the same way satisfaction is made to the words of Tertullian, for he himself does not disapprove of argumentative doctrine, which he employs in all his writings; but he contends only that the mysteries of faith are not to be measured and investigated by natural reasons.

You will say 2. If theology is argumentative, it will argue either by authority or by reason: but neither can be said. Not by authority, because, says Boetius, the locus from authority is less efficacious and weak, and hence it does not suit the dignity and firmness of theology. Nor by reason, because this is opposed to the end of theology; for it empties the merit of faith; for as St. Gregory says: Faith has no merit, where human reason supplies proof.

I answer. Theology argues from authority, not indeed human and fallible, but divine and truthful, for it rests upon the revelation of God himself, to which it is repugnant that falsity be subject; but to argue from divine and infallible authority does not disgrace the dignity and firmness of theology. It likewise uses human reason as an extrinsic principle, so that natural reason serves faith, and illustrates it as far as possible.

Second conclusion. — Theology can argue, so as to prove positively that its principles are credible: not, however, so as to demonstrate that they are naturally possible.

This conclusion has two parts, of which the first

It is proved 1. That can be shown evidently credible which can be shown not to involve contradiction and repugnance, and which has valid and firm motives of credibility: but such is the case with the principles of theology; since all the arguments and all the contradictions which are wont to be urged against the articles of faith can be resolved; as in fact all the holy Fathers and the sacred Doctors resolved the entanglements urged by the Philosophers against the faith. Likewise many motives are supplied by which the articles of faith appear credible, of which sort are the miracles wrought in confirmation of the faith, the declaration and universal consensus of the visible Church, the sanctity of its doctrine and morals, the assent of the most learned in every age, etc.

Moreover, from St. Bonaventure, prooemial quaest. 2.: We ought to be ready to give a reason to everyone asking of the faith which is in us, says St. Peter in 1. Epist. cap. 3. Since, therefore, there are many who attack our faith, it is necessary that we establish it through reason in an inquisitive and argumentative manner.

Thirdly. From the same: The truths of our faith are not of a worse condition than other truths: but other truths have this, that they can be defended through reason, just as they can also be attacked: therefore the same is to be said of the truths of our faith.

Fourthly. From the same. Our faith is not now of a worse condition than in the beginning: but in the beginning, when it was attacked through the false miracles of the Magi, it was defended through the true miracles of the Saints: therefore, since it is now attacked through the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended through the true arguments of the Doctors.

The latter part likewise stands: since the mysteries of faith exceed the natural capacity of the human mind, natural reason can supply no medium by which those mysteries could be demonstrated to be naturally possible, which I establish thus: Those things which are demonstrated to be naturally possible are contained within the limits of nature and through a medium naturally known: but the principles of theology are not contained within the limits of nature, since they cannot be made by any natural agent; nor is there any medium naturally known that could establish them; for every medium by which the possibility of a thing is demonstrated must be intrinsic to the thing; and consequently the medium of a supernatural thing, such as the mysteries are, cannot be naturally known.

You will say 1. The mysteries of faith, which are the principles of theology, can be proved positively to be credible: therefore also to be possible. The consequence is clear, for nothing is credible unless it is likewise possible; because nothing is credible unless it is true, and nothing is true unless it is possible or existing; for the impossible, since it is not a being, is likewise not true, because truth is a property of being.

I deny the consequence. For although what is credible is also possible, it does not however follow from this that the possibility of the thing can be proved in the same way: it is proved through a medium extrinsic to the thing believed, for instance through the authority of the one speaking, miracles, etc.; but possibility must be proved through a medium intrinsic to the thing known, by which it is proved that the predicate can belong to the subject. Whence, although there are positive external media by which the credibility of the mysteries is proved, it does not follow that there are likewise positive intrinsic media, naturally known, by which their possibility is demonstrated.

You will say 2. The mysteries of faith can be proved not to be impossible: therefore they can be proved to be possible, because between being possible and being impossible no middle is given; and hence if a thing is not impossible, it follows that it is possible.

I deny the consequence. Likewise also its proof, since, as the Philosopher observes and warns, lib. De interpretatione, cap. 3., possible and impossible are not precisely contradictories, because each is affirmative. Then, although perhaps a parte rei nothing lies between a thing being possible and impossible; nevertheless between a thing being able to be demonstrated possible and being able to be demonstrated impossible there is given a middle, namely, not being able to be demonstrated possible, nor being able to be demonstrated impossible, namely while no urgent reasons appear by which the possibility or impossibility of the thing is established. And hence, although the mysteries of faith can be naturally proved not to be impossible, it does not follow that their being possible can be naturally demonstrated.

Third conclusion. — The theological habit is not only explicative of the articles of faith; but also illative and adhaesive.

It is proved first. If theology were only explicative of the Scriptures, as Aureolus holds, one would not arrive at theological knowledge through faith; rather, that knowledge itself would lead to faith as if by the hand: but this is false, for St. Augustine says in serm. 51. De verbis Domini: Receive thus, believe thus, that you may merit to understand: for faith ought to precede understanding, so that understanding may be the reward of faith; for the Prophet (Isaias, cap. I. according to the version of the 70) most openly said: Unless you believe, you will not understand.

Secondly. If theology were only explicative, any infidel, who gives no assent at all to theological propositions, could be a theologian; for if he had skill in the languages, and applied diligence in reading the Sacred Scriptures, he could explain them, and open their hidden sense; but it is false that he who does not have faith, nor assents to theological conclusions, can be called a theologian, as all admit: therefore etc.

Thirdly. The theological discourse proceeding from believed premises, duly disposed in form and syllogistic figure, generates and confirms a necessary conclusion: therefore it is necessary that the intellect, having given assent to the premises, also assent to the conclusion; because, as was said in the 3rd note, the assent of the conclusion is virtually contained in the assent of the premises, so that the intellect which assents to the premises cannot not consent to the conclusion; and hence it is necessary that the theological habit be adhaesive, and not only declarative of the Scriptures and expositive of the mysteries of faith.

You will say 1. From St. Augustine, lib. 14. De Trinitate, cap. 1., the theological habit is that by which faith is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened: but this is done through the mere literal exposition of Sacred Scripture, not through inference or argumentation. Proof: Through the knowledge of the conclusions the knowledge of the principles is not generated, nor through it is it defended, nourished, strengthened; rather, on the contrary, the knowledge of the conclusions is generated and strengthened through the knowledge of the principles: therefore faith is not generated by deduced conclusions; nor consequently is theology, ordered to generating and nourishing faith, occupied in inferring conclusions.

I answer. Theology indeed fulfills not only the office of science, by deducing and inferring conclusions from believed principles; but also sometimes performs and supplies the role of the habit of principles, insofar as it is occupied with the mysteries of faith which are its principles, namely that it illustrate, explain, and defend them, partly through the explicative knowledge of Scripture, partly through the knowledge of argumentation: but from this it does not follow that, once it has explained and grasped such principles, it cannot deduce conclusions from them.

You will say 2. The whole theology of the holy Fathers is engaged in the exposition of Sacred Scripture, whether they expound books expressly, or on occasion, disputing with heretics, they draw forth some texts from it, or they clarify the Sacred Scriptures twisted by heretics into a perverse sense: therefore the adequate office of theology is to unlock and expound the mysteries of faith hidden in Sacred Scripture.

It is confirmed. By the authority of St. Dionysius, in the book De divinis nominibus, cap. 1.: By no reason (he says) is it to be presumed to say or think anything about the supersubstantial and most secret Deity, beyond those things which the sacred utterances have handed down to us.

I answer. Indeed the holy Fathers were wont to use expository theology, yet they did not neglect the argumentative and illative one, as is clear from their writings, and as we proved in the third quaest. of the first art.

To St. Dionysius. I say that he understands by the sacred utterances not only Sacred Scripture, but also those things which have been deduced from the sacred letters, as another version of his work has it.

It is certain, however, that theology is occupied either in expounding Sacred Scripture, or in inferring from it conclusions for the clearer understanding and persuasion of the mysteries.

Since Aristotle in the Topicis set forth certain common principles from which philosophers could draw the material of their arguments, as from a storehouse, and which for this reason he judged should be called the places, seats, and dwellings of arguments; so theologians establish certain principles for themselves, from which they derive arguments in drawing out and confirming their truths.

Note moreover 1. The Theological loci can be considered either according to a looser or according to a stricter usage. In the former way, ten are commonly numbered, namely the authority of 1. Sacred Scripture; 2. the Traditions of Christ the Lord and of His Apostles; 3. the Catholic Church; 4. the Councils, especially the approved general ones; 5. the Supreme Pontiff decreeing deliberately and with Pontifical authority; 6. the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church; 7. the Scholastic Doctors and the experts in pontifical law; 8. the natural philosophers, and the counsellors of Caesarean law; 9. human and civil history; 10. natural reasoning. For the theologian flies and ranges through all the aforementioned loci, like a bee, so as to draw out from them the honey of truth by his discourse. — But if the Theological loci are taken strictly, only three will be numbered, namely: 1. Sacred Scripture written in the Old and New Testament; 2. the Tradition of Christ and of the Apostles, to which is referred the common sense of the Fathers in teaching and of the faithful in believing; for by these two things Tradition becomes known; 3. the authority of the Church, which comprises the decrees of the Councils and of the Supreme Pontiffs. These three, moreover, are called the proper and domestic loci of theology; the rest, however, foreign and improper, for the reason that these are supported only by human faith or reason, whereas those rest upon divine revelation and the heavenly illumination and help of the holy Spirit. Since, however, the authority of the Traditions and of the Church must be treated ex professo in the treatise on Faith (God willing), therefore here only certain things concerning Sacred Scripture, from which Theology chiefly draws its truths, are to be sampled.

Note 2. Sacred Scripture cannot be called the principle or the locus of theological arguments except according to its genuine signification. Since, however, words are signs of concepts, and concepts signs of things, it follows that the signification or sense of Sacred Scripture is the concept of the things expressed through the words and terms of the same Scripture. This sense, moreover, is customarily distinguished as threefold, namely 1. the historical or literal, which the letter first impresses upon the mind from the customary signification of the words and the primary institution of men. 2. The mystical or spiritual, which is expressed not indeed by the words, but by the things themselves signified through the words. 3. The accommodative, or by accommodation, when the words of Scripture signifying one thing are taken to signify another, according to the good pleasure and estimation of the one taking them, on account of some suitability which he judges to intervene between the two things.

Note 3. These three senses are again subdivided into others: for the accommodative is one thing by extension, by which the words of Scripture determined to one person are extended also to another: Thus for example the words of Psalm 68, The reproaches of those who reproached you have fallen upon me, which David uttered concerning himself, Paul extends and applies, to the Romans cap. 15., to signify the passion of Christ and the persecution of Christians; whence he adds: Whatever things were written, were written for our doctrine, that through patience and the consolation of the Scriptures we might have hope. And another is by allusion, when we attribute and accommodate the words of Scripture to another thing, although no natural or moral similarity intervenes between those things per se; for example, if someone adapted these words of Psalm 62 to litigating men: They shall enter into the lower parts of the earth, that is, they shall be thrust down into prisons: they shall be delivered into the hands of the sword: that is, the officers shall lay violent hands upon them: they shall be the portions of foxes, that is, their goods and riches shall be squandered by the Procurators and Patrons. — The literal likewise is one thing, the proper, when things are signified by words according to the customary power of signifying and the primary institution of men: the other, the metaphorical, when things are signified by a word from an improper and transferred signification; thus Christ is called metaphorically a lamb, a lion, a rock, etc. — The mystical or spiritual sense likewise, which is contained in the historical and literal as the soul in the body, is threefold: the first is allegorical, when namely the history of the Old Testament signifies something to be done in the New, for example the exaltation of the serpent by Moses, which designated Christ to be exalted on the cross. 2. The tropological or moral, when from the page of the history of the Old Testament we are provoked to compose our morals. 3. The anagogical or bearing upward, when for example the beatitude of the future life is designated through the entrance into the land of promise. All these senses, moreover, are made manifest by the single word Jerusalem, for example; for to the letter it signifies the city of Judea; allegorically, the Church; tropologically, the soul of the just; anagogically, the heavenly homeland. Our Lyranus likewise embraced those senses in these two verses:

The letter teaches deeds: what you should believe, Allegory: The moral, what you should do: what you should hope, Anagogy:

Some have expressed these verses more fully and significantly in the following:

That is called Historic, which the express words designate. And Allegoric, which plays in the ancient shadows. The Moral, by which the norm of living is held. What you should hope, indeed, the Anagogic offers more deeply.

Moreover, it must be known that all these senses are found not only in the Old, but also in the New Testament, as one may gather from many instances: for marriage, for example, signifies the union of Christ with the Church, Ephes. 5.¹ likewise it designates the grace conferred upon spouses, and finally it shadows forth eternal happiness under the signification of nuptials. Furthermore, every action of Christ was our instruction: when he raised the dead, he designated the justification of penitent men; while he enlightened the blind, he figured the effects of evangelical preaching; while he walked upon the sea, he urged us to trample underfoot the storms of this life and to bear the various temptations with a constant mind, etc.

But whether valid arguments can be drawn from all these senses for setting forth and defending the faith is disputed among the theologians: but that what seems truer to us may appear, let it be

First conclusion. — The proper literal sense of Sacred Scripture always affords a firm theological argument.

Proof. And this from St. Paul, 2. to Timothy 3: All Scripture divinely inspired is useful for arguing, etc. But this it chiefly performs through the literal sense; since it is through that sense that it is made most useful for arguing, which points out the truth with easier effort and is evident to all who know the language: but such is the literal sense; inasmuch as for perceiving it the knowledge of the language and of the words with which Sacred Scripture is written suffices alone. For who doubts that from these words of Deuteronomy 6, The Lord our God, the Lord is one, the unity of God is rightly designated? Who does not perceive that those words of John 1, The Word was made flesh, signify the incarnation of the divine Word? Therefore the literal sense is most useful for arguing.

You will say 1. From that sense a firm theological argument cannot be gathered, which is manifold, variable, and wholly uncertain: but such is the literal sense. I prove it: There can be several entirely dissonant literal senses of the same text, as is evident from the first words of the whole of Scripture, In the beginning God created heaven and earth; St. Augustine teaches, lib. 12. of the Confessions cap. 20., that these words can be taken literally in three ways, so that "in the beginning he created" sounds the same as 1. in the Son, or in his eternal wisdom; 2. the same as at the beginning of time; 3. the same as before every other work. Whence he adds at cap. 31:

When one has said: "Moses meant this, which I mean"; and another: "nay, rather that, which I mean"; I judge that I speak more religiously in saying, why not rather both, if both are true? And if a third; if a fourth, and if someone has seen something altogether other and true in these words; why should it not be believed that he saw all those things, through whom the one God tempered the sacred letters with many senses for those who would see true and diverse things?

Therefore he judges that several literal senses can be assigned to the same text. — I answer. The minor can be denied; and as to the authority, I say that of the aforementioned words there is one genuine literal sense, namely that by which it is designated that God from the beginning of times created heaven and earth and the things which are in them; so that the expression "in the beginning" signifies that creatures are not from eternity, but that all were founded together at the beginning of times, as the 4th Lateran Council under Innocent III used the aforementioned words, cap. 1: God, he says, from the beginning of time created both creatures out of nothing, the corporeal and the spiritual, the angelic and the human. Whence the other two senses are foreign, and are not to be called truly literal.

You will say 2. From that sense a firm argument cannot be deduced, which is darkened by such great obscurity that it can scarcely be detected and grasped: but such is the literal sense, as all the holy Interpreters confess, who for that reason affirm Sacred Scripture to be that Book sealed with seven seals, Apocalypse 5., so that no one besides the Lamb is found worthy, neither in heaven nor on earth nor under the earth, to open the book and loose its seals; for the divine truth lying hidden in it made darkness its hiding place: therefore from that sense a valid argument cannot be drawn. — I distinguish the minor. In some contexts, which do not chiefly serve to persuade and open up the Catholic truths, I concede: in those which the theologians need in order to persuade and defend those truths, I deny. I confess indeed that Sacred Scripture is sometimes filled with manifold obscurity, and that for various reasons, which the Holy Fathers gather together and disclose. — First, indeed, says St. Jerome, that we should humbly press upon God with redoubled prayers to attain its understanding. Second, lest it should become cheap to us through too great ease, says St. Gregory Third, that through the labor and difficulty of attaining the sense (says Clement of Alexandria) our pride, too much pleasing to itself, should be broken and blunted. Fourth, finally, says St. Dionysius, lest our mysteries should become manifest to the infidels, and be exposed to their mockery.

You will ask, by what indications can the literal sense be distinguished and detected? — I answer. For detecting it, the following rules are especially to be observed: 1. If the text openly coheres with the antecedents and consequents. 2. That is to be judged the genuine and literal sense which has been determined either by the Councils, or by the Supreme Pontiffs, or has been used by the Apostles themselves to express something literally. 3. When it is received and understood with the consensus of the Fathers. 4. If it does not directly conflict with another text; for it cannot happen that truth is opposed to truth. 5. Finally, when the words enunciate nothing which disagrees and differs from the doctrine of faith and the right rule of morals, as St. Augustine indicates, lib. 2. De Doctrina Christiana, cap. 10: Whatever, he says, in the divine discourse can be referred properly neither to the honesty of morals nor to the truth of faith, let him know that it is figurative.

Second conclusion. — The mystical sense serves sometimes to prove something; the accommodative, however, never.

Proof of the 1st part. Every true sense intended by the Holy Spirit in the reading of the sacred Scriptures can serve to strengthen and explain the truth: but the mystical sense is true and intended by the Holy Spirit: For prophecy was never brought by human will, says St. Peter, 2. c. 1., but holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. It is also ordered to our instruction; For whatever things were written, says St. Paul Rom. 15., were written for our doctrine: therefore, etc. — It is confirmed. That sense which is called the sense and signification of Scripture was designed and sealed together with the literal by the Holy Spirit: but the spiritual and mystical sense is called the sense of Scripture and its signification. I prove it from John 19., where when he had said that Christ's legs had not been broken by the soldiers, he adds: For these things were done that the scripture might be fulfilled: You shall not break a bone of him. But these words were said in the literal sense, Exod. 12., of the paschal lamb: therefore together with the literal sense designating that the bone of the paschal lamb was not to be broken, the mystical and spiritual sense was also confirmed by the Holy Spirit, signifying that the bone of Christ dying on the cross was not to be shattered: for how would Scripture be said to be fulfilled, if it did not involve this sense?

2. That sense can serve for the proof of truth which Christ the Lord and the Apostles for the most part used, that they might intimate the truth and repel falsehood and error: but they for the most part used the mystical sense. Thus John 10., when the Jews accused Christ and wished to stone him, because he had said that he was God and the Son of God, he answers and argues: Is it not written in your law: I said, you are gods? If then he called them gods to whom the word of God was made, and the Scripture cannot be broken; do you say of him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world: you blaspheme, because I said, I am the Son of God? Thus everywhere from the parables he either gathers what is to be followed and what is to be fled, or he argues against and beats back the accusation of the Pharisees insulting him. Likewise the Apostles frequently argue in the mystical sense. Thus St. Paul from these words of Deuteronomy 25, You shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the corn, gathers, 1. Corinth. 9., that the evangelical preacher ought to live by the Gospel. Thus from the fact that Abraham had two sons, Ismael by the handmaid, and Isaac by the free woman, he gathers allegorically, to the Galatians 4., that God is the author of both Testaments, the Old and the New, and the father of two peoples, the Jews and the Gentiles.

3. Just as men use words to bring forth their concepts, so God uses things to disclose and signify future or mystical realities. Nor is there less truth in the things designated and employed by God to signify something, than in the words instituted by men: but words through the literal sense can serve to prove something; therefore also things through their mystical sense. Whence rightly St. Paul, 1. to the Corinthians 10., when he had premised that the Fathers of the Old Testament were all under the cloud, adds: But all these things happened to them in figure. And to the Hebrews 10., after a long and accurate discussion through several chapters of the signs and symbols of the Old Testament with respect to the New, he subjoins this causal supposition: For the law having a shadow of future goods; namely of future goods in the evangelical law, to persuade which he is wholly engaged in that Epistle.

Note, however. That you may dissolve in one word all the things that could be objected: the mystical sense has no force of proof and argumentation, unless it has openly been established that it was so used by Christ or by his Apostles: for since the things on which the mystical sense is chiefly founded have a varied similarity and suitability with other things, they can also bear a varied and doubtful mystical sense. Thus the lion, for example, on account of its rapacity, is used, 1. Peter, 5., to signify the Devil, who is there called a roaring lion: on account of its strength, it designates Christ, who, Apocalyps. 5.² is called the Lion of the tribe of Juda: on account of its ferocity it shadows forth any adversary whatsoever, who, Psal. 16., is called a lion ready for prey; on account of its firmness and constancy, it designates the just man, Proverb. 28.: The just, confident as a lion, shall be without fear. Whence it comes about that in the mystical sense no force is to be placed in proving and arguing, unless it has been established from elsewhere that the thing was used by Christ or by the Apostles to signify that mystically.

The second part is openly evident; since indeed the accommodative sense was not sealed by the Holy Spirit together with the literal, but is taken up by anyone according to the dexterity of his wit and the arbitrament of his mind, it is certain that in it there is no force for proving the things of faith and defending them against those who attack them. Whence St. Jerome, lib. 2. on Matthew, explaining that passage, e. 13., about the leaven which a woman hid in three measures of flour, after he had adapted this similitude to the adorable mystery of the Trinity, adds: A pious sense indeed; but never can the understanding of parables and the doubtful intelligence of enigmas lead to the authority of dogmas. — St. Dionysius has the same, Epistle 9., which is to Titus, where, treating of the manifold and varied mystical sense which Scripture embraces, he says:

This also, moreover, must be understood: that the tradition of the theologians is twofold: one indeed hidden and mystical; the other plain and better known; and that one is contained in signs and prescribes the norm of ceremonies; this one embracing reasoning and philosophical demonstration. That which is open and that which is hidden are also joined and connected: and that indeed proves and confirms the truth of the things which are said: but this one effects and places in God by obscure and ineffable modes and institutions.

By which he indicates that the mystical sense does not always serve for proof; the accommodative, however, never. — Whence St. Augustine, Epistle 48., inveighing against the Donatists, who wished to persuade that the Church remained unharmed and intact in Africa alone, their homeland, from that verse of the Canticles 1., Where you feed, where you lie at midday, after he had in a wonderful manner bandied about and attacked the depraved use of this text, adds: Who, moreover, would not most imprudently strive to interpret something placed in allegory in his own favor, unless he also has manifest testimonies by whose light the obscure things are illustrated?

From these things it is apparent that the literal sense serves chiefly and almost solely theological arguments that conclude with certainty; for since manifest testimonies are rarely at hand by which the obscurity of the mystical sense might be illustrated, hence it comes about that scarcely anything can be gathered with certainty from it for proving Catholic truths; although it serves preachers in a wonderful way for illustrating and commending those truths.

You will ask first, which Edition of the Scriptures could serve the Theologian for proving and confirming his conclusions?

That this little question may be made sufficiently evident, it must be observed that Sacred Scripture was, for the most part, written in the Hebrew idiom. Moreover, that various versions of it existed; the earlier ones indeed were the Chaldean and the Syriac: the Chaldean is called by another name Targum, that is, a paraphrase or interpretation; but the Targum is one thing Babylonian, another Hierosolymitan, which is also called the Samaritan, as our Galatinus observes, lib. 1. Arcanorum cap. 3. The author of the Syriac version is unknown; for that some wish the New Testament to have been translated by Blessed Mark into the Syriac idiom rests on no foundation, for the holy Fathers would without doubt have made mention of this version; yet none of them makes even a slight mention of it, which is an open indication that this version is later than he himself.

But various Greek versions are in circulation, chiefly twelve. For the first is believed to have been before Alexander the Great, as St. Clement of Alexandria indicates, lib. 1. Stromatum, and Eusebius, lib. 9. Praeparationis Evangelicae cap. 3. Whence it happened that the Philosophers drew many things from the Sacred Scriptures; wherefore not without reason B. Cyril, lib. cit., asserts that Plato seems to be a second Moses speaking Attic, and accordingly it is established that in the times of Plato and before Alexander a Greek version already existed, at least of some books of Scripture. But after Alexander several others are counted, namely the Layiana in the times of Ptolemy Lagus; but, as Serrarius notes, cap. 16., this one, like the Herodiana, was supposititious and fabricated by heretics.

The first celebrated version of the Scriptures after Alexander, then, is that which was made by the seventy Interpreters under Ptolemy Philadelphus, the son of Lagus, who three hundred years before Christ, as Genebrardus notes, lib. 2. Chronolog., asked from Eleazar and the whole Church of the Jews and obtained seventy-two Jewish Doctors, namely six from each tribe, who, as the more common opinion holds, placed separately in various cells, translated the Sacred Scriptures in seventy days from the Hebrew into the Greek idiom.

Another is the edition under the name of Aquila, who seems to be the same as Rabbi Onkelos, as Serrarius proves, cap. 11. q. 4., and he was first a Christian from a Gentile and soon from a Christian a Jew, who, as St. Epiphanius relates, translated the whole Old Testament at the time of the Emperor Hadrian. Likewise another version is called that of Symmachus, who, since he was a heretical Ebionite, or as some will have it a Samaritan, and aspired to ecclesiastical dignity, which he could not obtain, went over from the Christians to the Jews; he lived, however, in the times of the Emperor Lucius Verus, as appears from the Latin Roman preface to the seventy Interpreters. Another also is called that of Theodotion of Ephesus, who at the time of the Emperor Commodus from a heretical Marcionite became a Jewish Proselyte, as St. Jerome observes in the Preface to Daniel.

Several other Versions are in circulation; namely the Hiericuntine, which was found in the city of Jericho at the time of the Emperor Caracalla: the Nicopolitan, found at Nicopolis, at the time of the Emperor Alexander, the son of Mammea: that of Lucian the Martyr, which was found at the time of Constantine, as Eusebius relates, lib. 9. Historiae cap. 6: the Hesychian through Hesychius the presbyter:

Origen's, which is the very edition of the seventy Interpreters, but by Origen in various places now changed, now corrupted, now corrected.

But this Origen selected from all the Editions which existed in his time four principal ones, namely those of the seventy Interpreters, of Aquila, of Symmachus and of Theodotion, and reduced them into one volume in four distinct columns, so that all could be seen at the same glance and verses answered to verses and periods to periods; the copies of which edition were called Tetrapla from those four columns, as St. Jerome notes, Epist. 89. Afterwards the same Origen placed before these four editions also the Hebrew one opposite, and that in two columns, of which the former contained the Hebrew text written in Hebrew letters; the latter presented the same text, but written in Greek letters; and so from those two added columns these copies were called Hexapla. Finally he added to the former two other Greek Editions afterwards; namely the Hiericuntine and the Nicopolitan, so that there were eight columns parallel to one another, whence they were called the Octapla of Origen.

But the most celebrated of all versions is the old Latin edition, which we commonly call the Vulgate; which now seems to be entirely St. Jerome's, a few verses or parts of verses excepted; nay, it seems simply his, if you remove the faults and errors of the copyists, as Serrarius rightly notes, cap. 19. For although St. Jerome did not translate all the books of Sacred Scripture from the Hebrew or Greek: nevertheless he translated very many, and besides corrected all the other Latin versions, as he himself affirms in the Preface to the Evangelists. These things then having been premised:

I answer. That this Vulgate edition is plainly authentic and to be preferred to all the other Latin ones, as the Council of Trent decrees in session 4 in these words:

The sacred and holy Synod, considering that no small advantage may accrue to the Church of God, if it be made known from all the Latin Editions of the sacred books which are in circulation which one is to be held as authentic, has ordained and declares that this same old and Vulgate edition, which has been approved by the long use of so many ages in the Church itself, be held as authentic in public Readings, Disputations, preachings and expositions, and that no one dare or presume to reject it on any pretext.

Yet by these things the Council does not weaken the authority of the Hebrew Edition, or of the seventy Interpreters; since it makes no mention of them, but only prefers the Vulgate to the other Latin editions.

You will ask secondly, whether it is lawful for the Theologian to use the authorities and opinions of profane writers, of Philosophers, and of Poets, and of the other pagans?

I affirm. For it is right that the philosophical and natural disciplines serve Theology, the Queen of all sciences: it is also glorious to conquer the pagan Philosophers with their own arms and to reduce them, bound by their own barriers, into the captivity of faith. And this is especially urged by the fact that not only the holy Fathers, but also the Apostles employed that manner of arguing, as St. Jerome luculently demonstrates in the Epistle to Magnus the Orator, who had blamed him because he sometimes placed examples of secular literature in his little works, by which, he said, he seemed to pollute the whiteness of the Church with the filth of pagans. — Answering this accusation, St. Jerome says:

Who does not know that both in

Moses and in the volumes of the Prophets certain things were taken from the books of the Gentiles, and that Solomon both proposed some things to the Philosophers of Tyre and answered some things? Whence at the beginning of Proverbs he warns that we understand the words of prudence, and the subtleties of words, parables and obscure speech, the sayings of the wise and riddles, which are properly those of the Dialecticians and Philosophers. But also Paul the apostle used a verse of the Poet Epimenides writing to Titus, The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy bellies.... And in another Epistle, 1. ad Cor. 15., he sets down the senarius of Menander; Evil conversations corrupt good morals. And at Athens, disputing in the court of Mars, he calls Aratus as a witness, Actor. 17.³ saying: For we are also his offspring.... For he had learned from the true David to wrench the sword from the hands of enemies and to cut off the head of the most proud Goliath with his own blade. He had read in Deuteronomy the precept given by the voice of the Lord, that the head of the captive woman is to be shaved, her eyebrows, all the hairs and nails of the body are to be cut off, and so she is to be taken in marriage. What wonder then, if I too wish to make the secular wisdom, because of the beauty of her eloquence and the comeliness of her members, an Israelite from a handmaid and captive? And if there is anything in her that is dead of Idolatry, pleasure, error, lusts, do I either cut it off or shave it?

These things he pursues with equal elegance of speech, but with wonderful erudition, opening up how all the sacred Writers and Doctors sometimes made use of the letters and opinions of profane writers.

St. Basil agrees with him, Homilia 24. ad Adolescentes, urging them to imitate Daniel and Moses learning the wisdom of the Egyptians and Chaldaeans; not that they should rest in the mere knowledge of it, but that they should convert it to the worship of God and to the utility and splendor of the Church.

St. Augustine likewise subscribes to these things, lib. 2. De Doctrina Christiana, cap. 10. The Philosophers, he says, if by chance they have said some things true and suited to our faith, especially the Platonists, are not only not to be feared, but are also to be claimed by us, as from unjust possessors, for our use. He adds, however, the example of the Israelites, who carried off the golden and silver vessels of the Egyptians, leaving behind their Idols, and he concludes that since the doctrine of the Philosophers is not only filled with perverse Dogmas, but also contains the liberal disciplines more apt for the use of truth, and some true things are found among them concerning the worship of the true God himself, their gold and silver, which they did not themselves institute, but dug out of certain mines, as it were, of divine providence, which is everywhere poured out, and which they perversely and injuriously abuse for the services of demons; when the Christian separates himself in mind from their miserable fellowship, he ought to take them away from them for the just use of preaching the Gospel.

The same, ibid. cap. 18:

We ought not to flee music on account of the superstition of profane people, if we can seize from it something useful for understanding the holy Scriptures, nor be turned to their theatrical trifles, if we discuss something concerning harps and organs that may avail for desiring spiritual things. For neither should we have not learned letters, because they say their inventor was Mercury, or because they dedicated temples to justice and virtue and preferred to adore in stones what ought to be carried in the heart — on that account justice and virtue are not to be fled by us. Nay rather, whoever is a good and true Christian, let him understand that whatever truth he has found anywhere belongs to his Lord, and, confessing and acknowledging it, let him reject superstitious fictions even in sacred letters, and let him grieve for and beware of men, who, knowing God, did not glorify him as God or give thanks, etc., says St. Paul ad Rom. 1. — Whence St. Augustine, ibid. cap. 19., distinguishes a twofold kind of doctrine among the infidels: one of those things which men instituted: the other of those which they observed as already accomplished or divinely instituted: that which is according to the institution of men is partly superstitious, partly not superstitious. Whatever has been instituted by men for the worship of Idols is superstitious, etc. cap. 25. he adds:

Next are to be considered the superstitious institutions of men, that is, those instituted not with Demons, but with men themselves. For all things which are of force among men for this reason, because it pleased them among themselves that they should be of force, are institutions of men, of which some are superfluous and luxurious institutions; some convenient and necessary.

He concludes cap. 27: But those things which men have brought to light by investigating, not by instituting, but either as accomplished in times past or as divinely instituted, wherever they are learned, are not to be thought institutions of men. Thence he opens up how all the natural sciences and arts serve the understanding of Scripture and of Sacred Doctrine. Let these things said concerning Theology in general suffice.